The Role of Instruments for Screening Cognitive Function and Alzheimer's disease: A Sociological Exploration by Swallow, Julia Elizabeth
The Role of Instruments for Screening Cognitive Function 
and Alzheimer’s disease: A Sociological Exploration 
 
 
 
 
Julia Elizabeth Swallow 
 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
The University of Leeds 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2015 
2 
 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that 
appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the 
work of others. 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without 
proper acknowledgement. 
 
Julia Elizabeth Swallow  
University of Leeds  
2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank the people who worked in the memory service and the 
hospital trust, and especially the patients who were referred to the memory 
service. Without their cooperation, support and kindness, this research 
would not have been possible. I am endlessly grateful to the clinicians who 
welcomed me into a service under huge demands and constraints, and who 
granted me access to consultations. I would also like to thank the patients 
and family members who allowed me to be present during these sensitive 
and private appointments. For this I am enormously thankful.  
 
This study would also not have been possible without sponsorship from the 
ESRC and the support from my supervisors, family, friends and colleagues. 
Firstly, I owe a huge thanks to my supervisors Professor Anne Kerr and 
Professor Andrew Webster for their support, encouragement and enthusiasm 
over the three years. Their regular communication and motivation, has 
helped me enormously, and I would like to thank them both for their 
willingness to share their knowledge, and expertise, and for helping me find 
my place in STS and medical sociology.  
 
I also owe thanks to postgraduate friends from SSP in Leeds and SATSU in 
York for their support and friendship. I have also had the privilege of 
working with Dr. Kim Jamie and Dr. Stevienna De Saille whose advice has 
been invaluable at various stages of my study. I extend this gratitude to Kim 
in particular, who has gone deliberately out of her way on numerous 
occasions to give advice on starting out in academia.  
 
Finally, I owe a huge amount of gratitude to my family. I would especially 
like to thank my parents for their love and support, and my three sisters who 
have kept me laughing and motivated throughout.  
 
I am especially grateful to my partner Chris for helping me keep things in 
perspective and for his unwavering support.  
Abstract 
 
This qualitative ethnographic study examines how cognitive screening tools 
are used in clinical practice in the process of articulating a classification of 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD). An exploration of how these low-technological 
tools constitute AD is important because of their central role in detecting 
initial cognitive decline in the ‘ageing population’. The study draws upon 
fieldwork undertaken across a secondary healthcare memory service and a 
major teaching hospital in the UK. Focusing on the everyday practices and 
interactions between clinicians, patients and these technologies, the study 
shows how these tools were made provisional, and yet emerged as central 
mediators for producing knowledge about AD. I explore the uncertainties 
associated with measures of cognitive decline and consider how these were 
navigated and managed through the making of the tools as provisional 
devices. I continue by showing how the tools emerged as central mediators 
for negotiating how classification proceeded in medical practice: producing 
and reproducing professional hierarchies and identities. I also investigate 
how uncertainty was mobilised by clinicians to constitute the boundaries of 
classification; fuelled by the possibility that patients may go on to develop 
AD. Finally, I demonstrate how the adoption of the tools in the wider policy 
terrain translated into everyday clinical practice; increased efforts to 
quantify cognitive decline at earlier stages, produced uncertainty around 
patient futures. I reflect on how the making of these tools as provisional 
devices, relied upon and resulted in the portability of these devices and, in 
turn, constituted AD. Portability highlights the temporal and spatial aspects 
of classification processes involved in diagnosis/prognosis, as well as 
patient and professional identities and autonomy. I conclude by considering 
the implications of these findings for the diagnosis and management of 
patients with cognitive decline and AD locally in the clinic, and with respect 
to managing the ‘ageing population’. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
In 1906, Alois Alzheimer described the ‘peculiar case’ of Auguste D; a case 
that represents the first known patient to be described with what is now 
termed Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (see Alzheimer’s Society, 2015d). AD is 
used to label individuals with symptoms of cognitive decline (memory loss 
being a significant factor of AD), not attributable to normal ageing 
processes
1
 (Ibid.). Alzheimer’s disease is a progressive disease and is also 
the most common form of dementia; dementia is the end stage of 
accumulated pathology (Alzheimer’s Society, 2015d). The World Health 
Organisation (2015) defines dementia
2
 as, 
 
“A syndrome – usually of a chronic or progressive nature – in which 
there is deterioration in cognitive function (i.e. the ability to process 
thought) beyond what might be expected from normal ageing. It 
affects memory, thinking, orientation, comprehension, calculation, 
learning capacity, language, and judgement…the impairment in 
cognitive function is commonly accompanied, and occasionally 
preceded, by deterioration in emotional control, social behaviour, or 
motivation.”  
 
Dementia of the Alzheimer’s disease type is however, a complex condition 
to diagnose and treat, as there are no known causes of the condition, and a 
definitive diagnosis can only be made at post-mortem examination (Hardy, 
2006). Furthermore, symptoms associated with AD are difficult to 
determine from the presentations of normal ageing (Gubrium, 1986). Age 
however, is known to be the greatest risk factor for developing the condition 
(Alzheimer’s Society, 2015d) and subsequently, with the advent of an 
                                                          
1
 The term was initially used to describe decline in cognitive function in individuals below 
the age of 65. However, there is now a categorical distinction between early onset (30-65 
years) AD and late onset AD (over the age of 65) (Alzheimer’s Society, 2015d). This thesis 
focuses attention on the process of diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease in individual’s aged 65 
and over. 
2 The World Health Organisation does not provide a definition of AD more specifically 
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‘ageing population’, social policy (see Department of Health 2012 ‘The 
Prime Minister’s Challenge on Dementia’), and medical research and 
practice in the UK (see Alzheimer’s Research UK, 2015b and Medical 
Research Councils Neurosciences Mental Health Board, 2013) has firmly 
cemented the disease as a site for critical attention.  
Expansion of AD in the ‘ageing population’  
 
The ‘ageing population’ pertains to an increase in individuals over the age 
of 65 (see Rajah, 2009). According to the Alzheimer’s Society (2015c), 
there are currently estimated to be 850,000 people with dementia in the UK, 
of which approximately 67% have been diagnosed with dementia of the 
Alzheimer’s disease type. In accordance with the ‘ageing population’, this 
figure is set to exceed one million by the year 2025 (Ibid.). The expected 
increase in prevalence of the disease, presents a set of unique challenges for 
healthcare practitioners, family members and patients. These challenges 
range from increased pressure on primary care GP services and memory 
services in terms of referral rates, to the challenges facing family members 
in terms of care, at a time when the NHS is undergoing significant economic 
and political change
3
. Financially, the cost of dementia overall to the UK 
economy is estimated to reach £26 billion per annum (Alzheimer’s Society, 
2015b)
4
.  
                                                          
3
 The Health and Social Care Act introduced by the Coalition government in 2012 marks 
one of the most significant changes to the structure of the NHS in its 65-year history. 
Primary care trusts have been replaced with Clinical Commissioning Groups, which control 
the financing of local services; commissioning has become a process of competitive 
tendering to both voluntary and private sectors (See Department of Health, 2015; Kings 
Fund, 2015). The Alzheimer’s Society raised its own concerns with regards to the 
implementation of the bill, particularly in relation to the role of GPs as commissioners. The 
Alzheimer’s Society argues that there is a lack of awareness and understanding of dementia 
amongst GPs. As the role of GPs widens to become part of the commissioning process, the 
consequences of this lack of knowledge could mean that the needs of patients and their 
carers are not met. The organisation recommends that GPs increase their understanding of 
dementia for both their clinical and commissioning capacity to meet the challenges 
associated with the expected growth in the number of people predicted to develop dementia 
(see ‘Contribution to the Health and Social Care Bill Listening Exercise’, Alzheimer’s 
Society, 2011). 
4
 Organisations such as the Alzheimer’s Society only provide statistics for those living with 
dementia, they do not specify between types of dementia in their statistical estimations. 
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In order to manage the growth of AD specifically, and dementia overall in 
line with the advent of an ‘ageing population’, medical and scientific 
research and healthcare policy has responded accordingly. Alzheimer’s 
Research UK in its ‘defeat dementia campaign’ sets out to increase research 
investment by £100 million over the course of five years (Alzheimer’s 
Research UK, 2015c). These funds will be utilised to drive research output 
and increase the number of researchers within the organisation by 50% by 
2020; encourage international collaboration and open access of intellectual 
property and regulation, and translate research into treatment in order to 
improve the quality of life for those living with dementia.  
 
In healthcare policy, reports such as ‘Dementia UK: The full report’, by 
Kings College London and the London School of Economics (2007), 
outlines the impact and economic costs of dementia in the UK. It sets out 
the aim in policy to make dementia a national challenge, whilst focussing on 
the structure of health and social care more generally. More recently, the 
‘Prime Minister’s Challenge on Dementia’ published in 2012, highlights the 
potential impact of the ‘ageing population’ on the role of healthcare 
practitioners, care workers, allied health professionals, non-governmental 
organisations (NGO’s), and non-profit organisations (Department of Health, 
2012a, 2015b). The second phase of the Prime Minister’s ‘dementia 
challenge’ (2015-2020) which is currently being implemented, sets out to 
further improve dementia care and support for patients, families and carers. 
It also aims to advance innovation in research into dementia and other 
neurodegenerative diseases (Department of Health, 2015b). Setting out to 
equip the population with knowledge and resources to manage this ‘ageing 
population’ is considered crucial by the Prime Minister (PM) to ensure 
quality clinical practice, and health and social care. At a clinical level, this 
equates to ensuring more accurate and earlier diagnosis, prognosis and 
treatment of AD, and dementia more broadly.  
 
As well as being a national concern, dementia is also a global concern. The 
G8 dementia summit held in London, UK in 2013 set out the aim to 
‘develop co-ordinated global action on dementia’. Discussions focussed on, 
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‘improving life and care for people affected by dementia and their carers, 
preventing and delaying dementia, and social adaptation to global ageing 
and dementia’ (see ‘The Dementia Challenge, G8 Summit’, Department of 
Health, 2013). During the summit, plans were unveiled to significantly 
increase the amount spent on dementia research to follow the ‘global 
envoys’ on HIV and AIDS and on Climate Change’ (Department of Health, 
2013). Investment in social and healthcare resources and technological and 
intellectual resources to manage the growth of AD in the ageing population, 
is subsequently the focus of debate in the UK and globally. 
Diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease 
 
In terms of diagnosing the disease, medical and scientific research and 
healthcare policy in the UK, is currently being driven towards efforts to 
detect the condition in its earliest stages. According to the Alzheimer’s 
Society (2015c), approximately only 44% of individuals in the UK living 
with the symptoms of AD have received a formal diagnosis. As a result, 
developing methods, which promote diagnosis rates overall, and efforts to 
find a cause, cure and treatment for the disease at earlier stages, drives both 
medical research and healthcare policy (see Dubois et al., 2007; Department 
of Health, 2012, 2015; Zetterberg, 2011). Biomarker technologies in 
particular, which aim to detect the earliest stages of AD, are the focus of 
current research developments worldwide (see Dubois et al., 2007; 
Alzheimer’s Research UK, 2015b). In healthcare policy, initiatives such as 
the National Dementia Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
Framework (CQUIN) in secondary healthcare, and the Enhanced Service 
Specification for Facilitating Timely Diagnosis and Support for People with 
Dementia 2015/16’ in primary care, aim to financially award NHS services 
for increasing referral and subsequent diagnosis rates in the clinic
5
 (NHS 
England, 2015a, 2015b).  
 
                                                          
5
 Introducing targets to detect dementia in clinical practice has been met with controversy 
amongst practising GPs (see Brunet, 2014).  
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Despite current research programmes and healthcare policy initiatives, 
which aim to increase diagnosis rates overall, and early diagnosis more 
specifically, the act of diagnosing the disease in the clinic remains 
uncertain. As I will explore in more detail in Chapter Two, the disease 
category of AD and its nosological framework are complex, which makes 
diagnosing the disease difficult. 
 
The following diagram depicts the number of pathways through which 
patients are assessed and referred to specialist old-age psychiatric memory 
service.
6
 
Pathways into Specialist Old-Age Psychiatric Memory Service 
   
                                                          
6
 This diagram refers only to the memory service included in this research and I am 
therefore not suggesting that this represents the case of all memory services across the UK. 
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In the clinic, instruments for screening cognitive function
7
 are the tools used 
to detect the initial stages of cognitive decline associated with AD. These 
low-technological tools assess and review levels of cognitive function 
associated with diseases such as AD (Ismail et al., 2010). The tools used in 
the memory service, and of pertinence to this research, are the Montreal 
Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) and the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive 
Examination 111 (ACE 111). These tools are open access and their 
reliability and validity in clinical practice has been well researched (see 
Nasreddine et al., 2005; Mathuranath et al., 2005; Mioshi et al., 2006; 
Ismail et al., 2010; Newman and Feldman, 2011). Cognitive screening tools 
have however, been criticised for their cultural insensitivity and with 
insensitivity to factors including age, education and socioeconomic status 
known to affect patients’ scores (see Crum et al., 1993; Parker and Philip, 
2004). The tools also enact particular representations of class since a 
number of questions on the ACE 111, for example, require patients to 
understand the meaning of words including ‘marsupial’ and ‘nautical’; 
categorising only those individuals who have specific levels of academic, 
educational attainment. The MoCA and the ACE 111 are also culturally 
specific, requiring individuals to recall previous UK Prime Ministers and 
US Presidents. The ACE 111 is also a time consuming test requiring high 
levels of concentration; difficult to maintain if the patient is struggling to 
answer the questions. As one clinician exclaimed during an observation of a 
team meeting, ‘it’s no wonder he [the patient] fell asleep, do you know how 
long it [the ACE 111] takes?’ These tools have therefore been subject to 
criticism both across psychological and psychiatric research and as shown in 
the above quote, more tacitly amongst clinicians in the memory service, as 
this thesis will go on to demonstrate.  
 
An additional tool of pertinence to this research is the AMTS as adopted in 
frameworks which govern diagnosis rates in secondary healthcare including 
the National Dementia CQUIN. The Department of Health introduced the 
National Dementia CQUIN In an effort to standardise screening practices 
                                                          
7
 The terms ‘instruments for screening cognitive function’ and ‘cognitive screening tools’ 
are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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and improve the identification of dementia in acute hospital settings. The 
initiative aims to identify patients with dementia and assess levels of 
cognitive function to prompt relevant referral and follow up after leaving 
hospital (Department of Health, 2012). The framework was developed in 
response to widespread concern regarding the care of people with dementia 
in general hospital, including length of stay and inaccuracy of clinical 
coding (see Department of Health, 2012 report ‘Using the Commissioning 
for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework guidance on new 
national goals for 2012-2013’). In brief, the framework relies on the use of a 
particular instrument for screening cognitive function; the Abbreviated 
Mental Test (AMT) to identify those who may have pathological cognitive 
decline associated with Alzheimer’s disease and overall dementia8 . The 
AMTS is a brief 10-item scale for the detection of pathological cognitive 
decline. Introduced in 1972 by Hodkinson, this screening test was 
developed by geriatricians to be used routinely within secondary care 
hospital settings (Woodford and George, 2007).  
 
The AMTS, MoCA and ACE 111 are used alongside diagnostic 
technologies including Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and/or 
Computerised Tomography (CT) scans, and blood tests to rule out 
pathologies associated with other diseases such as cancer. Instruments for 
screening cognitive function play a central role in detecting initial cognitive 
decline. They are therefore important devices for navigating the complex 
terrain of diagnosing AD during initial consultations in the clinic, and 
navigating the challenges associated with an ageing population, as 
healthcare services are dealing with an increasing number of diagnostic 
referrals. 
 
Whilst these tools are low-technological, and complex; time consuming, 
culturally insensitive, and enact particular representations of class, they are 
pervasive technologies across healthcare for detecting the initial stages of 
                                                          
8 Patients aged 75 and over admitted to an Acute Medical Unit (AMU) are assessed 
using an AMTS and referred to primary care for further testing if they score 7 or 
less/10. 
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cognitive decline. Given their low-technological and seemingly mundane 
status, the sociological significance of these tools is perhaps questionable, 
particularly when comparing them with the central focus in Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), on technological innovation for producing 
knowledge about disease. However, whilst these low-technological tools 
may appear to lack the sophistication associated with innovative 
technologies, which dominate the critical attention of STS, as I show 
throughout this thesis, these tools are in fact far from mundane. These tools 
remain the only technologies for assessing cognitive decline in initial 
consultations, and therefore play important roles in producing the realities 
of cognitive decline that could be associated with AD. They are important 
devices in the organisation of the memory service; they emerge as central 
mediators for producing knowledge about AD, and for negotiating the 
uncertainties inherent to diagnosing the disease, particularly since there 
remains no cure and there is a lack of treatment options available.  
 
I  explore the role of these low-technological tools in everyday clinical 
practice yet, I also critically examine the ways in which these technologies 
and diagnosis overall, are governed in initiatives such as the  National 
Dementia Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) Framework 
aiming to increase diagnosis rates and detect cognitive impairment at earlier 
stages. Subsequently, it is important to distinguish between technologies of 
governance such as the CQUIN and the tools used in everyday clinical 
practice. In doing so, I demonstrate the practices involved as the CQUIN is 
adopted in everyday clinical practice and elucidate the ways in which these 
technologies of governance are approached and performed by healthcare 
practitioners involved in the diagnosis process (c.f. Latimer, 2000). These 
technologies of governance differ from everyday technologies in clinical 
practice and have the potential to reaffirm the role of medicine as 
‘spectacle’ (Ibid.). Medicine as ‘spectacle’ has the potential to shift the ways 
in which the patient is approached in the hospital setting, the role of the 
professional, the tacit working practices of clinicians, the ways in which 
cognitive screening tools are negotiated and articulated, and subsequently 
the diagnosis process. As a result, I examine both the everyday role of 
14 
 
cognitive screening tools in the memory service alongside the frameworks 
through with diagnosis is governed: the CQUIN as a technology of 
governance is critically analysed. As this thesis demonstrates more broadly, 
the sociological significance of these technologies emerges as their 
operation in practice as a whole is investigated: bridging current 
understandings regarding age, diagnosis, and medical practice. Overall, I 
deploy the analytical gaze to that which is ‘taken for granted’ (Woolgar and 
Neyland, 2013). 
 
It is timely to explore how clinicians navigate and negotiate the complexity 
associated with diagnosing AD locally in the clinic, and with respect to 
managing the ageing population more broadly. To do so, I investigate both 
the role of these cognitive screening tools in the clinic, and as adopted in 
initiatives such as the National Dementia CQUIN. I elucidate how the tools 
are used by clinicians to make sense of diagnosis in the clinic, and for 
family members and patients struggling to cope with increasing demands. In 
what follows, I will briefly outline the ways in which AD as a complex 
disease category has been explored within medical sociology, STS, 
philosophy and ageing literatures, which I develop in more detail in Chapter 
Two. 
Previous Research 
 
Alzheimer’s disease has previously been the subject of academic attention 
in sociology, philosophy, anthropology and STS; each discussion drawing 
on different methods and frameworks to critically examine the emergence of 
AD from its inception in 1906. Overall, the majority of these studies can be 
categorised as approaching two distinctive yet interrelated aspects of the 
condition. First, a number of studies investigate the experiences of 
individuals with a diagnosis of dementia in terms of how care and 
caregiving practices are approached and performed (Post, 1995; Kitwood, 
1997; Wilkinson, 2002; Adams and Gardiner, 2005). Concern for 
preservation of personhood and ‘self’ in approaches towards care, drive the 
core interests of authors such as Post (1995) and Kitwood (1997). Yet, in 
15 
 
response to the claim that a more person-centred structure of care fails to 
recognise the role of carers and family members, a more ‘relationship-
centred’ approach has since been suggested (Adams and Gardiner, 2005). 
This approach takes into consideration the experiences of individuals with 
dementia, informal carer(s), and one or more health and social care 
perspectives (Adams and Gardiner, 2005). It highlights the extent to which 
the experiences of the dementia patient are integrated with that of their 
carer, and was developed in response to the absence of the carer in previous 
discussions on care practices (Ibid.). Focussing attention on the experiences 
of individuals with a diagnosis in relation to preservation of ‘self’, 
corresponds with literature across medical sociology and ageing studies. 
Research in these areas has explored the embodied identity and lived 
experiences of individuals with a diagnosis of dementia (see Twigg, 2010; 
Twigg and Buse, 2013), and in turn, the (re)emergence of senility, which 
shapes the ways in which individuals experience the ageing process as a 
discursive construct between unsuccessful and successful ageing processes 
(see Gilleard and Higgs, 2010, 2013; Higgs and Gilleard, 2014). 
 
Second, a proliferation of studies in philosophy, medical sociology and 
STS, critically examines AD as a diagnostic category. Scholars writing in 
the tradition of social constructivism, discuss the case of Alzheimer’s in 
relation to a series of ‘historical moments’ interpreted in specific ways 
which have shaped current understandings of the disease (Gaines and 
Whitehouse, 2006). It is argued that the disease is a socio-historical and a 
socio-cultural construction of which the difficulty in determining normal 
from pathological ageing processes has been a key factor of analysis 
(Gubrium, 1986; Lock, 2005; Gaines and Whitehouse, 2006). Linked to the 
idea that AD is a socially constructed disease criterion, the expansion of the 
category to incorporate the earliest stages of the disease (Mild Cognitive 
Impairment), intersects across wider debates around the medicalisation and 
biomedicalisation of ageing, and the difficulty in determining early stages of 
AD from ‘normal’ ageing processes (Estes and Binney, 1989; Kaufman et 
al., 2004; Whitehouse and Moody, 2006; Moreira, May and Bond, 2009).  
16 
 
The emergence of AD as a public health priority and its expansion as a 
diagnostic category to incorporate MCI has also been extensively discussed 
by Peters and Katz (2015). Peters and Katz (2013) not only highlight the 
economic, political and social processes through which the category of AD 
emerged and has since been reconfigured to incorporate labels such as MCI, 
their work captures the ways in which ageing as a set of processes is being 
managed and (re)constructed more broadly. In the special issue of Dementia 
titled ‘Voices from the Field: Expert Reflections on Mild Cognitive 
Impairment’, Peters and Katz (2015) draw on data from interviews with 
leading scientists and researchers to explore MCI as a diagnostic 
classification. The authors found that these experts ‘produced as many 
questions as they did answers’ particularly around the meaning of MCI and 
its validity as a diagnostic category (pp. 285). The authors thus highlight the 
need to approach MCI with both care and caution for understanding how the 
label relates to ideas around the ageing brain. Developing the crux of 
arguments made in the field of social studies of ageing (see Gilleard and 
Higgs, 2010, 2013; Higgs and Gilleard, 2014), as chronological age 
becomes less of a marker by which successful ageing is constructed (given 
the increasing ageing population), other standards or markers enact ideas 
around what it means to age successfully, of which memory loss has 
become a significant factor: ‘cognitive health has joined physical health as a 
key indicator of successful ageing’ (Peters and Katz, 2015: 285). Peters and 
Katz (2013) summarise the crux of their arguments in the following 
question, ‘how can we disentangle the public or ‘neuro’ culture of the 
ageing brain and our anxieties about growing older from the sciences that 
aim to identify risk, assess cognitive status, and treat and care for people 
with dementia’? 
 
There remains a substantial degree of uncertainty around what MCI is, and 
what it actually means, despite the fact that the label has gained traction 
within scientific research, medical practice and public health, to describe 
and/or explain the earliest stages of cognitive decline. Expectations for 
maintaining, improving or enhancing the ageing brain have led to the notion 
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that MCI as a predictor of brain ill-health has an important role to play when 
negotiating the ‘successes’ of the ageing process.  
 
Focus of attention on the earliest stages of the disease within current 
medical and scientific development, has also been criticised as the 
proliferation of technological innovation such as biomarker technologies in 
research, has reignited debates around the prevailing biomedical model for 
managing AD. First, it has been argued that this model fails to recognise the 
socio-cultural dimensions of diagnosis, and second, that it fails to privilege 
care as a viable alternative for managing the disease, particularly when it is 
difficult to categorise overall (Chaufan, Hollister and Fox, 2012; Cuijpers, 
Lente, Boenink and Moors, 2014; Cuijpers and Lente, 2014). Lock (2013) is 
especially critical of increased efforts in biomedicine to prevent AD and 
detect cognitive decline at earlier stages. Lock (2013) maps the shift in 
Alzheimer’s research from focusing on reversing the symptoms of the 
condition to preventing its onset. This shift is grounded on the conception 
that prevention strategies will lead to an improved understanding of AD’s 
aetiology. Yet, as Lock shows throughout her work, uncertainty with 
regards the aetiology of AD prevails, despite increased attention on disease 
prevention in research and policy. 
 
Lock (2013) highlights the dilemmas emergent from, and embedded in, 
efforts to prevent Alzheimer’s disease through early detection of pre-
symptomatic changes in the brain in healthy individuals. In doing so, Lock 
engages with ideas around biomedical uncertainty regarding complex 
neurological disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease of which there is no 
known cause or cure, despite increasing financial investment in medical and 
scientific research. As Lock (2013) contends, AD ‘is the most commonly 
diagnosed subcategory of dementia [and] proves to be an elusive 
phenomenon’ (pp. 11). Lock focusses on the uncertainties associated with 
attempting to detect AD as scientists remain committed to understanding the 
disease within biomedical and neurogenetic frameworks.  
 
18 
 
In doing so, Lock (2013) argues that there are inherent ‘uncertainties 
associated with predicting the future by means of biomarker testing’, which 
produces anxieties for patients (pp. 98). Lock subsequently investigates how 
individuals make sense of genetic risk demonstrating that despite the 
dominance of biomedical narratives regarding risk and disease progression, 
selfhood and care dominates patients’ concerns. Deconstructing the 
uncertainties and ambiguities inherent to diagnosing AD, efforts to detect 
AD at earlier stages, and the prevailing biomedical and neurogenetic lens 
through which AD is positioned, is the crux of Lock’s work. 
 
Taken together, focus of attention on AD in previous research, shows how 
the emergence of the disease category, and expansion of interest in the 
disease, has triggered critical debates in two distinctive ways. First, in 
relation to the experiences of individuals with a diagnosis in terms of 
identity, self and material practices of care, and second, in relation to the 
diagnostic categorisation of AD as a socio-historical construction bound 
temporally, spatially and historically. Whilst the contribution of existing 
themes found in previous literatures is indisputable, they can be subjected to 
criticism. Despite the theme of complexity being at the centre of debates 
around the disease category of AD and its social, cultural and historical 
construction, the processes through which this complexity is navigated and 
managed in everyday, routine practice requires further in-depth exploration. 
Furthermore, the technologies, which play a central role in detecting initial 
cognitive decline associated with AD, is an under researched area within 
medical sociology, STS and ageing literatures. Whilst low-technological 
cognitive screening tools which pervade clinical practice have been 
subjected to rigorous studies testing their reliability and validity in the fields 
of psychiatry and psychology (see Jitapunkul et al., 1991; Ihl et al., 1992, 
Tombaugh and McIntyre, 1992; Crum et al., 2003; Claes et al., 2004; 
Davey and Jamieson, 2004; Parker and Phillip, 2004; Mitchell, 2008; 
Nieuwenhuis-Mark, 2010; Marioni et al., 2011), their role in the clinic from 
a sociological perspective has yet to be explored. Furthermore, whilst 
studies with an STS perspective such as Moreira (2010), considers how 
memory loss emerges and is managed in UK memory clinics, an 
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investigation of the role of these particular technologies used in this process, 
remains an interesting area for exploration in sociological research.  
 
Focussing on cognitive screening tools is fruitful for elucidating both how a 
diagnosis of AD is made sense of in the clinic, and on the potential impact 
that the ageing population might have on existing practice. In addition, an 
investigation into how these technologies operate in the clinic for bridging 
current understandings around age, diagnosis and medical practice, is 
important since there has been no substantial sociological attention given to 
how complexity is resolved, how discursive constructs around age and AD 
are handled in the clinic, and whether the expansion of the disease in an 
‘ageing population’ has shifted and (re)configured current practice. Whilst 
ageing studies have investigated the re-emergence of senility and the ageing 
process as a constructed success or failure (see Gilleard and Higgs, 2010, 
2013), given that age is a risk factor for developing AD, the effects of these 
discursive entanglements on the diagnosis process, would be an interesting 
dimension for exploration; absent from previous literature.   
 
 
Additionally, although the experiences of patients diagnosed with dementia 
overall, and AD more specifically, occupies a dominant position in recent 
sociological literature (see Twigg, 2010; Twigg and Buse, 2013), research 
which takes into account the perspectives of professionals, particularly in 
the decision making process remains to be explored in-depth. Clinicians are, 
as highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, under increasing pressure to 
refer individuals for assessment, and to prepare the diagnostic pathway for 
patients in an ‘ageing population’ and changing healthcare environment. 
Reflecting on instruments for screening cognitive function embedded in 
healthcare practice and exploring that which goes unnoticed, is also 
productive when there is a plethora of studies in STS on innovation and its 
myriad of uncertainties. 
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Research Outline 
 
A study which investigates how AD is classified through the use of 
cognitive screening tools enables a closer look at the world(s) of AD within 
and outside the confines of the clinic which thus far, has have gone 
relatively unnoticed in debates regarding AD and diagnosis. This research 
develops an ethnographic approach to explore how Alzheimer’s disease is 
diagnosed in everyday clinical practice. At the intersections of medical 
sociology and STS, I investigate the process of diagnosis by centring 
cognitive screening tools as agentic devices for producing knowledge about 
cognitive decline, and analysing their operation in practice. Attending to the 
role of these technologies within complex socio-material practices and 
socio-technical environments (Berg, 1996; Mol, 1998, 2002a, 2002b; 
Latimer et al., 2006; Latimer, 2013), enables a more nuanced perspective of 
what occurs ‘on the ground’; beyond the taken for granted status of these 
pervasive technologies since they play a central role in the medical decision 
making process (c.f. Woolgar and Neyland, 2013). In effect, I turn the 
complexities of an AD diagnosis into matters of the everyday and I 
investigate how clinicians
9
 navigate the practices of classification in the 
clinic, identifying how AD is made up or ‘done’ (Garfinkel, 1967; Latimer, 
2013). AD as a complex interplay of practices, which ‘make up’ diagnosis is 
worthwhile for exploration particularly when considering the extent to 
which diagnosis is a social process and AD is a nosologically complex and 
evolving phenomenon. This has the potential to shape debates around 
current diagnostic practice within the context of the ‘ageing population’, 
and the healthcare challenges it poses. In the following section of the 
chapter, I shall explain my aims and objectives for the thesis and outline the 
remaining seven chapters. 
Current study 
 
I explored both the role of cognitive screening tools in the clinic in 
everyday, routine practice, and their role as adopted in the National 
                                                          
9
 I use this term to refer to a wide range of clinical staff and not simply medical doctors.  
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Dementia CQUIN. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Four, the 
current study was situated within a secondary healthcare UK memory 
service and a large teaching hospital trust in a metropolitan city. I conducted 
an ethnographically inspired study working with two memory clinic teams 
within the memory service across two different geographical areas of the 
city, an elderly medicine department within the teaching hospital and 
informatics department of a teaching hospital trust. I observed fourteen 
hours’ worth of team meetings and consultations, and interviewed twenty-
one healthcare professionals and two information managers. Whilst I 
observed clinicians from two memory clinic teams within one memory 
service this is not a comparative study. I set out to capture the interests of 
the memory service more broadly, rather than exploring the subtleties of 
difference between approach and practice across teams. Furthermore, I did 
not have access to observe memory nurses across both teams and as such a 
comparative study would have been imbalanced. The overarching concern 
of this thesis was to explore professional practice regarding the use of 
cognitive screening tools overall, as opposed to drawing attention to 
differences in practice and protocol across the two teams. Throughout my 
thesis, I explore the interactions across healthcare practice however, I do not 
focus solely on the patient-professional dyad in isolation, rather; this 
interaction is only a part of the whole and not the whole itself. The 
interaction between professionals and patients is only one aspect of the 
diagnostic process. With this in mind, I critically analyse both the micro 
processes of the clinic, and the adoption of the tools at a macro level in the 
wider policy terrain for managing the ageing population. 
 
My primary focus for this research is on how clinicians use cognitive 
screening tools to navigate complexity in the diagnostic decision-making 
process. By recognising the constitutive role of medical technologies in 
healthcare (Berg, 1996; Mol, 1998, 2002a), I am interested in how the tools 
establish interactions, and mediate working practices across the situated 
contexts in which AD is ‘done’ (Garfinkel, 1967). Exploring how these 
tools produce and reproduce hierarchies, I also describe and analyse how 
clinicians approach these tools, explore who adjudicates on their use, where 
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they are adopted and by whom, across the spatiality and temporality of the 
decision-making process. Overall, this means I illuminate the multiple ways 
in which complexity is made sense of for producing knowledge about 
disease both within the arena of the clinic and the wider policy terrain. I am 
particularly interested in the use of cognitive screening tools within 
moments of performance and interaction (Goffman, 1959; Garfinkel, 1967; 
Mol, 1998; 2002a). 
 
In line with my ethnographic approach, I do not ascribe AD a pre-defined 
ontological status and I abandon a priori knowledge, regarding disease 
classification. As I demonstrate in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, I hope 
to contribute to the literature on constitution or enactment of disease in 
practice through technologies in the clinic (Berg, 1996; Mol, 1998, 2002a; 
Latimer, 2013), risk and complexity in healthcare (Estes and Binney, 1989; 
Rose, 1998; Conrad, 2005), professional organisation literature (Latimer, 
2000; Latimer, 2004) and the ageing process (Gilleard and Higgs, 2010, 
2011, 2013; Higgs and Gilleard, 2014). However, I extend this literature in a 
number of significant ways adding to existing understandings of ageing, 
diagnosis and medical practice. First, I extend previous literature by 
demonstrating the power of mundane technologies as agents in the process 
of diagnosis. Second, I explore how the tools produce and reproduce 
professional power relations (hierarchies and identities) within a complex 
distribution of practice on a micro level. I also investigate the wider 
distributions of power with respect to the ageing population, through 
initiatives such as the National dementia CQUIN. In doing so, I highlight 
the temporalities of classification for producing knowledge about cognitive 
decline and AD. Third, I extend existing literature on ageing and risk, by 
exploring how the tools are implicitly involved in the construction of 
particular discursive representations and expectations of age and ageing, 
which has important implications for how diagnosis is approached in the 
clinic. Overall, I demonstrate how AD is a site for critical attention by 
intertwining social (senility, ageing, classification boundaries, risk), medical 
(the growth of scientific knowledge, screening, MCI), and political (case 
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finding, early diagnosis, increasing diagnosis rates, policy frameworks, 
screening) developments. 
Aims and Structure of the Thesis 
 
In this thesis, I shall answer one main research question guided by three 
sub-questions in order to critically examine the role of instruments for 
screening cognitive function in constituting cognitive decline and AD, 
within and beyond the confines of the clinic. My overarching research 
question asks, how do instruments for screening cognitive function 
constitute Alzheimer’s disease at various sites of clinical and policy 
practice?  
 
The following three sub-questions guide my empirical chapters –  
 
How do clinicians use instruments for screening cognitive function 
to navigate and manage the uncertainties associated with measures 
of cognitive decline and articulate a formal classification of AD? 
 
How do clinicians use instruments for screening cognitive function 
to negotiate the boundaries of classification in the organisation of 
clinical practice towards the production of AD diagnosis? 
 
How do increased efforts to detect cognitive decline as laid out in 
the National Dementia CQUIN translate into clinical practice in the 
process of classifying AD? 
 
In the following chapter, I will explore the clinical history of AD before 
continuing by engaging with key debates in medical sociology, STS, 
anthropology and philosophy. Debates within these literatures of relevance 
to this thesis, investigate AD as a socially, culturally and historically 
constructed phenomenon from its inception in 1906, to its establishment as a 
clinical diagnostic category in 1984, revised in 2011. I therefore identify 
opportunities to build on in current research as highlighted in this chapter, 
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and extend current debates particularly around how technologies operate in 
practice within a complex diagnostic process.  
 
In Chapter Three, I outline the theoretical foundations of the thesis. I draw 
predominantly on an approach that demonstrates the constitutive role of 
medical technologies (Berg, 1996; Mol, 1998, 2002a), and adopt 
ethnomethodological sensibilities (Garfinkel, 1967) for exploring everyday 
healthcare practice. I do not however, remain wholly committed to these 
perspectives and I engage in theoretical pluralism or conceptual scaffolding 
(Goffman, 1959), by drawing on a wide range of concepts and ideas from a 
number of different perspectives bearing in mind that: ‘scaffolds, after all, 
are to build other things with, and should be erected with an eye to taking 
them down’ (pp. 246).  Following this, Chapter Four comprises an outline 
of the practicalities and methods of my research in terms of gaining NHS 
ethical approval, the fieldwork process, data analysis, and my approach to 
ethnography, including a broad overview of the theoretical positions on 
which my methodology is grounded. 
 
Chapters Five to Seven outline and present the key findings of my data. I 
begin analysis in Chapter Five by investigating the role of cognitive 
screening tools in the clinician-patient interaction. I demonstrate that within 
the organisation of the memory service, the tools are approached and 
performed as provisional devices by clinicians, for navigating and managing 
the complexities associated with measures of cognitive decline. The 
articulation work in the clinic is performed in order to navigate and manage 
three core elements of uncertainty associated with measures of cognitive 
decline. However, at the same time that I demonstrate what I describe as the 
‘making of provisionality’, through the mediation and manipulation 
practices in the clinic, the tools also emerge as central mediators for 
producing knowledge about AD, within a complex distribution of medical 
practice. Within the organisation of the memory service, approaching and 
therefore performing the tools as provisional devices renders them portable 
as they shift across different settings. In doing so, they produce and 
reproduce professional hierarchies, confirming the idea that medical 
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technologies are implicitly involved in maintaining power relations in 
healthcare (Berg, 1996). However, as they shift across different spaces, the 
tools also align with what is socially and culturally significant for 
negotiating classification, and memory nurses are able to craft a unique 
space for responsibility within the MDT. The final section of the chapter 
demonstrates an important feature of the co-production of cognitive decline: 
the informal or ad hoc practices of the clinic are balanced alongside the 
formal quantified element of the technologies. I investigate how this co-
production renders the tools portable for proceeding with classification. 
Overall, the chapter is grounded in a broader discussion around negotiating 
uncertainty, and professional and patient identities and hierarchies. 
 
In Chapter Six, I explore how clinicians use cognitive screening tools to 
constitute the boundaries of classification, performed in response to the 
enactment of risk and complexity in the clinic. I demonstrate that 
uncertainty is mobilised by clinicians where patients are kept on for review, 
which is fuelled more broadly by the possibility that patients may go on to 
develop AD. This is driven by a borderline score on a cognitive screening 
tool, and patients are deferred to psychology. The space for deferral 
(Latimer, 2013) is simultaneously constituted through efforts to manage 
risk, and the expectations around the field of psychology in terms of 
specialist expertise and experience for resolving the borderlines. This 
deferral space is performed as both a technological and organisational 
endeavour. Overall, given the lack of diagnostic certainty around AD and 
treatment options for the disease, the space for deferral mobilises action and 
performs hope; uncertainty is utilised and valued. In the second section of 
the chapter, I extend the theme of risk and risk thinking, to demonstrate a 
further example of the borderlines of classification: the label MCI. Whilst 
MCI ‘depends on the language of risk’ (Webster, 2002: 447), it also 
depends on the extent to which the label constitutes particular discursive 
constructs around ageing, and the ageing process as a success or failure. The 
expansion of the disease to incorporate MCI is therefore involved in the 
construction of expectations around age, ageing and AD; it impacts how 
clinicians constitute the boundaries of the disease and label normal ageing, 
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MCI and AD. In this sense, the tools both enact risk through a borderline 
score mobilised by clinicians, but also produce risk and uncertainty for 
patients faced with a borderline condition.  
 
In Chapter Seven, I extend this theme of risk, and explore how instruments 
for screening cognitive function are adopted in policy frameworks such as 
the National Dementia CQUIN, where I analyse how the framework 
translates into everyday clinical practice. The CQUIN is constitutive of 
wider networks of power in the organisation of healthcare, which is 
demonstrated by its aim to govern clinical practice (Rose, 1998). However, I 
extend this body of literature by reflecting on the extent to which the 
CQUIN shifts the temporalities of classification as it enacts the patient 
pathway. I engage with literature on the sociology of expectations, which 
demonstrates that the realisation of future(s) depends on particular 
representations of temporality in the present, which shifts as the CQUIN is 
translated in practice. I highlight the ways in which the CQUIN shifts how 
patients conceive the nature of diagnosis in the clinic, as it is implicitly 
involved in constructing patients’ expectations around a future with AD, 
which produces as opposed to resolves the uncertainties in the clinic. It also 
reifies the linearity of the patient pathway, producing particular 
uncertainties and challenges around the practicalities of healthcare, 
including resource allocation for managing the ageing population. I 
conclude this thesis by arguing that the conceptual framework of portability 
developed throughout this thesis, is necessary for handling complexity in 
the context of the clinic, and in relation to managing the ‘ageing population’ 
more broadly. I also discuss the implications of these findings for current 
diagnosis and management of patients with cognitive decline and AD.  
 
Taken together, the chapters aim to reveal the situated ontologies and 
technical capabilities of the tools (Woolgar and Neyland, 2013) within the 
routine, everyday procedures in which AD is ‘done’ (Garkinkel, 1967). I 
provide ‘thick descriptions’ of situated encounters, which attend to the 
social, cultural and political arenas of AD. I document professionals’ 
approaches towards the tools and diagnosis more broadly, which has 
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important implications for how AD and ageing are conceptualised; 
technologies adopted and configured, and ideas surrounding normality 
(Canguilhelm, 2008). The complex distribution of medicine in which these 
technologies and AD resides, provides the context in which diagnosing AD 
is explored. This shapes a particular understanding of ageing and AD 
dementia in the clinic, and within contemporary society, for a disease often 
metaphorically conceived as a ‘fate worse than death’ (Zeilig, 2013).  
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Chapter Two 
Framing the Clinical History of AD 
 
In Chapter Two, I map the emergence of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) as a 
diagnostic disease category from its inception in 1906, by drawing on key 
debates within clinical literatures and medical sociology, Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), and ageing literatures. From the inception of 
Alzheimer’s disease in 1906, to its emergence as a clinical disease criterion 
in 1984 (revised in 2011), medical and scientific researchers have sought to 
determine AD’s nosology10. As yet, there is no cure for, or cause of, the 
disease and a definitive diagnosis remains at post-mortem examination. 
With this in mind, the emergence of AD as a disease category has also been 
explored by sociologists, STS scholars, philosophers and anthropologists. 
Within these literatures, scholars have drawn attention to AD’s social and 
cultural framing and construction.  
 
In what follows, I will begin by providing a short clinical history of the 
disease, where I demonstrate the continued efforts to categorically define 
AD, and determine cause, treatment and cure for the disease. I continue by 
showing how AD as a socially, culturally and historically constructed 
disease category has been approached across social sciences literatures. In 
doing so, I frame the chapter within a wider discussion on diagnosis as both 
category and process (Rosenberg, 2002, 2003, 2006; Jutel, 2009), reflecting 
on Jutel’s (2009) claim that diagnoses are the ‘classification tools of 
medicine’ (pp. 278). Of pertinence to this chapter, diagnoses within medical 
practice play important roles within the institution of medicine and have 
therefore been a point of interest across social science literatures in terms of 
the social and historical framing of disease, and of debates around the 
authority of medicine in terms of medicalisation and biomedicalisation. 
Within these broader themes across medical sociology and STS, I 
                                                          
10
 Nosology refers to the classification of disease (Oxford Medical Dictionary, 2009). 
Difficulties in classification occur when a disease has a contested or unknown pathogenesis 
or aetiology. 
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investigate the case of Alzheimer’s disease, and the categorisation of the 
disease, to highlight the emergence of AD as both a public health priority, 
and a label, which continues to be difficult to frame, manage and therefore 
categorise in practice. Finally, this chapter draws this body of literature 
together to address the opportunities for research, which analyses the 
processes through which a diagnosis of AD is negotiated at both the clinic, 
institutional and policy level in an ‘ageing population’.  
A Brief Clinical History 
 
For over a century, AD has been regarded as a clinicopathological
11
 
disorder, and a discussion of the cause and nosology of the disease has 
pervaded scientific and biomedical research (see Hardy, 2006; Giaccone et 
al., 2011). The term initially arose in 1906 due to the work of Alois 
Alzheimer (arguably cases of the disease had emerged prior to this time but 
had remained nameless) (see Hardy, 2006; Uchihara, 2007)
12
. 
Neurologically, the disorder is characterised by the observation of amyloid 
plaques (miliary foci) and neurofibrillary tangles (fibrils) in the brain (see 
Hardy, 2006; Uchihara, 2007; Giaccone et al., 2011). These ‘tangles’ were 
made observable using tissue silver-staining methods (pioneered by 
Santiago Ramón y Cajal and Camillo Golgi in 1906), which meant that they 
could be visualised at autopsy (See Uchihara, 2007). In 1910, Kraepelin, a 
senior colleague of Alzheimer’s, suggested labelling these findings as 
constitutive of a specific disease entity: Alzheimer’s disease (Hardy, 2006; 
Uchihara, 2007; Giaccone et al., 2011)
13 . At the time of Kraepelin’s 
description, a clinical diagnosis of the disease could only be achieved at 
autopsy, yet even given the advance in research of diagnostic techniques 
during the past century, this also remains the most accurate method of 
diagnosis today (Ibid.). 
 
As a consequence of Kraepelin’s naming of the disease, AD was used to 
                                                          
11 Clinicopathological pertains to signs and symptoms associated with disease. 
12 Hardy (2006) stresses that Alzheimer was not the first to describe or observe a number of clinical 
features of the disease. In fact, Hardy (2006) argues that Emil Redlich in 1898 first described the 
pathological plaques present in the brain at autopsy. 
13 Kraepelin’s description of AD led to the clinicopathological separation between the disease and 
other causes of presenile dementia such as Pick’s disease (Hardy, 2006).  
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describe individuals with ‘presenile (classically, less than 65 years) onset 
age’ (Hardy, 2006: 3). ‘Senile dementia’ at that time was describable as 
being solely constitutive of hardening of the arteries in the brain (Ibid.). In 
1968 however, Blessed, Tomlinson and Roth (1968) discovered that the 
majority of individuals with ‘senile dementia’ were no different from 
individuals with Alzheimer’s disease in the formation of pathological 
tangles and plaques present in the brain. This work led to the nosological 
separation between senile dementia and Alzheimer’s disease; senile 
dementia was abandoned as a term and AD was thus transformed from ‘a 
rare neurological curiosity to a major research priority’ (Hardy, 2006: 3). 
 
In response to Blessed, Tomlinson and Roth’s (1968) case for the 
nosological separation between senile dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, 
Gaines and Whitehouse (2006: 61) argue from a philosophical perspective, 
that their research at that time, did not engage with the fact that individuals 
with symptoms of dementia did not always present the pathological 
formation of neurofibrillary tangles and plaques in the brain at autopsy (See 
Ballenger (2000) for a detailed discussion of this). This lack of correlation 
between observable pathology and signs and symptoms of AD, remains a 
point of contention in research and clinical practice. What Gaines and 
Whitehouse (2006) go on to contend however, is that despite this lack of 
complete correlation between dementia and findings at autopsy, the cases 
that did correlate perhaps empowered Blessed, Tomlinson and Roth and 
subsequent researchers, to further the objectification of the pathologies of 
the brain to ensure the disease appeared ‘real’ in research. Concurrently, the 
disease became ‘amenable’ to the efforts in biomedical science expanding 
the disease further, whilst its aetiology remained unclear (see Ballenger, 
2000; Hardy, 2006; Uchihara, 2007). 
 
From Blessed, Tomlinson and Roth’s work onwards, research into 
determining the cause of the disease, and in developing innovative measures 
for diagnosis, dominated clinical and scientific research. In the late 1970’s, 
research centred on developing an understanding of the biological 
mechanisms pertaining to a clinical diagnosis of AD (Hardy, 2006). 
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Investigations of individuals’ brains and recognising that memory loss in 
particular was associated with the disease, led to the development of the 
‘cholinergic hypothesis of Alzheimer’s disease’ in the mid-1970’s (see 
Bartus et al., 1982; Francis et al., 1999). The ‘cholinergic hypothesis’ 
proposes that Alzheimer’s disease is caused by the degeneration of 
cholinergic neurons in a number of areas in the brain, which contribute to 
the decline in cognitive function particularly memory loss, in individuals 
with suspected Alzheimer’s disease (Francis et al., 1999). The cholinergic 
hypothesis is also the basis for pharmacological treatment for the disease; 
cholinesterase inhibitors such as Aricept aim to protect the cholinergic 
neurons lost in the early stages of the disease (Ibid.).   
 
Alongside the occurrence of the ‘cholinergic hypothesis’, instruments for 
cognitive screening including the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) 
in 1966, and the Mini-mental state examination, (MMSE) in 1975 were 
developed (see Folstein, 1975 and Nasreddine, 2005) (a detailed overview 
of the cognitive screening tools used in clinical practice, and of pertinence 
to this thesis, are detailed in Appendix A). Cognitive screening tools assess 
and review levels of cognitive function and are a means of detecting early 
signs of cognitive impairment (Ismail et al., 2010). Non-invasive imaging of 
the brain such as Computerised Tomography (CT scans of the head), Single 
Photon Emission Computed Tomography, and Nuclear Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging was also developed from the 1970’s onwards allowing for what 
was argued at the time, a superior understanding of neuroanatomy; a 
‘powerful diagnostic tool’ (Khachaturian, 1985: 1100). Molecular genetics 
then began to dominate the 1980’s through into the 1990’s. In 1991, genetic 
linkage to late onset Alzheimer’s disease and chromosome 19 markers were 
identified (see Roses, 2006).  
 
Mapping the developments in research, which have attempted to determine 
the cause of the disease, a formal definition of AD in psychiatry as a clinical 
diagnosis emerged in 1984. The 1984 AD criteria and the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders fourth edition (DSM IV) state that 
AD is a clinical diagnosis made after the individual develops dementia 
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(Kimchi et al., 2012): ‘clinical dementia is the end product of accumulated 
pathology’ (pp. 16). However, the developments in research from the 
1960’s onwards, referred to by STS scholars Moreira, May and Bond (2009) 
as the ‘bioclinical collective’14 of AD (which led to the 1984 criteria) was, 
‘built upon shifting foundations’ for two distinctive reasons (pp. 669). First, 
in the early 1980’s the cholinergic hypothesis was challenged; its translation 
into ‘safe pharmacology’ was questioned extensively by medical 
researchers. Second, molecular genetics, dominated the 1980’s through into 
the 1990’s, to which end the bioclinical collective of AD focussed attention 
on the genetic model of AD, leading to the development of the ‘amyloid 
cascade hypothesis’ (Hardy and Higgins, 1992). However, competing 
theories emerged, which challenged the foundations of this hypothesis and 
suggested alternative biological indicators for the pathological deterioration 
present in the brain (see Lovestone and Reynolds, 1997 and Nunomura et 
al., 2006). 
 
Despite these ‘shifting foundations’, the 1984 criteria reinforced a clinical 
diagnosis of AD, integrating research, therapeutic investigation, and clinical 
practice (see Moreira, May and Bond, 2009). In 2011, the National Institute 
on Aging and the Alzheimer’s Association work group on diagnostic 
guidelines for Alzheimer’s disease revised the 1984 criteria (Kimchi et al., 
2012). The 2011 criteria differ significantly from the 1984 criteria by 
describing new clinical criteria for the disease including the concept of mild 
cognitive impairment (MCI) (Ibid.). MCI was introduced as a diagnostic 
criterion for those at risk of developing the disease (Giaccone et al., 2012). 
The criteria also incorporates the use of biomarkers to begin to understand 
the disease before it reaches the threshold of dementia (Budson and 
Solomon, 2012; Kimchi, et al., 2012). Focus from herein as Zetterberg 
(2011) claims, has shifted towards developing innovative biomarker 
technologies to diagnose the disease in its earliest stages. More recent 
                                                          
14
 The ‘bioclinical collective’ as described by Moreira, May and Bond (2009) aims to, 
‘capture the extended, heterogeneous, distributed character of the production of evidence 
that is required by the contemporary intersections between laboratory and the clinic’ (pp. 
686).  
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efforts in medical and scientific research include, developing stem cell 
techniques to study AD in the laboratory for pioneering treatment options, 
and developing clinical trials to test new dementia treatments (Alzheimer’s 
Research UK, 2015b). As yet however, there are no definitive tests that may 
positively confirm a diagnosis of AD, and samples of tissue taken at autopsy 
remains the only accurate method of diagnosis (Hardy, 2006). In particular, 
the connection between observable pathological deterioration at autopsy and 
behavioural symptoms associated with a decline in cognitive impairment 
that could be associated with ageing generally (normal ageing) is ambiguous 
(Gubrium, 1986). This makes diagnosing the disease in the clinic difficult. 
As a result, the search for the cause of Alzheimer’s disease continues but in 
an arena of medical uncertainty. In what follows, I will frame the case of 
AD within sociological, philosophical, anthropological, and STS academic 
literatures, which address the disease as a social, cultural, and historical 
category.   
The case of AD: A socio-cultural and historical construction 
 
As the clinical history of the disease demonstrates, the category of AD 
remains a significant source of uncertainty within medical and scientific 
research. Prior to discussing the specific case of AD in relation to its 
emergence as a socially and culturally constructed disease category, I will 
first outline the key points of interest in the well-established literatures of 
medical sociology and STS, which elucidate diagnosis as both process and 
category in the institution of medicine (Blaxter, 1978; Bowker and Star, 
2000; Rosenberg, 2002, 2003, 2006; Jutel, 2009). As Blaxter (1979) first 
described, diagnosis is, ‘the thing that the physician does: the conclusion 
reached, or the act of coming to that conclusion’ (pp. 9). Diagnosis therefore 
involves both the emergence of pre-existing categories, and the collective 
judgements upon which these categories are labelled as specific disease 
entities. As Jutel (2001) contends, diagnosis is both material practice and 
yet dependent on its social framing.  
 
 
34 
 
Rosenberg (2002) further argues that diagnoses play important roles in the 
institution of medicine adopting increasingly, economic, political, cultural, 
organisational, and professional roles within medicine. At both an 
individual and institutional level, diagnosis provides a gateway to service 
provision and renewed status of the ‘self’ (Rosenberg, 2003) and as 
Nettleton (2006) argues; permission to be ill can be granted through 
diagnosis. Rosenberg (2003) continues by stressing that this paves a way for 
considering the relationship between disease categories and bureaucracy of 
healthcare, where disease categories appear as ‘integrating mechanisms’ 
impacting on a number of decisions within practice (pp. 499). For 
Rosenberg (2003), ‘the awarding of diagnoses is one way of managing 
individual pain and social deviance, yet one that will remain endlessly 
contested at both the individual and social system levels’ (pp. 502). At a 
local level in the clinic, Jutel (2009: 279) concurs with Rosenberg (2003), 
suggesting that diagnosis is both interpretive and relational; diagnosis sorts 
the ‘real from the imagined’, and yet is also a space of contestation and 
negotiation between professionals and patients, during interactions in the 
clinic. In this sense, diagnosis as a system of classification is performative 
with powerful effects and consequences for patients, clinicians and the 
organisation of healthcare practice. In terms of categorisation, Bowker and 
Star (2000) argue from an STS perspective, that agreeing about the kinds of 
conditions that lead to a legitimate diagnostic status, has important practical 
implications within healthcare from public planning of healthcare, to 
collecting health data. 
 
Scholars such as Bowker and Star (2000) subsequently address the 
performative aspect of disease classifications. They question the 
significance of diagnostic classifications socially and culturally, whilst also 
demonstrating their spatiality and temporality. “A classification is a spatial, 
temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world. A ‘classification 
system’ is a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) into which things can be 
put to then do some kind of work” (Bowker and Star, 2000: 10). In turn, the 
authors demonstrate how methods of classification, in particular that of 
medical classifications, emerge and are constructed as, ‘workable 
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epidemiological tools’ developed and constituted within medical 
organisations (Bowker and Star, 2000: 72). They also reveal that cross-
culturally, disease categories have remained ambiguous, and classification 
and treatment pathways differ greatly. Therefore, despite a number of 
conditions configured as contested disease categories (see Nettleton, 2006), 
perhaps all standard medical classifications could be said to be in some part 
uncertain or ‘configurationally complex’ given what Bowker and Star 
(2000) describe as the messiness of disease (pp. 172). It is therefore well 
established in medical sociology and STS, that diagnosis is a socially and 
culturally configured process with powerful and productive consequences in 
the clinic and the institution of healthcare. Entangled in diagnosis, as 
category and process, are the negotiations, which lead to the construction of 
the boundaries of disease, of which constituting the normal from the 
pathological is a key process. The shifting boundaries of disease and 
therefore emergence of new disease entities (Brown, 1995; Jutel, 2009) are 
driven by the authority of medicine at both individual and institutional 
levels (Estes and Binney, 1989; Armstrong, 1995; Conrad, 1992, 2005; 
Aronowitz, 2001; Kaufman et al., 2004; Dowrick, 2009).  
 
The emergence of Alzheimer’s disease can be framed across these key 
debates in medical sociology and STS, and although there has been an 
extensive body of literature, which draws on these theoretical sensibilities 
for understanding AD as category, and its expansion in an ageing 
population, particular dynamics of this process are missing. First, the 
process of, or judgements involved in applying the label AD requires further 
research. Second, the role of medical technologies as agents for navigating 
this process, in an arena of medical uncertainty, and for making sense of 
diagnosis in the organisation of healthcare, requires further exploration. 
Third, the social and cultural elements of diagnosis and relations between 
age, ageing and AD merits further attention. Investigating these dynamics 
would be fruitful for considering the nuances of the process of diagnosis 
made visible through particular technologies in the routines of everyday 
practice, but also in relation to the role diagnosis plays in an ageing 
population at both individual and social system levels.  
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Overall, a disease category is not only clinically or biologically produced 
but is historically, socially and culturally produced, as demonstrated by 
scholars including Rosenberg (2003), Mol (1998) and Fujimura (1996). 
Rosenberg (2003: 496) notes that in order to discern the ‘what’ of disease 
the ‘when’ and ‘where’ should be brought into consideration; disease is 
bound in time and space and is ‘necessarily historical’. In Mol’s (1998) 
investigation of the work of Barbara Smith’ 15  who studied the social 
production of the prevalence of black lung disease in miners, she reifies 
Smith’s argument that black lung disease was socially produced. To do this, 
Mol demonstrates that the constant change in definition of the disease 
corresponded with political shifts in the coal mining industry. Similarly, 
Fujimura (1996: 255) in her work on cancer and the emergence of the ‘right 
tools for the job’ for diagnosis, argues that disease is situated within time 
and place, and negotiation of interpretation and meaning is crucial to its 
construction. Disease categories are therefore active participants in the 
institution of clinical and medical practice, and are social actors: ‘specific 
disease categories are omnipresent…indisputable social actors, real 
inasmuch as we have believed in them and acted individually and 
collectively on those beliefs’ (Rosenberg, 2002: 240). Focusing specifically 
on the case of AD, I frame its categorical construction, socially, culturally 
and historically.
                                                          
15 As Mol (1998) states, Smith’s article ‘Black Lung: The Social Production of Disease’ (1981) was 
published in the International Journal of Health Services but has had little citation elsewhere. 
 
Developing the work of Rosenberg (2003), Gaines and Whitehouse (2006) 
adopt a social constructionist approach in order to discuss the disease 
category of AD in relation to a series of ‘historical moments’, interpreted in 
ways, which have shaped current understandings of the disease. They 
demonstrate that the development of AD is ultimately a social process, 
constructed culturally and historically, particularly the focus on cognitive 
impairment and memory loss in the 1970’s, and the discrepancy around the 
cholinergic hypothesis as previously outlined. Prior to the work of Gaines 
and Whitehouse, Gubrium (1986) makes the case that the disease became a 
reality within a specific framework of empirical codes and structures of 
which difficulty in distinguishing normal from pathological cognition forms 
a key point for analysis: this will be discussed further in the chapter.  
 
As argued by Brown (1995), analysing the social construction of disease 
overall, requires due attention to the historical construction of disease 
entities. In recognition of Brown’s (2009) claims, sociologist Annemarie 
Jutel (2009) maps and locates the emergence of AD as a socially 
constructed phenomenon born out of both scientific discovery and the 
interprofessional relationships between Pick and Alzheimer. As Jutel 
explains, research into AD’s nosology took place within two competing 
neuropathological schools: one in Munich with the work of Alzheimer and 
Kraepelin, and the other in Prague with the work of Fischer and Pick. 
Alzheimer focussed his attention on neurofibrillary tangles whereas Fischer 
described senile plaques: both of which are present in AD and Pick’s 
disease
16
. As Jutel (2009) argues, as consequence of the competition 
between each site of research, it was not until Kraepelin assigned 
Alzheimer’s name to a diagnosis of presenile dementia, that disagreement 
between the sites of research regarding what constituted each disease, was 
resolved, and the label AD assigned (Ibid.). The politicisation of these 
institutions led to the categorical distinction between Picks disease and the 
labelling of Alzheimer’s disease.  
                                                          
16 Pick’s disease is also referred to as Frontotemporal Dementia, which is one of the more uncommon 
types of dementia. Symptoms of Frontotemporal Dementia particularly in the later stages of the 
disease are similar to that of AD, which makes diagnosis difficult (see Alzheimer’s Society, 2015d).  
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A further significant moment in the history of the categorisation of AD and 
the labelling process was the nosological abandonment of senile dementia. 
Writing from an anthropological perspective, Lock (2005) argues that a 
number of social and cultural practices led to the term senile being 
eradicated in 1976. The category of senile dementia carried with it 
problematic connotations closely associated with ‘madness and moral 
disapprobation’ which was concealed within psychiatric hospitals (Lock, 
2005: 203). This is where it remained until the 1970’s, when in 1976 the 
term senile was eradicated (Ibid.). Arguably, this transformation of senility 
into an ‘outmoded concept’ was in part due to its representation of a broader 
‘gerontophobia’ existing within the population (Lock, 2005: 204). In turn, 
anthropologist Lawrence Cohen (1998) contends, families and patients 
feeling burdened by the disease began advocating for the medicalisation of 
senility. Fox (1989) also highlights the role of the family as a form of lay 
social movements driving to stabilise and define AD to generate research 
and promote diagnostic status. Coupled with Blessed, Tomlinson and Roth’s 
(1968) work, the eradication of the term ‘senile’, transformed Alzheimer’s 
disease from ‘a rare neurological curiosity to a major research priority’ 
(Hardy, 2006: 3) and led to its clinical categorisation in 1984. Despite the 
discrepancies associated with categorising AD however, anthropologists 
such as Lock (2005) claim that due to the role of families affected by the 
condition, and the efforts of clinicians to categorise the disease as 
legitimate, the conceptualisation or discourse of AD that is available in the 
clinic to the public is that it is a, ‘distinct, universal, biological entity’ 
(Lock, 2005: 205).  
Constructing the normal from the pathological 
 
Entangled in diagnosis as both category and process, lies the task of 
constructing the boundaries between the normal and the pathological across 
individual, institutional and social systems levels (Aronowtiz, 2001). 
Constructing the normal from the pathological within the process of 
diagnosing AD is complex however, as the following section will 
demonstrate. It is well established that the nosology of AD has been debated 
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by scientists and medical researchers, and between social science scholars. 
Linked to its contested nosology however, is the difficulty in determining 
what are perceived to be normal from pathological ageing processes. 
Gubrium (1986), writing from a sociological perspective, contends that with 
the drive individually and institutionally to categorically ‘explain’ AD, there 
is inherent difficultly in determining normal from pathological ageing 
processes, despite its emergence as a discrete diagnostic entity in 1984. 
Gubrium’s arguments are taken from in-depth analysis of visual, oral and 
written descriptions of the disease. The author demonstrates that everyday 
experiences of living with AD (behaviours associated with the disease) 
shape the demand for diagnostic explanation and treatment solutions for the 
disease, despite research and healthcare practice recognising that there is no 
known cause or cure. As Gubrium (1986) explains overall, the diversity of 
symptoms associated with AD, makes correlating symptoms with 
pathological changes in the brain inherently difficult. “How is pathology 
revealed in the neuritic markers of the brain of elderly persons, described as 
“there” when ageing is likewise describable” (Gubrium, 1986: 50)? 
Gubrium argues that focussing on the quantitative difference between 
normal and pathological ageing processes objectified in the brain, does not 
make a clinical diagnosis easier to which end, categorising behaviours 
associated with pathological ageing is inherently problematic.  
 
More recently, as outlined briefly in Chapter One, the expansion of the 
disease category to account for the earliest stages of the disease, further 
complicates determining normal from pathological ageing processes, as the 
following section will demonstrate. Specialists and clinicians are 
increasingly faced with the challenge of how to identify when normal 
ageing processes begin to become pathological degenerations 
(Mendelzweig, 2009). The expansion of AD to incorporate the earliest 
stages of the disease reflects more broadly the continual (re)construction of 
the boundary between normal and pathological cognitive decline. The 
revisions to the 1984 diagnostic criteria in 2011 to incorporate Mild 
Cognitive Impairment highlight this effectively. As Whitehouse (2004) 
argues, MCI as a label makes it difficult for clinicians to demarcate normal 
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from pathological cognitive impairment (ageing processes). The purpose of 
the term MCI used by clinicians (prior to its incorporation as a diagnostic 
criterion) was to give a label to the origins of cognitive impairment 
associated with ageing more generally. However, the crux of the author’s 
arguments here is that at what point does memory impairment begin to be 
manifested as MCI and then develop on to AD? Whitehouse (2004) also 
raises important questions around the construction of cognitive impairment 
as normal or pathological. Labelling the origins of cognitive impairment 
associated with normal ageing as potentially pathological, encourages 
critical discussion regarding the point at which any form of memory loss 
begins to become pathological deterioration (Ibid.). The construction of 
normalcy and pathology therefore underpins the difficulties in attempting to 
categorise Alzheimer’s disease in research and practice, particularly as there 
is no definitive cause or cure. 
 
Writing from a philosophical perspective, Whitehouse and Moody (2006) 
also question the value of the label MCI, and the ethical dilemmas it poses 
when new knowledge around more innovative techniques in research such 
as neuroimaging and genetics, blur the boundaries of the disease further 
(Ritchie and Lovestone, 2002; Whitehouse, 2003; Whitehouse and Moody, 
2006). From an STS perspective, Moreira, May and Bond (2009) also 
explore the inherent uncertainty associated with the emergence of MCI, in 
line with the current ‘search’ for a category or biomarker to ground the 
earliest stages of the disease. The authors investigate the ways in which 
uncertainty is reframed in ‘new diagnostic conventions’ in terms of how 
organisations and clinicians begin to objectively know MCI. The difficulty 
in determining the ‘normal’ and the pathological from a range of different 
perspectives in healthcare, adds to the construction of the disease as a 
contested disease nosology. The revised diagnostic criteria for the disease 
also has the potential to shape individuals’ experiences of the disease as the 
treatment options for those diagnosed, can only be administered at later 
stages of the disease; when a clinical diagnosis of dementia is made (Kimchi 
et al., 2012). The implications of this shifting construction of normalcy and 
pathology in relation to the ageing process for individuals, wider public 
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health policy, and health and social care, is worth considering given the 
increasing number of individuals diagnosed with the disease.  
 
The debated construction of normalcy and pathology, which underpins the 
categorisation of AD, can also be framed within broader literatures, which 
address the authority of medicine within the rise of medicalisation or 
biomedicalisation. As attested by scholars including Jutel (2009), 
medicalisation does not solely refer to diagnosis (see for example Apple, 
1995). However, for the purposes of investigating AD, the construction of 
normalcy and pathology through which diagnoses emerge, intersects across 
broader conceptualisations and theories as to the expansion of disease 
categories which in turn reflects the processes of medicalisation and 
biomedicalisation. The following section will review literatures on 
medicalisation and subsequent biomedicalisation of society, which has 
important implications for how age and the ageing process are managed. 
Jutel (2009) discerns that disease is legitimised if the cultural considerations 
of normalcy and pathology allow for this. Yet, Armstrong (1995) writing 
prior to Jutel, contends that the construction of normalcy and pathology is 
also bound in temporality.     
 
Armstrong in ‘The Rise of Surveillance Medicine’ considers the effect of 
focusing on healthy populations and targeting those ‘at risk’ of disease, and 
the changing construction of normalcy and pathology. Armstrong provides a 
socio-historical analysis of this construction beginning by discussing 
Foucault’s description of the changes or new ‘spatialisations’ of illness, 
which he argues dominated the end of the19th century into the 20th century. 
Armstrong stresses that medical focus has shifted beyond this ‘tertiary 
spatialisation’ of the hospital and sole concern of those who are ‘ill’ to 
concern for all members of the population who have the potential to 
‘become ill’. The author argues this is a primary feature of surveillance 
medicine; the problematisation of normality. To begin to understand this 
shift in medical practice the relationship between sign, symptom and 
pathology should be carefully considered. As Armstrong (1995) stresses, the 
space in which pain is considered shifted allowing for a renewed 
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understanding of the surface and depth of symptoms and signs. Armstrong 
(1995: 396) proceeds by arguing that the tertiary spatialisation of illness is 
characterised by the ‘locus of illness in the context of healthcare activity’. 
The increased proliferation of acknowledging well bodies as ‘at risk’ is the 
predominant feature of the construction of this problematisation or 
‘medicalisation of society’ (See Conrad, 1992, 2005; Clarke et al., 2003). 
According to Conrad (1992), the emergence of medicalisation in social 
science literature began in the 1970’s. Whilst arguing that the construction 
of normalcy and pathology was discussed prior to this in the realm of 
psychiatry, the term itself was not used until the 1970’s. Since the 1970’s, 
the term has been well placed in medical sociological literature. It is 
however, a concept that is perpetually changing (Conrad, 2005) with the 
development of biotechnological advances in healthcare, arguably shifting 
medicalisation toward biomedicalisation (Clarke et al., 2003).  
 
As Armstrong (1995) contends, medicalisation (as a form of social control) 
focusing on healthy populations (targeting those who are ‘at risk’ of 
disease), dominated the 20th Century. According to Armstrong this began 
with the increased surveillance of the ‘unformed mind of the child’ where 
physical and psychological development had the potential to become 
problematic and consequently open to intervention. Conrad (2005) however, 
argues that specific changes in medical organisation and knowledge now 
drive a shift in traditional notions of medicalisation. Medicalisation 
primarily focussed on the role of the medical professions categorising an 
increasing number of symptoms as pathological leading to the emergence of 
new disease categories (Conrad, 2005). This renewed focus on healthy 
populations has implications at a policy level, which is manifested by the 
uptake of resources aimed at identifying, managing, and potentially treating, 
those who may be ‘at risk’ of developing specific diseases. This is 
significant considering the ageing population and with the recent scientific 
endeavours, which attempt to identify Alzheimer’s disease in its earliest 
stages; ensuring the disease is managed effectively.  
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Emergence of medicalisation and biomedicalisation 
 
Clarke et al., (2003) develop the ideas around medicalisation and argue that 
the 21
st
 Century is dominated by ‘biomedicalisation’. Briefly, 
biomedicalisation is describable as the transformation of medicalisation, 
taking into account emerging technoscientific processes with the potential 
and indeed ability, to alter individuals’ experiences of ‘illness’ in a myriad 
of complex ways (Ibid). Medicalisation and indeed biomedicalisation have 
however been critiqued with the emergence of pharmaceuticalisation as a 
concept (Williams et al., 2011). The authors stress that 
pharmaceuticalisation differs from the overall concept of medicalisation in a 
number of ways. Whilst the authors identify that pharmaceuticalisation is a 
necessary development of medicalisation, and also recognise the importance 
of the pharmaceutical industry for medicalisation, they argue the concepts 
differ. Pharmaceuticalisation extends beyond the initial focus and 
identification of ‘at risk’ individuals which dominates the concept of 
medicalisation, and is useful for critically engaging with the economic 
interest in commercialisation of pharmaceuticals and subsequent potential to 
construct new disease categories (Williams et al., 2011: 711.Whilst 
focussing on medicalisation or biomedicalisation is not the primary focus of 
this review given the existence of extensive literature on the topic, it is 
important to illustrate the ways in which these theories can be used to 
demonstrate the shifting boundaries between the normal and the 
pathological. Moreover, to demonstrate the extent to which the ageing 
process is increasingly subject to the processes of biomedicalisation in 
particular. 
 
As Estes and Binney (1989) note, the political and economic emphasis with 
regards to the commercialisation of pharmaceuticals, reflects what they term 
the ‘biomedicalisation of ageing’ (see Estes and Binney, 1989). Since Estes 
and Binney’s (1989) publication of ‘The Biomedicalisation of Aging: 
Dangers and Dilemmas,’ Kaufman et al., (2004) have developed their 
arguments by iterating that biomedical sciences, shape the knowledge and 
expectations of the aged body and consequently medical intervention. Estes 
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and Binney (1989) identify the biomedicalisation of ageing in two 
distinctive ways. First, they argue that ageing is socially constructed and yet 
predominantly regarded as a medical problem, and second they argue the 
prevailing biomedical model for ‘managing’ ageing, has the potential to 
(re)shape medical and scientific research. With reference to the authors’ first 
point, the idea that ageing is a social construction corresponds with Gilleard 
and Higgs (2013) later claims regarding the eradication and subsequent 
revival of the term ‘senile’.  
 
Despite the nosological abandonment of the term senile in 1976, Gilleard 
and Higgs (2013) stress that more recently there has been a revival or ‘re-
emergence’ of the discursive construction of senility and the fear of old age. 
Their claims are compounded by the notion that ageing is predominantly 
managed through medical means, leading to the growing medicalisation of 
ageing, and therefore emerging narratives associated with successful ageing 
processes. This has the potential to reconfigure normality and well-being; or 
the projection of the third and fourth stages of ageing (Gilleard and Higg, 
2013: 368). The re-emergence of senility therefore contributes to the 
conceptualisation of what Gilleard and Higgs (2010, 2013) term is the 
fourth stage of ageing. The paradox of this promotion is that it lends itself to 
the dichotomies between successful and unsuccessful, and healthy and 
diseased (Gilleard and Higgs, 2013). In relation to AD dementia within this 
body of literature, previous literature has also drawn attention to the 
increased surveillance of older individuals particularly those with dementia 
(see Kenner, 2008)
17
. 
 
With reference to Estes and Binney’s second point and the extent to which 
the biomedical model (re)shapes medical and scientific research, dementia 
as a UK national challenge or public health priority, has signalled an interest 
                                                          
17 A number of studies published in the Sociology of Health and Illness special issue (2010), frame ageing through 
a science and technology studies lens critically examining ageing and dementia within particular biomedical, 
social, cultural, and technological arenas (Joyce and Loe, 2010; Mykytyn, 2010; Fishman, Settersten Jr and Flatt, 
2010; Marshall, 2010; Kaufman, 2010; Brooks, 2010; Kinnunen, 2010; Brittain, Corner, Robinson and Bond, 2010; 
Wigg, 2010; Copelton, 2010; Loe, 2010; Neven, 2010).  
 
45 
 
in the development of innovative diagnostic techniques aimed at initiating 
early diagnosis to challenge the increasing ageing population (Dubois et al., 
2007). Diagnostic innovations for Alzheimer’s disease such as MRI scans 
(Alzheimer’s Research UK, 20121), combinatorial biomarkers including 
blood testing (Alzheimer’s Research UK, 20122) and novel biomarkers of 
damage to DNA and ‘telomere dysfunction (chitinase activity, N-acetyl-
glucosaminidase activity, stathmin, and EF-1alpha)’ in cerebrospinal fluid 
(CSF) (Watabe-Rudolph et al., 2012: 569) are examples of the increase in 
biomarker technologies aimed at identifying early stages of AD. This 
corresponds with Estes and Binney’s (1989) claim that the increasing power 
and relevance of the biomedical model, has the power to shape research 
around the aetiology of disease and its biological constructions. As 
Kaufman et al., (2004) stress, developments in biomedicine effect how we 
conceive the nature of ‘growing old’ primarily as a process amenable to the 
efforts in medicine to ensure a successful ageing process. Indeed, “medical 
interventions are reshaping norms of aging and standard clinical practice” 
(Kaufman et al., 2004: 732). Therefore the increased number of 
biotechnologies, biomarkers and diagnostic imaging introduced to attempt 
to alleviate the challenging process of differentiating between mild 
Alzheimer’s disease, mild cognitive impairment and non-AD dementias 
(Foster, 2007; Bloudek et al. 2011), ensure that normal ageing processes are 
reshaped (Kaufman et al., 2004).  
Constructing the classification ‘box’  
 
Underpinning this literature on the biomedicalisation of ageing in particular, 
is the idea that managing disease is predominantly the task of medical, 
biological and clinical classification frameworks. Within medical sociology, 
Rosenberg (2006) draws on STS scholars Bowker and Star (2000)
18
 and 
claims that for those conditions that are difficult to frame within medical, 
biological and clinical frameworks, the process of claiming legitimacy for 
symptoms is difficult, and makes the act of diagnosis complex. Focussing 
                                                          
18
  STS scholars such as Bowker and Star (2000) express their concern that classification 
‘boxes’ at times fail to consider context. 
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on Bowker and Star’s (2000: 72) acknowledgment that methods of 
classification are ‘workable epidemiological tools’ developed within 
medical organisations, Rosenberg (2006) stresses the contested ‘biological 
reductionism’ of ADHD. The author argues that classification in practice, 
focuses primarily on biological intervention aimed at ‘treating’ this 
contested, arguably contextual behavioural disorder, whilst ignoring a 
number of social factors, which influence the condition. As Rosenberg 
(2006) elucidates, disease is legitimated upon presentation of clinical 
characteristics, which produce a discrete disease entity: to gain legitimacy, 
disease must be at once ‘specific and somatic’ (pp. 411). In doing so 
however, this effaces the perhaps equally important behavioural or 
emotional symptoms that may accompany clinical characteristics, which 
subsequently renders the boundaries of disease complex and contested 
(Ibid.). As Rosenberg (2006) explains, “the terms hyperactive or attention 
deficit are context-dependent by definition, reflections of specific 
institutional realities and cultural needs” (pp. 419 emphasis in original).  
 
Jutel (2011) rightly points out that metaphorical boxing of classification 
therefore fails to consider the myriad of practices, voices, principles, 
interests and values which produce disease and henceforth its classification 
‘box’. In turn the voices, which ‘make up’ coding frameworks for 
classification, mean that classification is endlessly contested; there will 
always be differing interests, values and practices. As Rosenberg (2006) 
concludes, this will remain the case as long as we call upon medicine to be 
involved in constructing the normal from the pathological fuelling the 
‘guerrilla war’ between disease and deviance, to provide one example (pp. 
422). Privileging the medical or biomedical model for managing disease, 
has important implications for diagnosis and the process by which clinicians 
are able to determine boundaries that separate one disorder from another 
(Dowrick, 2009). This is likely to be a particularly difficult task for AD 
given the complexity concerning its nosology, and the difficulties 
determining normal from pathological ageing processes: determining these 
boundaries is much the role of medical technologies.  
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The role of medical technologies 
 
Technologies play an integral role in classifying disease; as has been well 
established in STS, technologies are not just physical artefacts but also 
systems and tools of diagnosis more broadly. Within sociological 
examinations of medical technologies, studies range from exploring the 
more mundane or ‘taken for granted’ devices for measuring the body such 
as the medical record (Berg, 1996), to the more sophisticated technologies 
used in genetic testing (see, Cunningham-Burley and Kerr, 1999; Kerr and 
Cunningham-Burley, 2000; Webster, 2002). In relation to the more 
innovative technologies in healthcare, with continuing advancement in 
research and practice for creating new disease states and categories, this 
raises important sociological questions. Whilst technological change 
succeeds with ‘putting a name to it’ (Jutel, 2011), it simultaneously raises 
new challenges for patients and clinicians in terms of making sense of 
disease and diagnosis, and (paradoxically) increasing uncertainty (see 
Webster 2002; Cox and Webster, 2012). Therefore, as the expansion of 
disease grows as previously discussed, more sophisticated and accurate 
screening technologies are developed to detect pathology, or risk of 
pathology, at earlier stages and to target diagnosis, treatment and monitoring 
options effectively. 
 
For AD, there has been no official screening programme implemented 
despite efforts to detect the disease in its earliest stages. The UK National 
Screening Committee has rejected AD as suitable for adoption in a 
formalised screening programme (UK NSC, 2015). In January 2015, the UK 
NSC reviewed screening for overall dementia and concluded that screening 
should not by recommended (UK NSC, 2015).  The UK NSC concludes that 
there is a lack of evidence that a screening programme would be beneficial 
in terms of treatment, and the tools currently used in the diagnosis process 
including instruments for screening cognitive function are not deemed 
specific or sensitive enough for the purposes of a formal programme 
(Ibid.).In particular there is a lack of treatment available to prevent or slow 
down disease progression if identified early and finally whilst current tests 
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for dementia have the potential to identify individuals with MCI, only a 
small minority of individuals would go on to develop dementia which has 
implications for well-being (UK NSC, 2015). However, despite ruling 
against a formal screening programme for AD, cognitive screening tools 
used to detect initial decline are being adopted in frameworks such as the 
National Dementia CQUIN, which assesses all individuals over the age of 
75 on entering Acute Medical Units in secondary healthcare. I outline the 
aims of the National Dementia CQUIN in Chapter Seven. 
 
As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Three, the focus of attention in 
this research is therefore on mundane practice and flexibility of tools, 
categories and devices in co-producing disease as Berg and Mol (1998) 
stress. Thinking about handling of disease in practice (Mol, 2002a) is 
particularly important if the disease itself is contested or can appear 
‘invisible’ in clinical practice with no known cause or cure. This raises the 
question around how clinicians begin to make sense of diagnosis according 
to knowledge practices, which recognise the contested categorisation and 
nosology of the disease. Considering the matrix of health, technologies and 
ageing (Joyce & Loe, 2010) in practice and policy, specialists and clinicians 
are increasingly faced with the challenge of how to identify when normal 
ageing processes begin to become pathological degenerations 
(Mendelzweig, 2009).  
Managing AD and care 
 
So far, I have sketched key debates within medical sociology and STS, 
which investigates AD as a contested disease category. There is a further 
body of literature however, which attends to the experiences of individuals 
post-diagnosis in terms of care. Sociological scholars including Twigg 
(2010) and Twigg and Buse (2013) for example, have framed the 
experiences of individuals with a diagnosis of dementia overall, in debates 
around the embodiment of identify regarding clothing and dress. A further 
body of literature has also explored care as a material practice for those with 
an established diagnosis. The work of Tom Kitwood (1993) who developed 
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the psychosocial model for dementia in the 1980’s, was pioneering in the 
sense it criticised the biomedical model of dementia, as it focused attention 
on the personhood of individuals. As such, Kitwood centred attention away 
from the concerns of professionals to the needs of patients, and his approach 
became the foundation on which debates regarding the relative lack of 
attention towards care as opposed to cure in dementia health policy, have 
since emerged (Ibid.).  
 
A further body of literature also critiques the prevailing biomedical model 
of AD. In STS, Moreira, May and Bond, (2009) consider the extent to which 
privileging diagnosis as a means for managing AD (of which the 1984 
criteria is a predominant driver), pitches cure against care; care as a viable 
alternative for managing AD is relatively neglected in research and policy 
(see Chaufan, Hollister and Fox, 2012: 792). In particular, in terms of 
increased efforts to detect AD in its earliest stages, Kimchi et al., (2012) 
argue that whilst the revised criteria for the disease and the recognition of 
pre-dementia states in research, allows for a renewed consideration of how 
the disease can be managed, the provision of care and subsequent treatment 
for those with pre-clinical dementia is unclear; particularly, if symptoms fail 
to be demarcated from normal ageing. 
 
Moreover, from a sociological, philosophical and bioethical perspective, a 
number of studies have explored how individuals’ experiences of a 
diagnosis, are shaped by the stigma associated with the disease and notions 
of the diminished ‘self’ upon diagnosis (Post, 1995). Writing from a 
bioethical position, Whitehouse, Frisoni and Post (2004) emphasise the 
importance of disclosing a diagnosis of dementia in clinical practice, 
contending that to deny the truth from patients given the recognised stigma 
surrounding the disease, “underestimates the remarkable human capacity to 
deal creatively and resiliently with the implications of serious diagnoses” 
(Whitehouse, Frisoni and Post, 2004: 126). From a sociological and 
philosophical perspective, Davis (2004) also challenges the biomedical 
positioning of dementia by elucidating the ‘societal structures’ that underpin 
dementia, which means that practices of care, in terms of preserving the self, 
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may be performed differently (pp. 377). In relation to care, the pioneering 
work of Kitwood (1997) further stresses the importance of acknowledging 
and accepting the subjective experiences of the person with dementia. 
Kitwood states that the experiences of patients with dementia should inform 
both research and policy. The notion of ‘dementia care’ has subsequently 
dominated literature within the social sciences: issues such as preservation 
of autonomy in care (Wilkinson, 2002) and recognising interdependencies 
of care giving to ensure maximum quality care (Adams and Gardner, 2005) 
have featured particularly prominently. Preservation of autonomy in care 
has also been discussed in relation to the act of disclosing a diagnosis of 
dementia in clinical practice (Pinner, 2000; Post, 2004). Writing as a 
practising psychiatrist, Pinner (2000) argues that given the prevalence and 
importance of early intervention and prevention strategies for the disease, 
the disclosure of a dementia diagnosis is crucial. 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have framed the case of Alzheimer’s disease in terms of its 
diagnostic category within sociology, STS, philosophy, and anthropological 
debates, which across their disciplinary trajectories, debate the social, 
cultural and historical construction of AD as disease category. The chapter 
begins with a short clinical-history of the disease in order to demonstrate 
that within medical and scientific research, the nosological framework of the 
disease has been debated. I also mapped the technological developments 
since AD’s inception in1906, attempting to determine cause, cure and 
treatment for the disease. Following this, I attended to the social science 
academic debates, which highlight the case of AD as a socially constructed 
disease criterion. In doing so, I discussed the wider bodies of literature in 
sociology and STS, through which the case of AD can be framed. It is well 
established in sociology and STS that diagnosis is a social process, 
classifications are ‘workable’ tools in this process, and technologies play 
key roles within healthcare practice.  
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A review of this social science literature has shown the extent to which AD 
has emerged as a critical site of attention within medical sociology and STS, 
particularly in terms of its categorisation and the experiences of individuals 
post-diagnosis. As postulated by Jutel (2009), analysing the social framings 
or forces through which a clinical diagnosis of disease is produced, 
generates an informed understanding of the ‘fluidity and fallibility’ of 
diagnosis (pp. 294). In doing so, diagnosis, ‘bind[s] the biological, the 
technological, the social, the political and the lived’ (Jutel, 2009: 294). 
Having explored the extent to which AD can be framed within, or has been 
framed within these social, political and technological arenas within medical 
sociology and STS, including debates on normalcy and pathology, and the 
authoritative role of medicine, it is clear that AD as a disease category has 
received worthwhile attention. However, the claims or debates drawn on 
from medical sociology in particular, explore the categorisation of AD as 
opposed to the processes of diagnosis. The process of diagnosis involves the 
particular judgements involved in assigning an AD category, which 
encompasses navigating complexity; negotiating the boundaries between 
normal and pathological; negotiating the discursive construct between 
successful and unsuccessful ageing processes, and negotiating the 
challenges facing the institution of healthcare in terms of increasing referral 
rates. Furthermore, the literatures reviewed are underpinned by a social 
constructivism paradigm, which as I demonstrate in Chapter Three, I 
develop to critically analyse how disease and diagnoses are handled in 
practice using particular technologies for making sense of complexity. The 
disease is more than that which is describable and able to be placed in time 
and space, it is ‘handled’ in practice performing realities of the disease not 
yet assumed, reaching far beyond the original manifestation of the disease 
(Mol, 1998, 2002a).  
 
In Chapter Three, I map the theoretical frameworks on which this thesis is 
grounded. I attend to the constitutive role of medical technologies adopting 
an approach which foregrounds practice, for negotiating complexity towards 
a classification of AD. At the intersections of medical sociology and STS, I 
centre cognitive screening tools as actors in navigating identities and 
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hierarchies; discursive constructs of ageing, and risk and uncertainty, both 
within the clinic and through wider networks of political power with respect 
to the ageing population. I therefore show the ways in which clinicians 
perform, organise, classify, approach and resolve the complexity of 
categorising AD through the role of cognitive screening tools. In doing so, I 
further develop the STS focussed perspective, that classifying disease is a 
temporal and spatial process; embedded in a set of work practices and 
organisational routines (Bowker and Star, 2000). I argue that classifications 
are constitutions, enactments both productive and performative of the 
disease they attempt to ‘pin down’ (Mol, 2002b) socially agreed and made 
up between ‘debates’ and ‘negotiations’ in healthcare practice (Latimer, 
2013: 195).  
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Chapter Three 
Theoretical Foundations 
 
In the following chapter, I will introduce some of the broader theoretical 
literatures and particular concepts that I draw upon to frame my analysis. As 
Chapter Two revealed, there remains a level of uncertainty in the medical 
arena about the nosology of Alzheimer’s disease, and efforts to determine a 
cause and cure for the disease dominate medical and scientific research. 
Following a brief clinical history of the disease, I continued by framing the 
case of AD within sociology, STS, philosophy and anthropological 
literatures. Within these literatures, AD figures in two distinctive ways. 
First, AD is analysed as a contested socially, culturally and historically 
constructed disease criterion, and second, the experiences of individuals 
post-diagnosis are debated, particularly in terms of care as both material 
resource and social practice. Overall, I located the case of AD in broader 
literatures, which critically engage with diagnosis as category and process, 
classification and categorisation of disease, the construction of normalcy 
and pathology, and drivers of medicalisation and biomedicalisation. As 
shown, there has been relatively little attention given to how a classification 
of AD is accomplished and handled in routine, everyday practices in the 
clinic, and with respect to managing the ‘ageing population’ more broadly. 
Subsequently, it was found that there is relatively little known about how 
complexity which is entangled in a categorisation of AD is navigated in 
clinical practice, through the use of available technologies which are 
pervasive across healthcare practice.  
 
By focussing on cognitive screening tools as agents within this classification 
process, I develop the theoretical orientation of scholars including Berg 
(1996) and Mol (1998, 2002a), who illustrate the constitutive role of 
technologies, and the multiple ontologies of disease in practice. I therefore 
investigate the ways in which cognitive screening tools, given their role in 
detecting initial cognitive decline, might be ‘central mediators’ 
(Timmermans and Buchbinder, 2013: 108) in the (re)production of social 
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worlds, by focusing attention on everyday practices and interactions in 
healthcare. In doing so, I extend the theoretical paradigms of previous 
research which tend to adopt a social constructivist approach for analysing 
the disease category of AD as outlined in Chapter Two, by providing an in-
depth exploration of the ways in which complexity is handled in practice 
beyond reducing analysis of technologies to social factors. The overall 
theoretical concern of my thesis is to show the complex social, technical and 
political networks through which AD is constituted, and emphasise the co-
production of classification across situated occasions.  
 
To explore the role of cognitive screening tools in practice, I focus on an 
ethnomethodological tradition of work especially the work of Goffman and 
Mol to deepen my analysis of the constitution and performance of disease 
and technologies in practice. I concentrate on these writers’ explanations of 
how uncertainty and complexity is negotiated, and identities and hierarchies 
are configured, in the everyday routine practices of the clinic. However, 
whilst I draw on ethnomethodological sensibilities to explore the everyday 
situated occasions in which classification is produced (Garfinkel, 1967), the 
arguments I make across the empirical chapters adopt a range of 
perspectives and concepts from different paradigms. Therefore, my 
theoretical position and approach is multiple: the complexity of the 
theoretical steering underpinning my research is a reflection of the 
complexity of AD, which this research seeks to explore. Handling of AD 
cannot be achieved by reducing analysis to one particular paradigm or 
indeed for it to be ‘pinned down’ (Mol and Law, 2002: 21). Overall, I focus 
on complexity; performance of technologies in practice (Berg, 1996; Mol, 
1998, 2002a, 2002b); interactions; identity-work (Gofman, 1959); 
hierarchies; power relations in the temporal and spatial arena of the clinic 
(Latimer et al., 2006; Latimer, 2013), and organisation of healthcare overall. 
I investigate what is ‘taken for granted’ when diagnosing AD, in order to 
understand and theorise the wider processes and complexities of handling an 
increasing number of individuals predicted to develop AD in the ‘ageing 
population’. 
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Mundane technologies and foregrounding practice 
 
Analysing the role of low-technological tools in healthcare represents 
divergence from the focus in STS, which predominantly analyses the 
innovation of medical technologies with which to measure pathology. I 
subsequently adopt a theoretical approach, which investigates the mundane 
with respect to medical technologies, which as part of my overall 
ethnographic approach, means I investigate that which has been largely 
ignored or taken for granted “‘givens’ that ‘grounded’ our social 
experience” (Timmermans and Berg, 2013: 108). Previous examples, which 
critically analyse mundane technologies in healthcare, include Berg’s (1996) 
analysis of the medical record in shaping healthcare practice and the modern 
patient. I develop the work of scholars such as Berg (1996) and the 
constitutive role of technologies in practice, to explore how they mediate 
particular situated occasions and socio-material environments for producing 
knowledge about disease.  
 
Exploring the role of cognitive screening tools in practice requires an 
investigation of their role in an arena of medical complexity. As highlighted 
in Chapter Two, and which will I elucidate more thoroughly as the thesis 
progresses, diagnosing AD is complex. Not simply because there is no one 
definitive method for diagnosing the disease whilst a person is living, and 
detecting normalcy from pathology is difficult (Gubrium, 1986; Hardy, 
2006) but because of the wider social and cultural discursive accounts of 
ageing and AD that exist in the general population with the potential to 
disrupt the classification process. Furthermore, the process of diagnosis is 
likely to be rendered further complex as healthcare practice handles an 
increasing number of cases for diagnosis in the ageing population. 
Throughout my thesis, I highlight the ways in which the entangled 
complexities associated with AD are dealt with. In order to navigate and 
make sense of complexity, there is the endless work of constitution and 
enactment through practices of coordination in healthcare, of analysing 
relations in socio-material practices, which the technologies perform and 
produce in healthcare. Opening up complexities for discussion is fruitful 
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since complexity in healthcare is ‘not only an intellectual challenge but also 
an often urgent practical task’ (Mol, 2002b: 249). The idea that the 
challenges and complexities facing healthcare are likely to be as much of a 
practical as an intellectual dynamic, underpins much of my analysis with 
respect to the ageing population in terms of referral rates and allocation of 
resources. 
 
In order to demonstrate how AD and cognitive decline are constituted, and 
complexity navigated and resolved, I foreground practice. In particular, I 
draw on Mol (1998, 2002a, 2002b) to speak with and through my data, 
centring the role of mundane technologies for constituting AD in practice. 
Adopting this approach to practice, I demonstrate that the realities of 
cognitive decline and AD are situated, emergent and multiple; performed 
through medical technologies (Mol, 1998, 1999, 2002a). As Mol (1999) 
describes, the reality of disease is ‘done and enacted rather than 
observed…reality is manipulated by means of various tools in the course of 
a diversity of practices’ (pp. 77). Describing Mol’s (1998, 2002a) work 
further, in her analysis of lower-limb atherosclerosis in a Dutch hospital, she 
shows that the ordinariness of atherosclerosis becomes more than a singular 
object or reality reified by particular perspectives across healthcare, but 
comes into existence through the practices in which it is ‘handled’. The 
author describes a number of locations in which the disease ‘appears’, 
contending that clinicians are often faced with the challenge of navigating 
these appearances (or realities) in order to make sense of disease and begin 
to consider what happens next for practice and patient. Mol therefore 
postulates the extent to which and at what points, these multiple realities 
interfere and relate to each other; describing not the ontological ordering of 
disease but the ontologies that are continually being (re)negotiated across 
sociomaterial practice(s). Mol (1998, 2002a) moves away from regarding 
‘knowledge’ as something with which to refer to and instead claims that it is 
something to be continually ‘manipulated’ which leads her to question ‘how 
are objects handled in practice’? As Mol (1998: 162) questions however, 
‘what difference does it make to say that medical practice performs bodies 
and diseases locally, and that its ontology is multiple?’ For Mol (1998), the 
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social analyst needs to re-think the opposing schools of thought on 
medicine, one that positions it either as a ‘source of salvation’ and the other 
as a ‘monstrous beast’ (pp. 162). As the author explains, exploring medicine 
from the ‘inside’ will enable access to the multiplicity of performances of 
disease in healthcare which are entangled, ‘go this way, that way, the other’ 
by engaging with clinicians and patients on the ground (Mol, 1998: 162). 
Importantly this dialogue ‘inside’ medicine can begin to cast light not on 
which aspect or composite part of disease in practice is more ‘real’ but 
which is most important; considering the effects and consequences of this 
for healthcare practice and the diagnosis process overall (Ibid.).  
 
Across Mol’s (1998, 1999, 2002a, 2002b) work, she demonstrates that 
realities of disease are multiple and performed in particular socio-material 
practices. Extending the social constructivist approach for understanding 
disease in healthcare, Mol (2002) makes a clear case for considering the 
performativity of enactment or constitution of disease as opposed to its 
construction, explaining that construction implies the ability of an object to 
be brought ‘gradually into being’ to the point of stabilisation (pp. 42). 
Whereas, enactment implies that, “if an object is real this is because it is 
part of a practice. It is reality enacted” (Mol, 2002a: 44 emphasis in 
original). Although I develop this further in Chapter Four, Mol’s attention to 
enactment of practice represents a theoretical shift from construction to 
practice, highlighting the power of practice for constituting disease realities. 
As Law (2004) contends, discussing ‘constitution’ or ‘enactment’ requires 
the researcher to attend to the ‘continuing practice of crafting’ (pp. 56). 
Production of disease therefore depends upon this continuing crafting of 
practices with people, technologies, techniques and materials particularly 
for a disease that may not already be ‘bedded down in sedimented practices’ 
(Law, 2004: 56).  
 
Yet in this thesis I demonstrate the myriad of ways in which clinicians value 
uncertainty because there is no closure for the disease. This represents a 
shift away from Mol since unlike atherosclerosis, there remains little if any 
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certainty as to what AD is amongst, clinicians, scientists, public health and 
patients. 
 
Cognitive Screening tools shift between different actors, and across 
different spaces and temporalities. Yet, at the same time, I also demonstrate 
that the inherent characteristics of the tools do not hold some intrinsic 
similarity as they are made portable; they are not constituted or constructed 
the same across different spaces and times. In fact I show how the tools are 
(re)made and continually (re)shaped by clinicians since they recognise, 
utilise and value the uncertainties associated with measures of cognitive 
decline for the purpose of classification. I acknowledge however, that in 
demonstrating the ways in which these tools shift and translate in practice, 
these tools could be conceptualised as boundary-objects, or indeed 
immutable mobiles. However, developing the theory of portability, I make a 
conceptual shift away from these theories; reflected in my overall 
commitment to practice and ontology.  
 
Boundary-objects as theorised by Bowker and Star (2000), are ‘plastic 
enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several parties 
employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across 
sites’ (pp. 297). In this sense these objects act as devices which cross 
different cultures and social groups; flexible or ‘multi-interpretable’ with the 
ability to be reconfigured across different spaces and cultures, and between 
different actors. There is little doubt that cognitive screening tools could 
also be theorised and understood in this way as they are differently 
interpreted by different actors and in different settings; treated as a crossing 
point between particular arenas. Yet by adopting the term portability, I am 
not referring to different and multiple interpretations of the tools but 
multiple versions or ontologies of the tools as they are made in practice; 
practices make these tools ‘work’. I demonstrate that the portability of the 
tools is not always fluid and does not always cleave at neat points where 
producing AD through the use of these tools is complex and messy: 
difference matters since AD is complex. The theory of boundary-objects 
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effaces the nuances of practice and the difficulties involved in trying to 
make these tools ‘work’. 
 
I also acknowledge that Latour’s description of immutable mobiles could 
also be applied to conceptualise the role of these tools in healthcare. 
According to the theory of immutable mobiles, objects are ‘made to be 
easily transportable without changing the inherent characteristics of those 
things’. Latour (1986) argues further that in order to convince someone of 
something ‘you have to invent objects which have the properties of being 
mobile but also immutable, presentable, readable and combinable with one 
another’ (pp. 6). Whilst I show the mobility of cognitive screening tools, I 
argue that these tools can be modified across different spaces and times in 
order to make sense of complexity: emergent through particular sets of 
practices. Their role shifts in order to account for uncertainty and yet, as I 
will show throughout this thesis, this work is largely invisible; reconfiguring 
the relations that make these tools ‘work’. By drawing on my own 
theoretical position of portability, I show that the tools are brought into 
being, thereby rejecting the notion that these tools have any inherent 
characteristics which shifts or stays rigid.  
Clinician-patient Interaction 
 
Employing Mol’s approach to practice, I investigate the role of cognitive 
screening tools and the constitution of AD in situated interactions with 
clinicians and patients, in order to demonstrate how AD is constituted and 
complexity resolved. According to Woolgar and Lezaun (2013), adopting 
the terms enactment or constitution implies that objects for analysis are not 
meaningful because of the contexts in which they operate rather, as the 
authors describe, they are ‘realised’ through interactions in a particular 
situated occasion or ‘set of circumstances’ (pp. 324). The important 
theoretical point made here, is that by employing the term enactment, this 
echoes the theoretical position of ethnomethodologists and the idea that 
interactions in action produce particular realities (Garfinkel, 1967). As a 
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result, similar to the claims of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), Mol 
attends to the situated performances in which disease is enacted.  
 
I analyse the role of cognitive screening tools within interactions between 
clinicians and patients in situated occasions, to highlight the invisibilities 
and intricacies of everyday practice. Furthermore, since I foreground 
practice, I approach the role and therefore values of cognitive screening 
tools as emergent, grappled with, and negotiated in the clinic. Throughout 
my empirical chapters, there is a theoretical commitment to practice both in 
terms of producing knowledge about disease enacted and constituted, and in 
terms of the articulation of values associated with the tools used within the 
clinic (Dussauge, Helgesson, Lee and Woolgar, 2015). Observing cognitive 
screening tools in practice, involves theorising on the interactions between 
technologies, clinicians and patients that relates to identity-work, 
hierarchies, and power relations, to understand how clinicians and 
technologies operate in the clinic. 
 
Whilst Mol’s approach to enactment and performance is therefore is not 
unlike that of actor-network theory, her work differs subtly. Particularly in 
‘The Body Multiple’, she argues that whilst disease is enacted in a number 
of different ways in the hospital setting, this multiplicity rarely leads to 
difference or chaotic practice (Mol, 2002a). For Mol (2002a), it is exactly 
this multiplicity and flow of relations, which makes the treatment for 
atherosclerosis function in the hospital setting. Overall, in order to begin to 
make sense of how complexity and multiplicity of AD is resolved, I adopt 
Mol’s approach and investigate situated interactions between clinicians, 
patients and technologies. Within the realm of STS, researchers are 
increasingly ‘exploring the fluidity, ambivalence and multiplicity of 
ontologies with contrasting realities produced across a number of practices, 
emergent through action and interaction’ (Mol, 2012: 380 emphasis added).  
 
Investigating how the tools are articulated during observations of 
consultations, the work of Goffman (1959) is also helpful. Perhaps to draw 
on Goffman is however, ‘rather an unusual place for the sociology of 
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technology’ (Pinch 2010: 410). Yet, as Pinch (2010) emphasises, Goffman 
in his work on  ‘Encounters’ (1961), and ‘Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life’ (1959), explicitly analyses the role of mundane technologies and 
materials in the interaction order. As Pinch analyses Goffman’s (1961) 
work, he argues that there lies a ‘hidden sociology of technology’ where 
‘the staging of the interaction, the mediation of the interaction, and its 
performance depend crucially on the detailed material and technological 
arrangements in place’ (pp. 414 emphasis in original). Whilst Goffman did 
not necessarily pursue the role of technologies in establishing social order, 
his work on the situated occasion of ‘surgery’, demonstrates just this; the 
interactions observed, align with ‘material arrangements, tools, and 
technologies’ (Pinch, 2010: 416). Pinch further extends his arguments to 
Goffman’s theory on the ‘Presentation of Self in Daily Life’ and the 
performances of front stage and back stage practices, which as I will go on 
to describe, are of particular relevance to this thesis. Pinch (2010) argues 
that when shifting between front stage and back stage arenas, these spaces 
are ‘bounded and connected’ and therefore materiality matters (pp. 417). 
This bounded space permits participants to alter their behaviour and 
therefore the materiality of the setting, or the architecture of the different 
stages and is something Goffman closely analyses. According to Pinch, 
Goffman adopts material and technological staging to demonstrate how 
interactions are performed, despite as Pinch suggests, his work being an 
‘unusual place’ to begin exploring the role of technologies for achieving 
social order in interactions.  
 
For Pinch (2010), ‘we need to combine the attention to technological 
artefacts, which is the strength of approaches such as actor-network theory 
and social construction of technology, with more traditional sociological 
approaches like Goffman’s, which attend to the interaction order and the 
meanings through which materiality and technology facilitate’ (pp. 424). In 
line with Pinch, I adopt the more traditional sociological approach of 
Goffman, to explore how AD is constituted in interactions with 
technologies, materials and actors in the clinic; I draw on Goffman (1959) to 
explore mundane technologies in ‘situated microcosms of social interaction’ 
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(see Pinch, 2010: 419). Overall, my theoretical position draws on Mol 
(1998, 2002a) to help inform an understanding of the multiple ontologies of 
disease, and its enactment through technologies, which are mundane and 
framed in interactive encounters (Goffman, 1959).  
Identity-work 
 
Goffman’s (1959) work is also useful for investigating how the use of 
cognitive screening tools reflects particular background expectations in the 
clinic. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, there is a body of literature, which 
frames the experiences of individuals with a diagnosis of AD or dementia 
more broadly, in terms of self and identity. I therefore investigate the role of 
shared expectations around the self and AD that inform social interaction 
and its performances. Firstly, I turn to Goffman’s analysis of drama in the 
everyday practices of institutions, where actions derive from ‘a command of 
an idiom, a command that is exercised from moment to moment with little 
calculation or forethought’ (Goffman, 1959: 74). As Goffman (1959) 
explains in his work on the presentation of self, actors perform the self. 
Goffman’s dramaturgy metaphor is useful for considering how modes of 
presentation are employed and utilised by actors in the everyday, which has 
broader means for the ceremony of social context. The dramaturgy 
metaphor sets out how the performance of actors in interactions, is shaped 
by the settings, and the audience to which the actor performs (Goffman, 
1959). As ‘performers’, individuals’ incorporate particular societal ideals 
(norms in any given situation) and present in ways, which are appropriate 
according to societal standards and expectations: this is described by 
Goffman as the ceremony of everyday life. The front stage setting for this 
performance, embraces these societal ideals, and the actor performs 
characteristics in keeping with these ideals. The backstage regions of 
performance however, are the more ‘truthful’ performance of the self, which 
is not revealed front stage. As such, in the process of establishing social 
identity, the background work in settings or the mundane presentations, is 
driven by concern for self and identity and the emergence of what Mead 
(2009) first conceptualised as the ‘generalised other’. These are the ideals 
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held by individuals in a particular society where actors, envisaging what is 
expected of them, adopt the perspective of the ‘generalised other’. Broadly 
speaking, Goffman provides an insight into the conduct and strategies of 
individuals who attempt to uphold normative assumptions regarding 
appearance and conduct through actions, and behaviours in particular 
situations: the presentation of self. Furthermore as Goffman contends, what 
may seem mundane or ineffectual is revealing of this ceremony of everyday 
life, particularly in relation to the preservation or presentation of self and the 
interaction order. This involves a ‘definition of the situation which involves 
not so much a real agreement as to what exists but rather a real agreement as 
to whose claims concerning what issues will be temporarily honoured’ 
(Goffman, 1959: 21).  
 
The work of Goffman (1959) is valuable for exploring interactions in 
settings in order to investigate the normative, everyday assumptions (Scott, 
2009) of the clinic and operation of technologies. Furthermore, when 
applying the dramaturgy metaphor as a conceptual framework written in my 
empirical chapters, the backstage and frontstage interactions (Goffman, 
1959) emerge as central components for the performing of technologies and 
performativity of AD. This argument is found in further commentaries, 
which attempt to grasp the meaning of performances within technoscientific 
arenas and cultures (see Law and Singleton, 2000). Similarly, I recognise 
the value of exploring taken for granted utterances and gestures revealed in 
the performance of technologies in interactions, which I relate more broadly 
to patient identity-work (Goffman, 1959). To accomplish order in the clinic, 
clinicians work to, or account for, the identity of patients in response to the 
complexities that AD produces, or what Mead (2009) describes as the 
‘generalised other’. As I have outlined in Chapter Two, there exists 
particular discursive constructs around ageing with respect to its constructed 
successes and failures, which I will analyse to highlight the impact that 
these constructions might have on the interactions in the clinic, and 
therefore the classification process overall. Furthermore, given that 
temporality is a key point of analysis in this thesis, I analyse the extent to 
which the self in Mead’s (1982) terms, performed in interactions as argued 
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by Goffman (1959), is temporal. Rather than it being a static or structured 
entity, it is a moment in time with a ‘biographical history’ and is therefore 
temporal ‘it is a dynamic and open-ended flow of events’ (Flaherty and 
Fine, 2001: 157). Drawing heavily on Goffman to frame the clinician-
patient interaction, I also draw on Mol when demonstrating how 
technologies perform in practice since Mol (2002a) claims that ‘objects are 
framed as parts of events that occur and plays that are staged’ (pp. 44). 
What is most interesting and relevant for this thesis is that Mol actively 
distinguishes her work from the dramaturgical perspective of Goffman and 
the presentation of self by emphasising the ‘two-way traffic’ between 
enactment and reality or the ‘performativity of enactment’ (Law, 2004: 56). 
Across my empirical chapters, I adopt Goffman’s approach to explore self 
and identity in situated encounters, and draw on Mol to extend this by 
demonstrating how self and identity are subsequently performed, emergent 
through interaction.  
The space of the clinic, risk and power 
 
Another aspect of this thesis is to analyse the importance of space within 
socio-material practices. By focussing attention on the clinician-patient 
interaction, and the wider role of cognitive screening tools through the 
implementation of the CQUIN, I investigate the clinic as a particular space 
for constituting and performing knowledge about AD. The clinic itself 
emerges as a site, which enacts particular social, cultural and political 
affective concerns (Atkinson, 1995; Latimer, 2000; Mol, 2002a). The work 
of Latimer (2013) in particular, is developed throughout my thesis for 
considering how the clinic affects the role of technologies in the medical 
decision making process. As Latimer (2013) argues in her work on the 
revival of ‘medical dominance’ for diagnosing dysmorphology, the clinic is 
an important, some might argue privileged, site for knowledge production 
particularly for navigating uncertainty around classification. I develop 
Latimer’s claims to draw attention to how AD is accomplished in practice, 
by locating the role of mundane technologies in the clinic and elucidating 
the extent to which this space is atemporal/temporal or bounded/unbounded 
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within the organisation of healthcare. Since classification, as critically 
analysed by STS scholars including Bowker and Star (2000), is temporal 
and spatial. Drawing on Latimer’s work, I am also able to investigate the 
effects and accomplishments of broader theories of medicine, such as 
medicalisation and biomedicalisation, on a local level in the clinic. I will 
return to this point later in the chapter. Furthermore, I consider the role of 
technologies and to an extent materials (Latimer, 2004), in the decision 
making process where I am able to treat space, materials and technologies as 
important factors in the diagnosis process.  
 
Another intention of this study is to postulate how complexity is handled in 
relation to the emergence of risk. This is accomplished in two distinctive yet 
interrelated ways. First, Rose (1998) is helpful for framing my analysis of 
the National Dementia Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
Framework (QUIN) as a clinical, governance initiative and the extent to 
which the ‘lure of the number’ (Rose, 1998: 18), shifts the content of work 
in everyday clinical practice; developing the notion that clinical governance 
initiatives, such as the CQUIN, enacts risk. Risk is therefore constituted 
through the CQUIN as it drives classification of AD to earlier stages. 
Second, I show the extent to which the enactment of risk might shift the 
boundaries of the disease, where I engage with the notion of an ‘at risk’ 
label, and the role of technologies involved in this process. In doing so, I 
frame my analysis within biomedicalisation theory and its affects in the 
clinic showing how the expansion of AD to incorporate MCI in particular, 
might drive the problematisation of ageing. This relates further to the 
theoretical underpinnings of ageing literatures and the particular discursive 
entanglements of the third and fourth stages of ageing (see Gilleard and 
Higgs, 2010, 2013). How this is negotiated in the clinic, adds a further 
dimension to understandings regarding age and the relationship between 
age, ageing and AD, since age is the greatest risk factor for developing AD. 
 
A further dynamic of this research, is to develop the broad theories 
associated with authority in medicine, to demonstrate the intricacies of 
power and the division of labour in the memory service and hospital setting. 
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I take heed of Mol’s (1998, 2002a) approach towards knowledge and power 
relations, by elucidating how they are enacted simultaneously in situated 
moments alongside materials and technologies. I analyse the production of 
hierarchies in MDT work and ordering relations (Latimer, 2004), and the 
extent to which the distribution of knowledge across technologies, materials 
and actors is shared when making decisions about diagnosis. Overall, an 
investigation of power in my own thesis is about demonstrating clinicians’ 
relations with the tools: who uses the tools, who adjudicates on their use, 
and who makes diagnostic decisions based on the operation of the tools in 
the clinic for resolving complexity and producing knowledge about AD. The 
work of Latimer (2004) and the position of the MDT in these debates is 
fruitful for analysis since the memory service is built increasingly on an 
MDT approach due to the current demands on the service (increasing 
delegation of tasks to non-specialists (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005). 
Across the division of labour in the memory service and hospital setting, I 
reflect on how clinicians make medical-decisions, which, are made up of 
interactions over time, and where mundane or tacit knowledge practices 
play significant roles (Berg and Mol, 1998). 
 
At the same time however, I also explore ‘the broader distribution of power 
in society’ (Harris, 2005: 175). I take heed of the critique around ANT 
theory and Mol in particular, with regards to their reluctance to address 
power (see Harbers, 2005). At the same time that I analyse power in 
relations, which are enacted in practice, I also draw attention to broader 
social and political networks of power within the complex distribution of 
medicine in which AD resides. This corresponds with Munro (1999) and his 
observation that “contrary to imagining power…as running through 
structures…power is theorised as exercised in the networks that cut 
transversally across structures (pp. 431). In other words, I try to explore how 
broad theoretical literatures such as risk and therefore medicalisation and 
biomedicalisation, shape the role of technologies both on a wider policy 
scale, and also within the clinic more locally. The broader political arena in 
which AD exists, dominants ways of managing AD, reflected in healthcare 
policy initiatives such as the CQUIN which promotes early diagnosis. This 
67 
 
has the potential to implicate the perception and expectations around AD 
and diagnosis on a local level in the clinic. If difference is valued, and 
enactments could always be otherwise, ‘there is not much space for 
describing how decisions reach closure, how facts become relatively final, 
and how professionals are held accountable’ (Jenson and Winthereik, 2005: 
267). Therefore, whilst I attend to the intricacies of the political in everyday 
diagnostic practice, I also pay due attention to the role of management in 
healthcare. I consider who uses the technologies, who adjudicates on their 
use, who makes final decisions, and therefore who is accountable in the 
medical decision making process. Here, accountability is of particular 
pertinence to analysing the CQUIN as a measure of clinical governance, as 
it shifts professional boundaries and responsibilities. I develop the work of 
Mol and extend it to look at both the wider networks of political power in 
which current diagnosis is occurring (ageing population), and also the 
hierarchies, identities and structures of medical dominance, which lead to 
diagnostic resolve.  
Temporalities of classification 
 
A further aim of this research is to analyse the temporalities of classification 
given that the expansion of AD to include the earliest stages of the disease is 
promoted in initiatives such as the CQUIN, and an increase in referral rates 
is shifting the temporal orderings of the clinic. I frame my analysis of the 
temporalities of classification within my investigation of how the CQUIN, 
which draws these dimensions of time together, is approached in everyday 
clinical practice. The CQUIN attempts to manage the increasing number of 
individuals projected to develop AD in the ageing population. Here, Rose 
(1998) is particularly useful for theorising on the CQUIN as a clinical 
governance initiative, which may have an impact on professional identities, 
autonomies and responsibilities. In order to show how the CQUIN translates 
into everyday clinical practice, I draw on the sociology of expectations 
literature (see Brown, Rappert and Webster, 2000; Brown and Michael, 
2003; Borup et al., 2006; Selin, 2006). In doing so, I illustrate how the 
classification process is made up of different kinds and perceptions of time 
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and temporality, for navigating complexity and managing patient 
expectations around a future with AD. The CQUIN as a process for enabling 
patients and clinicians to prepare for the patient pathway, is a particular 
version of cognitive decline but one through which points of difference and 
contention in practice emerge, which cannot be easily sorted. I show how 
the socio-technical environments, and situated occasions for classifying AD, 
are temporal and bounded. By looking to the sociology of expectations 
literature, I also further elucidate how the CQUIN is entangled in, and 
implicitly involved in, constructing expectations around the future of AD 
both in the clinic and in terms of resource allocation. The political power of 
the CQUIN might shift the temporal orderings of classification, and the 
articulation of the tools in everyday practice because of the changing 
structure of healthcare, and complex distribution of labour in which AD 
resides. The spatiality and temporality of classification is therefore centrally 
located as a theoretical underpinning of this thesis. 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have drawn attention to the key theoretical positions, which 
underpin and inform my overall approach. In order to address the 
problematic of this research as highlighted in Chapter One, and to 
demonstrate the complexity of attempting to classify AD, I identify a 
number of theories, which I see as especially useful to my research. These 
include, the theories of Goffman (1959), Mol (1998, 2002a, 2002b) and 
Latimer (2013) for producing knowledge about cognitive decline and AD in 
situated occasions by focussing on cognitive screening tools. Woven 
throughout my empirical chapters, I adopt these theoretical perspectives to 
make sense of diagnosing AD. Overall, however, my approach to exploring 
the role of technologies in healthcare privileges and foregrounds practice in 
situated occasions across social, technical and political arenas in routine 
everyday practice (Goffman, 1959; Garfinkel, 1967; Mol, 1998, 2002a). As 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, a categorisation of AD is complex in relation 
to its nosological framework to which literatures within philosophy, 
anthropology, STS and medical sociology have responded accordingly. 
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However, the process of diagnosis accomplished in the clinic through the 
use of available technologies and their operation in practice, has not as yet 
been the primary focus in the literature. The practices of the clinic and the 
articulations and negotiations, which take place, are important for 
considering how to make sense of complexity and difference or the 
multiplicity of disease realities. This is therefore a study of how AD is 
‘done’ and enacted (Garfinkel, 1967; Mol, 1998, 1999, 2002a). 
 
More specifically, driven by an interest in the complex distribution of 
medicine in which diagnosing AD occurs, I capture the hierarchies, 
identities, responsibilities, interactions, and power-relations entangled with 
the operation of these technologies. I subsequently identify the dynamics of 
articulation work and how this hierarchical work (re)shapes the role of the 
tools in particular spaces (patients’ homes and the MDT). This involves 
focusing on the articulation of the tools across time and space in the 
intricacies of the clinic. Furthermore, extending the micro claims of 
ethnomethodology, I also attend to the wider distribution of power across 
the memory service by developing broad literatures on risk. Therefore, I 
consider how the political dimensions of power are performed; analysing 
how the tools have the capacity to produce and (re)produce hierarchies and 
responsibilities in the memory service and hospital setting, but recognising 
that the wider arena of an ageing population enacted in the CQUIN needs to 
be accounted for. Grasping life in the clinic is partly a process of emerging 
dimensions of power that are both intricate and networked but also 
constraining. As a result, I ground the everyday practices of the clinic in a 
broader political arena to capture how moments of multiplicity hang 
together, difference is resolved, and actors held accountable. Overall, I 
foreground practice by analysing situated encounters which are at once, 
social and technical, and also political. 
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Chapter Four 
Method and Methodology 
 
In the following chapter, I discuss the research methods on which this study 
was grounded. I explain my research design including how I gained entry to 
the field, the fieldwork process, the data collected, how the data were 
analysed, and the limitations of my study. I begin by briefly outlining my 
overall approach which foregrounds practice, where I extend the lens of 
constitution and enactment of disease embedded in my theoretical approach, 
to the research design itself. I developed the notion that research methods 
have productive and performative consequences, and constitute multiple 
realities (Law and Urry, 2003). I adopted a qualitative approach drawing on 
ethnographic methods, in order to explore how AD was ‘brought into being’ 
and made within a particular set of healthcare practices (Woolgar and 
Lezaun, 2013: 323). In order to access the field prior to data collection, I 
proceeded with the NHS ethical review process, and I engaged with what 
Caine et al., (2009) describe as ‘preliminary fieldwork’. I describe how data 
were collected within two memory clinic teams in a memory service, an 
elderly medicine department, and an informatics department in a large NHS 
teaching hospital trust in the UK. Overall, I drew on the concerns of 
situational analyses’ (Clarke, 2003) in order to make visible and ‘better 
grasp the complexities of social life’ (pp. 572). 
 
Approaching the research iteratively, is also a matter of reflexivity 
(Desmond, 2008), and I critically engage with the extent to which my role 
as a researcher was shaped by particular complex social and cultural 
relations. I continue by drawing attention to the limitations of my study and 
my claim to doing ethnography more broadly. As Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007) note, “there is an important sense in which all research is a 
practical activity requiring the exercise of judgement in context; it is not a 
matter of following methodological rules, nor can all the problems be 
anticipated, or for that matter resolved”. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, 
the complexity of the theoretical steering of this thesis was a reflection of 
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the complexity of diagnosing AD, and therefore my research design 
attempted to order and make sense of the disorderliness of practice. Overall, 
I was interested in exploring the role of medical technologies in healthcare 
for producing knowledge about disease (Berg, 1996; Mol, 1998, 2002a) and 
investigating identities, hierarchies and responsibilities in which AD is seen 
to be ‘done’ (Garfinkel, 1967).  
Approach: Foregrounding Practice 
 
My overarching research question asks: 
 
How do instruments for screening cognitive function constitute Alzheimer’s 
disease at various sites of clinical and policy practice? 
 
The following three sub-questions guide my empirical chapters –  
 
How do clinicians use instruments for screening cognitive function to 
navigate and manage the uncertainties associated with measures of cognitive 
decline and articulate a formal classification of AD? 
 
How do clinicians use instruments for screening cognitive function to 
negotiate the boundaries of classification in the organisation of clinical 
practice towards the production of AD diagnosis? 
 
How do increased efforts to detect cognitive decline as laid out in the 
National Dementia CQUIN translate into clinical practice in the process of 
classifying AD? 
 
I investigated the role of mundane technologies in the process of classifying 
AD in order to highlight the social issues left ‘hidden’ in current diagnostic 
practice. As outlined in Chapter Three, my overarching theoretical approach, 
foregrounded practice and the multiplicity of disease which was constituted 
across particular situated occasions. By examining the multiplicity and 
complexity of classification and exploring medicine from the ‘inside’, I 
72 
 
attempted to make sense of the socio-technical settings through which AD is 
made (Mol, 1998: 163). I analysed how negotiations of practices, actions 
and interactions emerged as ‘central social processes’ in the production of 
classification and diagnosis (Clarke, 2003) where ‘nonhuman entities 
achieve a delegated agency within socio-technical networks’ (Hess, 2001: 2). 
Adopting this approach, I therefore considered AD aside from socially 
constructed categorical distinctions, which dominates previous literatures as 
noted in Chapters Two and Three, and assumes ‘closure [of AD] has been 
achieved’ (Law, 2004: 56). Rather, I attended to the constitutive versions 
and enactments of AD in practice through the use of technologies, thereby 
giving AD ‘a complex present, too, a present in which their identities are 
fragile and may differ between sites’ (Mol, 2002a: 43) beyond its historical 
construction. 
 
I considered AD not as a single reality ‘out there’ for investigation, but as a 
production between interrelated elements of practice (Mol, 1998, 2002a). 
Opening up and interfering with current diagnostic practice to examine AD 
‘in the making’ (Latimer et al., 2006: 614) was useful for reflecting on how 
healthcare practice was dealing with, and responding to, the increased 
number of referrals to specialist memory services in the projected ‘ageing 
population’. To address my research questions, I therefore explored the 
myriad of ways in which complexity was navigated and sorted in healthcare. 
In terms of the first research sub-question, the aim was to highlight the 
processes through which the uncertainties associated with diagnosing AD, 
were navigated in the clinician-patient interaction across the division of 
labour in the memory service. With reference to the second sub-question, in 
order to investigate the ways in which the boundaries of the disease were 
constituted, I attended to the role technologies played in enacting risk and 
complexity within the organisation of the multi-disciplinary team (MDT). 
This meant I was interested in how clinicians dealt with further complexity 
as both a technological and an organisational occasion, producing and 
reproducing professional hierarchies. In order to answer the third sub-
question, and the translation of the National Dementia Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation Framework (CQUIN) in clinical practice, this meant 
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investigating how clinicians approached, negotiated, interpreted, and made 
sense of this initiative in practice. I therefore highlighted what shifted in 
terms of the ways in which clinicians were already making sense of 
complexity in practice as mapped through the first two sub-questions. 
Overall, I was interested in both moments of interaction, and accounts of 
clinicians and information managers.  
 
In order to answer the research questions and attend to the ‘hows of social 
interaction’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 2008: 377 emphasis in original), I drew 
on the claims of ethnometholodogy, which assumes that social practice is 
constitutive; it does not exist independently from the world under 
investigation (Holstein and Gubrium, 2008). The approach attends to 
matters of the everyday and as a result, this study attempted to ‘grasp’ the 
complexity and diversity of the situated world of classifying AD in the quest 
for social order (Garfinkel, 1967; Clarke, 2003: 572). Therefore attending to 
the ‘hows’ of social reality necessarily required a discussion of the 
‘discursive resources’ from which multiplicities of disease were produced 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 2008). Discourse is, ‘composed of ideas, attitudes, 
courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the 
subjects and the worlds of which they speak’ (Lessa, 2006: 285). Herein, I 
framed the actions of clinicians in discursive practices, which through the 
use of the tests, were reflected in the interactions of the clinic and beyond. 
These practices (re)constituted the power, roles and identities of patients and 
clinicians, and were therefore implicitly involved in (re)producing power 
relations within the organisation of the service. My aim was to ‘sensitively 
illuminate’ (Pinder et al., 2005: 765) power relations in terms of how the 
tools were approached, who adjudicated on their use, who had the expertise 
and skills to do so, and how this shaped the process of classification. I did 
not want to ‘proffer simple solutions to complex problems, possibly 
reproducing the very power structures it [my research] needs to challenge in 
doing so’ (Pinder et al., 2005: 765).  
 
At this point, I reiterate that despite the fact that I drew on the sensibilities 
of ethnomethodology for exploring situated occasions of interaction, I also 
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extended the culturally interpretive mode of analysis on which 
ethnomethodology is grounded by framing my analysis overall, within the 
work of Mol. The ‘socio-ontological’ and constructivist practice approach 
of Mol, moves from representation to performativity, and from 
epistemological to ontological concerns abandoning a priori assumptions 
about the reality of disease (Van heur, Leydesdorff and Wyatt, 2012). As 
Van heur, Leydesdorff and Wyatt (2012: 355) claim, “the language of 
ontology is used to assert long-standing commitments to situated, 
ethnographic research methods and to signify the centrality of tools in 
constituting socio-technical relations” (emphasis added).  My research 
design subsequently reflected my overall approach to practice and I 
developed the concerns of Law and Urry (2003) who contend that research 
methods ‘do not simply describe the world as it is, but also enact it’ and I 
provided an empirical argument about ontology as opposed to epistemology 
(pp. 1). What is interesting regarding Law and Urry’s (2003) work, and 
which was particularly important for this thesis, is that the terms enactment 
or constitution embed the notion that there is no longer a single reality ‘out 
there’ to explore. What is known is no longer a single reality but instead is 
being ‘made’ at different locales and within different spaces (Ibid.). 
Multiplicity is produced in what Law and Urry (2003) consider are 
contested socio-material relations and practices (pp. 6 emphasis added). As 
Law and Urry (2004) stress, “to suggest that while the ‘real’ is indeed ‘real’, 
it is also made, and that it is made within relations” (pp. 395 emphasis 
added).  
Research Design 
 
The following research design grounded these conceptual claims. Through 
observation work and the accounts of professionals, I highlighted what 
shifted, was made useful, and was made visible, in the process of 
classification. I adopted a qualitative approach and drew on ethnographic 
methods: I interviewed professionals regarding their work practices, and 
subsequently observed the interactions between professionals, patients and 
the tests. The purpose of this observation work in situ (Holstein and 
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Gubrium, 2008) was to investigate the face-to-face interactions in the clinic. 
I drew on an ethnographic approach because as Law (2004) argues, 
ethnographic methods reject the traditional methods models in an attempt to 
explore the uneven process of producing knowledge in research, ‘it 
[ethnography] looks beyond the official accounts of method (which are 
often clean and reassuring) to try to understand the often ragged ways in 
which knowledge is produced in research’ (pp. 18). Although I focused on 
the multiple truths or versions of AD which the ‘ethnographer discovers’ as 
described by Denzin (2000: XV), I did not exclusively adhere to the 
principles of ethnography or any other discipline or tradition. In particular, I 
did not claim to be wholly ethnographic in approach, instead adopting a 
qualitative approach, which drew on ethnographic methods, as there were 
limitations to my sample and data collected. This will be discussed further 
in the chapter.   
Site for research 
 
As ethnography implies an open-ended approach to the research design 
(Maxwell, 2012), this research design responded to and emerged from 
empirical work. I gathered data for my research in a memory service and a 
large NHS teaching hospital trust. To begin data collection, I underwent a 
lengthy preparation process necessary for gaining access to privileged 
environments. Initially, I planned to conduct research across two memory 
services within adjacent cities, and also carry out participant observations of 
clinicians in hospital wards across two large NHS teaching hospitals. In 
order to gain access to each of these sites (selected in part for the large 
number of individuals from a variety of social and ethnic backgrounds), I 
applied for NHS ethical approval. NHS ethical approval involves an in-
depth assessment where a study is granted or declined clearance by an 
independent panel of medical and non-medical experts. Applying an open-
ended approach to the research design however, meant that in order to gain 
ethical approval, I immersed myself in the intricacies of the field since 
securing access to the field begins prior to negotiating the bureaucracies of 
the ethical landscape. Securing access ethnographically (Wolcott, 1990) is 
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accomplished through extensive interaction work between potential 
gatekeepers or experts within the field, and engaging with literature to 
prepare for formal review. Subsequently, fieldwork is not marked by those 
who adjudicate on ethicality of the study, but emerges from the interactions 
and instances that precede this official access to the field (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). Furthermore, the epistemological assumption of 
ethnography is to abandon a priori assumptions of the ways in which 
knowledge is acquired (Maxwell, 2012). As such, ethnographic fieldwork 
begins by exploring what Malinowski (1922, 1967) terms ‘foreshadowed 
problems’.  
 
The role of ethnography in the social sciences has been subject to 
considerable debate, and in order to ground its complexity, has been defined 
broadly as a method of participant observation in the field (Denzin, 1997). 
Yet, given that ethnography is not consigned to the methods for data 
collection, the definition of ethnography is contested (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). Solely grounding ethnography in methods for data 
collection such as participant observation and semi-structured interviews, 
does not take into consideration the work that necessarily has to occur prior 
to entry into the field. I therefore drew on the assumptions of Caine et al., 
(2009) who refer to the stages of research that occur prior to formal access 
to the field. In the following section, I will outline the work I undertook 
prior to formal ethical review, in recognition of the fact that making 
connections within the field, the role of gatekeepers, and understanding the 
intricacies of the culture of the field, is crucial for ethical review. In 
accordance with my theoretical approach more broadly, I both rejected the 
pre-existence of AD ‘out there’ to be explored (Law and Lien, 2012: 366), 
and ignored a priori assumptions about the field gathered during 
preliminary fieldwork.  
Preliminary fieldwork and NHS ethics 
 
Throughout my thesis, I adopted pseudonyms for each of the research sites. 
Carlton Hospital was an in-patient and out-patient elderly assessment unit 
based in a large psychiatric hospital. As I will explain further in the chapter, 
I was unable to carry out my research in this site despite having ethical 
approval confirmed. Nunmill Hospital and Ridge NHS Centre were both 
out-patient and in-patient elderly psychiatric services with specialist 
memory clinic facilities. Holmwood Hospital was a large teaching hospital. 
Gaining access to these sites was a carefully considered process, as I will 
highlight throughout the chapter.  
 
My study began with a discussion with my doctoral supervisors who 
suggested I contact a colleague and previous Dean of a medical school. This 
colleague was named as my Clinical Supervisor and overarching gatekeeper 
to the sub-sites. At this point, plans for my research were tentative, vague 
and particularly ambitious principally about how I wanted the study to 
proceed. During the meeting with the clinical supervisor, we discussed how 
best to proceed with the Research Ethics Committee (REC) application. 
This included formulating an inclusion and exclusion criteria for patient 
participation, discussing how I would proceed with ensuring patients had 
capacity to consent to research, and deciding on a process for recruitment in 
out-patient clinics and Acute Medical Unit in-patient wards.  I heeded his 
advice concerning meeting clinicians within these sites to discuss my 
project further, and accepted his recommendations. Following this meeting, 
the Clinical Supervisor arranged for me to discuss my research project with 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1, the lead clinician for a memory clinic within the 
memory service. It was during this meeting that concerns about the 
practicalities of my work were raised. The cognitive test that I wanted to 
investigate had recently become subject to copyright and the Trust was no 
longer paying for its use. Consultant Psychiatrist 1 expressed her enthusiasm 
for the project but advised that I revise my investigation to ensure the 
service would not be implicated. Furthermore she suggested I explore the 
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reliability and validity of other tools within the service such as the Montreal 
Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) and Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination 
(ACE) 111. The meeting was overwhelming as I realised how little I knew 
about old-age psychiatry or medicine in general. Furthermore, it 
demonstrated the extent to which the researcher has to negotiate the agendas 
of both themselves and of those on whom their research depends. 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1’s suggestions with regards to assessing the 
reliability and validity of tools within the service, did not align with my own 
aims and objectives for the research. Whilst the reliability and validity of 
these tools has been researched within the field of psychiatry and 
psychology in terms of sensitivity and specificity, it was not the task of this 
research to further develop this body of literature.  
 
Having met with my doctoral supervisors and revised my research aims to 
ensure the service would not be implicated in regard to copyright, I once 
again approached Consultant Psychiatrist 1 and she agreed to support the 
study. In addition, Consultant Psychiatrist 1 also organised a meeting with a 
consultant psychiatrist in Carlton Hospital (I will explain further in the 
chapter how I did not go on to include this site within my research).  I 
pitched my research to the consultant psychiatrist in this site and she agreed 
to support the study. I gained access to the elderly healthcare department at 
Holmwood Hospital through the Clinical Supervisor. The Clinical 
Supervisor also put me in contact with Information Manager 1 based in 
Holmwood Hospital as part the teaching hospital Trust. I met with 
Information Manager 1 who advised on who I would need to contact and the 
kinds of documents I may be able to access upon ethical approval. 
Following initial meetings, email exchanges, and telephone calls with 
consultant psychiatrists, geriatricians, information managers and memory 
nurses, and further contact with the Clinical Supervisor, I developed key 
contacts within each of the sites. This helped me to map out the specifics of 
data collection, which proved essential to gaining ethical approval. 
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NHS ethics and claim to ethnography 
 
A number of individuals, including professionals and students, who had 
been successful in the ethical review process, recommended that it would be 
beneficial to recruit someone within each site of study and a clinical 
supervisor to champion my study. I was made aware by previous doctoral 
candidates that the NHS REC looks favourably on researchers who are able 
to demonstrate this support, and therefore the Clinical Supervisor was 
assigned this role. Consultant Psychiatrist 1 and Information Manager 1 
became my gatekeepers throughout the duration of my study. Coyne (2010) 
describes the ways in which gatekeepers are able to effectively maximise 
recruitment opportunities, hone the research design, and embed the 
researcher within the setting because as Johnson (1990) contends, they have 
access to privileged knowledge systems. This work is fundamental for the 
scaffolding of a research project particularly when conducting research in a 
hospital setting (Coyne, 2010). For the purposes of navigating the NHS 
ethics application, the role of the gatekeeper is also essential for diminishing 
the possibility of rejection or rebuttal; the gatekeeper role is deemed to 
possess more power than the researcher in navigating the ethics terrain 
(Reed, 2007).  As an individual with no medical background or specific 
alliances with the sites for investigation, I discerned that the sponsorship of 
each of these individuals would ease the transition from stranger to 
researcher (c.f. Coyne, 2010).  
 
I prepared the NHS REC documents for submission during the preliminary 
fieldwork stage. My vague, at times naïve, thoughts and ideas regarding the 
research design, were reshaped through discussions with key contacts in the 
field. Within the extensive research protocol, I provided an account of the 
data that would be collected; where this would be collected and how; the 
number of hours expected to be in each site; how participants would be 
approached, and how many would be recruited. The application process was 
a laborious task and it has been argued more generally that the rigorous, 
prescriptive stipulations of the process hinder the art of engaging in iterative 
qualitative research (Bosk and De Vries, 2004; Dingwall, 2006). Following 
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receipt of my initial application, I was invited to attend a REC meeting 
(December 2013) where I was asked a number of questions about my study 
by both medical and non-medical members of the committee. The meeting 
lasted for approximately twenty minutes. During the meeting, the committee 
queried a number of points. First, they queried why I had stated I wanted 
consent forms to be signed and posted to myself; they questioned how this 
would work as the forms are usually signed in the presence of the researcher. 
Second, the committee queried the timescale of the research, which they 
deemed to be an adventurous commitment for successful completion within 
three years. In response to these points, I confirmed I would not ask for 
consent forms to be posted and that I would ensure my research was 
finished in the given timescale since my funding is a three year contract 
without the possibility of financial extension. Third, the REC queried the 
patient information sheet, which they suggested was unclear, as I had 
implied that if non-English speakers can read the information sheet they 
could then consent to participate in the study. They suggested that I amend 
the inclusion and exclusion criteria to ensure that patients did not 
misunderstand. At the end of the meeting I was also given space to ask any 
questions. I asked whether the inclusion and exclusion criteria for assessing 
capacity to consent to research, which I had discussed extensively with my 
academic supervisors and my clinical supervisor, would be practical; 
members stated that they had no queries or discrepancies about this aspect 
of my research.  
 
Overall, the committee was particularly responsive towards the fact that I 
was investigating the best use of current practice as opposed to developing a 
new technology for implementation. The committee spoke encouragingly 
about the importance of research, which explores how current technologies 
are used. In this sense the committee conveyed a sociological imagination 
that I was not anticipating. Despite its laborious and at times bureaucratic 
nature, recognised by clinical researchers (see Ashcroft, Newson and Benn, 
2005 and Shaw, Boynton and Greenhalgh, 2005) and social science 
researchers (see Reed, 2007 and Richardson and McMullan, 2007) alike, the 
ethics committee was unquestionably helpful and supportive of my research 
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ideas, and looked favourably on the project. As a result, my research was 
approved pending the completion of minor amendments and following 
resubmission I was granted full ethical approval in January 2014. My 
experience chimes with Hedgecoe’s (2008) claims that the REC and its 
members primarily see their role as facilitating and supportive of social 
research. It has been argued however, (see Murphy and Dingwall, 2007; 
Reed, 2007) that the process of NHS ethics may complicate the practice of 
doing ethnography in medical settings, of which there is a considerable 
history (see Bosk, 1979; Strong, 1979; Atkinson, 1995; Berg, 1996, 1997, 
1998; Mol, 1998, 2002a, 2002b; Latimer, 2000, 2013). 
 
As ethnography involves the researcher participating in the area of study for 
an extended period of time (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) subsequently, 
I question whether gathering detailed snapshots of the field (as is the case 
with this research), constrained my claim to doing ethnography. In order to 
investigate this, I focus on the role of the REC and the ethics application 
process overall. Although I have attempted to apply an ethics in practice 
approach to my research (Guilleman and Gilham, 2004), which goes beyond 
formal ethics applications and approval, the question remains as to whether 
this formality and the research design approved by the REC, constrained my 
claim to ethnography overall. I reflect on the existence of committee 
ontology or ontologies, which I claim did not reflect the broad ontological 
assumptions of this research that embraced multiplicity, and constitution of 
disease in practice. The REC requires researchers across clinical and social 
science practice to detail each stage of the research process including 
specifying research methods; outlining the recruitment strategy; providing 
an inclusion and exclusion criteria list for assessing suitability for 
participation; detailing ethical considerations including potential risk of 
harm to participants, and finally, detailing the benefits of the study. 
Subsequently I provided an inclusion and exclusion criteria list to assess 
participant suitability for study; outlined in detail the sites for study; stated 
what I would be focussing on during observations of team meetings and 
consultations, and rigorously outlined how I would be seeking informed 
consent from participants. As stipulated earlier in the chapter, the 
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formulation of the research design was a collaborative endeavour with 
clinical ‘experts’ and gatekeepers, which was key to successfully 
negotiating the REC process, and ensuring a transparent research design that 
would safeguard the interests of participants. Commitment to transparency 
however, which was reflective of a broadly realist perspective and therefore 
constituted a particular version of AD ‘out there’ for exploration. The 
emphasis of my research however, was on demonstrating how in practice 
AD became to be made ‘real’ appropriating the lexis of ontology in the 
terms ‘constitution’ or ‘enactment’. In a phenomenological sense then, 
‘rather than there being a world of concrete objects which a theory cuts this 
way and that,… the cake is constituted in the very act of cutting it’ 
(Garfinkel, 1972: 5). Conceptually, this was in stark contrast to the role of 
the NHS REC, which embraces essentialism and realism, and the 
importance of a priori knowledge to ensure transparency in research.  
 
The REC dictated the population for recruitment, the settings for 
investigation and a version of pathological cognitive decline only evident in 
those with the capacity to consent to research. The committee reduced the 
‘plurality of worlds’ for exploring how instruments for screening cognitive 
function constitute AD, and projected particular normative concerns 
regarding AD in practice on my research. Overall, the REC projects a 
powerful set of practices upon research. It has the ability to constitute the 
sites and practices the researcher engages with in fundamental ways. 
Although this is primarily evidenced in the necessity to detail each stage of 
the research process, it extends beyond what the researcher will be doing 
and who will be included in the study, to considering the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions the researcher has to embed in the research 
practice in order to ensure ‘ethical’ practice. The NHS ethics review process 
is essentially an enactment or reification of the (bio)medical model 
(Hedgecoe, 2008), which itself has the potential to impose on the research 
design. With respect to my own work, it imposed on the overall constitution 
of AD by dictating the particular sites and settings for investigation, and 
therefore versions of the disease for exploration.  
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Subsequently, I questioned how these competing epistemologies and 
ontologies could be navigated to ensure that I upheld the key concerns of the 
STS scholars that have influenced my research and my claim to ethical 
practice; in particular the ability of my work to be wholly ethnographic in 
approach. As such, I adopted a reflexive, flexible approach to my research, 
wherein I stipulated that the claims I made are reflective of a specific, 
particular world of AD rather than making broad, general assumptions. 
Furthermore perhaps the constraints or norms of the REC embedded in what 
became the research design should not be of sole concern but instead the 
analysis of the norms embedded in the practices that came out of this design 
should be of primary significance (c.f. Mol, 2012). Therefore, I adopted 
ethnographic methods in recognition of the fact that I could not claim to be 
wholly ethnographic in approach.  
Fieldwork: Ethnographic Methods 
 
Following confirmation of ethical approval, I contacted each of the 
gatekeepers within the proposed sites for research. To clarify, it was at this 
point that my connections with Carlton Hospital were not taken up. Despite 
having agreed to my study, for organisational reasons, the gatekeepers 
deemed that my work was going to be too onerous a task for clinicians and 
patients. As such, fieldwork began with Holmwood Hospital, Nunmill 
Hospital and Ridge NHS Centre. Following an email exchange with 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1 at Nunmill Hospital, she invited me to attend a 
Multi-disciplinary Team (MDT) meeting. Here I presented my research and 
gathered the contacts of those who would like further information about the 
research, and to be contacted for possible participation. With regards to 
participant observation of consultations, it was agreed that I would contact 
clinicians separately with criteria for inclusion and exclusion, and they 
would then contact me with relevant appointments to observe week by week. 
The research protocol I produced for the ethics committee was formulaic 
and included a list of exactly what it was I wanted to observe or would be of 
interest to me. Yet, I also entered the field with flexible research interests 
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and concerns in order to guide initial consultations. I observed team 
meetings, hospital wards, offices, and consultation rooms, where AD gets 
‘done’ (Garfinkel, 1967). The majority of my fieldwork however, was 
conducted via observation in two teams in the memory service. As I will 
explain in the final sections of this chapter, I could not observe memory 
nurses in the second memory clinic team, as I did not have ethical approval 
to carry out observations in patients’ homes.  
 
Observations of team meetings and clinical encounters were focussed and 
selective, which reflected the microcosm of the cultural actions of the clinic 
as opposed to portraying a whole cultural system (Wolcott, 1990). Therefore 
despite the small sample of observation data I had, I maintain that I have 
provided the level of ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973) and cultural 
interpretation (Wolcott, 1990), in clinical encounters to reveal the ‘situated 
rationality of action’ (Murphy and Dingwall, 2007: 2224). Limiting my 
observation focus to two teams in one memory service also allowed me to 
formulate well-thought through, rich and deep insights into the social life of 
the setting in line with my theoretical sensibilities as outlined in Chapter 
Three. In what follows, I briefly describe the nature of the three locations in 
the memory service setting where I carried out observations and interviews. 
Memory Service  
 
The memory service is an NHS governed institution and is accredited by the 
National Memory Services National Accreditation Programme, through the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. This programme aims to expand the number 
of memory services for accreditation to increase performance management 
and improve clinical services for diagnosing dementia, in line with the PM’s 
Challenge on Dementia as outlined in Chapter One (see Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2015). 
Nunmill Hospital  
 
The memory service is governed by a partnership foundation trust and the 
memory service operated within three memory clinic teams covering three 
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localities of the city. The memory service was based at Nunmill Hospital. 
The service overall, aims to assess, diagnose and treat individuals 
predominantly over the age of 65 experiencing early dementia and provide 
support for those who are subsequently diagnosed. I observed appointments 
in Nunmill Hospital and Ridge NHS Centre. In Nunmill the memory clinics 
were held in a building adjacent to the main hospital site. The building was 
not only used for memory service but for all mental health services, which 
fall under the responsibility of the community mental health service. 
Arriving at the centre, individuals are greeted by a small waiting area with a 
reception desk facing the seating. The room is generally quiet with only a 
couple of rows of seats. There are a number of information leaflets scattered 
around and posters on the walls with information about various mental 
health services available across the city. Aside from the posters, the walls 
are relatively drab, broadly representative of a generic GP surgery or 
healthcare centre. Nothing about the waiting area sets it apart as a specialist 
service. Adjacent to the reception desk is a security-coded door which leads 
to a number of consultation rooms each containing a desk, computer, three 
chairs, a set of scales and other generic medical equipment such as a 
stethoscope. The rooms are numbered (e.g. Consultation Room 1) and are 
used by a number of clinical professionals working across the service. 
Clinical professionals come and go through the building throughout the day; 
they are not assigned a specific consultation room.  
Ridge NHS Centre 
 
The second site was located in a suburb on the outer areas of the city serving 
the north locality of the city. Memory clinics were held in Ridge NHS 
centre. On arriving at Ridge, individuals are greeted with a large waiting 
area and a reception to the left. The room is generally bustling with clinical 
professionals walking through the waiting area and around the building 
more generally. Despite the fact that their work is scattered across the city, 
Ridge is also where a number of the professionals’ offices are located. 
Those working behind the reception area add to the hustle and bustle of the 
waiting room as they converse openly with each other and engage with 
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individuals waiting for appointments. Along the corridor from the waiting 
room are the offices of clinical professionals (serving as consultation rooms); 
a number of generic consultation rooms; a bathroom, and a room dedicated 
to staff meetings. Whilst a number of professionals pass through this space, 
consultants, registrars and junior doctors are those primarily occupying this 
space, as memory nurses in Ridge do not carry out appointments in clinic 
but rather in patients’ homes.  
Holmwood Hospital 
 
The third site, from which interviews with geriatricians and information 
managers were conducted, was located in the centre of the large 
metropolitan city. This NHS teaching hospital trust was therefore not part of 
the partnership foundation trust through which Nunmill Hospital and Ridge 
NHS Centre were governed.  
Data collection 
 
I will start by outlining how I collected data in Nunmill Hospital and Ridge 
NHS centre. I spent approximately six months collecting the data for my 
research. I carried out seven observations of consultations, two observations 
of team meetings and twenty-three interviews with professionals. 
Combining these methods, I attended to the operation of cognitive screening 
tools in practice and thus the interactions between the clinicians and the 
tests (Goffman, 1959; Mol, 2002). Whilst observation alone can reveal this 
spatiality of regions central to how AD is ‘done’ (Garfinkel, 1967), I 
supplemented the rich in-depth data from these selective observations with 
interviews, to explore the situated actions of clinicians (Murphy and 
Dingwall, 2007), the rationality behind why and how they located 
themselves, and the tools in practice. Carrying out observations also meant 
that I could elucidate the ‘inevitable slippages between what people said 
they thought and did, and what they ‘actually’ thought and did (Pinder et al., 
2005: 764). Observations are situated occasions of clinical work and 
represent the fluidity of relations between humans and materials for 
supplement through interview. These methods enabled me to consider the 
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frontstage and backstage practices, which make up AD as outlined in 
Chapter Three. In traditional ethnographic standards for ‘doing 
ethnography’, participant observation allows the researcher to be placed 
both ‘inside’, through participation and ‘outside’, through observation of the 
social world under exploration (Spradley, 1980).  
 
Selecting observations, as a method for gathering data, was not extensively 
and exclusively adopted in this research for a number of practical reasons. 
In part, the small number of observations carried out, reflects my overall 
focus on the particularity of setting; namely consultations where cognitive 
screening tools were used with patients. I selected observations to reveal the 
‘artful practices’ (Garkinkel, 1967: 11) of the everyday work of clinicians 
set with the task of classifying AD, supplemented by the accounts of 
professionals during interview. The arguments drawn from my observations 
in this thesis, stemmed from extensive fieldnotes written before, during and 
after the observation event. However, whilst I immersed myself in the 
routine procedures of the consultations, I did not immerse myself wholly in 
the routine procedures of the clinic overall (see Garforth and Kerr, 2010). I 
did not sit and observe the waiting area, or how professionals occupied 
themselves between consultations, or what they conversed about in the staff 
quarters and so on, because of my ethical review constraints. Although 
immersing myself into the culture of each setting informally would have 
allowed me to capture truly what was taken-for-granted, I had to confine 
this to what was taken for granted in the moments I was present in the team. 
I could not develop more than a ‘peripheral membership role’ in the field 
(Angrosino and Rosenberg, 2011: 468) and nor could I claim to have 
become ‘one of them’’ (Wind, 2008: 87). My fieldwork was a specific 
formulation of negotiated interactions and despite the importance assigned 
to carrying out observations, doing fieldwork is ‘so much more than being 
there’ (Wind, 2008: 86). 
 
Observations of consultations were arranged with clinicians in Nunmill 
Hospital. Consultant Psychiatrist 1 subsequently put me in contact with 
Consultant Psychiatrist 2 in Ridge NHS Centre, and again I met with the 
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team, outlined my research, gathered a list of professionals who would like 
to be contacted with further information, and similarly to Nunmill, I 
arranged consultations with individual clinicians. I had stipulated in my 
protocol for ethical review that I would include only those who had the 
capacity to consent to research, and this was the responsibility of the 
clinician to identify. As a result, I could not sit in the waiting rooms and 
wait for clinicians to inform me of a suitable case, particularly given that 
clinicians rarely spent more than a morning or afternoon in any one site. If 
there was cause for concern regarding capacity to consent when I arrived at 
the clinic and met the patient, I did not observe the appointments.  I 
arranged to observe the team meetings where I provided a ‘cover story’ 
(Bosk, 1979: 194) when questioned about my presence in the team, ‘I am a 
PhD student in sociology interested in how clinicians use instruments for 
screening cognitive function in the process of diagnosing AD’. This was 
met with enthusiasm across each of the teams and made contacting 
professionals for both observation of consultation and interviews less 
daunting.  
 
Access to the sites for observation was opportunistic. I waited on 
professionals who would email me with a list of potential observation dates 
and times; it was crucial that patients met the criteria for inclusion. In the 
majority of cases, I was asked to arrive approximately fifteen minutes prior 
to the start of the appointment to discuss with clinicians how I would be 
seeking consent from the patient. However, primarily this time was spent 
with the clinician who talked me through the patients’ medical notes and 
explained why they had been referred and what the appointment might 
entail. From the initial consultation I observed, I engaged in a process of 
reflexivity, continually moving back and forth from the field with revised 
thematic criteria, focus points and questions (c.f. Duneier, 1999). Following 
the six months of observation and interview work, I reached the point of 
data saturation both practically and conceptually. I began to make clear 
links between sets of data. Although data could have been supplemented 
with further rich and useful information, this may have led to an overload of 
unnecessary data to organise. In retrospect, I feared my presence was 
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perhaps too onerous for a number of clinicians who at times felt pressured 
by my presence because they had misconstrued the nature of my work, as I 
will go on to discuss when I turn to the limitations of my research.  
Fieldnotes 
 
During the observations of consultations and team meetings, and once I had 
gained consent from patients and practitioners, I carried a notepad and made 
fieldnotes. During the brief and de-brief or less formal encounters, I relied 
on memory and created notes immediately following fieldwork. This was 
because I felt that writing extensive notes during conversations (particularly 
if this was a first encounter with a clinician) would add to professionals’ 
curiosity as to what and why I was writing. Consultations were an 
appropriate more formal environment to construct fieldnotes. Whilst this 
approach to data collection has the potential to be construed as ad hoc and 
less rigorous than other forms of data collection, the notes I made during 
consultations were well-recorded, detailed and illuminating (Atkinson, 
1995). The fieldnotes gathered, contained exhaustive information of 
particular moments; briefing with the clinicians prior to consultation, 
consultation, de-brief following the consultation and the team meetings. 
They described interactions, relations, discourses, verbal practices, non-
verbal practices, space of the setting and personal reflections. Fieldnotes are 
not, and should not be read as, a comprehensive, exhaustive record of the 
setting; the researcher necessarily draws on tacit knowledge systems that 
cannot be contained in the written notes (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
As such, I relied on my memory to ‘recontexualise’ the observable events 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 147).  
 
I transcribed the fieldnotes as soon as possible following fieldwork because 
I opted not to use an audio-recorder; I feared that it would disrupt the order 
of the setting perhaps already compromised by my presence. This meant 
that I might have missed key events that I could have captured on the 
recorder. However, my overarching concern was that the presence of a 
recorder would be an intrusion on what was already a particularly sensitive 
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consultation. As Memory Nurse 6 explained when waiting for a patient to 
arrive prior to observation, ‘the patient needs to be as relaxed as possible, 
they may be coming into this clinic worried what’s going to happen and the 
family member might be too’.  
Conducting interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with twenty-one healthcare 
professionals and two information managers. The views and perspectives of 
patients undergoing testing for cognitive decline and the process of 
diagnosis, is of undeniable value and yet is a significantly under researched 
area of study. An increasing number of scholars highlight the benefits of 
involving dementia patients in research (Bond and Corner, 2001) but 
recognise that doing so poses ethical and practical issues, such as how to 
gain informed consent and assessing capacity to consent to research 
(Sherratt and Soteriou, 2007). The aim of this study was to explore how 
cognitive screening tools were used to classify AD, and henceforth 
constitute the disease in clinical practice, given the lack of attention towards 
the process of diagnosing AD within Sociology and Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). Whilst the accounts of patients would provide an 
interesting and important component for this endeavour, I attended to 
situated occasions to pursue an exploration of professionals’ interactions 
with the tests in healthcare practice, and how they made sense of the 
complexities associated with categorising AD more broadly. Furthermore, 
ensuring that patients included in the study had the capacity to consent to 
research, meant that gaining ethical approval would have proved 
challenging particularly, as I was also constrained by the three year 
timeframe to carry out doctoral research. I drew on both observations and 
interviews for my fieldwork.  
 
The majority of my fieldwork however, was in fact taken from interviews 
with clinical professionals. Interviews with clinical professionals were used 
both to confirm the observational data (often I wanted to clarify moments of 
uncertainty in the clinic) and as a method to simultaneously probe for 
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information and generate unexpected data. There were a number of 
instances however, where clinicians consented to observation but did not 
consent to a follow-up interview. Semi-structured interviews more generally, 
are also a particularly useful method of data collection for research within 
the healthcare setting. According to Holloway and Wheeler (2013), semi-
structured interviews are not dissimilar from the practitioner-patient 
encounter rendering them particularly effective at capturing the reflections 
and perspectives of clinicians. Furthermore, following discussions with a 
number of practising clinicians, it was made clear that the semi-structured 
interview method would be familiar to a number of clinicians. In accordance 
with my theoretical approach more broadly however, neither the accounts of 
clinicians nor the observations of interactions were ‘gold standard’ of an 
enactment or constitution of AD (Law, 2004). Rather, they participated in 
the enactment or constitution of realities: I attended to matters of 
‘praxiography’ as opposed to epistemology where methods do not presume 
the nature of AD (c.f. Mol, 1998, 2002a).  
 
Whilst the formal methods adopted in this research such as interviews and 
observations were assemblages of the interactions and relations between the 
‘fluxes of the real’, I did not take these accounts at face value. Instead I 
attended to their situatedness, which allowed me to engage with the 
continued enactment or continuing crafting of social life (Mol, 2002a). As 
such, I engaged with a context driven fieldwork, which encompassed both 
the unscripted and scripted accounts of professionals, particularly as 
ethnography adopts a multiple methods approach (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). Semi-structured interviews were also carried out with 
geriatricians in the large teaching hospital Trust (I did not observe these 
clinicians because of ethical approval constraints) and information managers 
who provided both non-clinical and clinical perspectives on the 
implementation of the National Dementia Commissioning for Quality and 
Innovation Framework (CQUIN). Their perspective on how both the 
instruments and the data generated were used was an important dimension 
for this research. Both geriatricians and information managers interviewed 
were sampled purposively from within the memory clinic teams, where I 
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gathered a wide-range of clinical professionals from across the hierarchy of 
the teams. Whilst empirically, this meant my research had limited 
generalisability I have generated theories, which could be generalised across 
other sites of practice.  
 
The majority of my field data was taken from interviews with professionals 
across psychiatry, psychology, gerontology and informatics. I drew 
extensively on interviews with professionals where I shifted back and forth 
between these formal ‘accounts’ or multiple versions of truth. However, I 
approached data with caution, recognising the identity enactments and 
justfications of actions through which these accounts were ‘made’. I further 
recognised that within these actions emerged a particular version of truth 
and yet at the same time, I did not claim that participants’ voices ‘[spoke] 
for themselves’ (Atkinson and Delamont, 2006: 166). Since I drew on 
ethnomethodological sensibilities, interview ‘accounts’ were not taken at 
face value rather they created ‘the realities they purport to describe’ 
(Atkinson and Delamont, 2006: 167). Since the data I had was 
predominantly drawn from interviews with professionals, there were 
moments across my thesis where the versions of truth emerging from 
interview accounts were difficult to supplement, confirm or refute through 
the more informal practices emergent during observation.  
 
I did not exclusively attach importance to professionals’ ‘accounts’ 
(Garfinkel, 1967) however, in terms of what they accounted for, and said 
they did during interview. I was also interested in their actions during 
observations and how these interactions ‘fitted’ alongside more formal 
interview accounts; the ‘slippage’ between formal accounts and informal 
practices (Horlick-Jones, 2005). Observing consultations and team meetings, 
I drew extensively on Goffman (1959) to demonstrate the front stage and 
back stage performances and mediation practices with regards to the use of 
cognitive screening tools. I therefore approached the data as negotiations of 
roles and identities across the spatiality of interaction (Goffman, 1959). 
Observing both the front-stage consultations and the back-stage team 
meetings and de-briefing with professionals, I viewed individuals as situated 
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beings whose interactions with humans, materials, objects and technologies, 
were embedded with social and cultural meanings. For those moments 
where I was able to carry out observations alongside interviews, I was able 
to verify and/or refute professionals’ claims. The kinds of thoughts and 
actions professionals reveal to an interviewer, are bound in the context and 
situation itself which emerges during observation (Garfinkel, 1967; 
Goffman, 1983). I recognised the multiple and situated versions of reality 
produced in the field and ‘revealed’ in accounts.  
 
Drawing on both interviews and observations, I mirrored Walford’s (2009: 
118) claim that doing ethnography requires multiple methods of data 
collection. However, this is not a question of truth or untruth with respect to 
the kinds of knowledge produced by such methods. Instead, by drawing on 
both interviews and observations, reflects the efforts made to comprehend 
interactions which are contextually constructed and shaped by the power 
relations between researcher and researched. The thoughts and actions 
emergent during interaction or revealed to the interviewer, and the 
situatedness of these actions are dependent upon the situation itself 
(Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1983). I therefore explained action both at the 
individual level and drew on context-driven fieldwork. 
 
The interviews were carried out throughout the six-month fieldwork period 
across Nunmill Hospital, Ridge NHS Centre, and Holmwood Hospital as 
part of the large teaching hospital Trust. I was given an allotted time for 
interview set aside from the routine working practice of professionals, and 
the location of the interviews meant enabled me to capture the context of 
their professional practice. The interviews were semi-structured, audio-
recorded and ranged from thirty minutes, to one hour thirty minutes in 
length. I created interview schedules but approached them as guides, which 
allowed me to develop points, reflect on questions and refine where 
necessary. As demonstrated in Appendix K, these were flexible interview 
guides as not all the questions may have been asked. The questions focussed 
on professional practice in terms of experiences, lives, opinions and 
interactions within the organisation. Professionals were informed and asked 
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to consent to the interview being audio-recorded for transcription; informed 
that they could refuse to answer questions and stop audio-recording if 
necessary, and withdraw from the interview at any point throughout its 
duration. The professionals were sincere and often candid about their role 
and the use of cognitive screening tools, drawing on and reflecting on 
specific patient cases to elaborate specific points. Although they were 
particularly candid in these responses however, there were a number of 
times where professionals pretended to place their hands over the recorder 
or asked me not to include what they had said in my thesis. Overall, 
professionals were eager to participate and were particularly open. In what 
follows, I outline my role as researcher within the field and how this was 
shaped, approached and perceived by professionals. I reflect on the reasons 
for their candid accounts of their experiences and approaches towards the 
tools and their role in the organisation, which in part, I consider to be 
reflective of the subject under investigation.  
The role of the researcher and student researchers  
 
Amit (2000) reflects that negotiation and reflexivity within the research 
process will influence the experiences told; the situations will define the 
method, and the way the method is approached. During both observations 
and interviews, clinicians were engaged with my research and generally 
supportive of my role. However as there is a ‘delicate relationship’ between 
the ethnographic researcher in the clinical space and access to this space 
(Long et al., 2008: 71 emphasis added), gatekeepers were crucial to this 
engagement and support. When I approached clinicians for interview, or I 
was asked about my presence when carrying out observation work, 
disclosing my affiliation with the gatekeepers provided me with the 
authority to be present in the team and also to approach participants for 
inclusion in the project (see Atkinson, 1995). I consider that without these 
gatekeepers, access to participants would have been enormously time 
consuming and laborious. Moreover, whilst my observations of the settings 
were minimal, it was important that I established relationships with 
professionals in order to claim the rights of the observer in the shifting 
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positions of insider and outsider research status (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007). It is to this last point that I turn when considering my role as a 
student researcher in the acquisition of data and access to the field. 
 
The concept of participant observation in traditional ethnographic standards 
of ‘doing ethnography’ positions the researcher as both ‘insider’, through 
participation and ‘outsider’, through observation of the social world under 
exploration (Spradley, 1980). The extent to which these positions are fixed 
is however, a matter of contention, experienced differently by participants 
and the researcher (Desmond, 2007; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; 
Angrosino and Rosenberg, 2011). Given the existence of pre-determined 
‘roles’ within the clinical setting (patient, health worker, relative/visitor 
(Wind, 2008)), it is perhaps only appropriate for researchers to assume the 
role of researcher or student in these settings, thus failing to participate per 
se in the roles under investigation. Subsequently I drew on the concerns of 
Woolgar and Neyland (2013) in their ethnographic work on exploring the 
role of mundane technologies. For Woolgar and Neyland, (2013) they 
describe their task, ‘to document and reflect upon the experiences of moving 
back and forth across cultural divides and perceptual boundaries, of being 
simultaneously an insider and outsider and of moving between the two’ (pp. 
15). The degree of participation however, will differ in accordance with the 
settings to be researched and the characteristics of the researcher themselves. 
Furthermore, I am aware that my level of participation in the field 
constrained my ability to be wholly ethnographic. Whilst Consultant 
Psychiatrist 1 sponsored my study, my role as researcher in the field was 
ultimately as ‘outsider’.  
 
What contributed to my approval in the field despite not being fully 
immersed in the field was that clinicians were willing to engage with the 
topic, which they felt was worthy of study. Moreover, the merit of 
qualitative research is that individuals feel able to talk about their lives and 
experiences with someone who is a relative stranger, and I reflected on my 
role and access as one of reflexivity. Whilst negotiating access to clinical 
settings may be relatively unproblematic as Wind (2008) suggests, the 
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complexities of holding this position of access is inherently difficult. 
Undoubtedly professionals working in these settings are constantly 
undergoing their own negotiations with the patients themselves that leaves 
little scope for the role of the researcher. It was therefore important that I 
made myself known as a researcher and built rapport with the professionals 
working in the field (Goodson and Vassar, 2011). There were moments 
however, particularly during the observations of team meetings when 
professionals misconstrued exactly what it was I was doing and referred to 
me as a psychology student or social worker. 
 
In relation to the interviews carried out with professionals, as a student 
researcher, interviewing elites could have been a challenging process 
particularly when I did not have a claim in the profession overall (Harvey, 
2010). As Harvey (2010) contends, it is essential that junior researchers be 
better organised, persistent and flexible than those interviewing lay people. 
For Harvey, it is crucial to be aware that the lack of experience of junior 
researchers and establishment within the field of study, may hinder the 
recruitment process. As such, I remained flexible with regards to arranging 
interviews; acknowledging that clinicians’ schedules could potentially 
change and therefore I may be required to alter my working practices. The 
gatekeepers also aided the process of recruitment as my affiliations with 
these professionals allowed me to access individuals perhaps more easily 
than if I had approached the field blind. 
Data analysis 
 
In line with the philosophical and theoretical orientations of this research, a 
‘reflexive interaction’ process guided the data analysis process (Altheide, 
1987:65). Analysis of data is an on-going process, which begins in the field 
and continues in transcription and coding (Ibid). Ethnographic analysis 
adopts an iterative process in which themes arise during data collection or 
‘field work’ (Thorn, 2000) where the researcher codes and categorises data 
to ‘interpret thematic categorisations, search for inconsistencies and 
contradictions and generate conclusions about what is happening and why’ 
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(pp. 68). Themes were identified both at a ‘manifest level’ (observable 
within the data), and at the ‘latent level’ (that which is underlying the 
phenomena and not directly observable) (Boyatzis, 1998). Thematic 
analysis in this research did not impose strict analytical frameworks on the 
data but was sensitive to the emergence of themes, inferences and nuances 
in the data. I also carried out situational analysis, which renovates the 
framing of actions central to a grounded theory approach, and considers the 
‘key elements and conditions that characterise the situation of concern’ (pp. 
554). As such, the complexity of resolving and constituting AD was framed 
within what Geertz (1973) describes as ‘thick descriptions’ of social worlds, 
arenas and negotiations (Clarke, 2003: 558).  
 
Clarke (2003) claims that grounded theory does not take into account the 
‘sea of discourses’ (pp. 559) that represents the post-modern era. 
Subsequently, influenced in part by the concerns of grounded theory, Clarke 
draws attention to ‘inchoate social features of a situation’ to make them 
more ‘visible’ (pp. 572). As Clarke suggests, the situational analysis 
approach can be utilised to analyse or map a variety of data including 
observations, interviews and documents. As such, throughout my fieldwork, 
the material from interviews and observations were compiled to establish 
moments of intersection and also disconnection. The ‘fractional objects’ of 
reality (Mol, 2002a) emerged through the cross checking of data materials, 
revealing the thick descriptions and subsequently interpretations of data 
(Geertz, 1973). Furthermore, I sought a method of ‘social inversion’ (Clarke, 
2003: 572) where I attempted to reveal the invisibilities of situation. This 
was in accordance with my overall approach, which foregrounded practice 
and as a method overall, which allows social scientists to explore that, 
which has been largely ignored or taken for granted (Timmermans and Berg, 
2003). 
 
This is not to suggest however, that themes emergent in the literature review 
were not considered to make sense of the data. During fieldwork, I adopted 
an inductive, reflexive approach and developed themes, categories and 
interpretations to illuminate the areas of inquiry of pertinence to my 
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research, which also aided the focus of my empirical chapters. As such, my 
findings were coherently sorted and grounded in theory. In terms of the 
tools used for analysis, I attempted to manage and make sense of my data 
through NVivo9: qualitative data management software. However, I decided 
against persevering with this software as I found that it became increasingly 
time consuming when attempting to order my data. As such, I decided to 
begin analysis manually, which allowed me to manage and make sense of 
my data without becoming overwhelmed by quantity and scope (Seidel, 
1992). In the thesis, I provided quotes from both observations and 
interviews, and attempted to keep as much detail as possible to avoid further 
fragmentation of accounts and instances. During transcription I transcribed 
verbatim and I deleted some of the more ‘distracting’ aspects of the data 
such as pauses (Atkinson, 1995: 12).  
Limitations of ethnography  
 
I do not claim to have produced a wholly ethnographic study but I adopted 
the theoretical orientations of this approach and drew on ethnographic 
methods including participant observation. Subsequently, it is important to 
consider the limitations of ethnography regardless of the extent to which this 
research can claim to be wholly ethnographic in approach. According to 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), there are five dominant ethical issues to 
consider when drawing on ethnographic sensibilities. Whilst these are not 
solely constitutive of ethnography and can be applied more broadly to other 
social science methods or methodological frameworks, ethnography gives 
these issues a ‘distinctive accent’ (pp. 207). The authors categorise them 
under five headings: informed consent, privacy, harm, exploitation, and 
consequences for future research (pp. 207). More generally, as Bosk (2001) 
claims, ethnography has the potential to become a moral and ethical 
problem for a number of reasons. We knowingly encourage the types of data 
which will yield rich data such as discrepancies, do not completely disclose 
the interests of the research, and exploit participants who may get ‘little or 
nothing in return’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 217).  
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In relation to the issue of informed consent, as Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007) contend, because the researcher actively builds and facilitates rapport 
with participants, it could be the case that participants ‘forget’ that the 
research is taking place (pp. 210). Furthermore, and particularly in relation 
to my research, regardless of the fact that the study was overt in nature, I did 
not disclose every detail about the research to the participants. First, when 
attempting to navigate initial access to the field, I did not have all the 
components of my research mapped out because of the reflexivity regarding 
fieldwork in ethnography more broadly. Second, whilst I provided enough 
information for participants to understand the basics of my study and ensure 
it was relevant for professionals working in the medical sector, there were a 
number of occasions where despite providing numerous information sheets, 
clinicians asked if I was a psychology student or a social worker. On 
reflection, since I did not provide every detail of my study this could have 
confused participants and yet concurrently, providing reams of information 
could be regarded as intrusive subsequently affecting the behaviours of 
participants (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).  
 
Furthering this discussion on informed consent, whilst studies including 
Atkinson’s (1981; 1984) which examines teaching of medical students at the 
bedside in hospitals, did not seek consent from the patients or students 
present, this exclusivity would have been ethically problematic for my 
research. As a non-medical student entering a medical field, I had to gain 
consent from each person within the consultation room. Whilst the control 
ethnographers have over the research process is minimal (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007), given that it is difficult to ensure every person within the 
observation arena can be fully informed, this was something I had to 
overcome having stipulated to the REC that I would only include those with 
the capacity to consent to research. It was also important to recognise that 
clinicians were attempting to fit my role into their own pre-existing frames 
of practice. Subsequently, I had clear criteria of who or what to observe: I 
observed encounters with patients, professionals and family members/carers, 
and observed professionals in team meetings. These closed environments 
meant that some control was exerted over the encounters and ensured that 
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patients met a specific set of criteria for inclusion to avoid exploiting them if 
they did not have capacity to consent to research. 
 
Another problem arising from my study concerns anonymity. Whilst I 
replaced names with the professions of participants and ordered them 
numerically; replaced the names of research settings with pseudonyms; 
omitted details that could be traceable to the participant, and altered 
traceable attributes of participants, there were no guarantees that this was 
enough to preserve anonymity. Attempting to do so however, overcomes the 
distinction between private and public and trust between researcher and 
researched (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Yet despite my attempts to 
conceal the identities of those participating in my research given the 
relatively localised and specific site for study, there was the possibility that 
those within the field may uncover these identities laid down in permanent 
text for public exposure. Whilst I have tried to overcome this as best as 
possible, it remains a feature of ethnography overall which researchers are 
continually navigating.  
 
Perhaps another limitation of my study was the fact that I was anxious 
throughout my observation work that clinicians would perceive my role as 
one of judgement. This anxiety was born in part out of the fact that during 
analysis, I became aware that I might release details that could be perceived 
by professionals as a criticism of how they approached the tools and 
diagnosis more broadly. Moreover during my fieldwork, professionals 
themselves expressed their anxieties during observations and private 
conversations that I would be informing them that they were incorrectly 
administering the tests. As Trainee Psychiatrist 2 said to his patient during 
observation, prior to carrying out the test, ‘this is where Julia is going to 
watch to see if I do it [the test] right’. In order to overcome this, I clearly 
stated in the participant information sheet and clarified with clinicians prior 
to observations, that I would not be making judgements about existing 
practice. As I will demonstrate in the following empirical chapters, I clarify 
further that my aim was to uncover the complexities that clinicians were 
faced with when classifying AD; examining how they navigated social, 
101 
 
cultural, political and technical arenas through the use of the tools and 
within the organisation of the team. My intention was not to provide a 
privileged account of what should or should not be happening, or judge or 
render professional work open for criticism; healthcare organisations and 
particularly the memory service were under a great deal of pressure to 
perform. It was my intention therefore to provide a detailed, analytical 
account of the relationships, interactions, accounts, approaches and labour 
associated with classification which did not require me to pass judgement on 
these situated occasions. I have endeavoured to provide a critical yet 
accurate portrayal of how diagnosis and AD is ‘done’ across the settings 
(Garfinkel, 1967).  
 
As is the case with all qualitative research, carrying out the fieldwork for 
this research required flexibility, patience and investment in time. 
Appointments were cancelled at the last minute, at times clinicians forgot I 
would be attending observations or interviews, interviews were rearranged 
when professionals were required elsewhere, and so on. In accordance with 
these practical difficulties I faced however, there are a number of limitations 
of ethnography more broadly which require elaboration. A further practical 
limitation of my study was that whilst I gained ethical approval for two 
further sites for investigation, I did not access these sites since they claimed 
my work would be too onerous due to increasing clinical demands on the 
service. As such my sample is particularly small yet also rich and in-depth 
in accordance with my theoretical allegiance to ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 
1973). Furthermore, whilst I observed consultants, registrars and junior 
doctors across both teams, I could only observe memory nurses in one of the 
teams as they carried out the majority of nurse appointments in patients’ 
homes, for which I did not have ethical approval. Nor could I observe 
patients undergoing cognitive assessment associated with the CQUIN in a 
hospital ward as whilst I had ethical approval to do so, following contact 
with a number of individuals including consultant geriatricians and senior 
nurses, it was deemed too onerous for me to be present on an AMU, and 
capacity to consent could not be guaranteed. As such I avoided making 
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general claims regarding my observations but treated them instead as 
moments in time.  
 
Whilst the claims in this thesis were broadly representative of one specific 
team in an organisation, it remained difficult to discuss these situations in 
relation to making universal claims about the NHS more broadly. However, 
given the fact that the memory service and the large teaching hospital Trust 
are NHS institutions, their practices will be similar to other NHS institutions 
in spite of locality of variation. For example, the National Dementia CQUIN 
is a universal framework implemented across all NHS hospitals in the UK. I 
argue that each of these sites constituted a situated example of the use of 
cognitive screening tools in the process of diagnosing AD in the UK, and 
my analysis answered broad questions about how technologies are used in 
the process of classifying AD in clinical practice. Whilst perhaps my 
research overall, has limited external reliability, validity and 
representativeness, my theoretical sensibilities meant that there was no 
absolute reality that could be found in some pre-existent state across time 
and space. As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 234) note, whilst 
ethnography is unable to provide a solution for queries regarding 
generalisability, perhaps nor can any other form of social research. Drawing 
on ethnographic methods including observations, my research was highly 
interpretive; some of the text is not objectively reported but created and 
manipulated. However, whilst ethnography ‘plays a complex and shifting 
role’ (pp. 2) as an approach to doing research, it does not mean that the 
researcher cannot offer useful insights into and applications of particular 
forms of social life. Perhaps appreciating the limitations of ethnography as 
an approach (as with all social science research methodological sensibilities), 
and recognising its situated findings, should be of central concern to the 
ethnographer in the field.  
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have briefly outlined how my overall theoretical approach 
to practice, informed my research design. For Timmermans and Berg (2003), 
103 
 
an approach which foregrounds practice allows the analyst to observe the 
subtle effects and implications of technological implementation in everyday 
practice. With this in mind, I have reviewed my research design, the 
reasoning behind my decisions, and how my decisions were informed. As a 
result, my research design aimed to reflect not simply the ‘high hopes or 
dire warnings’ of cognitive screening tools, but intervene in the invisibility 
of current diagnostic practice in which these tools are situated, implemented 
and remain pervasive (Timmermans and Berg, 2003: 97). I opened up 
current diagnostic practice but at the same time abandoned preconceived 
ideas about technologies, techniques and professionals. As I have outlined, I 
embedded performative sensibilities in my research design, I asked what 
kinds of tools cognitive screening tools are, what they do, how they produce 
multiplicity in situated occasions, and resolve complexity. Furthermore, I 
described the ways in which I drew on the concerns of situational analysis 
(Clarke, 2003) to deal with the complexities of healthcare practice before 
continuing to engage with the limitations of my study which ranged from 
issues regarding informed consent, to my claim to ethnography overall. I 
highlighted how the accomplishment of ethnographic fieldwork relies on a 
complex and detailed relationship between theory and negotiation of 
knowledge construction a priori, which may have been constrained by the 
NHS REC.  
 
In the following three empirical chapters, I shall tell the story of how 
cognitive decline and Alzheimer’s disease are classified in clinical practice. 
Across these analysis chapters, I investigate the role of cognitive screening 
tools within complex socio-material practices, and explore the interactions 
between clinicians, patients and technologies in clinical practice. I attend to 
the ways in which clinicians make sense of diagnosis in the clinic and with 
respect to managing the ‘ageing population’ more broadly, demonstrating 
how cognitive screening tools, mundane and taken for granted, are ‘brought 
to life’ (Berg, 1996: 501). 
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Chapter Five 
Navigating Uncertainty in the Clinic 
 
The following three chapters outline the key findings of my study. By 
attending to the everyday work of professionals, I explore the constitutive 
role of instruments for screening cognitive function in the process of 
classifying Alzheimer’s disease (AD). I explore the role of these 
technologies in the clinician-patient interaction and demonstrate the myriad 
of ways in which clinicians are able to approach and perform the tools as 
provisional devices. In doing so, producing and reproducing patient 
identities and professional hierarchies, to navigate and manage uncertainty 
(Chapter Five). I also investigate how the boundaries of classification are 
constituted through the mobilisation of uncertainty for the production of AD 
(Chapter Six); and analyse the adoption of the tools in the wider policy 
arena for detecting the disease in its earliest stages (Chapter Seven). I argue 
that initiatives such as the National Dementia CQUIN, shifts the 
temporalities of classification when translated into clinical practice, 
producing further uncertainties particularly around patient futures, as it 
attempts to reify the patient ‘pathway’.  
 
In Chapter Five, I show how clinicians negotiate cognitive screening tools 
and articulate their provisionality in response to the uncertainties associated 
with measures of cognitive decline. This articulation work points to the fact 
that the value(s) associated with these tools are not ‘stable and predefined’ 
but ‘grappled with, articulated, and made in concrete practices’ (Dussauge, 
Helgesson, Lee and Woolgar, 2015: 1). This STS approach to the notion of 
values, grounds my empirical chapters since this thesis does not attempt to 
deconstruct whether the tools have intrinsic value for producing knowledge 
about cognitive decline. Rather, it elucidates how their values are 
constituted in socio-technical arenas for dealing with complexity and for 
making sense of classification. Overall, in relation to what I argue is the 
making of the tools as provisional devices, possible because of their low-
technological and mundane status, I introduce the concept of portability 
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across the three empirical chapters. I define portability as a set of practices, 
which ensures the movement of cognitive screening tools across different 
actors and settings, and across time and space. This portability, which is 
articulated across the sites of study, is necessary for two distinctive reasons. 
First, it is necessary for navigating and managing the uncertainties and 
complexities associated with diagnosing AD in the everyday, routine clinic. 
Second, it is necessary for managing AD in terms of resource allocation and 
service provision in the wider healthcare setting. The making of the tools as 
provisional and therefore portable devices is not completely unbounded 
however, and throughout my empirical chapters and particularly in my 
discussion, I reflect on when portability occurs, where it occurs, on whose 
proviso, and when it does not, across different settings and temporalities. 
 
In this chapter, I capture how clinicians use cognitive screening tools to 
navigate and manage the uncertainties associated with measures of cognitive 
decline. Tracing interview accounts and observations in the memory service, 
I demonstrate how uncertainty is manifested threefold. First, in the absence 
of a definitive method for diagnosing AD, second, in the ambiguities 
associated with the tools themselves, and third, in the ways in which 
patients conceive the meaning of diagnosis overall. I argue that the tools are 
articulated as partial and therefore provisional devices, for navigating and 
managing this uncertainty, and I emphasise how the tools are subsequently 
made portable for making sense of classification. In the context of the 
memory service, an increasing number of tasks are being delegated to 
memory nurses and Occupational Therapists (OTs), including the use of 
instruments for screening cognitive function in initial consultations. I 
therefore illustrate that performing the tools as provisional devices, is 
practised differently across the professional hierarchy, reproducing the 
power relations within the memory service. Whilst all clinicians observed, 
engage with mediation and manipulation practices, professionals occupying 
positions higher up the professional hierarchy, are afforded the 
responsibility of privileging clinical judgement to manage uncertainty (c.f. 
Bosk, 1979). Mapping these two distinctive strands of provisionality, I 
suggest that despite the tools producing and reproducing professional 
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hierarchies, the making of provisionality through mediation and 
manipulation practices also carves out a unique space for memory nurses. 
As the tools are made portable into patients’ homes, memory nurses assign 
significance to what is socially and culturally significant in this space. The 
final section of this chapter, highlights clinicians’ commitment towards 
objectivity, and the quantified element of the tools across the memory 
service, which drives how classification proceeds within a complex 
distribution of medical practice. These practices, as well as aligning with my 
arguments in Chapters Six and Seven, play a key role in understanding how 
the constitutive role of cognitive screening tools, drives the medical 
decision-making process in an arena of uncertainty. The power of the 
mundane is revealed, necessary for navigating and mobilising the networks 
of practices involved in what Berg (1992, 1996) describes as medical 
decision-making processes. More broadly, this chapter is grounded in 
theoretical literatures on patient identities and professional hierarchies 
(Goffman, 1959; Latimer, 2000, 2004; Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005). 
Organisation of the memory service  
 
Despite the ambiguities, which emerge as both cause and consequence of 
AD as a nosologically contested disease however, clinicians in the memory 
service overall, were committed to finding a diagnosis for patients, family 
members and carers in this arena of complexity and difficulty. There was a 
commitment towards getting diagnosis ‘right’ for a disease which remains 
in part highly stigmatised, fuelled more broadly by archaic approaches 
towards mental health and ageing more generally. Across the memory 
service, instruments for screening cognitive function were administered with 
individuals who had been referred either from primary care, in-patient 
liaison psychiatry, or through the community mental health team. The 
memory service consisted of a wide-ranging number of professionals 
working in the field of psychiatry including consultant psychiatrists, 
specialty doctors, registrars, junior doctors, memory nurses, and 
occupational therapists. On entry into the memory service pathway, a record 
of the individual’s referral was sent to the team and either allocated through 
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the central system, or discussed and assigned to the appropriate professional 
in the multi-disciplinary team meetings (MDTs), depending on the 
individual’s care trajectory. For initial appointments where cognitive 
function is assessed using instruments for screening cognitive function, 
memory nurses were expected to carry out the majority of the appointments 
either in the patient’s home or in clinic. The diagnostic appointments were 
the responsibility of the medics within the team. In the clinic, a family 
member and or carer usually accompanied individuals. The standard 
procedure for appointments is that the clinician asks the patient whether 
they know why they have been referred to the memory service and a full 
clinical history is taken prior to formalised testing for cognitive decline. 
Depending on the information gleaned from the appointment, which in the 
case of this research lasted no longer than 1hour, clinicians explained to 
individuals that they will either be referred for further diagnostic testing or 
in the case of consultants, speciality doctors, trainee doctors and registrars, a 
diagnosis was made during the appointment. Completion of a diagnostic 
appointment depended on the need for, or prior completion of, blood tests, 
Computerised Tomography (CT) or Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
scans. The cognitive testing made up (at the most) 25 minutes of the clinical 
encounter unless the patient was having difficulty understanding or 
answering the questions. At this point, the clinician could allocate more time 
depending on overall caseload. 
 
The organisation of the memory service reflects an increasingly complex 
distribution of medical practice: a multi-disciplinary approach to healthcare. 
Pressures on workforce boundaries due to increased demand on the memory 
service, have led to a delegation of tasks previously only performed by 
expert professionals (c.f. Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005): the 
administration of cognitive screening tools. The structure of the memory 
service in terms of delegation of tasks is important for analysing how the 
tools are used to navigate uncertainty, who adjudicates on their use, and for 
what purpose, within the MDT. Consultant Psychiatrist 2 explained the 
complex distribution of the service when asked about the history of the 
cognitive screening tools in current practice, 
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‘One of the reasons that we chose the Addenbrookes was that, about 
oh my goodness how many years ago now (I work with Mark who’s 
one of our clinical psychologists here) when we wanted to look at 
changing the memory service from being very medically led, so 
doctors did all the initial assessments, to when we knew there was 
going to be this big increase in cases, we would go for a multi-
disciplinary team approach.’ 
 
To provide some context, the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination that 
Consultant Psychiatrist 2 refers to, is a 30 question cognitive screening test 
used primarily for initial appointments across the memory service (see 
Appendix A). There was only one instance where I observed the Montreal 
Cognitive Examination (MoCA) being used for initial appointments and this 
was during an observation with Consultant Psychiatrist 4. When asked 
during de-brief why the MoCA was used instead of the ACE 111, 
Consultant Psychiatrist 4 explained that he deemed the tool to be ‘quicker’ 
to use than the ACE 111 and that the ‘clear history’ was considered to be 
‘the most important tool’. At the same time, Trainee Psychiatrist 1 explained 
during an observation that the reason for using an ACE 111 as opposed to a 
MoCA reflects the severity of the case; the MoCA is used for ‘moderate to 
severe cases’ and for patients ‘struggling with hearing and attention span’.  
 
The uptake of the ACE 111 in the memory service, reflects the shift in 
organisation of the service overall, (as Consultant Psychiatrist 2 described) 
and is therefore representative of the potential consequences of demand on 
healthcare provision (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005). As a result, the ‘big 
increase of cases’ the ‘professional turf’ (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005: 
899) in which, cognitive screening tools are administered, has become 
occupied by the traditionally lesser-valued or invisible roles of those whose 
expertise does not reside in the medical domain, such as memory nurses and 
OTs (c.f. Latimer, 2000; Allen, 2014). In what follows, I frame the 
investigation of the role of cognitive screening tools within this 
reconfiguration of the service. Memory nurses were increasingly required to 
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carry out initial appointments with patients, prior to involvement with 
professionals occupying positions higher up the professional hierarchy.  
The ‘making of provisonality’ 
 
Cognitive decline and Alzheimer’s disease are ‘categories in the making’ 
(Latimer et al., 2006: 614) continually (re)negotiated, navigated, and 
produced through the use of cognitive screening tools, and other diagnostic 
techniques across the professional hierarchy. The process of classification 
therefore relied on the articulation of the tools in the clinician-patient 
interaction, to respond to the uncertainties associated with measures of 
cognitive decline. First, tracing interview transcripts, I highlight the ways in 
which clinicians approached these tools across the professional hierarchy. In 
initial consultations across the memory service, the use of the tools was 
dependent on the clinical history of the patient; patient narrative of 
symptoms; family member and or carer narratives of symptoms; further 
diagnostic testing, and practising of clinical judgement. Articulating 
cognitive decline also relied on the ‘traditional clinical skill’ of attending to 
sign, symptom and pathology (Latimer et al., 2006: 614). The test was 
administered with the patient after the clinician had completed the clinical 
work. During conversations with clinicians including memory nurses and 
consultant psychiatrists, they described the relationship between the 
cognitive screening tools, clinical history, and functioning of the patient. 
When asked about the placement of the tests during consultation, Memory 
Nurse 4 explained,  
 
‘Yeah well it’s basically about the person themselves, so you’re 
asking literally about their well-being, how they are physically, how 
they are socially ‘cause that’s a big important task. It’s not just a 
case of doing that memory test, it’s all about what are they doing on 
a day to day basis, how are they getting up on a morning, how are 
they functioning, how do they get washed and dressed, how do they 
have their breakfast, are they going out regularly, how are they 
getting their meals, do they get the shopping brought in, do they 
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have visitors you know it’s everything basically so I tend to do, ask 
all those questions, and then do the memory test.’  
 
This was further demonstrated by Memory Nurse 3, 
 
‘I actually do my holistic assessment, I’ll start gathering my 
information and once I’ve gathered my information I then start to do 
my cognitive testing and that’s kind of the 80/20 rule there’ll always 
be a percentage where that it won’t be like that but for the, in terms 
of how I like to do my assessment that’s kind of what I do. So I’ll go 
in, do the holistic assessment, when I’ve done that bit then I’ll say, 
‘and now do you mind if I ask you some memory questions’ and, 
and I usually do it then.’ 
 
As both memory nurses illustrated, clinicians gathered the evidence for 
classification by attending first to the functioning of the patient and the 
extent to which the patient deviated from their normal or standard everyday 
routine. The ability of the patient to function or perform on a ‘day to day 
basis’ was privileged, the ‘80/20 rule’. This partiality was also confirmed by 
Memory Nurse 6 who explained during interview that they ‘would value the 
cognitive tool from between 20 to probably 40%. I would say that the other 
information was more important’. During an observation of a consultation 
with Trainee Psychiatrist 3, having discussed with the patient what the 
appointment would entail, she explained that ‘I just want to get a picture of 
what’s happening before objective testing.’ In this instance, the clinician felt 
it was important to reiterate the significance of the clinical work prior to 
objective testing because the appointment began with the patient asking a 
number of questions about CT scans and cognitive testing. The authority of 
the technology is as yet partial and incomplete, positioned alongside what 
was socially and clinically important (c.f. Latimer, 2000). This was also 
confirmed across the professional hierarchy as the following extracts from 
interviews with Consultant Psychiatrists 1 and 2 highlighted.  
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As Consultant Psychiatrist 1 clarified, 
 
‘Right, I suppose as a psychiatrist our clinical history is an 
assessment and that is probably the main stay of what we do, so 
that’s the bit that we give the major focus of when it comes to our 
differential diagnosis and formulation. The ACE 111 and MoCA are 
tools to support our clinical history and clinical acumen.’ 
 
In addition, as Consultant Psychiatrist 2 illustrated during interview, 
 
‘I use, I guess the first tool I would always say is that I use my 
clinical interview skills, so that would be my first thing is that I 
would always take a comprehensive history from the patient ‘cause 
that gives you loads of information without any formalised screening 
tool. I would then supplement that information if depending on what 
I found. If somebody’s mild to moderate impairment in my own 
mind as I’m doing this assessment, I would preferably, the first time 
I meet them, use the Addenbrooke’s cognitive examination version 
111, so that would be my preferred tool.’  
 
For Consultant Psychiatrists 1 and 2, their clinical work constituted the 
technique or ‘tool’ to privilege in the routine clinical encounter. As such, the 
cognitive screening tools were presented as devices, which ‘supplement’ the 
clinical work, confirmed by Consultant Psychiatrist 1 as ‘the main stay of 
what we do’ thus constructing and confirming professional identity aside 
from the use of the technology in the clinic. The idea that these ‘formalised’ 
tools were used as aides or conceptual support tools, suggests that the 
process of classification was not confined to any one technique or indeed 
formal technology. Interview transcripts were replete with further examples, 
and the partiality of the tools was a frequent topic of discussion across the 
professional hierarchy. During an observation with Memory Nurse 6 he 
reassured the patient following completion of the test, ‘not to worry because 
the test only plays one part’. Clinicians further attested their partiality in 
formal interview accounts stressing that the tools in the clinic were ‘not the 
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be all and end all’. This partiality does not mean however, that the tools 
were downgraded  or became redundant in the process of classifying AD as 
Memory Nurse 1 explained, ‘they are a really important part…and I do 
definitely value them, but they are only part of our assessment as Nurses’. I 
will return to the role of memory nurses further in the chapter. The 
classification ‘box’ to adopt the metaphor used by Bowker and Star (2000) 
and developed by Jutel (2009), was thereby not solely constructed or 
constituted through the use of cognitive screening tools; the utility of the 
tools was compounded by the clinical work that preceded their use.  
 
Developing this notion of partiality so far accounted for by clinicians, I 
suggest that uncertainty associated with diagnosing AD overall, had direct 
implications for the articulation of cognitive screening tools in the clinic. 
The status and role of the tools was entangled with the uncertainties and 
complexities associated with measures and the process of measuring, 
cognitive decline. As outlined in Chapter Two, AD is difficult to categorise, 
and there is no one technique or technology with which to definitively 
confirm a diagnosis in the clinic. Moreover, the uncertainties associated 
with measures of cognitive decline extend beyond the difficulty in clinically 
or biologically framing the disease. A diagnosis of AD and the process of 
diagnosing, produce discursive accounts of mental health, which tended to 
be articulated in the clinic. Together this formed a repertoire of uncertainties, 
with the potential to disrupt the process of classification, and it became the 
task of clinicians to navigate these uncertainties through the use of cognitive 
screening tools. During interview, Clinical Psychologist 3 highlighted the 
complexity associated with diagnosing AD overall, as she explained when 
asked to reflect on the role of the tools in the clinical encounter, 
 
‘There’s always a danger that if you attach too much importance to 
just one aspect of the diagnostic process, that you might have missed 
something and it is often a process of exclusion rather than 
confirmation in terms of the diagnostic process for dementia so I 
think it’s dangerous if we attach too much importance to the tests.’ 
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Clinical Psychologist 3 raised a number of key points. First, conceiving the 
tools as partial or incomplete systems to metaphorically ‘box’ AD (Bowker 
and Star, 2000: 10) reflected the uncertainty associated with categorising 
AD more broadly. For clinicians to make sense of the extent to which 
producing knowledge about cognitive decline and AD is a process of 
exclusion rather than confirmation, for Clinical Psychologist 3 it was much 
to do with not privileging any technique or technology. The tools were used 
only to determine what AD was not as opposed to what AD is ‘out there’ 
(c.f. Jutel, 2011). This was also articulated during observations of team 
meetings where the significance of the tools was entangled in in-depth 
discussions between clinicians describing patient functioning, clinical 
history and mental health history. There was a collective agreement amongst 
clinicians, that the tools only played a small part of what was essentially the 
‘bigger picture’; clinicians avoided placing privileged emphasis on the tests 
(Observation Team Meeting Nunmill Hospital). Yet, at the same time, the 
tools also performed a sense of responsibility particularly for memory 
nurses, and whilst the tools partiality was collectively iterated across the 
memory service, there were also tensions around the extent to which the 
tools were increasingly being used to formalise work practices. Memory 
Nurse 7 framed the tools as devices for legitimising work practices as she 
described during interview,  
 
‘Well I think they play a part of it and I suppose we seem to need to 
have measurements of things now don’t we to sort of see how people 
are doing so there’s – it, it’s interesting I think to see how someone’s 
functioning when they are doing something like this and then to 
compare. For me I think the biggest importance is about how 
somebody’s actually functioning day to day with things that they 
need to function with; I wouldn’t personally put too much reliance 
on the using things such as the Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA) but I suppose it plays some role in building the bigger 
picture.’ 
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Memory Nurse 7 confirmed that within the space of the clinic, individual 
function was regarded as a technique in itself in the process of classification. 
Arguably, this work which focused on ‘functioning day to day’, was 
encompassing of the more informal practices of clinicians; difficult to 
formally measure by any technological device. According to Memory Nurse 
7, increasing methods for measuring ‘how people are doing’ using 
technologies such as cognitive screening tools are emerging more generally. 
This produced tensions around formally measuring and tracking patients’ 
progress and thereby legitimising work practices, and simultaneously 
accounting for the invisibility of the clinical work through, which the tools 
were mediated. Furthermore, as Memory Nurse 7 explained, in recognising 
these motivations, it was simultaneously important not to privilege these 
tools for considering AD as a broader ‘picture’ of components or adding ‘a 
piece to the puzzle’ (Interview Memory Nurse 1) because ‘you wouldn’t sit 
a maths exam and not do a maths exam would you really or say somebody 
was blind and they got given an eye test - you need to do something’ 
(Interview Memory Nurse 1). At the same time that the tools were expressed 
as partial devices, they were also important devices for legitimating work 
practices, which resonated particularly with memory nurses.  
 
In my analysis thus far, I have focussed predominantly on the accounts of 
clinicians. In what follows, I develop my analysis by exploring how the 
partiality of the tools was constituted during the clinic-patient interaction. 
My analysis of the articulation of the tools and their emergent values is 
entangled overall with my claim to foregrounding practice. I show that the 
value(s) of the tools and the expectations around their performance for 
detecting cognitive decline are not intrinsic or pre-defined properties but 
were ‘made’ within the arena of the clinician-patient interaction (c.f. 
Dussauge, Helgesson, Lee and Woolgar (2015). Through the actions of 
clinicians, the tools were negotiated between professionals across the 
hierarchy in the MDT, and across different settings, in response to the 
uncertainties associated with measures of cognitive decline. Analysing the 
clinician-patient interaction, I found that clinicians valued individual 
particularities in situ and yet despite the tools emerging as provisional 
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devices, I do not suggest that they were redundant in the classification 
process. In fact, the practices of the clinic brought them ‘to life’ (Berg, 1996: 
501); in turn, shaping how cognitive decline and AD were measured. Prior 
to exploring the intricacies of the clinician-patient interaction, the following 
extract from an interview with Trainee Psychiatrist 1 confirmed that the 
process of classifying AD overall is complex,   
 
‘Yeah I think sometimes it’s the unknown you know. I think when 
people have cancer they have an x-ray, they have a CT you know, 
they have blood tests and so on and this is, dementia’s a much greyer 
subject for people ‘cause people present in such a different number 
of ways and I think that the people who are in that grey area of 
having cognitive decline but still functioning reasonably well, 
probably got under the radar and then it’s not until people are very, 
very demented…if you ask somebody about dementia they think of 
the very old demented person in a care home don’t they, so yeah I 
think the fact that you can’t identify it and say right I’m living and 
I’m functioning with dementia I’m ok, I’m still having a reasonable 
quality of life, does sort of cloud it for people.’  
 
Trainee Psychiatrist 1 began by comparing AD to diseases such as cancer 
for which visual imaging technologies such as MRI (Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging) and CT (Computerised Tomography) can (in the majority of cases) 
be used to confirm the presence of disease . Visual imaging techniques 
‘clear[ing] the ‘fuzziness of reality’’ (Gross, 2012: 106). What is different 
about AD however is that the ‘fuzziness’ (Gross, 2012: 106) of the disease, 
is neither metaphorically nor literally made clear through the use of 
visualisation techniques such as a CT scan. For Gross (2012), visual 
imaging technologies are perceived to be more objective and accurate 
methods for producing knowledge about the problem than the individual 
particularities of patients. Yet as Trainee Psychiatrist 1 confirmed, AD is 
‘greyer’, in that it is uncertain and difficult to produce a classification of AD 
through the available technologies. The experiences of patients and 
individual particularities (Dodier, 1998), ‘people present in such different 
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ways’ therefore made the practising of these technologies inherently 
difficult. It also directly impacted the experiences of patients and the ways 
in which they conceived a diagnosis overall, ‘if you ask somebody about 
dementia they think of the very old demented person in a care home’ which 
I will discuss further in this chapter. However, aside from the complexity 
associated with definitively diagnosing AD using any particular technology, 
I also observed that the testing process produced anxieties for patients, 
emergent in the space of the clinic. As I observed during consultations, this 
was recognised by clinicians and subsequently performed in the clinic,  
 
“During previous observations of consultations, I had been invited 
into the room to wait for the patient with the clinician but the 
memory nurse was running late and so I was shown to the 
consultation room where I waited for the clinician to arrive. The 
room consisted of three chairs and a desk with a computer: two of 
the chairs were adjacent to the table with the computer and one in 
the corner of the room. On arrival, I asked the clinician where would 
be most appropriate for me to sit (usually it is clear which seat I 
should occupy). The memory nurse suggested that I move the chair 
in the corner so that I would not be sitting behind the patient, 
explaining that the patient needs to be as relaxed as possible and ‘it 
is likely that the patient and the family member will be coming into 
the clinic worried about a diagnosis’ (Observation Memory Nurse 
6).”  
 
Memory Nurse 6 spoke candidly about the anxiety both patients and family 
members felt about the consultation process and the possibility of diagnosis, 
which was a frequent note of observation throughout the memory service. 
Staging this within the practices through which cognitive decline is 
measured more generally, this anxiety was representative of what I conceive 
of as both a ‘culture of testing’ in relation to the use of cognitive screening 
tools, and also the existence of negative discursive constructs around mental 
health more broadly. In the case of Memory Nurse 6, navigating this 
discourse was about ensuring the patient was as relaxed as possible because 
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as he attested during follow-up interview, ‘there’s a huge psychological 
dimension to a potential diagnosis…it can have all kinds of different 
responses’. Anticipating these responses was much of the work of clinicians, 
and the ways in which they approached and mediated their use of the tools.  
Anticipating ‘all kinds of responses’: A culture of testing  
 
Seen through the lens of a ‘culture of testing’, this anticipation work led 
clinicians to undertake what I conceive of as practical mediation and 
manipulation practices in order to navigate this ‘culture of testing’, which 
had the potential to impact how patients conceived the nature of diagnosis 
overall. Grounding this anticipation work further, the ‘culture of testing’ had 
the potential to impact patient self and identity of which the technologies 
were important mediators for navigating and preserving the presentation, 
and thereby performance, of self (Goffman, 1959; Mol, 2002a). In the 
ceremony of the clinic and observable across the memory service, clinicians 
engaged with front stage and backstage mediation and manipulation 
practices (Goffman, 1959) of the cognitive screening tools in order to 
protect patient identity. This mediation and manipulation work occurred 
‘front stage’ in markedly practical ways, and was driven by the performance 
of clinicians backstage in two distinctive ways (c.f. Goffman, 1959). First, 
the process had the ability to compromise patient identity born out of a 
wider perception about mental health which existed in the wider population, 
and second, because clinicians recognised the ambiguity of the tests and 
themselves as users of the tests. Engaging first with mediation practices, 
initially, clinicians reassured patients that the tests were not markers of 
intelligence. As I witnessed during a consultation with Memory Nurse 6, he 
talked through the test with the patient continually reassuring them 
throughout, 
 
“During the consultation, Memory Nurse 6 asked the patient a series 
of questions about previous medical history, symptoms, changes in 
lifestyle, behaviour, and mood. When asking these questions, 
Memory Nurse 6 paused for a moment and apologised, ‘I’m sorry 
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about all these questions some of them are quite personal’. This was 
marked by silence from the patient, and the clinician, wanting to 
elaborate on this further, reassured the patient about how important it 
was to ask all the questions because the test figures as only ‘part of 
the assessment and it does not matter if you got 0 or 100’. The 
patient appeared visibly anxious however, glancing to the family 
member sat beside him. Memory Nurse 6 asked if it would be ok to 
carry out a test to ‘look at how their memory is working’. The patient 
agreed but still appeared anxious and responding to this, Memory 
Nurse 6 told them to just ‘do your best’. The test began and the 
clinician explained to the patient that he would miss out the writing 
tasks because of their lack of education, which the patient appeared 
visibly relieved to have confirmed. The family member also 
remarked here that the patient could barely write their signature, 
which had always been the case. The clinician pulled out the test 
from the draw in the desk, all the while explaining to the patient that 
although the patient has a poor level of education, this is ‘not an 
intelligence test and they see lots of intelligent people who can’t 
read or write very well’ telling the patient that he could tell he ‘is an 
intelligent man’ from the history taken: the patient nods and smiles 
and the test began.”  
 
Throughout the appointment, Memory Nurse 6 performed reassurance 
practices to protect both the patient and the family member from the 
vulnerabilities of the consultation as I will go on to illustrate. From the 
beginning, the clinician attentively responded to the anxieties of both the 
patient and family member about what the consultation would entail. This is 
suggestive of the extent to which the clinician-patient interaction, and the 
narration of the tests by clinicians, was continually performed to protect the 
patient’s identity (Goffman, 1959). First, Memory Nurse 6 clarified and 
made explicit that the test does not signify a marker of intelligence. In doing 
so, they actively positioned the performance of the patient in relation to 
being able to just ‘do their best’ regardless of intelligence. Furthermore, 
intelligence was categorised beyond traditional accomplishments of literary 
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attainment in order to protect patient identity; the idea that poor education 
equated to lack of intelligence. This was demonstrated during the 
observation as follows, ‘we see lots of intelligent people who can’t read or 
write very well and I can tell you are an intelligent man from the history you 
gave’. Responding to this, Memory Nurse 6 actively manipulated the test, 
‘because of your lack of education I will miss out the writing tasks’ which 
was again, accomplished for the protection of the patient’s identity. These 
performances however, were also illustrative of the extent to which, the 
active doing of the test, served to accomplish or affirm the culture of testing. 
A lack of education signified failure at being able to carry out a number of 
the tasks. This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
 
The carefully choreographed narration of the test and the reassurance 
practices were in the main, performed to reassure the patient and had a 
direct impact on their behaviour in the clinic; initially looking confused and 
anxious, to engaging and interacting with the clinician, telling jokes and 
smiling throughout. Memory Nurse 6 reflected on his approach to the tools 
during a de-brief conversation where he explained why he felt it was 
necessary to narrate the test in this way,  
 
“I suppose it’s also a generation thing about the idea of exams and 
things like that - a cognitive test isn’t an exam. As soon as you use 
the word test it – it, it - a clinical test is easier I’m going to do a 
blood test I’m going to do a blood pressure people can cope with that 
but if you sort of say we’re going to do a cognitive mental test with 
you, people think back to the 11+, they think back to education, they 
think of ‘oh am I going to suddenly be asked to write something? 
I’m illiterate or I’m dyslexic and going to feel stupid’ so it’s about 
sort of saying I’m trying to understand how your brain is working. 
And I usually - and I say everyone will be different, I, I always say ‘I 
don’t mind if you get zero on this I’ve already seen enough to know 
that things are fine’, even if things perhaps aren’t fine and there are 
problems, the fact I had that conversation with the person to 
reassure.” 
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Memory Nurse 6 maintained that there was a discursive culture of testing 
which exists outside of the clinical encounter that emerged in the clinic 
which the tools had the ability to reproduce, and in turn shape how patients 
approached the cognitive screening tests. Memory Nurse 6 claimed that the 
use of the word ‘test’ conjured notions about education and henceforth 
intelligence, which was integral to the patient’s identity. For Memory Nurse 
6, narrating the test as a device to ‘understand how your brain is working’, 
protected the identity of the patient. Furthermore, the clinician also 
underplayed the importance of patient performance, by masking the reality 
of the clinical work that preceded the test, ‘I don’t mind if you get zero on 
this’ and ‘I’ve already seen enough to know that things are fine even if 
perhaps things aren’t fine and there are problems’. The patient was 
reassured that things were ‘fine’ and that the significance of them scoring 
poorly on the tests was irrelevant because of the clinical work that had 
preceded the test. The efforts of the clinician extended beyond the doing of 
the test itself, and into how they narrated the significance of the clinical 
work done prior to the formal testing; performed in the interests of the 
patient. This culture of testing discourse was illustrated similarly during an 
observation of a consultation with Trainee Psychiatrist 3. However, tensions 
also emerged in the clinic, which reflected the extent to which dementia and 
diagnosis overall, were negatively perceived across the general population. I 
found that the culture of testing was further troubled by negative discursive 
constructs around AD and mental health as the following observation notes 
suggest,  
 
“Trainee psychiatrist 3 asked the patient about losing her car keys or 
house keys, and whether she had ever left the gas on without 
realising. At this point, the patient interrupted visibly frustrated by 
the questions raising her voice saying, ‘I know who the Prime 
Minister is as well and where he lives!’” 
 
“When trainee psychiatrist 3 scored the test at the end of the 
appointment, both the family member and the patient suggested that 
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this was the point at which the clinician would confirm whether 
they’re ‘doolally’ at which point both the patient and the family 
member laughed.”  
  
Arguably, from the perspective of the patient, the test, which asks the 
patient to name the PM, was considered integral to classification. This did 
not simply reflect the emergence of a discourse of testing however; rather 
following completion of the test, the test constituted and enacted particular 
representations and discursive accounts of AD and mental health more 
broadly, hence the reference to being ‘doolally’. This negative discourse 
around the perception of AD and mental health was a frequent note of 
observation across clinic appointments, and which I found particularly 
uncomfortable to witness as a researcher. Throughout observations, I 
reflected on the extent to which both patients and family members were 
attempting to protect themselves against potentially undermining 
interactions seen here with reference to ‘doolally’, thereby highlighting the 
vulnerabilities of the diagnostic procedure. This was demonstrated similarly 
during an observation with Speciality Doctor 1. From the beginning of the 
appointment, the patient made a concerted effort to explain that memory 
loss is a normal part of growing older, recalling everything that they could 
remember from their childhood to prove and protect against the kinds of 
questions that would be asked, and therefore the testing process overall.  
 
There were therefore numerous occasions where the test constituted 
negative discursive accounts of mental health and AD observed across the 
memory service. During the same observation with Specialty Doctor 1, the 
clinician asked the patient about family mental health history. An important 
observation I made from reflecting on my field notes, was that at this point 
both the patient and the family member claimed that the patient’s Mother 
had memory loss, saying she’d, ‘lost it – she didn’t even know her own 
husband in her own house!’ Reference to having ‘lost it’ was also witnessed 
during an observation with Trainee Psychiatrist 2, where the family member 
asked the clinician if the patient had ‘lost the plot’. Furthermore, expressed 
during an observation with Consultant Psychiatrist 4, when the patient was 
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asked about the history of dementia or Alzheimer’s disease in the family, 
the family member replied with, ‘his [the patient] sister has dementia 
towards the end of her life; she was saying all sorts of silly things’. 
Following the cognitive screening test, the patient also said that he felt a ‘bit 
barmy’ and on the way out thanked the clinician for ‘not laughing’. 
Together, these discursive constructs around AD and mental health 
resonated across observations of consultations and had important 
implications for how clinicians approached cognitive screening tools. This 
is a theme I develop further in Chapter Six.  
 
Developing the theme around the ‘culture of testing’ and protecting patient 
identity, at the same time that clinicians were actively aware of the anxieties 
produced by the initial appointment, this was at times contradicted in the act 
of accomplishing the test in the clinic. There were moments where 
clinicians (re)affirmed the role of these tools as critical examiners or ‘tests’ 
of cognitive decline and in doing so, produced the very culture of testing 
that clinicians sought to avoid. This was observed during a consultation with 
Specialty Doctor 1,  
 
“The clinician asked the patient whether it would be ok if she asked 
him to do a test to assess his memory – called it a memory test. She 
stated that ‘not everyone gets everything right and there’s no right or 
wrong answer.’ Later in the appointment, the clinician stated that 
‘some questions are very easy’’ before asking the patient “how are 
your maths skills”? Having correctly answered the maths section the 
clinicians stated that ‘they managed to get them all right – ‘well 
they’re [maths skills] clearly better than mine.’” 
 
Specialty Doctor 1 narrated the active doing of the test in relation to patient 
performance and skill, ‘not everyone gets everything right and there’s no 
right or wrong answer’. She then actively contradicted this when asking the 
patient about their ‘maths skills’ and informing the patient of their positive 
performance, ‘you managed to get them all right’. In doing so, the tools 
emerged as critical examiners of cognitive performance, contradicting the 
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reassurance practices that the clinicians tried to deploy. Despite the 
projection that there was ‘no right or wrong answer’ to the questions on the 
test, Specialty Doctor 1 made every effort to ensure that the patient was 
assured that they their performance was not wholly negative. Following the 
testing the clinician explained, “‘You didn’t do badly and you got a few 
right. There was always going to be the expectation that you wouldn’t do 
too well as you’re reporting having memory difficulties.’ ‘You did get a lot 
of things right’”. Yet both Memory Nurse 6 and Specialty Doctor 1, were 
compelled to draw attention to and protect, the performance aspect of the 
test and in turn the patient’s identity, ‘this is not an intelligence test’ and 
‘there’s no right or wrong answer’. These reassurance practices were 
articulated in the majority of observations observed. For example, clinicians 
would praise patients ‘well done’ who had correctly answered questions, 
and at the same time informed patients that they had answered incorrectly 
‘I’m sorry Jean that’s incorrect’ (Observation Trainee Psychiatrist 2). As I 
observed during the consultation with Trainee Psychiatrist 2 however, I 
reflected on the extent to which his particular reassurance practices were 
entangled in his own frustration that the patient was failing to correctly 
answer the majority of the questions.  
 
The testing process and the degrees of care work involved in protecting 
patient identity have thus far been witnessed as narration practices 
performed throughout the duration of the appointment.  Subsequently, the 
tools emerged as value-laden components rather than ‘dead, disconnected, 
without any relevance’ (Berg, 1996: 501). Therefore, agreeing with Berg 
(1996) that the interrelation and interaction between actors and the tools 
overall, was necessary for making medical practice work in the clinic, this 
occurred not simply for accomplishing professional roles in the organisation 
of the memory service. It also occurred in order to negotiate the myriad of 
complexities emergent in the clinic, which had the potential to reconfigure 
patient identities. The active doing of the tests signified a shift towards 
considering the tools as enactments or constitutions of the culture of testing 
which did not simply present (Goffman, 1959), but produced and performed 
identities through the work of clinicians (Mol, 2002a).  Extending this 
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analysis further, it also signified the extent to which this performativity was 
not simply enacted by the technologies but was influenced more broadly by 
the conditions in which these technologies were adopted; presenting 
moments of tension between discursive constructs around age, ageing and 
AD. I develop this point for analysis in Chapter Six.  
Manipulation work: managing the ‘problem’ 
 
The mediation work occurring in the clinic witnessed thus far, went beyond 
matters of discourse in terms of how clinicians narrated the tests, towards 
practical manipulation work to ensure cognitive decline became a 
‘manageable problem’ for both practitioner and patient (Berg, 1996: 504). 
Drawing on Berg (1996) who argues that the medical record serves to 
‘transform[ing] a patient’s problem into a manageable problem’, I extend 
his analysis in two distinctive ways. First, I argue that the tools emerged as 
important components for medical decision making for both clinicians and 
patients in the organisation of healthcare. Second, this work led to the 
complete (re)constitution of the technology rather than a transformation of 
representations of the technology as Berg (1996) describes. Through the 
mediation and manipulation practices witnessed, the tools were 
(re)constituted as provisional devices inscribed with ad hoc procedures from 
one interaction to the next, for the purpose of transforming and making 
sense of complexity. Clinicians manipulated the tests in a number of 
practical ways including changing the order of the tests and actively 
omitting sections of the tests. The following observation of a consultation 
with Trainee Psychiatrist 3, highlighted this active manipulation work,  
 
“Trainee Psychiatrist 3 asked the patient to name as many of the 
animals on the test, at which point the clinicians tried to reassure the 
patient that they ‘can go back to it if need be’. I reflected here 
whether the clinician was pre-empting that the patient might find this 
task particularly difficult. My feelings were confirmed when the 
clinician asked the patient to point to the ‘marsupial’ and the patient 
having glanced at both their family member and myself in confusion, 
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asked the clinician ‘what is a marsupial?’ Instead of answering, the 
clinician exclaimed that ‘a lot of people don’t know what that is so 
we’ll leave it’. The family member interrupted at this point (perhaps 
to protect the patient from what might be an embarrassing situation) 
and exclaimed that, ‘this is quite a hard question’ and the clinician 
agreed. In order to protect the patient further, the family member 
turned to the patient and explained the meaning of marsupial.” 
 
It is clear from the observation that the inherent characteristics of the test 
(c.f. Latour, 1986) at times underwent significant manipulation and 
mediation work. I have postulated thus far that in the interpretive repertoire 
of the clinic, clinicians were able to approach and perform the tools as 
provisional devices in response to the ways in which patients conceived the 
nature of testing. Here however, this provisonality involved a very different 
set of uncertainties around the ambiguities of the tool, and the normativity 
of the questions written in the test. The tools overall, require patients to have 
a particular understanding and comprehension of language and vocabulary 
since the test classifies and boxes a specific group of individuals (Bowker 
and Star, 2000): only those who are able to engage with the vocabulary and 
language of the tests. Perhaps the manipulation work performed by 
clinicians was therefore entangled with negotiating the ‘bounds’ of the tools 
constructed overall, without due attention to what is ‘socially [and culturally] 
agreed’ (Jutel, 2011: 202). Furthermore linking back to my previous claims, 
perhaps this mediation and manipulation work was performed in response to 
the vulnerabilities that the diagnostic procedure brings forth. As a result, the 
clinician omitted the question from the test and the tool was reconstituted to 
take into account the patient who happened to ‘fall between the cracks’. 
Memory Nurse 6 explained the necessity of this manipulation work in the 
clinic both during a de-brief following observation of the consultation and 
during interview, 
 
“I asked why the patient had conducted the test in this particular way 
and he responded by explaining that, ‘I didn’t abide wholly with the 
way Addenbrooke’s wishes the test to be carried out because I want 
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to make the patient as relaxed as possible and give them the best 
chance possible.’ The clinician also explained that the reason they 
didn’t ask the patient to draw a clock straight away was because they 
wanted to see ‘how they did it.’ The clinician further suggested that 
the patient’s lack of education would play a part in how they would 
score the test and feedback to the memory team. They acknowledged 
that other clinicians ‘will do this differently.’”  
 
When asked why he felt this manipulation work was necessary during 
interview,  
 
‘I want the person to do as well as possible and I’ll do anything to 
facilitate that and possibly I’m corrupting the test and maybe I 
should be just sort of parrot fashion saying what day of the week it is 
what month it is please repeat this but I - I suppose - I want the 
person to do as well as possible.’ 
 
For Memory Nurse 6, the active manipulation of the tests was accomplished 
in the interests of the patient to maximise patient performance and ‘give 
them the best chance’. As a result, the tools emerged as value-laden 
components of the classification process. Arguably, this manipulation work 
also reflects how the test performed patient identity; the inability of the 
patient to carry out some of the tasks actively drove the clinician to omit 
sections of the test. For Memory Nurse 6 this work however, compromised 
the formality of the tools, ‘corrupting the test’. Furthermore, he went on to 
question whether he should be conducting the test ‘sort of parrot fashion’ 
but acknowledged that in doing so, would be failing to account for the 
complexity of classifying, and its effects and consequences for the patient, 
‘want the person to do as well as possible’. I also suggest that the 
manipulation work observed in the clinic was further performed in order to 
navigate and manage the ambiguity of the tools; clinicians were actively 
aware both of the limitations of the tools, and themselves as users. I 
observed a consultation with Trainee Psychiatrist 1, where the clinician 
actively recognised and subsequently navigated and managed this ambiguity, 
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“As Trainee Psychiatrist 1 began the test she asked the patient to 
repeat three words ‘lemon, key, ball.’ The patient repeated the words 
‘lemon’ and ‘key’ but struggled to repeat the word ‘ball’. Having 
struggled to repeat the word ‘ball’ and as the patient began to look 
increasingly frustrated, Trainee psychiatrist 1 interrupted at this 
point and explained ‘I will give that point to you because of my 
accent. It could either be bull or ball with my accent’. The patient, 
seemingly relieved, laughed and Trainee Psychiatrist 1 wrote a 
scribbled note in the margin of the test. The clinician carried on with 
the test and asked the patient to ‘subtract seven from 100’. The 
patient repeated the question a number of times looking to the family 
member for assistance but did not understand what the clinician was 
asking them. At this point the family member interjected to tell the 
clinician that the patient does not know what the word ‘subtract’ 
means and asked Trainee Psychiatrist 1 to ‘say takeaway instead of 
subtract.’” 
 
During a de-brief with the trainee psychiatrist following my observation of 
the consultation, they expressed their concern at how the language on the 
form had negatively impacted on the patient’s score; manifested in the 
patient’s inability to understand the words ‘subtract’ and ‘nautical’. “I think 
if I’d asked, ‘what would you find in the sea?’ they’d have got it but 
obviously I have to follow the form.” Yet despite Trainee Psychiatrist 1’s 
manipulation or mediation of the test, this only extended in practice so far 
since she recognised that she was required to ‘follow the form.’ This notion 
of ‘following the form’ however, was not shared across all professionals in 
the memory service, ‘I didn’t abide wholly with the way Addenbrooke’s 
wishes the test to be carried out’ (Memory Nurse 6). During an interview 
with Memory Nurse 7, she raised her concerns as to the ways in which 
clinicians carried out the tests, and the ambiguities and uncertainties 
inherent to the process. As she explained,  
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‘The one [instruction] where you’re to read out lots of letters and 
every time they [patients] hear the letter ‘A’ they’ve to tap on 
something, I find that always a little bit difficult ‘cause you’re trying 
to read and concentrate and you’re also trying to see if they’re 
tapping in the appropriate places and sometimes I think, ooh did they 
do it or did they not kind of thing you know. So I do wonder about 
the accuracy of that and I think, I just wonder between us all, how I 
think some of us might be kinder than others at you know, just if 
something’s not dead on accurate but is acceptable, I think from 
what I’ve heard some colleagues say they wouldn’t score it and 
maybe I would or vice versa.’  
 
Memory Nurse 7 highlighted a number of issues of pertinence to 
considering the ambiguities and uncertainties associated with these 
technologies more broadly. The tool more generally, is difficult to perform 
wholly accurately because of the nuances and idiosyncrasies of practice 
across the memory service. Whilst this is an argument that could be made 
about other medical technologies elsewhere in healthcare, what is 
interesting about the use of cognitive screening tools is that from observing 
their use in practice, they had the ability to be made provisional during 
interactions, and therefore their nuances accounted for between 
professionals. Ambiguity in this sense as attested by Memory Nurse 7, led 
to portability of the tools between colleagues for the organisation of the 
memory service as they ‘wonder between [them] all’. 
 
So far, I have sketched the ways in which clinicians articulated cognitive 
screening tools to navigate and manage uncertainties associated with 
measures of cognitive decline in the clinic. In the following section, I 
develop the theme of uncertainty and extend my analysis, to investigate the 
extent to which there were specific dimensions of provisionality, which 
were performed differently across the professional hierarchy. I develop the 
claims made by Berg (1996) that through the informal or ad hoc practices 
witnessed this, ‘form[s] a crucial site in the sociotechnical organisation of 
medical work’ (pp. 501 emphasis added). As I have suggested, whilst 
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mediation and manipulation practices were afforded the responsibility of all 
clinicians (despite the majority of whom were memory nurses), the art of 
clinical judgement, in the clinic, which rendered the tools further 
provisional, was predominantly the responsibility of consultants. I therefore 
argue that the tools produced and reproduced professional hierarchies, 
thereby confirming the differing roles and responsibilities of consultants and 
nurses, despite the tools being articulated as provisional devices by all 
clinicians. In the following analysis, I explore the practising and at times 
privileging of clinical judgement in order to account for the uncertainties 
observed thus far.  
Practising clinical judgement  
 
In this study, clinical judgement was used to navigate uncertainty, which 
added a further strand to the socio-technical system in which cognitive 
screening tools operated overall. To provide some context, whilst elsewhere 
in medicine the impact of new developments in bioscience has brought 
particular types of uncertainty associated with greater understanding of 
complex biologies, in Alzheimer’s disease this has yet to occur. Instead, as 
demonstrated, uncertainty was located in the meaning and use of 
standardised tools, such that clinical judgement remained of vital 
importance as the following analysis illustrates. If as Donna Haraway (1987) 
suggests, (although this has been critiqued see Latimer et al., 2006; Latimer, 
2013), the progression of molecular science would render clinical judgment 
unnecessary, considering the relative lack of technoscience and molecular 
science for AD in everyday practice, the clinic, and with it clinical 
judgement, perhaps remains essential to the process of formal classification. 
This is important to consider, given the overall arena of uncertainty in which 
classifying AD resides. 
 
Clinical judgement in practice is employed to manage medical uncertainty 
across healthcare (Fox, 1957, 1980, 2000). According to Fox (1957), the 
concept of uncertainty in relation to the acquisition of medical knowledge is 
because of medicines inherent unknowns, and the increase of medical 
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information, which has the potential to redefine disease classification and 
categorisation. In terms of the role of technologies within this arena of 
uncertainty, for Atkinson (1984), the act of practising clinical judgement, is 
in order to reach a level of certainty that medical technologies have failed to 
achieve; ‘medical knowledge and practice are inherently ‘uncertain’, while 
the ‘certainty’ of dogmatism and personal judgment are response to that on 
the part of the clinician’ (pp. 954). The negotiation, communication, and 
messiness of classifying AD within the clinic (c.f. Bowker and Star, 2000) 
‘observed and interpreted within the ordinary, practical activities of 
diagnostic and related work’ requires the practising and at times privileging 
of clinical judgement (Latimer et al., 2006: 607). The ‘gaze’ of clinical 
judgement or expertise (Foucault, 1973) therefore, suggests a particular 
disciplined method of observing through which the clinic emerges as a site 
for knowledge production (Latimer et al., 2006). As a result, in the clinics 
for classifying AD, with the active manipulation of the tests given their 
particular ‘situational exigencies’ (Berg, 1996: 515) and recognised 
ambiguities, the practising of clinical judgement or negotiating ‘individual 
particularities’ (Dodier, 1998: 55) played a key role in the constitution of 
Alzheimer’s disease: ‘the ACE 111 and MoCA are tools to support our 
clinical history and clinical acumen’ (Consultant Psychiatrist 1). 
Furthermore, as measuring cognitive decline has so far been demonstrated 
as a social process as well as a clinical one, both clinical judgment and the 
situated nature of the clinic, helped to inform how the tools could be used 
for navigating uncertainty as Consultant Psychiatrist 2 explained,  
 
‘Clinical judgement is crucial but then there are false positives but 
that - I think that comes more with experience as well when you 
become a consultant as well. You - you get a feel just from speaking 
to the patient you get you’re getting so before you’ve even started 
that cognitive assessment you sort of have an idea in your mind as to 
what you might be expecting and hopefully the score can formalise 
that. So clinical judgement is important setting things in context is 
very important as well.’  
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This was demonstrated similarly by Consultant Psychiatrist 1, 
 
‘I think it’s because as you learn to hone your diagnostic and clinical 
skills you take, you pick up on more of the subtleties of the history, 
the subtleties of other sort of presenting features and so you’re less 
reliant on a sort of raw quantitative data the emphasis on more of the 
qualitative aspects that you get from the history.’ 
 
According to Consultant Psychiatrist 2, navigating the uncertainties or 
ambiguities associated with the practising of cognitive screening tests, such 
as the occurrence of ‘false positives’, required the experience and expertise 
acquired as a consultant. As such, exercising clinical expertise occurred 
alongside navigating inherent uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the 
classification process (Latimer et al., 2006). Furthermore, the privileging of 
clinical judgement or gaze, a particular form of medical perception (c.f. 
Latimer et al., 2006), was exercised through initial conversation with the 
patient; consultants were able to ‘get a feel just from speaking to the patient’ 
about the possibility of a classification. This corresponds with the idea that 
the higher up the professional hierarchy within the memory service, the 
more likely clinicians were to utilise professional experience and expertise 
in relation to clinical judgement. As Consultant Psychiatrist 1 illustrated, 
with the honing of ‘diagnostic and clinical skills’, this also shaped how 
clinicians approached the quantified outcome of the tests, which I will go on 
to discuss further in the chapter.  
 
Therefore it is not the case that these tools have intrinsic value per se but 
rather for consultants, it is that their value emerged from being able to draw 
on their expertise and experience, which allowed them to take into account 
‘context’, and employ clinical judgement when making decisions in the 
clinic. Medics and consultants in particular, practised their clinical 
judgement or ‘clinical acumen’ (Consultant Psychiatrist 1), which reflected 
the acquirement of skills over time, related to expertise and experience. 
Therefore clinical judgement in ‘clinical problem solving processes’ was 
given legitimacy to those clinicians occupying positions higher up the 
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professional hierarchy, which was evidenced across the memory service (c.f. 
Bosk, 1979). Whilst there was a collective agreement about the partiality of 
the tools, the instances where clinical judgement was privileged, 
demonstrates that provisionality was performed differently across the 
hierarchy. In doing so, this confirmed the power relations within the service; 
the professional hierarchy was produced and reproduced precisely because 
of these different practices. Tracing my fieldnotes, this was further 
evidenced during an observation with Consultant Psychiatrist 4. During de-
brief following the observation, the clinician turned to me once the patient 
had left the room to say ‘actually clinically I could have given a diagnosis; I 
just know that I could give a diagnosis from the history which the test 
confirmed.’ Despite the clinician having given the patient their score of 
‘15/30’ and referring the patient for a CT scan, the clinician maintained that 
clinically they could have given a diagnosis. This was a frequent note of 
observation across appointments with professionals higher up the 
professional hierarchy, particularly consultants.  
Shifting the classification space: patients’ homes 
 
As I have previously suggested however, practising cognitive screening 
tools in initial appointments was predominantly the task of memory nurses 
and OTs, reflecting an MDT approach to healthcare. Therefore whilst 
approaching and performing the tools as provisional devices enabled 
consultants to exercise clinical judgement, simultaneously memory nurses 
were able to carve out a unique space for their role in the service. The 
practice of classification was troubled when the space of the clinic produced 
tensions around the meaning of classification and the testing process, which 
were difficult to navigate. Despite the clinic emerging as an important space 
for knowledge production (Latimer et al., 2006), its performative 
architecture in this study, had important implications for how patients 
conceived the nature of testing and diagnosis overall. It is at this point 
where I formally introduce the concept of portability. In this manner, the 
sociotechnical arena in which these tools were used shifted, and also shifted 
the ways in which clinicians interacted with patients, the tools and cultural 
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materials. In the following section I introduce patients’ homes as important 
spaces for navigating the clinic and its myriad of discursive affects. 
 
As evidenced in Nunmill Hospital and Ridge NHS Centre, the tools were 
transported into patients’ homes thereby extending the context of their use. 
Extending the space in which these tools were used by clinicians (i.e. 
extending the space of the clinician-patient interaction) was significant for 
classification, as it allowed clinicians to further mediate and manipulate the 
tests in order to ‘sort’ the social and cultural practices enacted in the clinic. 
Subsequently, this guided how clinicians approached and administered the 
tests. Similarly to the processes of the clinic, clinicians (predominantly 
memory nurses) engaged in front stage and backstage work (Goffman, 1959) 
when performing the tests. Much of this work relied on the ‘situational 
exigencies’ (Berg, 1998: 515) of patients’ homes where nurses carried out 
tasks ‘backstage’, to navigate the ambiguities associated with the tests. In 
the analysis that follows, I consider space and materials as important for 
analysing the social rather than treating them as ‘second class citizens’ (Law, 
1991: 6). Therefore, as I will go on to illustrate, the home of a patient 
emerges as an important space for extending the care with which clinicians 
approached the classification process, necessary for directing an ‘immediate 
course of action’ (Berg, 1997: 129).   
 
At this point, I reiterate that I did not have access to observe the consultation 
process in patients’ homes. In the following analysis, I therefore draw 
predominantly on the accounts of memory nurses and supplement them with 
observations of MDTs, where nurse work was transported for collective 
discussion. From the outset, memory nurses drew attention to the discursive 
nature of the clinic. When asked to explain the reason for carrying out initial 
consultations in a patient’s home, Memory Nurse 6 suggested that it 
‘avoid[s] any white coat syndrome’ in order to be able to secure as much 
information as possible for a classification, striving for a ‘truer picture’ of 
the condition. Similarly as Memory Nurse 2 explained when asked about the 
advantages of carrying out initial assessments in the home, 
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“You get to see way more - you can see people will sit there if they 
come to a doctors or they come to the hospital and they get dressed, 
it’s smart you’ve got a bit of that white coat syndrome haven’t you, 
where they sit up straight and answer the questions and everything’s 
fine and lots of people (especially wives and husbands) just mop up 
what’s going wrong what the other half can’t do; they mop it up and 
just do it, so you don’t always get to see what’s happening really. In 
their home, people are more relaxed as well and I think you get a bit 
of a truer feel of what’s going on and people are much - they know 
where they are and, they feel more comfortable, they might be 
having a cup of tea or a biscuit, and they can show you round the 
home and you can see for yourself what it is they can and can’t do. 
Any problems you can then think, ‘oh I need to get that put in, we 
need to get this, we need to get that’ and they tend to do (in my 
view), I think that they do better with the cognitive testing when 
they’re relaxed and in their own home. So it might take longer, and 
we might not see as many people in a day, but I think the whole 
assessment is better is more patient centered I’d say. I’ve no proof of 
that other than my own thinking.” 
 
For Memory Nurse 2, the home is a space for accumulating evidence, 
getting a ‘truer feel of what’s going on’ because she is able to ‘visualise’ the 
problems that may not manifest themselves in the clinic. Similarly to 
Memory Nurse 6, she explained that this may in part be due to what she 
considered is a ‘white coat syndrome’. This was further confirmed by 
Memory Nurse 4, ‘at clinic sometimes they can put on a little bit of a front’. 
Arguably, what both memory nurses alluded to was the presentation of self 
in the clinic (Goffman, 1959) manifested in the actions of the patient to, ‘sit 
up straight’ and ‘get dressed  - its smart’. This space of the home served as 
an extension of the mediation work observed during initial consultations; 
the space of the home was considered integral to the process of approaching 
the classification process with care for protecting patient identity. 
Subsequently, for Memory Nurse 2, the clinic had the potential to mask or 
ignore what was happening ‘backstage’ (Goffman, 1959) in a home 
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consultation. This ‘backstage’ work or embodiment of identity backstage, 
was revealed through observation of the mundane or perceived normality 
and routine to patients’ lives. In order to reveal ‘what’s happening’ for 
Memory Nurse 2, it was about normalisation of routine ‘they might be 
having a cup of tea or a biscuit and they can show you around the home’ 
through which they could make decisions about, and proceed with, 
facilitating the appropriate course of action (c.f. Berg, 1992), “any problems 
you can then think ‘oh I need to get that put in, we need to get this, we need 
to get that’”.  
 
As Memory Nurse 3 also attested she ‘want[s] people to do their best’ 
adding that ‘people all function at their best in their own homes it’s where 
their strengths are; if they were coming to a clinic they’ve already got 
themselves stressed trying to find the place’. This was confirmed by 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1 who explained when asked during interview, about 
the possibility of an inaccurate cognitive screening outcome, ‘we feel that 
our patients are much more comfortable in their home environment and you 
are much more likely to get a more accurate assessment both from history 
and their functioning on tests’. The ‘strength’ of patients, or ensuring they 
were ‘relaxed’ was performed in the home beyond the medical domination 
of the clinic. As a result, the ambiguities of the technologies were navigated, 
and formalised efforts to protect patient identity was performed within this 
space. Clinicians were able to manage the ways in which patients conceived 
the nature of the testing process overall, outside of the performative 
architecture of the clinic. For Memory Nurse 3, this subsequently produced 
a more accurate version of the technology for the process of classification. 
 
This was confirmed by Memory Nurse 4 during interview, ‘I like home 
initials although occasionally I do them in a clinic but I do prefer to do them 
at home because I think you’re seeing people more relaxed, you’re seeing 
what’s about in the house, you’re seeing how they’re functioning at home’ 
and OT 2 , ‘sometimes we get sent out just to see ‘cause a lot of the things, a 
lot of the assessment that’s done, particularly if it’s something new in the 
service, might be done at clinic so people are not seen in their home 
136 
 
situation.’ What was seen or made visible within this space, was captured 
by both memory nurses and OTs; the space of patients’ homes was 
significant for producing knowledge about decline, and for constituting 
what OT 1 described as ‘taken for granted’. Yet, not all initial appointments 
took place in the home environment. As a result, it was the task of OTs in 
particular, to be ‘sent out’ to see patients within this space (Interview OT 2). 
Tensions arose however, since the overall role of cognitive screening tools 
in this space was a point of contention for OTs. As OT 1 explained, 
cognitive screening tools were privileged over being sent out to see because, 
‘we have the professional backup of the tests now it’s not hopefully gut 
reaction… so practice wise, I think things are less subjective and more 
objective these days which can only be a good thing’. Despite both OTs and 
memory nurses collectively attesting the importance of the home 
environment, tensions also arose, as OTs suggested that formal assessment 
within these spaces was important for legitimating their work practices. 
Being able to ‘justify’, or ‘be accountable’ for OT 1 and OT 2, required 
increased use of testing through formal assessment. For OT 2, increased 
justification of their work through the use of the tools overall, allows for 
‘professional backup’; their practice could be formally identified and 
legitimated (c.f. Latimer, 2000). This was valued by OT 2 because as she 
explained, relying on ‘gut reaction’ downgrades (Latimer, 2000) their work 
in the process of classification; the tools then serve as agents to strengthen 
clinical reasoning (see Berg, 1998). 
 
It was also within the home space that memory nurses in particular, were 
able to attach significance to cultural materials not available in the clinic. As 
Latimer (2004) argues, cultural materials order relations; legitimising 
practice and producing professional hierarchies. In this sense, materials 
‘make relations, both conceptual and lived, manifest’ and are ‘symbols of 
significance’ (pp. 759). I develop Latimer’s claims by demonstrating that by 
attaching meaning to materials this rendered the tools further provisional but 
in doing so, created a unique space for the role of memory nurses in the 
MDT. Attaching symbolic meaning to materials, seen in the previous 
section by Memory Nurse 2 as ‘having a cup of tea or a biscuit, and they 
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can show you around the home and you can see for yourself what it is they 
can and can’t do’, cognitive decline was further enacted as a social and 
cultural, as well as a medical and clinical problem. Memory Nurse 7 also 
described the importance of the home for navigating uncertainty manifested 
in the complexity of a false positive or false negative result on a cognitive 
screening test,  
 
‘If you do a home visit that can tell you an awful lot of things ‘cause 
you can obviously check out with the environment as well what’s 
happening. You know I’ve always sort of said if you can get into 
somebody’s fridge it tells you an awful lot really ‘cause you know 
there’s sort of things maybe out of date or even empty, if there’s no 
food available so it’s always it’s sort of gathering a whole collateral 
of evidence to be used.’ 
 
Aligning the evidence towards medical decision-making in the space of 
patients’ homes required that nurses in particular, ascribed significance to 
what was both socially and culturally important. First, Memory Nurse 7 
shifted the measurement of cognitive decline from the technology onto the 
cultural materials for example, the fridge. The cultural material, the fridge 
and its contents, were aligned alongside formal measures for detecting 
cognitive decline because as she argued, the setting enacted particular 
conceptualisations of cognitive function. The home symbolised particular 
socio-cultural preoccupations about how older people should be managing 
their household, functioning day to day, and thus experiencing cognitive 
function observable within this space (c.f. Bourdieu, 1992). For Memory 
Nurse 7, gathering the evidence in the context of a patient’s home required 
interpretation of the patient’s ‘social situation’ (Latimer, 2000: 69) utilised 
to confirm or refute the results from cognitive screening tests. What is 
interesting is that in the space of the home, the work of memory nurses 
could not be immediately reclaimed by those higher up the professional 
hierarchy (c.f. Latimer, 2004). At which point, memory nurses played a key 
role in constructing the initial test, for taking forward into the MDT meeting.  
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Patients’ homes enabled particular social and cultural practices that emerged 
in the clinic to be sorted backstage. Memory nurses, and to a certain extent 
OTs, were therefore able to attach importance to what was socially and 
culturally significant for navigating uncertainty in this space. The shifting 
context, in which these tools were accomplished, is therefore suggestive of 
their overall portability across particular spaces. However, the question 
remains as to how the information gathered from these tools was used to 
proceed with the classification process. In what follows, I analyse the role of 
the tools within the MDT; the informal or ad hoc practices inscribed in the 
tools were brought into this space for collective discussion. In doing so, I 
demonstrate that the practices inherent to the making of the tools as 
provisional devices, were performed and collectively resolved across the 
hierarchy. Regardless of specialism across the service, the tools will always 
be partial devices within the wider arena of uncertainty, and simultaneously, 
the MDT further produced and reproduced professional hierarchies and 
power relations for negotiating complexity. 
The role of the MDT 
 
MDT meetings reflected portability on a micro level; the work performed by 
clinicians was brought into this arena for collective discussion. The 
meetings served as platforms for the mobilisation of evidence: the 
interpretation of cognitive screening tests, CT scans and MRI scans, 
presentation of clinical history and patient symptoms, towards formal 
classification of disease (c.f. Latimer et al., 2006). In particular, the 
manipulation and mediation work, performed in the clinic, was navigated 
and discussed, clinical judgement was practised and privileged, and 
professional hierarchy was subsequently maintained. I found that clinical 
judgement was practised in particular, to negotiate and manage the 
ambiguities associated with the tools as shown in the following observation 
of a team meeting at Nunmill Hospital,  
 
“The consultant steering the meeting turned to Trainee Psychiatrist 2 
and asked him ‘who’s next’? Trainee Psychiatrist 2 started 
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presenting a GP referral; a patient who had a cognitive screening test 
completed. The trainee psychiatrist outlined the results from the 
patient’s assessment including their score from the MoCA, but also 
explained that the patient had difficulty completing the test; he 
paused at this point and exclaimed that this was perhaps not due to 
lack of cognitive function but actually ‘negotiating the practicalities 
of the test’ itself. He outlined how the patient found it difficult to 
‘see’ the animals on the test because of visual difficulties. Here, I 
reflected on the extent to which Trainee Psychiatrist 2 recognised the 
limitations of the test and the potential it had to affect the 
performance of the patient. He completed his presentation by 
explaining to the consultant that he was unsure whether the test 
signified lack of cognition and a collective discussion about the 
results from the test ensued between colleagues.” 
 
Similarly to memory nurses, as I will go on to illustrate, trainee psychiatrists 
were also required to discuss all initial appointments with the team. In the 
case of the observation of this team meeting, Trainee Psychiatrist 2, 
presenting the findings of the consultation, recognised the ambiguities 
associated with the tests and testing, or ‘the practicalities of the test’ itself. 
This manifested itself in the patient having difficulty visualising the content 
of the test. Subsequently, Trainee Psychiatrist 2 actively employed their 
clinical judgment or perception to stress that, ‘performance of the patient 
but may not be due to a definitive lack of cognition’. This had parallels with 
a meeting at Ridge NHS Centre, 
 
‘Memory Nurse 1 presented a GP referral: the patient had made an 
appointment with their GP because they were concerned about their 
memory and having completed an AMTS, they scored 7/10. 
Following a brief description of the AMTS, the clinician proceeded 
by discussing the physical health of the patient, living arrangements 
and living conditions. The memory nurse highlighted that the patient 
had poor language skills and ‘as a result of their poor English they 
were difficult to assess’. The clinician carried out a MoCA instead of 
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an ACE 111 as the ACE 111 was seen as too arduous. Here, the 
clinician explained to the registrar steering the meeting that they had 
to administer the test three times and she had to ask the son to ‘act as 
interpreter’. At this point, the clinician reflected on whether they 
thought the poor score was due to the patient’s lack of English but 
explained that when the son interpreted the test for the patient, the 
patient still scored similarly. The registrar steering the meeting asked 
how the patient performed on the visual-spatial aspect of the test; the 
patient had scored particularly badly. The memory nurse and 
registrar engaged in an in-depth discussion about the family support 
for the patient, medical history and the need for further testing 
including a CT scan and diagnostic appointment. Importantly, the 
clinician stated that the family was not unduly worried about the low 
scoring on the MoCA and ‘were not particularly interested in a 
diagnosis.’”  
 
Here, assembling the evidence meant recognising the ambiguities of the test 
through mediation work, and privileging of individual or clinical judgement 
and perception. Memory nurse 1 recognised the ambiguity associated with 
cognitive testing, ‘as a result of their poor English they were difficult to 
assess’ and mediated this by asking the family member to ‘act as 
interpreter’. Despite the limitations of the cognitive test score, the patient 
was referred for further diagnostic testing. The final interpretation of the test 
towards medical decision-making (Berg, 1996) however, relied on those 
higher up the professional hierarchy concurring with the work of the 
memory nurse. Although the memory nurse could not be certain that the 
score was attributable to the beginning of the dementia process, the registrar 
decided that further clarification was required through additional diagnostic 
technologies that could help to align the evidence (c.f. Latimer et al., 2006). 
This observation serves to reflect how practising of clinical judgement 
sustained professional hierarchy and power relationships in the clinic, and 
concurrently that uncertainty became a collective endeavour within the 
MDT (c.f. Bosk, 1979; Cox and Webster, 2012). Whilst the score itself did 
not represent a classification for either the nurse or the registrar, and both 
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actors recognised the importance of context and judgement, it was the 
registrar who adjudicated on the following classification process. As 
Consultant Psychiatrist 2 demonstrated during interview, this extended 
beyond the clinician-patient interaction into the multi-disciplinary team 
meetings, ‘I don’t necessarily discuss that patient in full detail in an MDT’. 
The memory nurses were given the task of carrying out the initial 
consultations with patients, and the medics (other than the junior doctors 
who were also subjected to the checking process) acted as interpreters in the 
MDT.  
 
At this point, I reiterate that despite the division of labour within the service, 
where adjudicating on diagnosis required the work of consultants, medics 
and psychologists, the definition of what constituted cognitive decline was 
constructed through the interactions between medics and nurses observed 
during the MDT. This interaction work relied on both the expert 
adjudicators (consultants) and the work of memory nurses to construct 
patient context, in relation to the role of cognitive screening tools. The work 
done in clinics and the home was brought into the memory service for 
discussion, which drove medical decision-making (Latimer, 2000: 69) and 
the management of uncertainty observed in the clinic. When asked about the 
diagnosis process across the memory service, Memory Nurse 1 explained, 
 
‘In terms of the actual diagnosis, once the nurse has gained all the 
information that they need it would then be taken back to the MDT 
and discussed so it would be kind of like a team discussion about 
whether any further diagnostic testing is needed it’s never a decision 
that you’d make on your own.’ 
 
For Memory Nurse 1, the ‘information’ acquired in the consultation was 
articulated and rendered meaningful within the interactions of the memory 
team at the MDT. Despite the fact that nurses were not afforded the 
responsibility of interpreting the cognitive screening tests, for Memory 
Nurse 1 this did not represent a downgrading of professional expertise and 
skill (c.f. Davies, 1995; Rafferty, 1996) because she contends it would 
142 
 
‘never [be] a decision you’d make on your own’. As a result, this revealed 
the epistemic division of labour in the service necessary for enabling the 
process of classification to proceed. Furthermore, as highlighted at the 
beginning of the chapter, collating the information with regards to patient 
function and thus individual particularities during the clinician-patient 
interaction was interpreted and made meaningful by those higher up the 
professional hierarchy. As such, the role of the MDT was essential for 
assembling the evidence despite being implicated by uncertainty and 
complexity. Arguably, there was a shared responsibility of uncertainty 
within this diverse network of actors (c.f. Cox and Webster, 2012). 
Therefore, whilst memory nurses were able to carve out a unique space for 
work in response to managing the uncertainties produced by the clinic, 
professionals higher up the professional hierarchy subsequently adjudicated 
on this work within the space of the MDT as the following observation 
extracts highlight. During a team meeting at Nunmill Hospital, the work 
carried out by memory nurses was translated by medics within the team, 
 
“A memory nurse presented the case of a patient whose family 
member expressed concern that the patient ‘hasn’t got out of bed 
since Christmas’. The nurse read through the referral letter to the 
clinicians present in the MDT, which included information 
concerning cognitive assessment tests, medication, blood tests and x-
rays. However, the consultant did not draw particular attention to 
these factors and expressed their concern that the patient hadn’t left 
their bed in approximately six to eight weeks. The consultant 
decided that this was enough information to warrant her going to see 
the patient in their home to ‘see what’s going on.’’   
 
When presenting information from a referral, Memory Nurse 1 enacted the 
‘problem’ (Berg, 1996) in relation to the social situation or context of the 
patient, having ‘not got out of bed since Christmas’. Arguably, this points to 
what Rose (1998) contends are the increased efforts in healthcare to 
calculate risk in psychiatry, which has the potential to transform the ‘act of 
diagnosis’ towards focussing on the management of the everyday (pp. 185). 
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Despite engaging with the medical information for the patient such as blood 
tests and CT scans, it was context that affected the consultant’s decision. 
The consultant transformed what the nurse found to be significant into a 
clinical problem, suggesting she arranges to go and see the patient in their 
home. Furthermore, the observation of the team meeting pointed to the 
ceremonial order of the MDT (Strong, 1979; Latimer, 2000), which 
produced and reproduced power relations within the service because the 
consultant adjudicated on the subsequent stages of the patient’s 
classification process. This decision however, relied on the construction of 
cognitive decline manifested in the everyday, and therefore the role of 
memory nurses. In this instance it was the context of the nurse work that 
informed and was transformed as evidence in the classification process 
because of the division of responsibility rather than subordination within the 
service more broadly (c.f. Latimer, 2000). This was further illustrated 
during a conversation with Consultant Psychiatrist 4 when asked about the 
importance they ascribed to the multi-disciplinary aspect of the team,  
 
‘Yes it is important because the nurses always present their initial 
assessments and they’re always discussed and the good thing is that 
we’ll have different views on the problems for example we have 
OTs and (although at the moment we don’t have a psychologist but 
ideally we should have one) there are nurses support workers, OTs, 
medics so they get like from different views and social workers and 
you know from different perspectives I think the problems looked at 
from different perspective and the patient will get a better kind of 
support at the end.’  
 
For Consultant Psychiatrist 4, the network of actors in its different ‘views’ 
and ‘perspectives’ connected to ‘support’ the patient in the classification 
process. In turn, he also recognised that when making decisions in the clinic 
(Berg, 1996), the work of memory nurses was effectively translated to 
account for the ‘problems’. The interactions in the MDT led to a ‘shared 
understanding of the patients’ needs’ (Consultant Psychiatrist 1) to get ‘a 
kind of better support at the end’ (Consultant Psychiatrist 4). Consultant 
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Psychiatrist 4 reflected on the importance of a diverse range of clinicians 
solving the problem. Yet, what this also highlighted is the extent to which 
professional hierarchies were sustained since expert consultants reclaimed 
the work of memory nurses. Nurse work required justification within the 
team, ‘nurses always present their initial assessments’; their work was both 
translated, and yet also reclaimed by those with the expertise to handle it.  
Balancing act and valuing the quantified outcome 
 
The question remains as to how clinicians across the memory service 
approached the quantified outcome of cognitive screening tools when 
informal and ad hoc practices were performed in situated occasions. The 
work of Berg (1992) is helpful for framing the following analysis. With 
respect to resolving medical decisions, Berg (1992: 169) contends that 
problem solving in medical practice ‘could be seen to be utter chaos’ and 
questions what kinds of ‘frames of reference’ clinicians use to ‘clean up’ or 
prevent this chaos or messiness. Practising routine across clinical practice is 
one method Berg (1992) describes to organise this complexity, and for 
clinicians to order their different world(s). In order to make sense of 
uncertainty and classification, the characterisation of disease relies on the 
processes of routine. The routine performance of memory clinics and the 
clinical work of practitioners entailing the gathering of clinical history, 
patient narrative, medical history and psychiatric history, were routinely 
performed which ‘facilitate[ed] medical action’ (pp. 170). As demonstrated 
in my research, the decision making process for classifying AD was 
constitutive of what Berg (1992: 170) describes as ‘locally situated routines’ 
and which meant that clinicians were able to recognise and account for the 
complexity and uncertainty around diagnosing AD. According to Berg 
(1992), these routines overall, are performed with a ‘certain ‘automatism’: 
habitually, without explicitly reflecting on or legitimating the actions 
involved’ (pp. 170).  
 
However, exploring the significance of the quantified outcome of the test, I 
extend Berg’s arguments. Whilst clinicians accounted for locally situated 
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routines in order to prevent the ‘chaos’ that Berg (1992) describes, this was 
balanced alongside privileging the quantified outcome of the tools. The 
routines for AD were continually shifting and actively reflected on by 
clinicians because of the continually emerging complexities associated with 
classifying AD as this chapter has demonstrated. Rather than routines 
therefore, I suggest that the provisionality and therefore portability of the 
tools across the organisation of healthcare, allowed clinicians to make sense 
of ‘chaos’ and proceed with classification.  
 
Initially, I describe the ways in which clinicians approached the quantified 
outcome for making decisions about proceeding with classification. I 
explore what Berg (1992) describes as the ‘reconstruction’ of data; 
evidenced in the ‘downgrading’ of data obtained from cognitive screening 
tests, which added a further dimension to the making of provisionality. 
Across the memory service, the possibility of uncertainty, manifested in 
false positive and false negative results, drove clinicians to actively mediate 
the results from cognitive screening tests if the patient was deemed to lack 
education or be highly intelligent: if a patient did not ‘fit’ their previous 
clinical work. This was evidenced during an interview with Consultant 
Psychiatrist 2 when asked about the possibility of false positive and false 
negative results,  
 
‘So if I get somebody where they’re mismatched with how they’ve 
scored compared to how they’re functioning that would make me 
think what have I missed here. The other population is the very 
bright so I have lots of people in my patch that are retired old-age 
psychiatrists, psychologists, lecturers at the University, Professors 
and of course they have massive cerebral reserve I’ve even had 
people who’ve made some of these tools that then come to see me so 
it’s kind of being mindful of that.’  
 
As Consultant Psychiatrist 2 explained, lack of correlation between the 
quantified element of the test and the clinical work had much to do with 
being ‘mindful’ of the extent to which patients had the skills to perform the 
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tests anyway. Those with the ‘cerebral reserve’ to perform particularly well 
on the tests, could mask the true picture of cognition.  
 
This was further demonstrated in the following extract taken from an 
observation with Trainee Psychiatrist 1,  
 
“The clinician discussed with me the score from the test and 
expressed that were ‘very surprised at the score, I thought they 
would do much better as the patient was quite sharp and 
remembered all their medication, life history, events...’”. Trainee 
Psychiatrist 1 legitimated their ‘surprise’ at this low score by adding 
that ‘the patient’s literacy and numeracy is poor and they could have 
scored higher as they couldn’t possibly do some of the tasks’ all the 
while talking through the form with me to demonstrate this.” 
 
Trainee Psychiatrist 1 subsequently fitted the data to their clinical work in 
recognition of the fact that the patient could not fulfil all the necessary tasks; 
legitimating their ‘surprise’ at the score (c.f. Berg, 1992). Furthermore, 
when asked about the possibility of false positive or false negative 
diagnoses and the role of cognitive screening tools, Trainee Psychiatrist 1 
explained,  
 
‘You can get false positives and you can get false negatives but the 
the only way that you can overcome that because although these are 
objective measures of cognitive function, you’re gonna have your 
inter-rater bias, you’re gonna have all these confounding factors that 
will affect it, so the only way that you can account for that is to try 
and put it into a clinical context and it keeps coming back to that. 
But if you’ve got somebody who scores a little you know, I’ve had 
patients who have scored slightly lower than I expected them to 
‘cause they were really high functioning…it’s just about putting it 
into that clinical context and assuming, never assume it’s completely 
right.’ 
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First, Trainee Psychiatrist 1 expressed what was consistent across the 
memory service, the element of surprise concerning the quantified element 
of the test and the clinical work that preceded it. In this instance, Trainee 
Psychiatrist 1 sorted this complexity by attending to the patient’s inability to 
complete literacy and numeracy tasks. During the observation, she actively 
manipulated the tests by omitting sections of the tests. What this excerpt 
also suggests, is that the clinic was both resistant to statistical reduction in 
the sense that Trainee Psychiatrist 1 recognised that to make sense of the 
quantified outcome it had to be placed in ‘that clinical context’. However, 
whilst the clinic was ‘resistant to statistical or biological reduction’ (Latimer 
et al., 2006: 571), the quantified element of the tools was important for 
proceeding with classification as I will go on to demonstrate.  
 
Despite adopting the concerns of Berg’s (1992: 159) theory of 
reconstruction in the routine practices of the clinic however, the 
modification of data to support the ‘transformation’ he proposes, was a 
complex networked process for the classification of Alzheimer’s disease. As 
demonstrated, clinicians were at times surprised at the results and outcome 
of the tests, in accordance with both the clinical work that preceded the test, 
and their clinical judgement. Yet although the clinical work and clinical 
judgement, were at times privileged, this occurred alongside the numerous 
moments where clinicians used or mediated the tools to ‘supplement’ 
‘correct’ or ‘guide’ their clinical work. The raw scores were embedded in 
the clinical framework, making up just one aspect of the ‘diagnostic picture’ 
(Interview Consultant Psychiatrist 2). As Consultant Psychiatrist 1 
explained when asked about the value they ascribed to the tests as detectors 
of cognitive decline, ‘detecting not all, quantifying partially’. Therefore, as 
the final section of this chapter demonstrates, fitting the data to the clinical 
work was a process of continual adjustment both within and outside the 
confines of the clinic. A balancing act therefore ensued which shifted across 
the professional hierarchy, as I demonstrate in the following analysis.  
 
It is perhaps ‘self-evident’ that commitment to standards in medicine and 
use of protocol, ‘we’re supposed to be doing them consistently and asking 
148 
 
them in a consistent way so really if you’re following the absolute proper 
guidelines for the test then I guess everybody should be able to do it’, did 
not wholly constrain the practices of the clinic, ‘everybody’s different aren’t 
they no matter how standardised you try to do something’ (Interview 
Memory Nurse 1) (c.f. Latimer et al., 2006: 623). What I will go on to 
illustrate however, is that despite the clinic and its practices resisting 
reduction to statistics as evidenced in the work of Latimer et al., (2006) and 
Latimer (2013), I extend these claims by drawing attention to the general 
commitment to objectivity and measurement across the memory service, 
which was necessary for the organisation of what was essentially a complex 
distribution of medicine. Clinicians navigated valuing both objectivity and 
order, and the practices of the clinic, until the tools emerged as portable or 
black-boxed (Latour, 1987) devices necessary for organising where AD was 
‘done’ (Garfinkel, 1967). The making of AD, thus rested on the 
provisionality of the tools, and their role as central mediators for organising 
AD in the memory service.  
 
First, I will attend to what Dodier (1998) describes as the co-existence of 
systematic protocols of medicine and individual particularities when 
utilising the tests in the clinic. Similarly to the work in the clinic this was 
achieved in order to navigate and in turn manage the uncertainty associated 
with measures of cognitive decline. During the clinician-patient interaction, 
this amounted to, ‘follow[ing] the form’ whilst at the same time recognising 
‘individual particularities’, “there is that quote, ‘when you’ve seen one 
person with Alzheimer’s you’ve seen one person’ because everybody is so 
different and you can’t compare two people” (Memory Nurse 4). As 
witnessed across the memory service, there was a commitment to both 
protocol and judgement. The fact that clinicians were ‘supposed to be doing 
them consistently and asking them in a consistent way’ but equally, that 
performing the test required interaction with the patient in situ which shaped 
the tool, ‘skills come in how you administer, and how you engage with 
people when you’re administering it really’ (Extract taken from a 
conversation with Memory Nurse 1). This extract reflects what Dodier 
(1998) claims are ‘internal tensions in action’ between adhering to protocol 
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and interacting with the patient and the test in situ; related to the ways in 
which clinicians navigated the uncertainties associated with measures of 
cognitive decline (pp. 55). Together with the work done in the clinic and 
patients’ homes, clinicians also mediated the quantified data in terms of 
narrating the results within the space of the MDT, as the following extract 
from an interview with Memory Nurse 6 highlighted,  
 
“In this case [patient example] 46 out of 100 and I would say 
something like, ‘but I felt that their cognitive ability was better than 
the test suggested and I also felt that the test was negatively 
influenced by the fact that this patient wasn’t very literate so the 
literacy things couldn’t be done, or maybe if they’ve got eyesight 
problems or maybe they’ve got verbal problems’, which is obviously 
a deficit but that has influenced the overall score giving a worse 
score than it is.” 
 
As Memory Nurse 6 explained, navigating the score required recognition of 
the ambiguities and practices which, ‘influenced the overall score giving a 
worse score than it is’, or the ‘shadows’ of clinical practice (Latour, 1986: 
18), and accomplished this in the MDT meetings, “I would say something 
like, ‘but I felt that their cognitive ability was better than the test 
suggested’”. Whilst Memory Nurse 6 was committed to the score, its value 
was negotiated by accounting for ‘situational exigencies’ (Berg, 1996: 515) 
in response to the complexities that shaped and manipulated the outcome on 
the tests. The score was handled with care accounting for their role in situ. 
Therefore, the formal tests or ‘follow[ing] the form’, was at times 
‘superseded’ by what Berg (1996: 515) describes as ‘ad hoc’ or ‘informal’ 
procedures.  
 
Although I have demonstrated the accomplishment of the tools within 
locally situated routines, the (re)construction of data to fit the clinical work 
also occurred outside the confines of the clinic in response to the 
complexities associated with the ambiguities of the tools.  Therefore the 
mediation work of the data was not confined to the clinic (tacit and 
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embedded in the culture of the memory service), which demonstrated how 
the overall diagnosis process extends biomedical and medical spaces (Street 
and Coleman, 2012). Within the corridors and offices of the memory service, 
scores were continually debated and discussed by memory nurses backstage 
(Goffman, 1959). Memory Nurse 2 explained this informal practice and 
commitment to the score as a classification system in itself, 
 
“I mean today I did just exactly that [checked test score] there was 
someone was drawing you know the cube drawing and I wasn’t quite 
sure what I would have given that the score is 0, 1 or 2 and I just 
asked a colleague ‘what would you give in this instance’? And she 
said well I’d have done this, that, and the other and I thought ok, and 
I took that on board and made my judgement from that sort of thing. 
So we do, we often say, you know, ‘what do you think about this’, 
and it’s not unusual.” 
 
Similarly as Memory Nurse 7 also explained,  
 
‘I’ve just done it now because sometimes when you look at how 
someone’s responded to one of the elements on the tests, it you can 
have a little bit of self-doubt as to when you’re judging it.’ 
 
Outside the confines of the clinic, memory nurses navigated the materiality 
of the tests and its outcomes, through interactions and conversations with 
colleagues in order to sort the ambiguity and uncertainty embedded in the 
tests. For Memory Nurse 2, this routine communication with colleagues 
(re)ordered the uncertainties emergent in the clinic, and the informal, ad hoc 
practising of the tools reconfigured their ‘life-as-usual character’ (Garfinkel, 
1967: 37). The tools were shaped by and became active agents through this 
backstage work of memory nurses, which was not practised uniformly by 
those higher up the professional hierarchy. This suggests that clinicians 
across the hierarchy had differing routines for approaching the quantified 
outcome of the tools and resolving uncertainty. However, furthering this 
observation as Memory Nurse 7 explained, this ad hoc work also extended 
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into commitment to best practice where ‘self-doubt’ drove communication 
backstage. Furthermore, the quantified element was important for 
organising AD, which was highlighted by Trainee Psychiatrist 1 during 
interview,  
 
‘It [the score] just gives it gives you something ‘cause you know 
doctors rotate through jobs all the time it does give you something 
objective to put down on a bit of paper other than your subjective 
view of the patient so that other physicians and doctors can look at 
that and get something out of it…what these tools do is as I say is 
allow that transference of information between practitioners and 
monitoring of progressions which is important for thinking about 
pharmacological intervention and things like that so it is important 
yeah.’  
 
And further illustrated by Memory Nurse 2 when asked to reflect on the 
extent of the inter-collaboration and communication in the service, 
 
 ‘If somebody said to you they’ve got 22/100, you’d think oohh we 
all - the team would know where that person was it means the same 
thing to everybody I think.’  
 
This network of communication within the MDT, enabled the tests to 
emerge as agents in the classification process where ‘knowing what 
everything means’ amounted in part to the score on the memory test. What 
is significant about this extract is that the quantified outcome of the tool was 
important for proceeding with classification. This commitment to objectivity 
at times over the subjectivities inherent to medical practice (Fox, 1980) was 
valued within the work practices of the memory service, ‘doctors rotate 
through jobs all the time it does give you something objective to put down 
on a bit of paper’. As a result, the tools became ‘portable’ with the, 
‘transference of information between practitioners and monitoring of 
progressions’ inherently valued. The portability of the tools reflected and 
introduced in this chapter will be extended in the analysis of Chapters Six 
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and Seven. This is not to suggest that clinicians held intrinsic value to the 
quantification of cognitive decline, but within the organisation of the 
memory service and the constraints of the clinic and clinical work, the raw 
score was valued and the tests became ‘black boxed’ (Latour, 1987). In 
doing, so the multiplicity of practices as outlined in this chapter were 
subsumed within the broader commitment to portability where the informal 
or ad hoc practices of the clinic for proceeding with classification, “no 
longer needs to be considered, those things whose contents have become a 
matter of indifference” (Callon and Latour 1981:285).  
 
Despite the mediation work to ‘fit’ the data to the clinical work, within what 
Berg (1992) describes as locally situated routines, in order to make sense of 
classification in the memory service, it was the numerical score overall, 
which was valued. There was a stronger commitment within and across the 
service towards diagnosis in an organisation that was under increased 
pressure to make AD known in the clinic. The quantified outcome was 
reified as an objective set of truths for organising within the service, 
reflecting the complex distribution of medicine: rotation of registrars. More 
broadly however, whilst cognitive function as ‘amorphous, heterogeneous 
experience’ was transformed into a ‘calculable problem’ (Lakoff, 2007: 58) 
the locality of the clinic and the role of these tools in situ, was not disposed 
or made useless. Overall, as the provisionality and subsequent portability of 
the tools was made within the clinician-patient interaction and across the 
MDT, uncertainty associated with measures of cognitive decline were 
navigated and managed, and classification proceeded within a complex 
distribution of medical practice.  
Summary 
 
In this chapter, I captured how uncertainties associated with measures of 
cognitive decline were navigated and handled by clinicians in the clinician-
patient interaction and across the MDT. Through the making of the tools as 
provisional devices, clinicians were able to navigate the difficulty in 
determining a definitive diagnosis of AD, the ambiguities associated with 
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the technologies, and the ways in which patients conceived the nature of a 
diagnosis overall. This provisionality, which was constituted in the 
clinician-patient interaction, was accomplished in three significant ways. 
First, during the clinician-patient interaction, clinicians mediated and 
manipulated the tools where the practices of the clinic were able to ‘bring 
[the tools] to life’ (Berg, 1996: 501). Through these mediation and 
manipulation practices manifested in reassurance practices in the narration 
of the tests to actively omitting sections of the tests, clinicians were able to 
(re)constitute the tools to deal with the complexities emergent in the clinic. 
Extending this analysis further, I demonstrated how clinical judgement was 
subsequently privileged, which highlighted the production and reproduction 
of professional hierarchies, and subsequently the hierarchical dimensions of 
provisionality in the arena of the memory service.  
 
As a result, the second stage of provisionality was witnessed and the 
portability of the tools became manifest. In response to the performative 
architecture of the clinic, which produced particular anxieties around the 
testing process linked to negative accounts of mental health, which tended 
to be articulated in the clinic, the tools were transported into the space of 
patients’ homes. Developing the claims of Latimer (2004), I argued that it 
was in this space that memory nurses’ assigned significance to what was 
socially and culturally significant for producing knowledge about cognitive 
decline. Yet, what this pointed to more broadly, was the ability of the tools 
to produce and reproduce professional hierarchies, and configure and 
mediate particular relations between clinicians across the memory service 
(c.f. Berg, 1996). I demonstrated that whilst memory nurses were able to 
carve out a unique space within patients’ homes, consultants reclaimed the 
work of memory nurses in the MDT. Overall however, the work of memory 
nurses was significant because of the distribution of medicine across the 
service; they were routinely called upon to carry out the tests and therefore 
were explicitly involved in the making of provisionality. Overall, the 
provisionality of cognitive screening tools was a multi-disciplinary task, 
which became an important resource for navigating the uncertainties 
associated with cognitive decline. 
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The third way in which provisionality was performed across the service was 
through the reconstitution of the quantified element of the tools, for 
navigating and managing uncertainty. However, whilst I drew on the claim 
that overall the clinic resists reduction to statistics (Latimer et al., 2006: 
571), I also demonstrated the commitment to objectivity for proceeding with 
classification in the memory service and the medical decision making 
process. As a result, there emerged a balancing act: valuing the informal and 
ad hoc practices of the clinic, alongside the ‘black-boxed’ (Latour, 1987) 
quantified element of the tools. Through this ‘black boxed’ (Latour, 1987) 
tool, clinicians were able to proceed with classification in a complex 
structure of medical practice. I highlighted that whilst the quantified 
outcome of the tools was further mediated, clinicians also valued the 
quantified outcome of the tools.  
 
Furthermore, I extended Berg’s (1992) claims that the medical decision 
making process involves locally situated routines for resolving or preventing 
‘chaos’. I demonstrated that it was the portable outcome of the tools and the 
continual negotiation of routine to respond to emergent complexities that 
was important for making sense of the messiness of healthcare practice. 
Moreover, since I agreed that AD and cognitive decline are ‘categories in 
the making’ (Latimer et al., 2006: 614), the making of the tools in locally 
situated routines does not end in the arena of the clinician-patient interaction 
or the MDT. They are continually being made provisional and continually 
constructed in the corridors and offices of the clinics and during interactions 
with patients. Developing Berg (1996), I argue overall that the practices of 
provisionality did not mean that the formal work (despite being continually 
superseded) ‘stand[s] ‘powerless’ in the face of the contingent and 
interactionally achieved nature of the social’ (pp. 515). This chapter 
therefore illustrated the interrelation and co-production between the 
informal and ad hoc practices of the clinic, and the quantified outcome of 
the tools.   
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In the following chapter, I describe and analyse how clinicians use cognitive 
screening tools to constitute the boundaries of classification in the 
organisation of the memory service. In constituting the boundaries of 
disease, risk and uncertainty are mobilised in two distinctive ways. First, a 
borderline score on a cognitive screening tool drives clinicians to keep 
patients on for review, and second, it drives the categorical distinction 
between MCI and AD. Yet, despite the enactment of risk in the clinic, the 
expansion of the disease produces discursive constructs and contradictions 
around the ageing process and the meaning of AD overall, which impacts 
how clinicians proceed with classification. 
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Chapter Six 
Constituting the Boundaries of Classification 
 
In Chapter Five, I captured how clinicians articulated cognitive screening 
tools to navigate and manage the uncertainties associated with measures of 
cognitive decline. I demonstrated that in the clinician-patient interaction, 
clinicians mediated and manipulated the tools to deal with uncertainty, 
which manifested threefold. First, in relation to the social and cultural 
discourses around mental health and AD emergent in the clinic, second, 
with regards to the ambiguities associated with the tools, and third, in 
relation to the complexity associated with categorising AD more broadly. 
Together these formed a repertoire of uncertainties navigated through 
mediation and manipulation practices performed in the clinic, which 
constituted the making of the tools as provisional devices in situ. As I 
demonstrated, given this provisionality, the tools were rendered portable to 
further account for the uncertainties produced by the arena of the clinic. The 
tools subsequently shifted between different settings and across different 
actors. I therefore concurred with previous literatures including the work of 
Berg (1996), by arguing that the tools both produced and reproduced the 
power relations within the organisation of the memory service. Given the 
complex division of labour in the memory service, however, and as the tools 
could be transported into patients’ homes, memory nurses were able to 
carve out a unique space for professional practice. They attached 
significance to what was socially and culturally significant for constituting 
cognitive decline. In order to proceed with classification however, this work 
was collated in the MDT for adjudication by consultants.  
 
In the final section of the chapter, I captured how clinicians proceeded with 
classification; balancing the formal practice of the tools and their quantified 
outcome, alongside the informal practices witnessed in the clinician-patient 
interaction. In doing so, I developed the work of Berg (1992) arguing that 
whilst clinicians reconstructed the data to ‘fit’ their clinic work, for AD, the 
locally situated routines Berg describes were more complex than originally 
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assumed, as they continually underwent adjustment by clinicians to navigate 
and manage emergent complexities. This occurred both within the clinic and 
in the corridors and offices of the memory service: producing and 
reproducing the professional hierarchy. Overall, the portability of the tools 
as they shifted across a complex distribution of medical practice, enabled 
the classification process to proceed beyond recursive routines performed 
‘habitually’ (Berg, 1992: 170).  
 
In the following chapter, I explore how clinicians approach and use 
cognitive screening tools to negotiate the boundaries of classification in the 
organisation of the memory service. I argue that the enactment of risk and 
complexity in the clinic which blurs the boundaries of AD, creates a space 
where patients are kept on for review (Latimer, 2013); there is the 
possibility that patients may go on to develop the disease. I therefore argue 
that the imprecise and uncertainty in the clinic is mobilised, utilised and 
valued by clinicians (c.f. Latimer, et al., 2006, Latimer, 2013). The 
uncertainty, which drives this space for review and deferral
19
, can be 
characterised twofold. First, the patient may be deemed complex or risky 
due to physical or mental health concerns complicating the classification 
process, and second, the ‘messy’ patient narratives and results from 
cognitive screening tests do not necessarily fit neatly into a pre-defined AD 
category (Manning, 2000). I thus illustrate that cognitive screening tools 
play an important role in mediating and constituting the boundaries of AD. 
To demonstrate this, I focus on the significance of the borderline score, 
which is mobilised by clinicians for keeping patients on and creating a space 
for deferral, where the score is made portable across to neuropsychology.  
 
Subsequently, a borderline score also drives clinicians’ employment of the 
label Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), where I argue that constituting the 
boundaries of classification has the potential to ‘problematise’ ageing. The 
‘diagnostic creep of Alzheimer’s’ to include MCI (Beard, 2012: 12) has 
                                                          
19 I use the term ‘deferral’ to draw attention to both the theory of Latimer’s work on 
deferral processes in the clinic, and to denote those patients who are referred to 
neuropsychology, reflecting the theoretical or conceptual position of the chapter overall. 
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repercussions for the ways in which patients conceive diagnosis and ageing 
overall, and shifts the ways in which clinicians approach the tools and 
therefore the boundaries of AD constituted. The process of keeping patients 
on in the service is also entangled with efforts to offer those patients who 
are negatively affected by the possibility of a diagnosis, care-into-the-future. 
Extending my arguments in Chapter Five, keeping patients on in the service 
is not simply performed in response to the enactment of risk, but is also 
performed to account for those patients who may be negatively affected by 
the classification process and diagnosis overall.  
 
This chapter is grounded in broader themes including risk in terms of the 
shifting boundaries of disease, and develops the conceptual framework of 
portability in two distinctive ways. First, it demonstrates the tools 
manoeuvrability across the fields of psychology and psychiatry and second, 
it highlights the movement of patients across time and space, necessary for 
navigating complexity, and producing knowledge about the boundaries of 
disease. Since the tools are enacted as provisional devices, this drives the 
space for deferral, constructed on particular expectations about the field of 
psychology for negotiating the borderlines of AD and sorting complexity. It 
is the perceived partiality and enacted provisonality of the tools that renders 
them portable as they shift from the field of psychiatry to psychology. 
Navigating risks and complexity 
 
In the first section of this chapter, I explore how the boundaries of AD are 
negotiated and handled across the fields of psychiatry and psychology. In 
doing so, I demonstrate the mobilisation of uncertainty and explore the 
processes which drive clinicians to keep patients on for review. 
Classification overall, requires compromise (Hedgecoe, 2003) particularly 
in relation to formally classifying Alzheimer’s disease, which in itself is 
ambiguous and nosologically contested (Gaines and Whitehouse, 2006; 
Hardy, 2006). As demonstrated in Chapter Five, a categorisation of AD was 
difficult and involved a process of exclusion as opposed to confirmation 
confirmed by Consultant Psychiatrist 1 during interview, that a diagnosis is 
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‘by definition a probable diagnosis’ which as she further iterated, was a way 
of ‘hedging your bets’. If a categorisation of AD is therefore only ever 
probable, what happens to the decision making process (see Blaxter, 1978) 
when complexity becomes too much to sort in the clinics of psychiatry, 
blurring the boundaries of the condition? This is a particularly pertinent 
question if what is being made known is uncertain in itself, which makes 
determining ‘tidy boundaries’ as described by Cox and Webster (2012: 400) 
inherently difficult.  
 
In what follows, prior to the creation of a space for review or deferral 
(Latimer, 2013) to psychology, I show how the enactment of complexity 
characterised by a risky patient, was initially sorted within the hierarchy of 
psychiatry. Within the clinics of psychiatry, the everyday practice(s) of 
clinicians as they interacted with the tools was complicated by the 
emergence of complexity and risk. On a micro level, the characterisation of 
a risky patient occurred within the clinic in two distinctive ways. First, this 
characterisation was based on those who had unrelated physical or mental 
health issues, and second, on those who scored either particularly well or 
particularly poorly on the cognitive screening test. This represented what 
clinicians conceived of as a ‘borderline score’, which may not reflect the 
patient narrative or results from other diagnostic assessments including 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) or Computerised Tomography (CT) 
scans. Extending my analysis in Chapter Five, where I demonstrated the 
extent to which cognitive screening tools produced and reproduced 
professional hierarchies, this complexity was first ‘sorted’ within the 
hierarchy of the psychiatry team. During an interview with Consultant 
Psychiatrist 1, they explained how complexity was sorted across the 
hierarchy, 
 
‘If it’s a straightforward referral with no particular issues or risks 
identified, then they’re often allocated to one of the memory services 
nurses to do the initial assessment. If there’s any complexity, if 
there’s any physical co-morbidity, if there’s any mental health 
concerns about depression for example, and also if there’s been any 
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imaging that’s been done prior to the referral, those are the patients 
which tend to be seen by one of the medical members of the team for 
assessment.’  
 
This was illustrated further by Consultant Psychiatrist 3,  
 
‘If there’s mental health issues as well, so somebody’s presented to 
the GP, they’re anxious, they’re depressed and they’ve got memory 
problems, that can be a bit more difficult for a memory nurse to 
disentangle. They might come straight to a doctor to say to do that 
initial assessment but they want to try and rule out if there’s an acute 
mental health illness that needs treating first of all, before we go 
down the road of a memory assessment.’ 
 
For each of the two consultant psychiatrists, patient risk and complexity was 
enacted in the clinic through the production of medical or mental health 
concerns. As they explained, navigating this complexity, which 
compromises the boundaries of routine, required the expertise of those 
occupying positions higher up the professional hierarchy. For Consultant 
Psychiatrist 3, disentangling the heterogeneity of patient symptoms ‘they’re 
anxious, they’re depressed and they’ve got memory problems’ required 
navigation work, to ‘rule out’ the possibility of other conditions. Whilst the 
possibility of mental or physical health concerns would be noted in the GP 
referral notes, this was also assessed in the clinic. During each observation 
of a consultation, the patient was asked directly about their mental health 
history; ‘I’m going to ask you about your mood and mental health now’ (the 
patient nodded), the clinician asked, ‘do you feel depressed’ (Observation 
Speciality Doctor 1). On a further occasion, ‘I’m sorry but the next couple of 
questions are going to be quite dodgy questions, do you ever feel depressed?’ 
(Observation Memory Nurse 6). Negotiating co-existing mental health 
concerns, framed by Memory Nurse 6 as ‘dodgy questions’, and related 
predominantly to depression, was a frequent topic of discussion in each of 
the consultations observed. I reflected during observation that a number of 
patients at this point of the consultation were quick to dismiss the questions, 
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which is perhaps suggestive of the discursive constructs around mental 
health that remain in existence in the general population. Resolving these 
characteristics of a risky patient also depended on the division of labour 
within the memory service. As Consultant Psychiatrist 3 explained during 
interview, 
 
‘So the moments where it may come straight to a medic is if it’s 
urgent or if there are potentially risks. So if they’re wandering or 
family are under a great deal of strain, so if it needs memory nurse 
the waiting list is a couple of months. Whereas me, I can arrange to 
do a home visit which is a bit quicker.’ 
 
Demonstrated in Chapter Five, memory nurses were allocated the majority 
of initial consultations with patients thereby suggesting that a lack of risk 
and uncertainty was assumed to arise in the clinic. However, with the 
increasing pressures on the memory service in terms of referral rates for 
initial appointments, those occupying positions higher up the professional 
hierarchy in the memory service were becoming involved in these more 
routine appointments. As Consultant Psychiatrist 3 recounted, this was 
particularly the case if the pressure on the family was becoming difficult to 
manage. Therefore it was at times necessary for consultants to navigate and 
sort uncertainty, potential ‘risks’, because of the increased demand on 
memory nurses. However, the notion of a complex or risky patient did not 
end here. The enactment of risk and complexity in the clinic, at times led to 
a borderline score on a cognitive screening tool. A borderline score 
subsequently became a vehicle through which uncertainty was mobilised 
and indeed valued, leading to the creation of a space for deferral; a 
borderline score was significant for keeping patients on in the service (c.f. 
Latimer, 2013). This space for deferral also enacted a sense of hope for 
clinicians. Given that there remains no cause or cure for AD, this space was 
utilised to create value out of uncertainty; emerging as a space for hope for 
clinicians, that mobilised action rather than closed down uncertainty. Prior 
to demonstrating how a borderline score which institutes risk and 
complexity, was handled by clinicians in the medical decision making 
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process, the following extract summarises how the score overall, was 
handled across the professional hierarchy. Exploring how clinicians 
routinely negotiated the quantified outcome in the space of the MDT is 
important for considering the work that shifts when negotiating a borderline 
score in the division of labour in the memory service.  
 
During an interview with Memory Nurse 3 she described how the score was 
negotiated in the MDT,  
 
“Well it [the score] will be discussed at the next MDT with that 
consultant team and the MDT outcomes in terms of scores it might 
be that medically a doctor might say ‘what was the total score’? And 
then they’ll they maybe say ‘what happened to the sub scores’? And 
it might become a numbers game. And then somebody might 
depending on what else is happening and what other conversations it 
might be ‘can I have a look to see how they did on the visual 
aspect’?” 
 
From the outset, this extract reflects the hierarchical work produced by the 
quantified outcome on the test. The ‘numbers game’ was played by 
professionals occupying positions higher up the professional hierarchy. In 
doing so, it also rendered the work of nurses visible in initial consultations, 
‘can I have a look to see how they did on the visual aspect’? This translation 
work serves to sustain the professional hierarchy in the service and its 
ceremonial order (Strong, 1979); the work of nurses remained subject to 
scrutiny by those higher up the professional hierarchy. I also witnessed the 
‘numbers game’ that Memory Nurse 3 described during observations of 
team meetings, the registrar or consultant steering the meeting would 
directly ask the memory nurse or trainee psychiatrist presenting for the 
‘overall score’ which would then be orchestrated by the more senior 
colleagues in the decision-making process. This is suggestive of a collective 
and collaborative approach to making sense of the quantified element of the 
tools, and yet when risk and complexity were enacted in the clinic, this had 
the potential to reconfigure the quantified outcome of the tools and so create 
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what I conceive of as a borderline score. Clinicians managed and made 
sense of the risks associated with the score, as it was mobilised to create a 
space for deferral into the field of psychology. In doing so, the borderline 
score reproduced and also reconfigured the power relations within the 
memory service, to negotiate the boundaries of AD and proceed with the 
classification process. 
Risk and the space for deferral 
 
I ground my analysis of a borderline score on the theme of risk. On a macro 
level, there is widespread agreement that the post-modern era is 
characterised by attempts to quantify risk, turning the ‘incalculable 
calculable’ (Beck, 1992). Yet for the purposes of this chapter, I frame the 
‘dramatic shift’ of risk in the arena of medical practice, at a local level 
within the clinic (see Almeling and Gadarian, 2014: 482). I draw on the 
claims of Armstrong (1995) who contends that the shift in risk thinking is 
represented by a move from ‘hospital medicine’ where individuals were 
treated according to manifest pathologies, to ‘surveillance medicine’ and the 
monitoring of those who are deemed to be ‘at risk’ of potential pathology.  
 
Grounding this chapter in risk therefore ignites debates around the 
boundaries and categorical distinctions between health and disease. The 
boundaries of disease become blurred as risk emerges as a mechanism 
through which bodies are constructed as having the potential to become ill 
(Ibid.); normality becomes ‘problematised’ (Armstrong, 1995: 482). 
Commentators have drawn attention to how people experience medical risk 
(see Edwards, et al., 2008; McBride et al., 2010), with scholars such as 
Armstrong (1995), Novas and Rose (2000), Rose (2007b, 2009) and Clarke 
et al., (2010), theorising on the role of risk in the constitution of self and 
daily life, described as ‘somatic citizenship’. As societies become 
increasingly biomedicalised and thus technoscientific and ‘risky’, this 
encourages individuals to identify and inscribe themselves through 
increasingly technoscientific means (Clarke et al., 2003). The ‘self’ in all its 
regimes and responsibilities, is reconfigured as individuals construct 
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themselves as ‘enterprising’ and autonomous individuals for deciding their 
own life course. Whilst the notion of somatic citizenship is not the primary 
focus of the following analysis, the concept is important for developing the 
claims I make further in the chapter around the consequences of the 
problematisation of ageing. Discursive constructs around the ‘successes’ of 
ageing, encapsulate the idea that we are autonomous individuals responsible 
for how we grow old, and therefore the extent to which we are ‘at risk’ of 
developing diseases associated with old-age such as AD.  
 
Aside from concerns about the experiences of risk and the healthy 
population, commentators have also drawn attention to the convergence of 
the boundary between risk and chronic disease: the experience of being at 
risk, and the disease itself (Aronowitz, 2009). In terms of medical 
knowledge, medical science, and medical technology, commentaries on risk 
and uncertainty in health also claim that medical science emerges as a site 
for uncertainty and risk (Webster, 2002); medical technology and 
knowledge advancement means we are less able to tolerate clinical 
uncertainties (Fox, 1980; Crawford, 2004), and risk and uncertainty drives 
societal responses to, and experiences of, contested illnesses (Hayden and 
Sachs, 1998; May, 2000; Nettleton et al., 2004, 2005; Nettleton, 2006).  
 
Notwithstanding the idea that innovative technoscience enacts risk and 
shifts the boundaries of disease, this chapter troubles dominant 
constructions of risk, by exploring the power of low-technological tools for 
constituting the boundaries of AD. As demonstrated, cognitive screening 
tools as mundane technologies, were utilised to constitute the boundaries of 
AD; built in part around the expectations associated with the technologies in 
the field of psychology. In the latter part of the chapter, I also show how the 
problematisation of ageing, shifted how clinicians approached and therefore 
constituted the boundaries of AD, and employed the label MCI. Keeping 
patients on for review was not simply a matter of making sense of risk and 
the extent to which patients may go on to develop AD, but also about 
making sense of the contradictions around risk, age, the process of ageing 
and AD. The enactment of risk and the expansion of AD, have the potential 
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to problematise normality, which as I demonstrate, had important 
implications for the ways in which clinicians approached classification 
practices.  
 
Initially, I illustrate the ways in which risk as enacted in the clinic, was 
mobilised by clinicians to create a space for deferral to neuropsychology 
(Latimer, 2013). What Latimer (2013: 103) describes as the ‘imprecise’ or 
uncertainty in the clinic, was driven more broadly by the emergence of 
increasing levels of risk. Rather than disposing with a borderline score and 
therefore uncertainty, the clinic emerged and was ‘equipped’ to manage 
uncertainty; transformed into a ‘space that actually thrives on the imprecise’ 
(Latimer, 2013: 103). As argued by Latimer, the space of deferral returns 
the act of decision making to the clinic and thus reaffirms the role of the 
clinic as a critical site for knowledge production. I extend Latimer’s claims 
towards the end of the chapter, as this space of deferral for AD, was both 
created and performed ambivalently, as I illustrate by drawing particular 
attention to the label MCI. The space for deferral was driven by the 
mobilisation of uncertainty as well as discursive constructs around ageing 
and dementia, which played important roles in constituting this space, and 
therefore the decisions clinicians made about keeping patients on in the 
memory service. The space for deferral was utilised by clinicians to make 
sense of uncertainty. 
 
Across the memory service, uncertainty was a key characteristic of clinic 
appointments and team meetings as I addressed in Chapter Five. What I 
found particularly interesting from observing both consultations and team 
meetings, was that this uncertainty was utilised, mobilised and valued by 
clinicians as I witnessed during in-depth, collective discussions in team 
meetings, to ad hoc conversations during de-briefing consultations, and in 
the offices of the memory service as clinicians debated the ambiguities of 
the tools. This mobilisation of uncertainty was further witnessed when 
constituting the boundaries of classification; uncertainty and complexity 
were not disposed but utilised by clinicians as the following extract from an 
interview with Memory Nurse 1 highlighted,  
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‘Looking at the cognitive test I think the cut off for the ACE 111 (I’d 
have to look it up to know exactly) but I think it’s kind of mid 70s so 
if somebody’s scoring over the mid-70s out of 100 on the test, you’d 
be thinking is this a known dementia or is this just a normal ageing 
process? Sometimes only time will tell on that, sometimes you just 
have to go back in 12 months and see if there has been any 
deterioration really.’  
 
As Memory Nurse 1 explained, the ‘cut off’ on the ACE 111 was a device 
through which the clinician could navigate and continue the classification 
process (Blaxter, 1978). For Memory Nurse 1, a patient scoring 70 or above 
on the ACE 111, did not constitute a classification of dementia but nor did it 
constitute processes of normal ageing; borderline in the memory service as I 
will show throughout this chapter, does not always have the ability to 
categorise symptoms as pathological (Jutel, 2009). In recognition of this, 
Memory Nurse 1 attested the importance for keeping patients on, 
‘sometimes you just have to go back in 12 months and see if there has been 
any deterioration’. Furthermore, the tools emerged as agents of risk 
(Armstrong, 1995). As Memory Nurse 1 suggested, there was a possibility 
that patients may travel beyond the borderline, towards diagnostic closure. 
Arguably, this monitoring procedure serves as an extension of surveillance 
and the medical gaze (Foucault, 1973; Armstrong, 1995) towards those who 
have the potential to develop AD. This notion of keeping patients on in time 
resonated across the memory service, linked overall to the myriad of ways 
in which clinicians approached the classification process with care, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Five. Similarly to Memory Nurse 1, Consultant 
Psychiatrist 2 explained the significance of the ‘cut off’ score on the test and 
ascribed particular value to the role of neuropsychology when deferring 
patients, ‘if they’re right on the cut off and they’re really distressed do I 
refer them to neuropsychology for some in-depth testing just to see actually 
no, this is the start of an Alzheimer’s dementia?’ Memory Nurse 1 also 
reflected on the possibility that a high performing patient, who had the 
potential to alter the course of the tests, may require review over time for 
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diagnosis, in recognition of the ambiguity associated with the testing 
process. Importantly, these extracts point to the temporality of the 
classification process; clinicians took their time with diagnosis particularly 
when faced with deploying the label MCI. This is a point I develop further 
in the chapter.   
 
As an agent of risk therefore, a borderline score prompted deferral to the 
field of psychology; there was a chance that patients could go on to develop 
AD. This space of deferral ensured patients were subsequently ‘kept on’ 
(Latimer, 2013) in the memory service for further investigation. I argue that 
this space of deferral was constructed both around the mobilisation of risk, 
and also around psychiatrists’ expectations regarding the field of 
psychology, the technologies adopted in this field, and their expertise and 
experience. As highlighted by Consultant Psychiatrist 1 during interview 
when explaining the reason for deferring patients to neuropsychology,  
 
‘I suppose if you’ve got, so patients who’ve got, where their working 
diagnosis is uncertain, if they if they score unexpectedly well or 
poorly on a test which doesn’t mirror the history, that would 
potentially be a reason for sort of referring on for 
neuropsychological testing by our psychology colleagues.’ 
 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1 recognised that the score from the cognitive 
screening test may not correlate with the history as narrated by the patient. 
This was a point made by a number of clinicians during interview, and 
particularly during observations of team meetings, there were instances 
where clinicians would exclaim that the patient had ‘given a really good 
history but their test score was poor’ (Observation Team Meeting Ridge 
NHS Centre). As I have deduced from the interview excerpt, Consultant 
Psychiatrist 1 subsequently treated the quantified score as a ‘material-
semiotic device’ inseparable from the practices of the clinic (Verran, 2012: 
112). Rather than dismissing the situational exigencies and individual 
particularities (Berg, 1996; Dodier, 1998) which may have shaped the 
patient scoring ‘unexpectedly well or poorly’, Consultant Psychiatrist 2 
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explained how these factors promoted clinicians to defer patients to 
psychology for further testing. However, this reflected a point of disjuncture 
from Chapter Five. Rather than the clinician mediating the data to fit the 
clinical work, on presentation of a borderline score, clinicians ‘stepped out’ 
of their already complex routines and deferred the borderline score to 
psychology for further clarification, in order to resolve the complexity 
associated with a borderline score (c.f. Berg, 1992). The space for deferral 
therefore mobilised risk and yet at the same time, was constructed around 
the expectations of the tools adopted in both psychiatry and psychology. 
There were instances where the tools used in psychiatry were not perceived 
to be adequately sophisticated for resolving complexity. This was confirmed 
by Memory Nurse 3 as she explained during interview,  
 
‘But also with the cognitive testing there’s always those people that 
are in you know like the grey zone isn’t there. Sort of it’s usually if 
they’re getting in their 80’s [score result] and then from that it might 
be it might determine more neuropsychological testing it might 
generate another referral to psychology for further testing.’ 
 
The borderlines of classification were manifested practically in a borderline 
score or what Memory Nurse 3 described as the ‘grey zone’, navigated by 
clinicians towards deferral to neuropsychology. Here, the technology was 
significant for deciding how to proceed with the classification process. The 
ambiguity of testing, which was subjected to extraneous factors such as 
patient ‘distress’ or ‘functional impairment’, justified the need for the 
increased use of testing. Therefore when the boundaries of AD became 
increasingly blurred, it was further testing in psychology that was utilised to 
sort this complexity. The use of further testing or further technological 
intervention in psychology had a more enhanced role when negotiating the 
boundaries of classification; presumed to create added certainty. As 
Consultant Psychiatrist 4 further illustrated, at times, cognitive screening 
tools used in psychiatry were ‘enough in most cases…[but] sometimes you 
need some more sensitive tests and more specific tests then you need you 
know stronger evidence to show that there is problem with the cognitive 
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functioning’. The expectation was that this ‘in-depth’ or ‘further testing’ 
would order the uncertainty in the clinic. Many other practitioners expressed 
a similar sentiment across the memory service. There were also instances 
during observations where clinicians would stress to patients at the 
beginning of the appointment, that if there were any discrepancies about the 
results from the tests or ‘confusion’, they could defer patients to psychology 
for more ‘specialist’ testing. From my own experiences of being present 
during observations, this is suggestive of a further caring approach to the 
consultation: clinicians recognised the uncertainties emergent in the clinic 
and the possibility of unexpected results and attempted to navigate this early 
in the appointment. Similarly to Memory Nurse 3, Consultant Psychiatrist 2 
also recognised the importance of deferring to neuropsychology although 
she was careful to iterate that she had a ‘low threshold for referring them 
[patients] for neuropsychological testing’ if ‘they’re very distressed or 
there’s function[al] impairment.’  
 
The crux of the analysis in this chapter is that uncertainty emerged as an 
enabling feature, which was further evidenced by Memory Nurse 1 who 
illustrated during interview, ‘if we have somebody where the diagnosis is 
uncertain the test the cognitive tests and scan are giving, painting quite an 
unusual picture we’ll often send them to psychology for neuropsychological 
testing’. For Memory Nurse 1, the uncertainty of a diagnosis or ‘painting’ of 
an, ‘unusual picture’ was sorted through deferral to neuropsychology; the 
clinic emerged and was ‘equipped’, to manage this uncertainty. Echoing 
Consultant Psychiatrist 4, Memory Nurse 3 expected the tools used in 
psychology to more accurately distinguish and categorise Alzheimer’s 
disease (or help distinguish one disorder from another (Dowrick, 2009)) 
through the increased number of tools they have in the field, ‘I think 
psychologists have a much more sort of cognitive tools in their tool bag than 
perhaps nurses do’. From the psychologists’ perspective however, it was the 
more sophisticated or comprehensive tests used in the field, which were 
valued for the ways in which patients made sense of their deferral. The 
space of deferral and passing over the score into psychology, was important 
for reifying to patients that clinicians ‘don’t take diagnosis lightly…based 
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on a sixth sense…it does give a really good platform for having those 
conversations’ (Conversation Clinical Psychologist 3). I reflect here on the 
dynamics of care work embedded in consultations for ‘having those 
conversations.’ At the same time that clinicians were actively engaged in 
practices which attempted to care for the patient in terms of protecting and 
preserving identities in the clinic, the tools were also key agents for enabling 
clinicians to take responsibility for diagnosis in a caring manner; confirming 
that they did not take ‘diagnosis lightly’. The space of deferral when 
referring patients to psychology was therefore constructed both on the idea 
that patients may go on to develop AD, but also on the expectations of the 
technologies used in psychiatry and psychology.  
 
Entangled in the management of risk therefore, were the expectations 
associated with the field of psychology, which emerged in spite of the fact 
that clinicians approached and performed the tools as provisional devices in 
routine practice. This developed further than technological expectation 
however, into the expectations around the specialist expertise and skill of 
psychologists, which resonated across accounts with psychiatrists. Both 
psychiatrists and psychologists expressed the importance of specialist 
expertise and experience for further sorting complexity and moving beyond 
the borderline. As a result, the space for deferral is suggestive of the 
division of labour within the memory service, and concurrently, the 
expectations of technologies and the field of psychology, for making sense 
of complexity and mobilising uncertainty.  
MDT: Professional roles and expectations 
 
Keeping patients on for review to neuropsychology reflects psychiatrists’ 
expectations about the expertise and skill base of psychologists; their ability 
to adjudicate on, interpret and use, both instruments for screening cognitive 
function, and more sophisticated neuropsychological assessments such as 
the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status 
(RBANS). Psychiatrists legitimated the role and identity of psychologists in 
terms of ‘expertise derived from job specialisation’ (Sanders and Harrison, 
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2008: 295), purifying the field of psychology (c.f. Latour, 1993). As 
Consultant Psychiatrist 4 explained when asked during interview to reflect 
on the process of deferring patients to neuropsychology, 
 
‘When you need detailed assessment of the cognitive domains - 
specific cognitive domains - then again those neuro-psychometric 
testing come in handy and they are not very easy to just you know 
conduct them you need specific training you need specific skills and 
the psychologists have that skills and training.’  
 
According to Consultant Psychiatrist 4 the ‘expertise’ (Sanders and Harrison, 
2008) of psychologists within the complex network of the memory service, 
served to sort the uncertainty and diversity that emerged in the clinic. Whilst 
scholars including Larson (1990) depict this space as a ‘battlefield wherein 
different kinds of experts fight for pre-eminence’ (pp. 35), deferral to 
psychology was particularly important for negotiating complexity and 
constructing the normal from the pathological. Psychiatrists legitimated the 
professional role of psychologists by referring to their expertise with regards 
to their ‘job specialisation’ (Sanders and Harrison, 2008: 295), ‘you need 
specific training you need specific skills and the psychologists have that 
skills and training’. Concurrently however, psychologists were also 
increasingly aware of the limitations of these technologies and approached 
them with caution. During a conversation following a formal interview with 
Clinical Psychologist 1, he explained how the expertise and skill of 
psychologists was performed not by approaching and using the tools 
without question, but performed in recognition of the limitations of the tests. 
As he clarified,  
 
Clinical psychologist 1: ‘I think that in the right hands those tools 
are very good at detecting the difference between normal ageing and 
pathological processes; however, in the wrong hands they’re quite 
dangerous. So I think that’s why a lot of the training I do is about 
what does this number that you got out of it mean and what 
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tolerances type 1 and type 2 errors associated with this age group 
and this this measure’. 
 
JS: Could you elaborate on what you mean by the ‘right hands’? 
 
Clinical psychologist 1: So I suppose what I mean by that is 
somebody who sees the value of doing testing but doesn’t treat it as -  
a somebody who’s aware of the sort of limits of the test. Does that 
make sense? So it doesn’t mean it’s any particular profession it 
means that, that person is going to place value on the results but 
know the limit of what those test results can tell you and also take 
into account all the other things so a lot of the people in the memory 
service are very skilled in doing this as lot of people who work in the 
wider Trust are very unskilled.’  
 
Clinical psychologist 1 acknowledged that the purpose of these technologies 
for determining the normal from the pathological could only be realised 
when placed in the ‘right hands’: those who are ‘aware’ of the limitations. 
As Clinical Psychologist 3 illustrated, failing to recognise these limitations 
produced uncertainty and complexity, ‘type 1 and type 2 errors’, 
‘dangerous’ for classification overall. Furthermore, extending the claims I 
made in Chapter Five, in relation to the quantified outcome on the tests, 
Clinical Psychologist 1 valued both the objective, standardised and 
quantified element of the test in terms of the ability to ‘train’ individuals to 
uniformly carry out and interpret the tests (a standardised array of tools 
could be drawn upon (Porter, 1996)) but also accepted the importance of 
practising professional judgement, ‘somebody who’s aware of the sort of 
limits of the test’. This points to a claim that those with specialist expertise 
are the actors who have the authority to adjudicate on the use of the tools, 
and their inherent value in the classification process. This was evidenced 
further by Clinical Psychologist 3 who illustrated during interview,  
 
‘Sometimes with these tools you can kind of come across as a real 
expert and they allow you a certain language and jargon to use if you 
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want to, if you choose to do that, that can kind of definitely feed in 
to that kind of expert position. And often the psychometrics and the 
statistics of it is a language that other members of the team don’t 
necessarily speak. So people take it at face value then: yeah ‘we're 
not going to argue with the psychologists because they clearly know 
what they’re talking about’ and don’t quite understand when we go 
into percentiles and things like that yes. But that sounds a bit too 
negative and critical now because there is a place for it.’ 
 
Across the memory service, the professional expert model ‘implies a 
covenant based on trust that the expert will act in the patient’s best interest’ 
(Timmermans and Mauck, 2005: 23). As Clinical Psychologist 3 clarified 
however, this covenant of trust was compromised, if psychologists exercised 
their professional autonomy when using the tools without recognising the 
limitations of doing so. Despite psychiatrists emphasising and constructing 
expectations around the expertise and skills of their colleagues within 
psychology, this may not be productive for the decision-making process 
overall. Reflecting on observations of both consultations and team meetings, 
clinicians, particularly those occupying positions higher up the professional 
hierarchy, continually iterated that memory nurses in particular should ‘be 
careful’ about using the tools and drawing definitive conclusions from the 
results. Subsequently, the process of deferral rested not solely on the 
materiality of the tools, but reflected more broadly the professional 
hierarchy within the service; related to expertise and skill to exercise caution.  
 
Entangled in the constitution of the space of deferral and portability of the 
tools to psychology, was the negotiation of the everyday, organisational life 
of the MDT for constituting the boundaries of disease and creating this 
space for deferral. As I demonstrated in Chapter Five, the MDT in the 
memory service was an arena for collectively agreeing about the role of 
cognitive screening tools, and was demonstrable of the division of labour in 
the memory service.  When negotiating the borderlines of classification 
therefore, and the deferral space to psychology, how did psychologists 
navigate their role, and how were decisions made about moving beyond the 
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borderlines in the MDT? In what follows, I explore the distribution of the 
medical-decision making process across the MDT (c.f. Orlikowski, 2007) 
where negotiating the boundaries of classification was performed. As 
argued by Øvretveit (1993), multi-disciplinary working encourages, and 
offers opportunities for, collectively sharing different views and 
perspectives. It is therefore a space, which facilitates an independent and 
autonomous method for ‘doing’ healthcare (see Saferstein, 1992; Housley, 
2000). Drawing on the claims of Latimer (2004) however, the question 
remains as to how risk and complexity were resolved in such a collaborative 
space? ‘When no single narrative, or actor, is explicitly invested with 
authority over others, how exactly do matters get settled’ (Latimer, 2004: 
758)?  
 
In what follows, I capture how cognitive screening tools and the discussion 
of a borderline score, were central conduits for instituting interactions, 
debates and negotiations between professionals within the space of the 
MDT. However, I demonstrate that when negotiating a borderline score, 
both consultants and psychologists retained their professional power by 
adjudicating on how the borderlines were constituted for proceeding with 
classification, and also interpreting or call[ing] to account the work of 
memory nurses (Latimer, 2004: 770). Whilst I demonstrate that ‘all 
members play a part’ (Latimer, 2004: 768), I extend this analysis by arguing 
that psychologists played an integral role in calling every actor (including 
consultants (somewhat unexpectedly)) into account in the MDT. Prior to the 
enactment of risk and deferring decisions to psychology, the process of 
calling clinicians to account (Latimer, 2004) was observable in routine 
MDT meetings as I noted whilst observing a team meeting at Nunmill 
Hospital, 
 
‘The consultant psychiatrist was sat at the head of the table around 
which sat each member of the team. I noticed that rather than the 
consultant sitting with each patient’s notes, each clinician had their 
own pile of patient notes stacked in front of them. The consultant 
started the meeting by beginning with GP referrals. She asked which 
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clinician would like to begin and a memory nurse responded. Giving 
the name of the patient referred to the memory service to the 
consultant, the consultant entered this into the computer database, 
and the patient’s information was displayed on the wall at the 
opposite end of the table for all clinicians to see. From herein, 
patient referrals, results from initial appointments and then 
diagnostic appointments were discussed, with the consultant steering 
the meeting, ‘who’s assessed patient x’, ‘are you checking their 
living arrangement OT 1’, ‘can you talk me through what you’re 
doing about their falls…’,‘could you talk me through the main 
problems you see from the assessment’. Memory nurses often turned 
to consultants to ask ‘what should be done next?’ with collaboration 
between memory nurses and OTs, ‘I’ve been to see patient x in their 
home and do you think they’d benefit from a stairlift/memory board’?  
 
As I reflected during the observation, the consultant occupied a central 
position in sustaining the power relations in the service, which concurred 
with the claims of Latimer (2004). The consultant occupied the head of the 
table, steered the meeting, was responsible for the majority of the decision 
making, and called memory nurses and OTs to account, ‘can you talk me 
through what you’re doing about their falls…’, ‘could you talk me through 
the main problems you see from the assessment’. This is suggestive of the 
division of labour in the service. However, what I also witnessed across the 
memory service was that clinicians occupying lower tiered positions in the 
hierarchy, also called each other into account as I found when observing a 
team meeting at Nunmill Hospital,  
 
‘A memory nurse presented the case of a patient experiencing 
memory problems. The memory nurse continued by questioning 
whether the patient’s partner, who she had met in the initial 
consultation, was also experiencing memory problems. At this point, 
an OT interrupted to say that she disagreed having also met the 
couple in the last couple of weeks: ‘from my own observations I 
don’t think the partner is experiencing memory problems at all’. In 
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the end, the memory nurse responsible overall for the patient, 
explained that she hadn’t seen the couple for ‘so long’ she was 
perhaps missing key factors of decline and asked the OT to stay at 
the end of the meeting to discuss this further. I reflected at this point 
on whether this accounting practice would have occurred if it had 
been the OT disagreeing with the consultant.’ 
 
Although consultants continually called those occupying positions further 
down the professional hierarchy into account when negotiating evidence in 
the MDT, clinicians in these lower tiered positions also accomplished this 
accounting practice amongst one another, observable in the team meeting. 
Therefore whilst professional hierarchies were maintained, this was 
articulated across and within the hierarchy at simultaneous moments; seen 
here in the discussion between the memory nurse and the OT given their 
shared patient responsibilities. The following section therefore, addresses 
the role of psychologists within the MDT for negotiating risk. Whilst I 
demonstrate that the MDT accomplished and (re)accomplished professional 
hierarchy, this shifted when negotiating borderlines, and with the 
involvement of psychologists. When psychologists entered the space of the 
MDT, they played a privileged role in interpreting the cognitive screening 
tools used in psychiatry. As Memory Nurse 2 explained when asked about 
the significance of the cognitive screening scores during interview, 
 
‘We would discuss it [results from cognitive screening tests] at the 
MDT and we’d go through it and we have a psychologist there most 
of the time and he kind of picks up on things that we probably 
wouldn’t and the medics obviously clearly see things from their 
angle and they know what they’re looking for. If there’s something 
out of the ordinary, then that gets picked up and discussed and we 
can decide where it’s to go, if it’s a borderline score then we look at 
what else we’ve come up with; the behaviours and how they’re 
functioning and things like that then it might be about where do they 
go. So it all helps to build a picture of where the best place to meet 
their needs is going to be made and it could be that it just goes to a 
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medic and will go for a CT scan and will go for diagnosis but it 
could be that it goes to psychology for further testing. Or it could be 
we don’t know what’s going on here but if there’s no huge risks 
we’ll go back in six months’ time and we’ll see somebody again and 
we can compare if there’s been no change we’ll see what’s 
happening and we’ll bring it back then. If there’s anything 
outstanding I just say (well or unusual) we’d pick up on that and run 
with that and see where we go with that.’  
 
The interpretation of the tests was handled in the clinic as a multi-
disciplinary team task. However, as Memory Nurse 2 attested, the 
psychologists served as the actors with the ability to navigate the 
complexities of the tests and their outcomes, ‘he kind of picks up on things 
that we probably wouldn’t’. As Memory Nurse 2 noted, the technologies 
and their outcomes were managed and approached differently across the 
professional hierarchy because of the diverse ‘angle[s]’ of expertise. This is 
of course interesting because memory nurses were afforded the 
responsibility of carrying out the majority of initial appointments, but 
recognised the limitations of their profession in being able to interpret the 
outcomes of the tests. Arguably, such a claim represents a form of 
disciplinary power (Foucault, 1973), controlling rather than coercing how 
‘something out of the ordinary’ was approached and organised. Clinicians 
utilised this hierarchical power (Foucault, 1973) to mobilise the actions of 
clinicians to ‘build a picture’ of what was essentially a complex 
classification process. Within the team, the psychologist held the privileged 
position of interpreting and making sense of the technologies, and their 
inherent ambiguities and uncertainties. This privileged position was 
grounded more broadly in the hopes and expectations held by psychiatrists 
of the field of psychology as previously attested. The possibility of the 
uncertain or the unknown, ‘or it could be we don’t know, what’s going on 
here?’ served to drive the deferral of patients to neuropsychology. 
Subsequently, the professional hierarchy of the memory service was 
sustained. The interactions between clinicians mobilised and facilitated how 
clinicians approached classification within the organisation of the memory 
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service. As such, the patient was not disposed but ordered and managed 
within the team, of which psychologists played an important role. The 
mediating and thus enabling feature of the borderline score (enacting 
complexity) also extended into legitimating the need for increased use of 
diagnostic technologies (Latimer, 2013), ‘CT scan, psychology for further 
testing’ in order to fix a diagnosis.  
 
At this point, I contend that at times, a borderline score did not necessarily 
lead to deferral in the sense that the patient was ‘passed over’ to psychology. 
Rather, in the team meeting, the psychologist adjudicated on the uncertainty 
produced by the test without necessarily taking over the patient in terms of 
caseload. The following extract suggests how moving beyond the 
borderlines occurred through the responsibility of psychologists when 
present in the MDT. As Memory Nurse 3 explained during interview,  
 
“Psychologists at the team meeting usually take a more pro-active 
role in ‘actually can I have a look at it Joan?’ They actually take it 
off me and then they sort of sift through and I  - and maybe because 
they’re more knowledgeable about it, they can sort of glean a bit ‘oh 
I think they’re leaning towards an Alzheimer’s type presentation’ 
without actually giving a diagnosis but they may - they may sort of 
help to inform in terms of the  - cos the next appointment is for a 
diagnosis so it might be and then of course you’ve got your bloods 
and then the next part you would have a CT scan so it will it will be 
sort of aided in formulating a diagnosis and that’s usually it’s usually 
the psychologist that would contribute that.” 
 
What is interesting is that here, the technology itself served as a central 
conduit for reaffirming the power relations in the service and calling to 
account or calling to interpretation (Latimer, 2004) the work of memory 
nurses ‘can I have a look at that Joan’? As such, the clinical psychologist 
had the expertise to interpret the cognitive screening tools used by clinicians 
in psychiatry. Despite the psychologist in the MDT meeting only able to 
speculate on the results from cognitive screening, ‘oh I think they’re leaning 
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towards an Alzheimer’s type presentation… without actually giving a 
diagnosis’, this speculation work sustained the professional hierarchy and 
reflected their expert role. This was confirmed by the actions of the 
psychologist, in their physical handling of the test. For Memory Nurse 3, the 
test was also a valuable component for classification because psychologists 
had the expertise to handle it, ‘maybe because they’re more knowledgeable 
about it’ constructing a space for deferral in the MDT and for professional 
boundaries, necessary for the constitution of AD. The psychologist in the 
MDT held the privileged position for calling all clinicians into account. 
Nevertheless, observed during a consultation with Trainee Psychiatrist 3, it 
was not always the case that the borderlines of classification were deferred 
to, and therefore resolved by, psychology. Observing the consultation with 
Trainee Psychiatrist 3, I noted the importance of the role of the patient in 
determining how the boundaries of classification were resolved,   
 
 “The patient arrived at the appointment having previously had a CT 
scan prior to cognitive testing. One of the first questions the patient 
asked the clinician was to explain the result from their CT scan 
stating they ‘know about brain shrinkage’ questioning whether 
‘there is any medication I can take for it’? The clinician however, 
steered the consultation back to the cognitive screening test and did 
not answer. Following the cognitive screening test, the clinician gave 
the patient their score of 80/100 and explained that they had taken 
this score with the rest of the history as discussed at the beginning of 
the appointment. The clinician described what the score meant and 
suggested that it showed the ‘start of the cognitive process.’ The 
clinician explained this further by saying that the patient has a ‘bit of 
cognitive impairment but it is borderline with the cognitive testing’. I 
noted at this point that the clinician did not explain the use of the 
term borderline and the patient did not press for this information. 
The clinician explained that taking everything into consideration 
from the history, what the patient and family member was telling 
them, the CT scan and the cognitive testing score, that it showed the 
start of the Alzheimer’s type process. The clinician talked through 
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the results from the CT scan, which she had not been able to do at 
the beginning of the appointment, and explained that the results 
meant they could rule out other physical pathologies including 
cancer. The clinician reassured the patient that this was very positive, 
particularly when compared with the results from the cognitive 
screening test.” 
 
Here, the significance of a CT scan and the information gathered from the 
cognitive screening tool produced a borderline case. The boundaries of the 
disease were effectively constituted as Trainee Psychiatrist 3 aligned the 
‘borderline’ score, (80/100) with the clinical evidence, history, CT scan’ 
concluding that together this demonstrated the ‘start of the cognitive 
process’. During the observation, I reflected on whether the use of the term 
borderline, for the patient was perhaps ambiguous. However, despite this 
possible ambiguity, the patient played a significant role in organising the 
process of moving beyond the borderline score. It was clear from the 
beginning that the patient was interested about a diagnosis, she continually 
asked questions about the results from the CT scan and therefore brought 
cognitive decline into a material, visual space and engaged in ‘brain talk’ 
(Gross, 2012: 107) for constituting diagnostic resolve. This ‘brain talk’ is a 
specific form of objectification of disease which in this case allowed the 
patient to consider the ‘what next’ in the classification process (Blaxter, 
1978). However, for the clinician, the scan was used only as a prop to 
exclude the possibility of more visible diseases such as cancer. 
Subsequently, reaching diagnostic closure, the borderline score on the 
cognitive screening test, became significant for the medical decision making 
process. In the clinician-patient interaction, it was the patient that drove the 
clinician to push forward with diagnostic closure and move beyond the 
borderlines. This was further evidenced during the de-brief conversation 
with Trainee Psychiatrist 3 following the consultation where she elaborated 
on the significance of a borderline score, 
 
“The clinician discusses with me the borderline nature of the 
diagnosis and goes on to explain how they have taken into 
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consideration the history of the patient, and the CT scan results, to 
come to a diagnosis. The clinician ascribes a particular meaning to 
the concept of borderline stating that, ‘had the patient not seemed to 
want a diagnosis, I could have left it for about a year and asked the 
patient to come back for a review’”.  
 
At times, the decision-making process in terms of what was ‘done’ or 
enacted with the borderline score, was performed at the discretion of the 
patient. Despite recognising that the patient could be kept on for review over 
time, the patient was an active participant in their diagnosis, ‘had the patient 
not seemed to want a diagnosis’, and steered the classification process in the 
clinic. The score drove diagnostic closure as opposed to keeping patients on 
in the traditional sense of ‘review’ to measure and manage cognitive of 
decline (c.f. Latimer, 2013). Furthermore, the power relations in the clinic 
were exercised and mobilised towards diagnostic closure, and the patient 
emerged not as a docile subject (Foucault, 1973), but as an active participant 
in accomplishing classificatory boundaries. Whilst the patient’s risk of 
developing AD over time, could have led to them being kept on in the 
service or even deferred to psychology, the appointment reflected the extent 
to which the patient sought legitimacy for symptoms (c.f. Nettleton, 2006) 
and the clinician responded accordingly. In what follows, I introduce a 
further dynamic of the boundaries of classification: the expansion of AD to 
incorporate the label MCI. I investigate the enactment of risk, which 
prompted clinicians to use and also resist this label in practice.  
Categorical distinction between MCI and AD 
 
In the first section of this chapter, I have demonstrated how a borderline 
score was mobilised to create a space for deferral in terms of keeping 
patients on for review, and deferring patients to the field of psychology. In 
this space, psychiatrists argued that psychologists, have the expertise and 
experience and even the ‘right tools for the job’ (c.f. Clarke and Fujimura, 
1992), to successfully negotiate the boundaries of classification. 
Recognising that patients may go on to develop AD and therefore 
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mobilising risk, was also entangled in the expectations around the field of 
psychology, in terms of the technologies available, and their expertise and 
experience. As a result, I have captured the ways in which the space for 
deferral was created through the enactment of risk in the clinic driven by a 
borderline score, but I also illustrated that this space was constructed around 
the organisation of the memory service overall. Drawing on Latimer (2004), 
the space of the MDT was an important platform for negotiating 
classification, where I argued that psychologists were privileged actors 
within this space, for adjudicating on areas of uncertainty and complexity. 
Uncertainty and risk however, are also entangled with the classificatory 
struggle between normal and pathological ageing processes, crafted within 
and outside the confines of the clinic (Foucault, 1973; Canguilhelm, 1978; 
Rose, 2001). In the following section, I subsequently investigate the 
category MCI as an extension of the borderlines concept, and explore the 
contradictions around AD, MCI and ageing, which impacted how clinicians 
employed the term beyond efforts to manage risk. I illustrate the processes 
through which clinicians utilised a borderline score to work towards 
labelling patients with MCI: putting a name to the evidence available (c.f. 
Jutel, 2011). MCI is however, a contested category in the memory service.  
 
The expansion of the disease category to incorporate MCI is linked more 
broadly to efforts to increase early diagnosis rates for AD. For Alzheimer’s 
disease, there has been increased interest in the earliest stages of the disease 
as it is anticipated that this will prevent the continuation of the dementia 
process, and for which treatment options will be most beneficial (Dubois et 
al., 2007). Yet, with the expansion of the disease category to incorporate the 
earliest stages of the disease including MCI, some commentators have 
argued that these categories, which serve to support the work of clinicians 
and scientific researchers (Moreira, May and Bond, 2009), actually ‘reveal 
increasing ambiguity rather than clarity’ (Gaines and Whitehouse, 2006: 62).  
 
First, I consider how MCI as an extension of the borderlines concept, is 
grounded more broadly in ‘risk’ which led to further complexity regarding 
the categorisation of AD, and constituting the boundaries of the disease in 
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the memory service. MCI represents and constitutes those ‘at risk’ of 
developing AD. As a result, it emerged as a vehicle for the management of 
diversity in the clinic, which was both resisted and accepted by clinicians. 
Broadly speaking, the advancement of high-tech medicine creates categories 
of ‘pre-symptomatic’ patients; there is a possibility that patients will go on 
to develop disease which creates a space for new forms of risk and 
ambiguity to emerge (Webster, 2002: 447). This uncertainty and ambiguity 
however, cannot be wholly attributed to the advancement of high-tech 
medicine in the clinic towards the production of new categories, given that 
diagnosis for AD relies on cognitive screening tools; low-technological and 
mundane tools. As a result, exploring how risk was enacted in the clinic 
requires, as demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, attending to the 
role of cognitive screening tools and the significance of the borderline score, 
which produced risk. Subsequently, the label of MCI ‘depend[s] on the 
language of risk’ (Webster, 2002: 447) both in terms of the possibility that 
patients may go on to develop AD, and with regards the uncertainty and 
ambiguity associated with the nosology of the disease overall. 
 
Moreover, the expansion of AD to include categories such as MCI, 
represents what some commentators may argue is the ‘medicalisation of 
ageing’ or the ‘biomedicalisation of ageing’ however, I argue that clinicians 
were not simply passive respondents to the ‘engine’ of medicalisation. 
Whilst the expansion of the AD category raises questions around the 
medicalisation of normality, I explore the consequences of this 
problematisation, particularly in relation to ageing since as Rose (2007a) 
argues, ‘the theme of medicalisation, implying the extension of medical 
authority beyond a legitimate boundary, is not much help in understanding 
how, why or with what consequences these mutations have occurred’ (pp. 
701 emphasis added). The expansion of AD to incorporate MCI, was 
implicit in constituting or constructing the ‘impossible expectations’ 
(Aronowitz, 2009: 436) around what it means to age, which shaped how 
clinicians negotiated the boundaries of cognitive decline and employed the 
label MCI. I therefore explore what prompted clinicians to label patients 
with MCI, and negotiate the boundaries between MCI and AD, or the 
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‘borders of normality’ (Rose, 2009: 77). I highlight the renewed conditions 
of normality where clinicians, employing the label MCI, were implicitly 
engaged in the construction of patients’ expectations around both a 
diagnosis of AD, and the ageing process, which in turn implicated how 
clinicians approached diagnosis in the clinic. 
 
Initially, a borderline score on a cognitive screening tool prompted how 
clinicians used the label MCI. In particular, the uncertainty that arose when 
aligning evidence in the clinic (of which the borderline score was one 
component), drove the constitution of MCI in both the clinics of psychiatry 
and psychology. Traced from interview accounts and fieldnotes, the term 
MCI was predominantly used to describe a particular set of symptoms as 
Clinical Psychologist 3 explained, MCI is ‘a description of a presentation 
or certain symptoms that people present that aren’t quite in that kind of 
clinical diagnostic criteria of being able to call it a dementia’. Categorising 
MCI from clinical dementia, was therefore determined by the presentation 
of a borderline score as Memory Nurse 2 attested during conversation,  
 
‘Well I suppose when we use these tests, if somebody’s functioning 
wise is not too impaired, hasn’t changed that much and they get a 
borderline score, then you would say it’s probably a mild cognitive 
impairment. If they score quite low but they’re still functioning, and 
there’s no vascular things nothing to show on the brain scan, it’d be 
mild cognitive impairment but at that stage we would continue to 
monitor because people do tend to go on to develop a dementia and 
have problems trying to access things and support themselves so we 
would try and kind of advocate for people like that.’ 
 
As Memory Nurse 2 highlighted, a borderline score was used to navigate 
categorisation of MCI. If there was a lack of correlation between what was 
made visual through the use of brain scans and the borderline score, then a 
classification of MCI was produced. However, as Memory Nurse 2 clarified, 
this was far from a simple process, related to how the tests were interpreted 
by different professionals within the hierarchy of the service. A lack of 
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correlation between functioning and performance on the tests (representing 
the ambiguities associated with the tests more broadly as discussed in 
Chapter Five) drove the utility of the borderline score. The borderline score 
became and was transformed as useful (Latimer, 2013) if there was lack of 
correlation between patient narrative and performance on the test, which led 
to formal categorisation of MCI. Again, the tools acted as surveillance 
devices attempting to calculate the ‘risk’ of patients who may go on to 
develop AD (Foucault, 1973; Armstrong, 1995). Their position as 
surveillance devices through the borderline score allowed clinicians to 
‘monitor’ patients and keep them on within the service. Arguably, in a 
Foucauldian sense the clinical ‘gaze’ extended to include those with a 
borderline score who may be at risk of developing AD. The power of this 
particular gaze, interweaved within the networks of the organisation, 
produced how MCI and subsequently memory loss was approached. Yet, 
tensions arose since clinicians across the memory service did not uniformly 
approach MCI as a discrete category. As the following extract from an 
interview with Clinical Psychologist 1 illustrated, the bounds of AD 
categorisation, and thus the emergence of MCI, were ‘socially agreed’ (Jutel, 
2011: 202), and therefore the label was contested across the service. There 
were a number of clinicians, who resisted MCI as a categorical label as 
Clinical Psychologist 1 explained, 
 
‘But we’re getting more and more of that I think as people are more 
aware of memory and having bad memory and people think there’s 
something wrong about that. Whereas I think in the past, so if you 
asked my older colleagues, one chap who recently died 
unfortunately, but he would, I remember a conversation with him 
where he was saying MCI is just a label for someone that we’ve 
always known about and is just an invention of the PhD industry of 
America.’ 
 
Clinical Psychologist 1’s account suggests that the label MCI is broadly 
representative of what Conrad (2005) describes as the ‘engine of 
medicalisation’. According to commentators including Conrad (2005), 
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medicalisation refers to the increasing construction of new medical 
categories such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and hyperactivity, 
for management within medical or biomedical domains. As Clinical 
Psychologist 1 clarified, the bounds of AD overall are socially constituted; 
fuelled by growing concerns within the general population about memory 
decline. This is driven more generally, by political and economic agendas 
focusing on the early detection and diagnosis of AD, to ‘manage’ the ‘risky’ 
ageing population. MCI as a discursive moment (Foucault, 1973) produces 
the current truth about memory loss as ‘something to worry about’. Herein, 
discourse constitutes a categorical distinction between memory loss, ‘having 
a bad memory’, and pathological decline produced by the increasingly 
complex systems of knowledge production available to (re)configure 
normality; individuals ‘we’ve always known about’. In this sense and 
broadly speaking, MCI has reconfigured normative assumptions regarding 
cognitive decline.  
 
The question remains as to what extent this label was subsequently useful 
for sorting risk in the clinic, and whether clinicians approached the 
borderlines of MCI unequivocally. Although MCI configures patients as ‘at 
risk’, the following extract from an interview with Memory Nurse 2 showed 
that a classification of MCI overall, does not definitively confirm 
progression to AD dementia. Therefore in the clinics across the memory 
service, the label did not wholly ‘sort’ the risk as produced in the clinic 
which was a sentiment echoed by a number of clinicians. Overall, MCI 
enacted risk and was resisted by clinicians; they were reluctant to label 
individuals because of the lack of certainty associated with its progression to 
AD dementia. When asked to discuss the value they ascribed to the term 
MCI, Memory Nurse 2 contended, 
 
 ‘Well personally no. I just kind of think you’re  - either you’ve got a 
dementia or you haven’t you’ve either got memory problems that are 
ageing or not and at the moment if it’s not dementia it’s an ageing 
process ‘cause it might not turn into a dementia we know they 
normally do so no personally I don’t think it’s that meaningful. 
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People can come back and see us whenever they want but they don’t 
need to be told they’ve got MCI but that’s my personal view and I 
could be completely wrong.’  
 
Despite recognising that the label MCI ensured patients were kept within the 
service, Memory Nurse 2 demonstrated ambivalence towards the label as a 
discrete category, which was a frequent point of observation across the 
memory service. Whilst it could be used to ensure patients were kept within 
the service, clinicians frequently noted that in doing so this was 
unproductive for patients in terms of disease progression and treatment 
options. As this extract highlighted, the label MCI is in effect redundant 
given that more generally, it serves little purpose in defining what Memory 
Nurse 2 considered to be normal ageing processes. Furthermore, despite the 
label MCI enabling patients to be kept within the service for review, this 
was resisted by Memory Nurse 2 and did not necessarily require a formal 
label for patients to make use of the service. The label MCI overall, is 
therefore performative, producing effects and consequences, which 
produced further uncertainty and risk; there is no definitive moment at 
which an individual will develop AD and this remains uncertain. A paradox 
thus occurred: in order to keep patients on for classification, a label need not 
be applied because of the ambiguity associated with its employment. A label 
was not required for surveillance and MCI had powerful consequences in 
the memory clinics; producing and constituting further uncertainty (Rose, 
2001).  As Clinical Psychologist 3 explained, ‘although a number of people 
with MCI convert in having dementia, a large proportion of people that fits 
that kind of label of MCI do not convert to dementia. Now it’s about kind of 
how we deal with that how much do we pathologise it or not’. As Clinical 
Psychologist 3 illustrated during interview, the discrepancy between MCI 
and progression to AD, makes the labelling process difficult. Furthermore, 
MCI had important implications for the responsibilities of clinicians. 
 
A diagnosis more generally, is used to mobilise action: resource allocation 
and treatment options (Jutel, 2009) however, what the following extract 
from Consultant Psychiatrist 3 highlighted, is that MCI may not have 
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productive consequences for continuing the diagnosis process beyond the 
clinic. For Consultant Psychiatrist 3 an ‘ideal diagnosis’ or formal label, is 
used to drive management and treatment of the condition for patients and 
family members (c.f. Jutel, 2009) but as he explained, with the label of MCI 
this was difficult to practise,  
 
‘A diagnosis is given to either help the patient to understand what’s 
going on, deal with it and plan ahead for the future and to get 
treatment that would normally be the reasons why we give 
somebody a diagnosis so you know what you’re dealing with and 
you plan ahead and can get some treatment. With MCI is such a 
heterogeneous category, that some of these people may just have age 
related cognitive decline. Some of them maybe a bit physical health 
problems or medication issues so it may be just something that’s 
static as 1 in 10 will go on to progress to dementia each year, so 1 in 
five you’d expect half of them to go on to progress to dementia but 
you can’t say which will and which patients won’t. So essentially 
you’re giving someone a diagnosis but saying to somebody, I don’t 
know if this’ll get worse. It may become dementia or not, there’s no 
specific treatment that we can suggest other than healthy lifestyle 
which you would have given them anyway even if it wasn’t MCI.’ 
 
Consultant Psychiatrist 3 raised a number of important issues. Navigating 
the borderlines of classification manifested in the label MCI was complex 
and uncertain, as MCI regardless of context of use, does not have the ability 
to determine progression to AD. In essence, risk and uncertainty is not 
sorted through formal categorisation and surveillance continues. For 
Consultant Psychiatrist 3, it was this uncertainty, which also impinged on 
professional identity within the clinician-patient interaction (Goffman, 
1959). As he explained, upon diagnosis, the work of the clinician is to 
provide possible treatment and to enable patients to ‘plan ahead’. Both 
professional identity and patient identity were therefore compromised when 
employing the label MCI. There is little certainty in this label for clinicians 
in terms of proceeding with the process of diagnosis, and little certainty for 
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patients in terms of prognosis. Furthermore, out of necessity regarding lack 
of treatment and knowledge regarding progression, Consultant Psychiatrist 3 
exercised a form of pastoral power; governing the patient with MCI 
(Foucault, 1977). Power relations between the clinician and patient were 
enacted in the clinic when faced with navigating uncertainty and risk. The 
patient was implicitly disciplined to maintain a ‘healthy lifestyle’ to ensure 
somatic citizenship (Rose, 2001) in the face of increasing risk and 
uncertainty regarding MCI. Memory Nurse 4 echoed this point during 
interview and suggested that the label MCI is useful for patients in that, ‘it 
gives them [patients] that push to right, I’m gonna keep going…carry on 
with my knitting and the crosswords…I think it just helps people to get on, 
it’s like if we all have a little fright you know… you think oh right, I’ll cut 
down on this, I’ll do a bit more exercise and it spurs you on a little bit, the 
same is for MCI.’ Herein, the label MCI is useful for governing the patient’s 
own sense of self in terms of healthy or unhealthy lifestyles; to keep their 
brain engaged with activities such as crosswords. This was illustrated 
similarly during a number of observations and interviews. During an 
interview with Memory Nurse 7, she explained that often those patients who 
completed crosswords or puzzles would ‘seem to fair very well when they’re 
completing a lot of these tests and see it quite often as a challenge they quite 
enjoy doing’. Throughout an observation of a team meeting at Ridge NHS 
Centre, the clinician suggested that the patient liked ‘to do puzzles and 
crosswords and actually I think they see the cognitive test as a ‘bit of a 
challenge’ so I thought they would probably do quite well.’ Arguably these 
observations correspond with what Beard (2012) claims is the ‘heightened 
sense of value imposed on brains, mind and sentience in western societies’ 
which demonstrates how processes of medicalisation have led to what he 
describes as ‘existential angst’ in individuals with the potential to develop 
AD (pp. 13). The label MCI therefore, produces particular contradictions 
around age, ageing and AD, which had important implications for its use in 
practice, as the following analysis contends. 
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Contradictions and expectations: age and MCI 
 
Here, I extend my analysis of the label MCI and the management of risk, 
where I consider the contradictions around the distinction between AD and 
MCI. I found overall, from carrying out my research in the memory service, 
that distinguishing ageing processes from MCI was a complex and 
entangled process of accounting for risk, and also negotiating the negative 
discursive constructs around what it means to age and age successfully.  
As Consultant Psychiatrist 3 explained during interview,  
 
‘Mild cognitive impairment is ill-defined. There’s no clear 
borderline between dementia or MCI and ageing and sometimes the 
temptation is we want a diagnosis, MCI is an easy diagnosis, it’s not 
quite dementia. But, so a lot of people do get a diagnosis of MCI that 
may just have normal age related cognitive decline. It’s more a 
formal diagnosis rather than just saying it’s just your age which 
families, patients, GPs if they’re worried to come to the GP and they 
come back ‘oh this just seems to be your age’; so even though it’s 
possibly an arbitrary distinction between early MCI and age related 
cognitive decline I think you might veer towards calling it MCI, it’s 
that distinction.’  
 
As Consultant Psychiatrist 3 illustrated, the bounds of classification with 
respect to distinguishing ageing from MCI and then from dementia, was 
complex and uncertain. What Consultant Psychiatrist 3 recognised however, 
is that classification is performative. Despite there being little certainty 
associated with its employment as a label, the effects and consequences of 
using it as a discrete category, is what prompted clinicians to label patients 
with MCI. As Consultant Psychiatrist 3 explained, clinicians were driven at 
times to formally categorise patients with MCI as a ‘formal diagnosis’ to 
discursively distinguish MCI from processes of ageing. Herein, the ‘monster 
‘of old-age (Canguilhelm, 2008) was tamed; there emerged a categorical 
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distinction between pathology and ageing, therefore reconfiguring ‘normal’ 
ageing processes. However, it was Consultant Psychiatrist 3’s reference to 
MCI as an, ‘easy diagnosis’ which I found particularly interesting. Rather 
than it being a label for managing risk or the ‘at risk’ label, it problematises 
ageing, since patients who were worried about their memory, sought 
diagnostic answers and for which MCI was therefore useful. Here MCI was 
perceived to be less threatening compared to dementia, which drove its 
employment as a label. Paradoxically, as I will go on to show, such actions 
by clinicians reinforced the constructed distinction between successful and 
unsuccessful ageing processes, as a consequence of efforts to medicalise 
later life (Estes and Binney, 1989).  
 
Furthermore, the label MCI illustrated a semantic shift between MCI and 
dementia more broadly; clinicians utilised the label MCI as a way of 
categorising pathology without employing the label dementia, ‘I think the 
temptation for some people is they use it [MCI] ‘cause they don’t want to 
say you’ve got dementia and then people miss out on an early diagnosis’ 
(Conversation Consultant Psychiatrist 2). At times clinicians sought to 
distinguish between AD and MCI to avoid ‘ascribing the associated spoiled 
identity’ of AD (c.f. Goffman, 1963). This was evidenced further during an 
interview with Memory Nurse 1 when she was asked to reflect on the 
usefulness of MCI as a label, 
 
‘I think it might be quite intimidating for people. I guess from my 
perspective when we know what it is, you know we think it sounds 
relatively benign compared to Alzheimer’s disease but I bet if you 
gave somebody that diagnosis, they wouldn’t like it really but if you 
could explain to them what it is then that’s probably, I do think it is a 
useful diagnosis definitely.’ 
 
Memory Nurse 1 highlighted a number of important points. First, she 
recognised that MCI as a discrete category may have important 
consequences for patients. Second, Memory Nurse 1 recognised that 
semantically, the label MCI enacts different consequences for patients than 
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the label AD. She noted that a diagnosis of MCI was at times useful for 
patients since its label had more ‘benign’ consequences than perhaps 
Alzheimer’s disease. As a result, this impacted how clinicians approached 
the labelling process, as Consultant Psychiatrist 2 attested; some clinicians 
may not ‘want to say you’ve got dementia’. In turn, the label MCI employed 
by clinicians, may not map onto how patients conceive the meaning of the 
label and vice versa, which had the potential to make the diagnostic process 
further complex and uncertain. Arguably, this corresponds with Aronowitz’s 
(2009) claims that the experience of risk and disease overall, converge; to 
what extent does MCI put a ‘veneer of optimism onto the expanded groups 
identity’ (Aronowitz, 2009: 436) and thereby create impossible expectations 
around what it means to age and also develop AD? The contradictions 
between MCI, AD and ageing had important implications for constituting 
the boundaries of AD through the label MCI since, a diagnostic label and 
classification of MCI, was driven by cultural expressions in the memory 
service of what, or who, should be regarded as normal or pathological (Rose, 
2001; Canguilhelm, 2008). These cultural expressions were implicit in 
constructing patients’ expectations around ageing, MCI and therefore AD. 
As I reflected when observing consultations and carrying out interviews 
across the memory service, these expectations were constituted in terms of 
particular expectations of decline related to decline in standards of activities 
of daily living, and of performance of cognitive function related to age and 
ageing more generally. During an interview with Consultant Psychiatrist 2, 
she explained, 
 
‘So I think in the older old age ‘appropriate cognitive decline’ as I 
call it, or normal ageing, is much easier sometimes to explain than 
MCI and often I probably wouldn’t say to somebody in their 90’s, 
they’ve got MCI, if they’re independent in all activities of daily 
living with short term memory loss…If somebody was 70 with MCI, 
I would be much more likely to - I wouldn’t give them the option not 
to come back for follow-up.’ 
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For Consultant Psychiatrist 2, ‘appropriate cognitive decline’ was 
dependent on age. Thus she configured ‘normal ageing’ in relation to 
performing activities of daily living and remaining an independent and 
therefore, responsible somatic citizen (Rose, 2001) which drove how she 
classified individuals with MCI. As a result, the employment of the label 
was reconfigured across particular age groups, which highlighted the 
significance of age as a factor when constituting the boundaries of 
classification.  What I found particularly interesting during observations of 
consultations, was that patients and clinicians overall, were less concerned 
about increasing age and the risk of AD: the older the patient the more 
normal the symptoms. Herein a contradiction emerged; whilst the ageing 
population was a significant risk factor for developing AD, this was 
contradicted by clinicians and patients within the clinic, as I reflected during 
observations of consultations.  
 
“The consultant asked the patient about previous mental health 
history and family mental health history, at which point the family 
member in the consultation stated that the patient’s sister had been 
diagnosed with AD before she died. The clinician asked the patient, 
‘what age was your sister diagnosed with AD’? The patient replied, 
‘in her 80’s’. The clinician seemed relieved at this point and 
exclaimed ‘oh it wasn’t early AD then, that’s ok’. I made a note at 
this point reflecting on my surprised at this contradiction around 
increasing age and the normalisation of AD. I reflected on whether 
this would affect how the patient from herein, conceived the 
relationship between ageing and AD (Observation Consultation, 
Consultant Psychiatrist 4).”  
 
“The consultant asked the patient about memory loss and the types 
of symptoms they were experiencing at which point the family 
member interrupted, ‘she is 80, ‘I just put it down to old-age’ to 
which the clinician did not respond (Observation Trainee 
Psychiatrist 2)”.  
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From these observations, it would appear that older age was mobilised by 
both clinicians and patients as an important component for normalising 
memory decline in the older population. I reflected during the observation 
with Trainee Psychiatrist 2 on the opportunity that the clinician had to 
mediate the family member’s response since I noted throughout this 
appointment that both the patient and the family member were visibly 
anxious, both attempting to normalise the types of symptoms the patient was 
describing. Age overall, therefore played an important role in constructing 
or driving the borderlines of classification. 
 
Borderline and the ‘Third and Fourth Stages of Ageing’  
 
In the final section of this chapter I develop the notion that, ‘to classify is 
human’ (Bowker and Star, 1999: 1); classification in practice shapes and 
performs how we live (Hacking, 1996). As such, not only were clinicians 
faced with navigating how normalcy and pathology in medicine classifies 
AD but they also navigated the discursive entanglements of normalcy 
regarding the ageing process: how patients conceived the nature of growing 
old. Such classificatory struggles were enacted and performed both within 
and outside the clinic. In the clinic, professionals mobilised social and 
cultural practices and discourses related to how dementia and ageing were 
conceived within the general population. This was particularly important for 
a nosologically contested disease such as AD, where uncertainty is a 
dominant feature of classification.  
 
In what follows, I extend my analysis of how the boundaries of 
classification were constituted and diagnosis resolved. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, clinicians did not solely utilise the score of cognitive 
screening tests to navigate or ‘sort’ a classification (Bowker and Star, 2000) 
moving back and forth between different forms of evidence. As a result, 
whilst I have demonstrated the role of cognitive screening tools as central 
mediators in the constitution of boundaries and diagnostic closure, I extend 
this focus by attending to the emergence of particular social and cultural 
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discourses, around ageing and dementia, which impacted how diagnosis was 
approached and performed. In the clinics of the memory service, ageing was 
discursively constructed by patients, which had the potential to drive the 
classification process as Trainee Psychiatrist 2 described when asked about 
the nature of the borderline score, 
 
‘There’s a real danger of just sort of pinging everybody off for a CT 
head particularly the ones who are actually maybe have slightly less 
cognitive impairment, and the maybe more higher functioning, and a 
little bit more affluent. They’re quite intelligent and they push for it 
but you really sometimes need to be quite firm, but reassuring with 
them, that it’s a normal age related cognitive decline and there’s 
nothing really kind of acute going on’.  
 
For Trainee Psychiatrist 2, there was the possibility that a borderline score 
enacted what was constructed across the memory service as, ‘normal age 
related cognitive decline’, which was at times, resisted by patients. 
Categorising patients as ‘quite intelligent’ for Trainee Psychiatrist 2, 
enabled patients to request further evidence to confirm, clarify and make 
sense of their experiences. As a result, the discursive boundaries between 
ageing and cognitive decline were constituted; patients were reluctant to 
ground their experiences in ‘normal age related cognitive decline’. Here, the 
patient emerged as an active participant in the process of navigating the 
boundaries of classification and sought legitimacy for their symptoms (c.f. 
Nettleton, 2006). Moreover, the following extract from an interview with 
Clinical Psychologist 1 illustrated that whilst recognising that diagnosis 
overall, is a discursive and arbitrary distinction between normal and 
pathological ageing processes (particularly because things could always be 
otherwise), this may not be useful for the patient.  
 
 “I will usually spend an amount of time talking with them about 
trying to help them understand and make sense of, ‘ok we’re saying 
there’s nothing wrong but you’ve felt there was so why is that’ and 
so sometimes that’ll be saying to someone, ‘look the scores you’re 
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getting are not in the clinical range but maybe there’s some maybe 
there’s a little bit of a drop off in this compared to where you were 
you might have been and that may just be ageing and you may just 
be noticing normal ageing.’” 
 
As Clinical Psychologist 1 explained, during the clinician-patient interaction, 
navigating the discursive boundaries between normalcy and pathology was 
reflected not merely in the production of a diagnosis but also the discourses, 
which constructed how ageing and cognitive decline were approached. In 
this instance, reassuring the patient that ‘there’s nothing wrong’ required 
navigating how the patient conceived the nature of growing old without 
cognitive decline. As Rowe and Kahn (1997) contend, successful ageing is 
constructed and equated with physical functioning, low risk of disease, and 
engagement in society in the continuing acquirement of Bourdieu’s notion 
of social and cultural capital. Broadly speaking, normality and the monster 
(c.f. Canguilhelm, 2008) are reconfigured in relation to how ageing is 
perceived and classified more broadly; there is an intense classificatory 
struggle between how ageing is constructed as a success or failure, marked 
by decline in cognitive function. Yet in the memory clinics, attributing 
cognitive decline to pathology was what legitimated patient symptoms 
beyond that of ‘normal’ ageing which reinforced the claim that positive or 
successful ageing is built on a discursive oxymoronic notion that to age 
successfully is to resist ageing (c.f. Torres & Hammarström 2006). The 
antithesis of such a claim however, is that increasingly, individuals embrace 
a cultural notion of ageing that is defined by the choice to grow old 
gracefully; recognising and actively engaging with ageing and all it 
encompasses (see Fairhurst, 1998; Hurd Clarke, 2002).  
 
Subsequently, clinicians were faced with navigating how patients conceived 
and approached the boundaries of classification and diagnostic closure. This 
was reflected in how patients perceived dementia as successfully or 
unsuccessfully ageing: the extent to which a diagnosis represented an 
endemic fear of ageing (Gulette, 1998). Across the memory service there 
were instances where diagnosis represented a discursive shift from the third 
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stage of ageing into the ‘black hole’ of the fourth stage of ageing (c.f. Laslet, 
1991; Twigg, 2006; Gilleard and Higgs, 2010). Clinicians working in the 
fields of psychology and psychiatry across the memory service recognised 
that there were ‘powerful assumptions’ (Gilleard and Higgs, 2013: 369) 
about ageing and AD that resided in the population, which had the potential 
to infiltrate the practices of the clinic and the clinician-patient interaction 
(Goffman, 1959).  Clinicians across the memory service recognised the 
extent to which patients performed or accomplished the boundaries between 
normalcy and pathology, which was driven by assumptions more broadly as 
to what a diagnosis of dementia might represent. In particular, this shaped 
how the body with dementia and ‘self’ was perceived, presented and in turn 
constituted (Goffman, 1959). During an interview, when asked about the 
consequences of an ageing population, Consultant Psychiatrist 1 explained, 
 
‘The consequences for patients are obviously that more of them will 
either personally experience a dementing illness or know someone 
that has. There is still an awful lot of stigma in the population 
generally and amongst individuals as to the nature of it [AD 
dementia], a lot of fear. A lot of our patients will have had you know 
family members who historically would have had dementia when 
they’d have had a very potentially, very negative experience of what 
it was like in the age of institutional care and lack of any 
cholinesterase inhibitors or other treatments. So there’s still a 
reticence I think for people to come forward.’  
 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1 suggested that whilst diagnosis rates may increase 
given the ageing population, this may not be a simple process involving 
patients actively seeking diagnostic answers for their symptoms. There has 
been an assumption thus far in my analysis, that patients are active agents in 
the classification process, willingly referring themselves for testing and 
potential diagnosis. Yet, as Consultant Psychiatrist 1 explains, this did not 
always appear to be the case. At times, patients were unwilling to present 
with symptoms, in part because of the assumptions about dementia, which 
remained in existence across the population. Consultant Psychiatrist 1 coded 
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these assumptions in relation to archaic approaches towards mental health 
generally and care, the ‘age of institutional care’ which produces and enacts 
‘fear’ of stepping into the ‘community of otherness’ (Gilleard and Higgs, 
2013: 368); a state of becoming which lacks agency, choice and autonomy.  
 
As Consultant Psychiatrist 1 suggested, the ‘nature of it’ is uncertain and 
classification is bound in historical assumptions about what it means to 
develop the condition. The fear of the ‘senile other’ or the symbolism of 
senility (Isaacs, Livingston, and Neville, 1972) (related to dementia and old 
age more broadly) had the potential to drive the extent to which patients 
‘come forward’ for potential classification. The fear of the unknown, and 
the uncertainty associated with AD dementia more broadly, therefore had 
the potential to compound the assumptions of the ‘social imaginary’ of the 
fourth stage of ageing (Gilleard and Higgs, 2010, 2013); to push forward 
with diagnostic resolve, required acknowledgment of what testing cognition 
means for patients. In navigating this discourse however, there were a 
number of moments where clinicians actively resisted the ways in which 
dementia was discursively represented by patients. When discussing how 
patients approached diagnosis, Clinical Psychologist 1 explained,  
 
“I think people don’t understand it and I think people think about it 
in terms of being mental I saw a chap before you came in and he said 
‘am I mental’? You know and of course that’s not what I’m looking 
at ever really so I think there’s a lack of there’s just a general lack of 
understanding I think, people’s experiences of dementia is usually of 
their older relatives who were treated quite poorly.” 
 
For Clinical Psychologist 1, dementia as a classification overall, is 
misunderstood and misrepresented, driven by archaic approaches towards 
mental health ‘am I mental?’ and historic depictions of old age, reinforcing 
the symbolic power of the state of ‘senility’ (Gilleard and Higgs, 2013: 373). 
This reflects what Gilleard and Higgs (2013) contend is the re-emergence of 
senility. Patients have experienced relatives metaphorically passing through 
into this fourth state and subsequently fear the ‘community of otherness’ 
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that this represents (Gilleard and Higgs, 2013: 368). For those patients who 
do ‘come forward’, these powerful assumptions are brought into the clinic, 
which has the potential to affect the practices of classification. As 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1 described when asked about how these 
assumptions may affect the clinician-patient interaction, 
 
“There can be a tendency to minimise symptoms - that’s either 
conscious or a subconscious one-  because of the fear you know, 
‘you’re going to put me in a home, you’re going to send me off to 
some institution somewhere or other’, so that’s definitely a factor.” 
 
As Consultant Psychiatrist 1 suggested, the patient has the potential to drive 
the consultation, ‘minimise symptoms’, since perhaps a diagnosis represents 
an imaginary of being, restrained from exercising agency and therefore 
making choices specifically about care (c.f. Gilleard and Higgs, 2010, 2013). 
Although Consultant Psychiatrist 1 contended that such assumptions 
encapsulate historical representations of care and institutionalisation, care 
homes remain a space or ‘void’ (although less distinctive as an institution), 
‘every bit as terrifying as the workhouse and its infirmaries’ (Gilleard and 
Higgs, 2010: 126). It is the irreversibility of the process both practically and 
conceptually speaking (entering the care home and the ‘black hole’ of the 
imaginary of the fourth stage of ageing’) that signified for Consultant 
Psychiatrist 1, why patients were often reticent to divulge their symptoms, 
‘you’re going to send me off’, ‘beyond any chance of return’ (Gilleard and 
Higgs, 2010: 125).  Tracing observation fieldnotes, there were moments 
where I observed patients and family members actively attempting to 
minimise or normalise symptoms and make light out of what was clearly an 
incredibly anxiety inducing process. Throughout appointments, patients 
would continually stress how much they could remember about their life, 
and patients would recite rhymes or poems when asked about their memory 
to grasp onto their ability to remember; inextricably linked to their identities 
and selves. As a researcher present during these moments of interaction, I 
found this particularly difficult to observe, and which I made a clear point 
for reflection in my fieldnotes. The negative discursive constructs around 
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ageing and AD dementia, affected diagnostic resolve particularly for those 
patients caught in the borderlines between normal ageing, MCI and AD.   
 
For Clinical Psychologist 1 however, whilst recognising that patients may 
approach the meaning of diagnosis with preconceived ideas about ageing 
and dementia, he challenged these assumptions in an attempt to (re)affirm 
and (re)construct the agency of individuals diagnosed with dementia. As he 
explained, 
 
‘I think psychologically people find it very difficult to value the 
experiences of someone with dementia as much as they would value 
the experience of somebody who’s a top athlete. Ok so but who’s to 
say that this next moment of this person with dementia’s life is of 
any less value than the next moment of Christiano Ronaldo’s life? 
You know and it’s that sort of it’s that I think where greater value is 
placed on certain people’s lives and experiences whereas, yes you 
may have dementia but that doesn’t mean that you don’t enjoy 
playing with a doll let’s say even though you’re 90. Or that you don't 
enjoy having your hand massaged or held - you may not enjoy or be 
able to write a novel like you did when you were 50 but that’s not - 
do you know what I mean?’ 
 
For Clinical Psychologist 1, due to a broader commitment to fitting a 
classification, the experiences of individuals with dementia are often 
neglected. As a result, the discursive distinction between unsuccessful and 
successful ageing processes, and henceforth the discursive dichotomy 
between the third and fourth stages of ageing (Gilleard and Higgs, 2011) 
requires due attention for how it might impact the management of 
individuals with dementia. Perhaps what Clinical Psychologist 1 is also 
pointing to, is the idea that ageing and in this case, dementia, can in some 
sense be performed. Despite Schwaiger (2006) drawing attention to the 
performance and perception of old-age more broadly, as Clinical 
Psychologist 1 contended, ‘playing with a doll’ for individuals with 
dementia could (re)perform how ageing and henceforth dementia is 
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conceived more generally since ‘ageist perceptions of older people can be 
changed over time by the ways in which people perform age’ (Schwaiger, 
2006: 31). In constituting the boundaries of classification and working 
towards diagnostic closure, requires not simply the role of techniques, 
technologies and professionals but recognising and actively engaging with 
expectations around AD, dementia and ageing and the ways in which they 
are discursively constructed in the general population more broadly. In the 
following chapter, I extend this theme of expectation. I demonstrate that 
navigating expectations of a future with AD in the clinic, was constrained 
by particular representations of the future constituted by the National 
Dementia Commissioning for Quality and Innovation Framework (CQUIN), 
which aims to detect AD at earlier stages to manage the risks associated 
with the growing ageing population. 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to capture the points at which complexity 
and uncertainty became difficult to resolve in the clinics of psychiatry, and 
for which making decisions regarding diagnosis was therefore increasingly 
problematic. I explored the dynamics of clinical practice, which shaped how 
the borderlines of AD were conceived, constituted and performed. As a 
result of increased complexity in the clinic, which was manifested in 
complex patients and borderline scores on cognitive screening tests, the 
boundaries of classification became increasingly blurred and thus difficult to 
constitute. I illustrated the extent to which cognitive screening technologies 
were central mediators in both producing this complexity, and also driving 
how clinicians responded to this complexity through attempts to sort 
uncertainty in the field of psychology.  
 
I began this chapter by identifying the enactment of risk and uncertainty in 
the clinic that constituted the boundaries of classification. The production of 
a borderline score, which enacted risk and complexity, was mobilised by 
clinicians across the memory service (c.f. Latimer, 2013) driven by the 
possibility that in time patients may go on to develop AD. Drawing on the 
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work of Latimer (2013), I showed that the creation of a space for deferral 
and keeping patients on within the service was driven by the mobilisation of 
uncertainty. However, I developed Latimer’s claims to argue that this space 
was performed ambivalently, particularly when employing the term MCI. 
Troubling dominant constructions of risk, I captured the role of the 
mundane for shifting and thereby constituting the boundaries of 
classification demonstrating the expectations around the field of psychology 
for resolving complexity. On presentation of a borderline score, 
psychologists in the MDT emerged as important actors for sorting the 
complexity and moving patients on beyond the borderlines. The space for 
deferral was built on both the technologies available in psychiatry and 
psychology and the expertise and experience of psychologists; perceived to 
sort the ambiguities associated with a borderline score. The space for 
deferral was therefore an MDT occasion. I developed the claims of Latimer 
(2004), to highlight that the MDT retained its hierarchical power as 
psychologists held a position of privilege during the MDT, for negotiating 
complexity. In doing so, constituting the boundaries of classification was at 
once a technological endeavour for mobilising risk, and an endeavour, 
which reaffirmed professional responsibilities and hierarchies.  
 
The second section of the chapter explored the boundaries of classification 
through the employment of the label MCI. I extended the idea that the 
borderlines of classification were instituted by risk and uncertainty (Rose, 
2001; Webster, 2002) by analysing the contradictions in the memory service 
around age, ageing and AD. Clinicians approached the term MCI 
ambivalently; they recognised that the problematisation of ageing and 
keeping patients on for review, constructed particular expectations around 
the ageing process which as I observed in the memory service, was difficult 
to navigate in the clinic. I therefore considered the consequences of the role 
of broader networks of power such as the problematisation of normality 
(Armstrong, 1995; Conrad, 2005), accomplished in the intricacies of the 
memory service. Constituting the borderlines through the label MCI, 
involved managing the expectations of patients in terms of the constructed 
successes or failures of the ageing process (Gilleard and Higgs, 2010, 2013). 
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Clinicians mobilised a borderline score within the powerful yet productive 
hierarchy of the service, acknowledging that MCI is a contested label, and 
that it has the potential to constitute discursive entanglements of ageing and 
dementia represented in the wider population. Overall, within this chapter I 
have demonstrated the ways in which uncertainty was mobilised and valued 
by clinicians through the space of deferral. In order to make sense of 
uncertainty, the space for deferral performed a sense of hope for clinicians; 
uncertainty was not disposed but emerged as an enabling feature of the 
classification process because of the lack of diagnostic resolve. 
 
In Chapter Seven, I extend the theme of risk by exploring how increased 
efforts to detect AD in its earliest stages, translates into everyday clinical 
practice. I analyse the extent to which, the CQUIN as a particular enactment 
of the future with AD, shifts the temporality of classification as mapped 
across Chapters Five and Six necessary for navigating and managing 
uncertainty and complexity.  
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Chapter Seven 
The Dementia CQUIN: Time, Futures and 
Expectations 
 
In Chapter Seven, I develop the theme of risk introduced in Chapter Six. I 
extend my analysis of the management of uncertainty by investigating the 
role of clinical governance initiatives such as the National Dementia 
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation Framework (CQUIN), which 
attempts to improve diagnosis rates for Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in 
secondary healthcare. I explore the CQUIN as a device, which aims to 
improve diagnosis rates and therefore manage the risks associated with the 
ageing population, through the promotion of early diagnosis. Overall, this 
chapter captures how the CQUIN translates into everyday clinical practice, 
and investigates the extent to which it has the potential to shift the current 
classification practices mapped in Chapters Five and Six. I begin the chapter 
by framing the CQUIN as a clinical governance initiative, which I argue has 
the ability to constrain clinical autonomy in the hospital setting (Rose, 
1998); recognised by information managers and clinicians in my study. I 
continue, by exploring the extent to which the CQUIN alters the content of 
work in the hospital setting, where I describe the points at which the 
framework shifts the way clinicians approach cognitive decline, and 
consider the impact that increasing referrals might have on memory service 
practice. 
 
Given the uncertainties associated with current practice for diagnosing AD, 
described throughout this thesis, the CQUIN attempts to manage uncertainty 
by controlling diagnosis rates. This according to Nelis (2000) is ‘likely to 
prompt action which anticipates specific futures’ (pp. 210). The majority of 
this chapter therefore, extends the body of literature on risk and clinical 
governance, by demonstrating that as the CQUIN attempts to calculate risk 
and therefore manage uncertainty, it performs and enacts a particular 
construction of the future with AD. In doing so, it shapes how the patient 
pathway is performed. Rather than predicting what the future might bring in 
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terms of the CQUIN, I explore how its principles are performed in the 
present through an investigation of its translation in everyday clinical 
practice. Therefore, drawing on the analytical perspective of the sociology 
of expectations (see Brown, Rappert and Webster, 2000; Michael, 2000; 
Brown and Michael, 2003; Borup et al., 2006; Selin, 2006)
20
, I question the 
extent to which the ‘future is mobilised in real time to marshal resources, 
coordinate activities and manage uncertainty’ (Brown and Michael, 2003: 
2). The future depends on particular representations of time in the present, 
which has important implications for managing and navigating uncertainty 
and the patient pathway for AD.  
 
As I will go on to highlight, the implications of the CQUIN’s particular 
enactment of a future with AD, in everyday practice, manifest in two 
distinctive yet interrelated ways. First, it impacts the patient pathway post-
diagnosis in terms of resource allocation, and second, it affects patients’ 
expectations around a future with AD, producing uncertainties with respect 
to the meaning of diagnosis overall. This is an argument I have made 
throughout my thesis. In Chapters Five and Six I captured the mechanisms 
for managing uncertainty in the clinic, related to particular representations 
of time and therefore realisation of futures, which were constituted in the 
clinic. In Chapter Five, I showed how clinicians mediated and manipulated 
cognitive screening tools to deal with the uncertainties around measures for 
cognitive decline. This included navigating how patients understood their 
future selves and the meaning of diagnosis more broadly. In Chapter Six, I 
demonstrated that when constituting the boundaries of classification, 
clinicians often retained patients into the future for possible classification. 
This was driven in part by the expectations patients themselves held about 
their future selves, and the ageing process overall. With this in mind, the 
hopeful discourse around early diagnosis, which the CQUIN institutes, is 
designed to help patients to prepare for their future. In the final section of 
                                                          
20
 As I will discuss further in Chapter Eight, whilst the analytical perspective of the 
sociology of expectations is predominantly concerned with emerging innovation, I apply 
the principles of this analytical standpoint to exploring the myriad of ways in which the 
CQUIN as a more mundane technology, might shift the temporalities of classification in 
terms of the futures of an ageing population. 
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the chapter, I argue that this hopeful discourse may in fact construct 
patients’ expectations about a future with AD and produce particular 
uncertainties for them in the present. Overall, I focus my analysis on how 
the CQUIN and promotion of early diagnosis is translated, interpreted and 
negotiated across the hospital and memory service settings. I highlight the 
affects and consequences for clinicians, patients and family members, and 
cast light on the anticipations and anxieties the future of an ageing 
population with AD produces (c.f. Adams et al., 2009).  
Risk, uncertainty and clinical governance 
 
According to Hacking (1999) risk thinking, or the characteristics of risk, is 
the art of making the future calculable in the present and as demonstrated in 
Chapter Six, risk attempts to ‘discipline uncertainty’ (Rose, 1998: 180). 
According to Aronowitz (2009), ‘the risk of disease is some statistical 
probability that ill health might happen’ (pp. 419 emphasis in original). 
Therefore the projected numbers of individuals, who have the potential to 
develop AD, has led to the governance of referral and diagnosis rates 
through the implementation of the National Dementia CQUIN. This further 
corresponds with what Rose (2009) argues, that ‘numbers legitimate, and 
make demands’ rendering a ‘space governable yet contestable’ (pp.78). In 
relation to the National Dementia CQUIN’s role in calculating and 
managing the future risks associated with the growing ageing population, 
two overarching aims are apparent. The first aim of the CQUIN is to 
increase awareness and the quality of care in hospital for those already 
diagnosed with dementia. The second aim is to increase assessment, referral, 
and subsequent diagnosis rates for AD, by detecting cognitive decline 
associated with the disease at earlier stages. The second aim is therefore 
entangled with attempts to manage the number of individuals who might go 
on to develop AD since age is the greatest risk factor for the disease. It is 
this second aim, which I analyse within this chapter where I demonstrate 
that the governance of a specific group of individuals through initiatives 
such as the CQUIN is a point of contention across healthcare practice as I 
will demonstrate throughout this chapter.  
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The implementation of governance initiatives in healthcare corresponds 
with the overall focus in healthcare practice on the management or 
eradication of uncertainty which has been demonstrated throughout history 
(see Fox, 1959; Atkinson, 1984). Commentators such as Hillman et al., 
(2013) have argued however, that more recent measures for managing risk 
and uncertainty in healthcare, are target and performance driven where 
‘measurement become[s] a central risk technique’ (pp. 945). Shifting from 
efforts simply to manage or eradicate risk, towards the monitoring and 
regulation of healthcare practice through performance measures and target 
setting is marked by efforts to improve the quality of healthcare (see 
Checkland et al., 2004). As a result, examples of clinical governance 
initiatives for dementia include the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
(QOF)
21
 in primary healthcare and CQUIN in secondary healthcare.  
 
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation Frameworks are pay-for-
performance schemes introduced by the Department of Health in 2009. 
They enable commissioners to reward excellence and quality healthcare, by 
connecting the finances of healthcare providers, such as NHS Trusts, to the 
achievement of target driven, and performance-managed, quality 
improvement goals (see NHS Improving Quality, 2015). The National 
Dementia CQUIN introduced in 2012, focuses attention on efforts to 
standardise screening practices for cognitive decline, to identify patients 
with dementia in Acute Medical Units (AMU) in hospital settings. As 
previously stated, the CQUIN has two overarching aims and the 2015/2016 
guidance for the National Dementia CQUIN extends the aims of previous 
CQUINs by aiming to support and improve the communication between 
healthcare providers, general practice and the community, for both new and 
existing patients (see Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) 
Guidance, 2015/16). The rationale behind the CQUIN is that the number of 
                                                          
21
 GP Quality and Outcomes Framework subset 2014-15 dementia data ‘supports the Prime 
Minister's Dementia Challenge, within which aims (sic) there is an ambition to improve the 
national diagnosis rate of dementia.’ GP Practices are financially rewarded for achieving a 
monthly target of dementia diagnoses (see ‘Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) Recorded 
Dementia Diagnoses 2015’ pp.4).  
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individuals set to develop overall dementia, is predicted to increase which is 
likely to cost the UK economy £26.3 billion per annum (Alzheimer’s 
Society, 2015).  
 
The National Dementia CQUIN has three stages. As a pay-for-performance 
scheme, the initiative provides financial payment to each NHS Trust that 
achieves a quota of 90% of patients reaching each of its three stages
22
. At 
Stage 1, 90% of individuals admitted to AMU are asked the ‘awareness 
question’. The patient, family member or professional carer is asked, ‘have 
you/has the patient been more forgetful in the past 12 months to the extent 
that it has significantly affected your/their daily life).’ This question must be 
completed within 72 hours of admission. If the answer is yes to this question, 
the patient is moved to Stage 2. To receive payment, 90% of patients from 
Stage 1 need to be referred to Stage 2, which includes giving patients an 
Abbreviated Mental Test Score (AMTS) to complete, to determine the 
presence of dementia. If the patient scores below 7/10 on the AMTS they 
are moved to Stage 3. Again to receive payment, 90% of patients from Stage 
2 have to be referred to Stage 3, which includes referral to specialist 
diagnostic assessment, for example GP, memory clinic or old-age psychiatry 
liaison team. Payment is received if 90% compliance has been achieved in 
each of these three stages (see diagram ‘Dementia CQUIN: FAIR (Find, 
Assess and Investigate, Refer’ page 8 Using the Commissioning for Quality 
and Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework, 2012).  
 
Pay-for-performance schemes, in particular CQUINs, have received 
criticism from health policy and health economics commentators. Maynard 
and Bloor (2010) writing in the British Medical Journal, argue that the NHS 
should proceed cautiously when implementing performance measurement 
initiatives. They argue that as a result of initiatives such as CQUINs, which 
aim to improve a particular area of practice, this may lead to a deterioration 
of outcomes in other areas of healthcare practice. Furthermore, Kristenson, 
McDonald and Sutton (2013), question the design characteristics of pay-for-
                                                          
22
 Unlike Quality and Outcomes Frameworks, the CQUIN is aimed at rewarding hospital 
trusts rather than the clinical team. 
209 
 
performance schemes, and the extent to which they reflect local needs and 
priorities. More broadly, an increasingly systematic and calculating form of 
risk governance is therefore being witnessed within the NHS, which Brown 
and Calnan (2010 refer to as the ‘dark side’ of healthcare. Patient safety and 
quality of care are open to surveillance through target setting practices to 
avoid the (re)occurrence of prolific healthcare disasters (see Brown and 
Calnan, 2010). As a result, in response to what Ling (2000) describes as 
‘real medical failures’ healthcare practice is being ‘drawn back into attempts 
to establish protocols and rules’ of which commissioning initiatives are one 
example (pp. 261).  
 
Furthermore, social sciences commentators have challenged this shift 
towards standardised clinical governance regimes, suggesting that these 
regimes produce a technocratic, reductionist approach to healthcare, which 
has the potential to constrain professional autonomy (Abbott, 1988, 
Armstrong, 1977; Berg et al., 2000). According to Hillman et al., (2010), 
healthcare has ‘fallen victim to a wider societal trend to attempt to eradicate 
uncertainties through reasoned calculation,’ (pp. 951), alongside the rise of 
bureaucracy more broadly, the ‘risk management of everything’ and the 
emerging ‘bureaucratic patient’ (see Rosenberg, 2002, 2003, 2009; Power, 
2004; Kerr, 2008). In what follows, I investigate the extent to which the 
CQUIN, as a device for enacting future risk management, translates into 
everyday clinical practice by initially addressing whether it constrains the 
practising of clinical autonomy in the hospital setting.  
 
It has been well established by sociological scholars including Rose (1998), 
that calculating risk and uncertainty about the future of healthcare practice, 
also has the potential to weaken the autonomy of clinicians. In my study, 
efforts to calculate risk through the CQUIN shifted the content of work and 
approach of clinicians for measuring cognitive decline, where clinical 
autonomy was ‘de-emphasised’ in favour of transparency and order (pp. 
189). Tracing interview transcripts with information managers and the lead 
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clinician for the CQUIN
23
, these actors recognised the possibility that 
clinicians may regard the CQUIN as a bureaucratic initiative in what is 
already, an overly bureaucratised healthcare service. They were collectively 
concerned that the CQUIN might be viewed as a ‘paper based exercise’ 
(Information Manager 1) given that, ‘there is [already] so much paperwork’ 
(Information Manager 2), which as the lead clinician reflected, ‘it’s hard, 
it’s paperwork, it’s pieces of paper’. Arguably, these accounts are 
suggestive of the extent to which the CQUIN more generally, has the 
potential to generate a focus in clinical practice overall, ‘upon paperwork 
rather than practice’ (Kerr, 2008: 9) driven more broadly by the ‘lure of the 
number’ (Rose, 1998: 187). Exploring the accounts of clinicians, this was 
confirmed by Trainee Psychiatrist 1, who argued that the culture of 
healthcare practice is shifting towards a more target driven approach. As she 
explained during interview,  
 
‘I think at some point there’ll be some kind of government target 
that everybody who presents with x, y or z, needs to have this formal 
assessment documented and needs to have maybe like a yearly 
cognitive assessment or something like that. I think it’s going to 
become much more rigid, which is kind of frustrating because I 
think clinicians should be left alone to treat people, patients how 
they feel is appropriate, and as they’ve been trained to do.’ 
 
As Trainee Psychiatrist 1 illustrated, clinical autonomy overall, is likely to 
be compromised with a more target driven approach to healthcare. As she 
highlighted, this is perhaps going to have implications for the way that 
classification is currently practised, and how the tacit knowledge systems of 
clinicians, are valued more generally. As I will go on to elucidate, 
information managers also recognised the likelihood of this shift in the 
culture of healthcare practice. At the same time however, as the following 
interview extract demonstrates, the lead clinician for the CQUIN argued that 
in fact it was transparency of performance and ‘lure of the number’ (Rose, 
                                                          
23
 The lead clinician for the CQUIN was a practising geriatrician who oversaw its 
implementation in the clinical setting.  
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1998), that prompted improvement in practice for this particular healthcare 
site,  
 
“I feel very strongly that people don’t get patted on the back enough, 
don’t get told when they’re doing well but they’re told when they’re 
doing badly and that happens a lot in the health service…I do try and 
let people know that also data is extremely powerful, ‘cause if you 
send a spreadsheet around and you’ve got wards in the same 
specialty, and everybody else is hitting 98% and they’re green, and 
you’re amber, and you’re green, people will start to think – ‘hang on 
a second, why are my mates in the same specialty hitting that, what 
am I doing wrong?’ So it helps drive up standards and improve 
performance really. So yeah I do encourage us sharing the data. I 
think it helps sustain it, and I think it helps improve it, and at the end 
of the day it’s a very worthwhile thing to do really.” 
 
The CQUIN as a performance management initiative offers opportunities 
for surveillance and accountability. According to the lead clinician, the data 
was shared within the organisation, and clinicians were made aware of their 
own performance for documentation. This increased transparency within the 
team, and the CQUIN as a surveillance device, thus reflected a discourse of 
performativity. As a performance management framework, it encourages 
clinicians to be accountable; transparency of practice necessarily lends itself 
to performance improvement because of comparability across sites, which 
as the lead clinician argued, ‘drive[s] up standards’. Discussing exclusively 
the role of consultants and junior doctors here, for the lead clinician, the 
CQUIN performed how these actors approached their professional roles and 
identities ‘they’re green and you’re amber’ serving as a performance of 
Othering within the organisation, which was described similarly by 
Information Manager 1, ‘improves performance’. In this particular hospital 
site, the ‘objectivity effect’ (Rose, 1998: 189) of the CQUIN, for 
Information Manager 1, served to perform the professional hierarchy, which 
is an extension of the claims I made in Chapters Five and Six.  
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As the accounts from information managers and the lead clinician so far 
suggest, they recognised that practising the CQUIN may be resisted by 
clinicians. In what follows, I address the extent to which information 
managers and the lead clinician actively look beyond the CQUIN in terms 
of the ‘lure of the number’ (Rose, 1998: 187). Instead, these actors promote 
and thereby anticipate, the CQUIN as an initiative for reifying the patient 
pathway beyond performance management and target setting practices. 
Therefore I extend Rose’s (1998) claim that quantification is privileged for 
calculating and managing risk, by demonstrating that the CQUIN overall, is 
constitutive of a particular representation of the future grounded in 
anticipation of the reified patient pathway
24
. Across interview accounts and 
observations, I argue that the future enacted by the CQUIN, ‘is now, on the 
cutting edge of the present’ (Flaherty and Fine, 2001: 155) and as a result, 
my overall analytical focus is grounded in the sociology of expectations. 
The future of the patient pathway 
 
STS literature in recent years has begun to develop an area of work, which 
investigates the temporal orderings within the development of 
technoscientific research and practice (see Brown, Rappert and Webster, 
2000; Brown and Michael, 2003; Selin, 2008). In particular, commentators 
developing the analytical standpoint of the sociology of expectations have 
begun to develop an area of work, which seeks to explore the future as 
constituted in the present. The key analytical move of the sociology of 
expectations shifts the focus of critique from looking into the future, to 
looking at the future; the future is constituted in accordance with particular 
representations of temporality in the present. ‘…looking at how the future as 
a temporal abstraction is constructed and managed, by whom and under 
what conditions’ (Brown, Rappert and Webster, 2000: 4 emphasis in 
original). Despite the sociology of expectations analysing innovation in 
technoscience, I capture how the analytical themes raised by this approach, 
can be applied to the role of more mundane technologies and initiatives in 
                                                          
24
 Referring to the patient pathway here, I am describing the process whereby clinicians 
detect initial cognitive decline, refer patients for diagnosis, carry out diagnostic 
assessments, prescribe treatment and care options. 
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healthcare with regards to the CQUIN. Managing the future of AD, as a 
particular temporal abstraction, is important for considering how this might 
shift the representations of time embedded in current classification practices, 
and thereby reflecting on the translation of the framework in everyday, 
routine practice. 
 
As the following analysis shows, the two information managers included in 
my study and the lead clinician, were able to anticipate the future patient 
pathway through the implementation of the CQUIN, which had the potential 
to act as a ‘powerful agent on our present’ (Brown, Rappert and Webster, 
2010: 9). From the perspective of clinicians, this manifested in two 
significant ways. First, the CQUIN shifted the organisation of healthcare 
and second, the CQUIN produced particular uncertainties for clinicians in 
the hospital setting. Prior to analysing these implications, Information 
managers and the lead clinician, collectively agreed that the CQUIN should 
be performed beyond a framework for quantifying and calculating risk,  
 
‘I guess it, you know, the data is the data and that’s it; you can make 
it flat or three dimensional depending on what you want it to tell 
you. So I don’t think people relate to numbers as much as they relate 
to a story.’ 
 
As I have shown in Chapters Five and Six, emphasising the quantified 
outcome of cognitive screening tools, was balanced alongside valuing the 
more ad hoc or informal practices through which the tools were mediated. 
As witnessed during observations of consultations and team meetings in the 
memory service however, clinicians at times emphasised the significance of 
the quantified outcome for negotiating the boundaries of classification, and 
for proceeding with classification in a complex distribution of medical 
practice. The account of Information Manager 1 serves to highlight a further 
dimension of this balancing act. It was her use of the word ‘story’ which is 
interesting, since a story denotes a narrative with a past, present and future: 
the construction of cognitive decline across time. Similarly to the practices 
of the memory service, according to Information Manager 1, the numerical 
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data produced by the CQUIN was not emphasised above the narrative 
embedded within the outcome of the technology; overall, it was used to 
narrate the patient’s journey, which clinicians and information managers 
found useful in this particular study. Furthermore, the data could only be 
used to tell part of the story of the patient journey, as Consultant Psychiatrist 
1 explained during interview when asked about the consequences of an 
ageing population, ‘there’s gonna be increasing needs for this group 
[ageing population] and increasingly complex needs as time goes on’. 
Beyond the theme of risk, the data from the CQUIN overall, enacts the 
future in terms of patients’ ‘needs’ over time as it frames the patient 
pathway. As I will go on to capture, it was this dimension of the CQUIN 
that the information managers included in this study, found useful for 
ensuring clinicians complied with the framework, beyond its role as a paper 
based exercise for calculating risk. As the following extract from an 
interview with Information Manager 2 highlighted,  
 
‘People aren’t always that aware of the relevance of it [CQUIN] and 
because there is so much paperwork, sometimes they don’t - you 
know if you’re new into a role, you don’t actually understand that 
the paperwork is for the patient care and if they support each other… 
and so I think there’s got to be that whole awareness of it and 
education of it to get people to comply with it really.”  
 
Here, Information Manager 2 clarified that she is aware that the CQUIN 
may be seen to be unproductive in terms of adding an extra bureaucratic 
layer to clinical practice. Reflecting on observations of both consultations 
and team meetings in the memory service, there were numerous moments 
where clinicians remarked that referrals were increasing and they had little 
time to complete their weekly patient load. Particularly during weekly MDT 
meetings, clinicians would express their concern about the increasing 
allocation of referrals, and the impact this might have on time spent with 
each patient. The culture of current specialist, diagnostic services for 
dementia overall, were subsequently already facing a culture of ‘paperwork 
rather than practice’ (Kerr, 2008: 9). What is interesting about Information 
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Manager 2’s claims is that to navigate this culture of bureaucracy, they 
stressed the importance of anticipating the value of the CQUIN as a device 
for managing patient care. According to Information Manager 2, this meant 
that clinicians were more likely to comply with the principles of the CQUIN; 
they were able to anticipate its role beyond a target driven initiative. As 
Information Manager 1 further illustrated during an interview,  
 
“You know those numbers are telling you a story about patients who 
are going through a journey in the hospital. So I often used to have 
difficult discussions with the team because they would say, ‘ah yeah 
we’ve hit 90%’ and I would say, ‘but has that last patient been 
referred?’ and they’d say ‘no’ and I’d say, ‘go talk to the dementia 
lead about it; let’s get them referred’ because actually it’s not about 
the performance, it’s about making sure that if you think about the 
value that the CQUIN is meant to be giving, then the performance 
should emerge from the correct clinical practice rather than vice 
versa.” 
 
There are two important points to draw from this interview excerpt. First, 
the account of Information Manager 1 concurs with previous literatures that 
the CQUIN represents efforts to quantify and calculate risk driven by a 
commitment to objectivity (Rose, 1998). Arguably, the account also 
highlighted the extent to which commissioning initiatives overall, place trust 
in numbers (Porter, 1996). Given the increased attention in healthcare policy 
to formalise, measure and hold clinicians accountable for their work through 
initiatives such as the CQUIN, this arguably represents distrust of clinicians 
to effectively detect cognitive decline in the hospital setting. What is also 
interesting about this excerpt is that as clinicians successfully hit the 90% 
target, often it was the information manager that had to prompt the extra 
referrals beyond the target of 90%. Despite Information Manager 1’s claims 
however, I reflect here on whether current practice and prompting clinicians 
to achieve 100% referrals, was a consequence of clinicians expending an 
increasing amount of time implementing the CQUIN, and therefore may not 
necessarily have had time to go above and beyond the quota of 90%.   
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The second point to draw from Information Manager 1’s account is that she 
described the CQUIN as a framework for anticipating and thereby reifying 
the patient pathway. Information Manager 1 was keen to demonstrate that 
the CQUIN served a purpose beyond performance measurement to 
considering its role for the future of the patient pathway, their ‘journey in 
the hospital’. The uniformity of procedure (Berg, 1997a) by achieving or 
performing the target of ‘90%’ became more than a simple ‘accountability’ 
procedure (Kerr, 2008: 9): the numbers ‘are telling you a story’. 
Anticipating the patient journey prompted the performance of the CQUIN 
and the narrative of the data was valued (c.f. Berg, 1997a). This was 
confirmed by Information Manager 2, ‘it’s not just about the numbers and 
how we do that, it’s about the whole package of care really so it’s the more 
‘touchy feely’ aspect to the CQUIN’. As Information Manager 1 further 
elaborated during interview, constructing this ‘package of care’, had 
important implications for the future of the patient pathway, 
 
‘So actually that early identification of somebody suffering from 
possible dementia has a lot of value to play and actually a lot of 
value to play in healthcare in general because actually diagnosing 
that earlier might allow us therefore to prevent admissions for that 
patient later on in that pathway. So I guess for me it’s an opportunity 
to improve patient experience.’  
 
Here, early identification of cognitive decline more generally, prevents 
(re)admission to secondary healthcare, and therefore manages any possible 
disruption to the reified patient pathway. This is because, the CQUIN 
overall encourages earlier detection of pathology before ‘it’s too late…to 
manage what is likely to be a very difficult point of time in their lives’ 
(Interview Information Manager 1). In doing so, the CQUIN actively 
anticipates and mobilises the patient’s journey in terms of the patient 
pathway to ‘improve care’ as argued by the lead clinician during interview. 
The “‘real time’ activities” of these actors were performed in response to the 
uncertainties around the current patient pathway for dementia: from the 
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hospital setting and through into memory service at earlier stages (Brown, 
Rappert and Webster, 2000: 4).  
 
Yet, as I have captured in Chapters Five and Six, this patient journey is not 
necessarily a linear process, as clinicians shift back and forth between 
different techniques, technologies and professionals across healthcare, to 
account for the emergent complexities enacted in the clinic. Increasing 
referrals were subsequently met with reticence particularly by professionals 
working in specialist memory services. Furthermore, this ‘whole package of 
care’ that Information Manager 2 described, is suggestive of the more 
tangible and practical applications of the CQUIN along the ‘patient journey’ 
as Information Manager 1 illustrated. Yet, preparing for this ‘package of 
care’, implies a very different set of care practices than those captured in 
Chapters Five and Six, where I analysed the informal, ad hoc or carefully 
choreographed diagnostic appointments in order to manage uncertainty. As 
a result, despite Information Manager 1 emphasising the ‘touchy feely’ 
aspect of this package of care, paradoxically this produced uncertainties, 
which the CQUIN and early diagnosis overall, claims to resolve. I will 
develop this point further in the chapter. 
 
So far, I have briefly sketched the accounts of information managers, 
framed within a broader analytical perspective, which demonstrated the 
extent to which the CQUIN enacted and anticipated specific futures around 
the patient pathway. This was seen by the two information managers and the 
lead clinicians to aid the performance of the CQUIN and minimise 
disruption to autonomy. The question remains however, as to how this 
approach was translated into clinical practice by clinicians, and whether 
anticipations about the future as projected by information managers were, 
‘object[s] of creation rather than fully set’ (Selin, 2008: 1880). Selin makes 
an important claim that informs the following section: the extent to which 
creating particular futures had important implications for both patients and 
clinicians despite the CQUIN enacting these futures as ‘fully set’ (pp. 1880).  
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Shifting time and moments of uncertainty 
 
Drawing on interview transcripts and observation notes, in what follows, I 
argue that the CQUIN emerged not simply as a device for calculating risk; 
rather, in anticipation of the patient pathway, it shifted the temporal 
orderings of current classification practice. In doing so, it had important 
implications for the content of work in the hospital setting, and for patients 
facing assessment as the ‘future influence[ed] the present’? (Mead, 1936: 
301). According to Mead (1936) in his writings on time, the future is 
constituted in both the past and the present since the future is ‘already being 
made’ (pp. 301). Mead’s writings refer predominantly to notions of 
temporality in interactions. The self is a temporal moment inscribed across 
time, a point I will develop further in the chapter. Approaching the future by 
adopting this analytical framework, I analyse time and temporality not 
simply as ‘facet[s] of nature’ (Flaherty and Fine, 2001), neutral and value 
free, but as analytical devices in themselves, which in my own study, had 
important implications for diagnostic assessment, classification practices, 
and the everyday work of clinicians.  
 
The promissory claims of the CQUIN have been presented thus far in terms 
of its ability to enable clinicians to prepare for the patient pathway or the 
‘patients journey’ in the hospital setting, into specialist memory services, 
aside from debates around professional autonomy and the value of tacit 
working practices. This was confirmed by the accounts of information 
managers and the lead clinician. The ways in which these promissory claims 
were realised in clinical practice had important implications however, for 
classification practice in the hospital setting, in two distinctive ways. First, it 
implicated the ways in which a number of clinicians approached cognitive 
assessment and second, it implicated the organisation of healthcare practice. 
In terms of being able to explore the CQUIN in practice, the CQUIN was 
difficult to observe. Despite having ethical approval to observe the 
framework on hospital wards, the nature of it, and its demands on AMU, 
meant that clinicians were reluctant to allow me to carry out observations. 
They were concerned that my presence on the ward would disrupt working 
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practice. As a result, the accounts I have of the CQUIN from those working 
in the hospital setting, were taken from semi-structured interviews.  
 
In order to explore how clinicians approached the CQUIN in the hospital 
setting, a significant component of this process was performing the AMTS 
for those patients referred to Stage Two of the CQUIN. The AMTS (see 
Appendix A), is a 10-question tool to assess decline in cognitive function: a 
result of seven or less would warrant referral for diagnostic assessment. 
Prior to the implementation of the CQUIN, it was used routinely across the 
hospital setting; its adoption in the CQUIN has simply standardised its use 
for assessing cognitive decline. Tensions arose however, between those 
actors implementing the CQUIN, and clinicians practising the CQUIN, with 
regards to the usefulness of the AMTS in practice. For the lead clinician, the 
AMTS prompts the successful performance of the CQUIN since it fits 
neatly into the current pressures and demands on clinical practice. The 
simplicity of this tool is what connected different actors across space and 
time in order to ‘create ‘direction’’ for assessing cognitive decline and 
preparing the patient pathway (Brown, Rappert and Webster, 2000: 4). As 
the lead clinician explained during interview,  
 
‘I think as a quick screening or quick assessment test the AMTS is a 
very good one; I’m a huge fan of it. It’s had its critics and it has its 
limitations of that there’s no doubt but the beauty of it is, that it takes 
a matter of a couple of minutes to do. It doesn’t require anybody to 
draw anything on a piece of paper, it doesn’t require like the Mini-
mental state examination, somebody to fold a piece of paper, it is a 
series of questions that can be answered quickly, can be done at the 
bedside, by just about anybody who’s trained.’ 
 
For the lead clinician, the ‘beauty’ of the AMTS is the fact that it is a simple, 
portable test which can be transported or transferable across healthcare sites, 
‘at the bedside’ by those who have been adequately trained. The test reduces 
the time it takes to assess cognitive function in AMU, and mobilises action 
across settings because of its simplicity and portability. In terms of 
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mobilising action across settings, this is a point I will return to further in the 
chapter. However, whilst the lead clinician referred to the concept of 
portability here during interview, this produced a very different dimension 
of portability than that which was witnessed during observations across 
Chapters Five and Six. According to the lead clinician, the simplicity of the 
AMTS enables it to shift effortlessly between different actors and in 
different spaces.  
 
Performing this portability however, without due regard for the informal and 
ad hoc care practices observed in the clinics of the memory service, had 
important implications for clinicians in the organisation of the hospital 
setting. There was a collective concern across the hospital setting, that the 
adoption of the AMTS despite its portability, negatively affected the point 
in time at which cognitive decline was assessed, managed and documented. 
This had implications for patients who were being assessed, and the 
organisation of the hospital setting overall. Developing the claims made by 
Mol, Moser and Pols (2010), I am not suggesting that the AMTS ‘work[ed] 
or fail[ed]’ rather, by shifting the point in time at which cognitive function 
was assessed, a variety of affects emerged which were at times ‘surprising’ 
for patients and clinicians alike (pp. 14). In the hospital setting, this 
‘surprise’ or what I argue were the unintended consequences of the CQUIN, 
were difficult to navigate as the following extract from an interview with 
Registrar Geriatrician 1 illustrated, 
 
“I think it’s [AMTS] a really blunt screening tool I preferred it when 
I could use my discretion I think it’s really obvious when you are 
talking to a patient who’s got cognitive impairment that may not 
have been picked up recently and I think that these things are better 
done if they’re more targeted and that you just that you pick this 
stuff up. I think also the other side of that is just by screening 
everybody, there are some people who find it really offensive that 
you’re asking them these questions and when I do to those people 
who I know are going to score 10/10 because they’ve given me a 
really good story of why they’re in hospital and absolutely 
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everything, you know there’s no cognitive impairment, it’s then 
really embarrassing and I do like say, ‘I’m really sorry David 
Cameron makes me ask you these questions’. But having said that, 
although I think that I would prefer to use my clinical judgment, I’m 
a geriatrician and I recognise that there are a lot of other specialties 
out there who would not have the skills and expertise that I have and 
will be less good at picking these things up: wouldn’t recognise it, 
wouldn’t be interested in doing it. So perhaps the screening tool is 
more appropriate for them, but then how could you say these groups 
of people can use the screening tool but geriatricians you don't have 
to do it, you can use your judgment. So I can see why they’ve done it 
as a screening tool.”  
 
Echoing the point I made at the beginning of the chapter, arguably the 
observations of Registrar Geriatrician 1 serve initially to highlight how the 
CQUIN both constrained professional autonomy or discretion
25
, and also 
reflected disciplinary objectivity as opposed to mechanical objectivity 
(Porter, 1996). The tacit knowledge systems of geriatricians were privileged 
and insight was applied through ‘learned experience amongst peers’ (see 
Berg et al., 2000). In the case of the registrar, this led to disdain for 
‘standard or standardised solutions’ to what was essentially a complex, or 
what should be a ‘targeted’ task (Berg et al., 2000: 784). However, the 
account of Registrar Geriatrician 1 also highlighted the expectations that 
clinicians held of these technologies. Registrar Geriatrician 1 drew attention 
to the difficulties associated with using the AMTS and characterised it as a 
‘blunt’ tool. The tool made it difficult to exercise discretion and judgement, 
necessary for negotiating the ways in which patients might conceive the 
assessment process. The CQUIN more generally, shifts the point in time at 
which clinicians assess cognitive function to earlier stages, which in this 
instance, had direct implications for how patients conceived and therefore 
perceived the testing process. For a number of patients who might ‘find it 
                                                          
25
 The effect of this framework on professional autonomy however, is likely to differ across 
specialties particularly where specialisation in medicine (in this case elderly medicine) is 
traditionally associated with exercising greater professional autonomy (Nancarrow and 
Borthwick, 2005). 
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offensive’ to be assessed, the AMTS produced particular uncertainties in the 
hospital setting as found in my research. Drawing parallels with the claims I 
made in Chapters Five and Six, navigating how patients conceived the 
possibility of a diagnosis was difficult when the CQUIN governed the use of 
the AMTS for use at specific moments in time. Arguably, in this sense, the 
interpretive repertoire of the clinic and the making of provisionality had the 
potential to be constrained through the CQUIN. Drawing on Mol, Moser 
and Pols (2010) is helpful here, since the observations made in Chapter Five, 
illustrated the ways in which clinicians were able to treat the tools as 
provisional and temporary, aware of situational exigencies and individual 
particularities and therefore clinicians were able to engage in ‘care work’ 
(pp. 15).  
 
The sentiments of Registrar Geriatrician 1 however, were not necessarily 
shared across the hospital setting as the following extract from an interview 
with Consultant Geriatrician 1 highlighted, ‘It [AMTS] doesn’t tell you the 
cause, it doesn’t tell you whether it’s acute or chronic, but it helps identify 
patients. So I guess what I’m saying is, the ones that are really confused it’s 
obvious but there’s a group of people we think are absolutely fine, but 
actually it’s not until you do the AMTS that you start to pick up the subtle 
problems.’ According to Consultant Geriatrician 1, the technology had the 
ability to enact, and render visible, the subtlety of symptoms. Yet, as the 
CQUIN extends the boundaries of practice to those less obvious cases, and 
the point in time at which cognitive function is assessed to those who might 
be in the earliest stages or asymptomatic, for Registrar Geriatrician 1, this 
had the potential to produce uncertainty for those patients who may be 
‘offended’. 
 
Extending the theme of time and the temporal orderings of the content of 
work in the hospital setting, the CQUIN also had the potential to shift the 
current structure and practice of AMU, particularly for junior doctors. It 
shifted the priorities of junior doctors and the point in time at which 
cognitive function was assessed and documented. As the following extract 
from an interview with Consultant Geriatrician 1 confirmed, the CQUIN as 
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a medical accomplishment, therefore produced and reproduced professional 
hierarchies,  
 
‘It’s [CQUIN] predominantly medical so the nurses often have a role 
in prompting it. They have, they’ve now just moved to an electronic 
patient screen that they update and one of the things is the dementia 
CQUIN so they will often prompt us if it hasn’t been done. But it’s a 
medical, for us it’s a medical responsibility to do it; junior doctor 
senior doctor and then it’s our medical responsibility to pass it on to 
the GP or liaise directly without liaison psychiatry. So the multi-
professional communication would be nurse to doctor we would 
communicate doctor to nurse if we’ve identified problems.’ 
 
The responsibility of the CQUIN as Consultant Geriatrician 1 described is 
primarily a ‘medical’ accomplishment, which served to sustain the 
professional hierarchy in the hospital setting. This supports my argument 
that such tools had the ability to produce and reproduce the division of 
labour in healthcare. Whilst still maintaining ‘multi-professional 
communication’, those higher up the professional hierarchy were able to 
check or confirm the work of nurses, as communication was ‘nurse to 
doctor’. However, despite this division of labour as demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, the process of assessing and subsequently diagnosing 
AD through the use of cognitive screening tools was a collective and 
collaborative network of practices. The hierarchy of the CQUIN however, 
had the potential to shift this collaboration and produce moments of chaotic 
practice since the framework predominantly relied on the role of junior 
doctors in AMU. Trainee Psychiatrist 1 highlighted the ways in which the 
arena of the AMU meant that junior doctors were not making time for the 
CQUIN since the immediacy of defining and presenting problems in this 
space, meant assessment was put off to do in time. This produced particular 
uncertainties around how the CQUIN was dealt with in clinical practice and 
the content of work on the ground. As Trainee Psychiatrist 1 described, 
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'One of the things that we did find when we audited the CQUIN tool 
at the - in the acute medical unit, is that the people who are 
undertaking these cognitive assessments are junior doctors. They’re 
foundation year one so they’ve just started, or foundation year 2 
maybe an SHO that’ll have been in for about three years. So that 
initial assessment would be by a junior doctor and they’re done at - 
you know like, being a junior a doctor on a hospital ward is frantic; 
it’s just so so busy. You don’t eat or drink for 14 hours and it’s just, 
it’s really busy so you almost at the time you kind of like, I don’t 
actually care about this patients’ dementia which is chronic long 
term, I don’t need to solve that, what I do need to solve is that this 
lady’s oxygen’s level is in her boots, her blood pressure’s dropping 
you know that kind of stuff. So the kind of more, the kind of 
dementia picture really takes a back seat in the acute setting. So I 
think that they’ve got a long way to go at trying to educate younger 
doctors as they’re coming in on the importance of using these short 
acute admissions for identifying these. Obviously all patients have 
their consultants who’ll see them in ward reviews, and particularly 
elderly consultants - they’re always looking out for stuff like this but 
it would be really useful for junior doctors to have a bit more 
training on why it is important to sort of flag it up. You know even if 
it’s three in the morning, have a little think about it: if the daughters 
saying, ‘oh she’s not been herself, you know she’s been a bit more 
forgetful for the last six months’ that is important. That needs to be 
documented.” 
 
Healthcare practice is fragmented and disordered (Atkinson, 1995) 
particularly for junior doctors. For junior doctors attempting to establish 
themselves within the hospital team (c.f. Kerr, 2008) the pressures and 
practices of AMU made the accomplishment of the CQUIN difficult. As 
Trainee Psychiatrist 1 explained, in AMU it was generally the responsibility 
of junior doctors to carry out the CQUIN, who in the early stages of their 
career, are facing huge demands and demands on time in particular. To 
accomplish the CQUIN in the current temporal orderings of AMU was 
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therefore difficult, to which end the ‘dementia picture really takes a back 
seat.’ The priority for junior doctors in these conditions was to attend to 
what was immediately the problem, ‘this lady’s oxygen is in her boots, her 
blood pressure’s dropping’. As Trainee Psychiatrist 1 iterated however, 
documenting the CQUIN was important for the purpose of anticipating and 
preparing for the patient pathway: in terms of what was both immediately 
present in time and that, which may be important over time. Therefore 
different temporal orderings co-existed in the space of AMU, which led to 
moments of uncertainty particularly for junior doctors. For junior doctors 
concerned with what was immediately the problem in a pressurised 
healthcare service, meant that the CQUIN was put off to do in the future at 
which point the reified patient pathway was affected. The CQUIN in its 
quest to establish order for the future of the patient pathway had the 
potential to shift current approaches to cognitive function in practice.  
 
The difficulties faced by junior doctors when practising the CQUIN are 
reflective of the conditions in which the framework overall is implemented, 
and the increasing pressures on the healthcare service. I reflect here on the 
elusiveness of the CQUIN in my own research in terms of the difficulty in 
recruiting participants. I consider that the difficulty I found following the 
CQUIN through practice, parallels with, the current conditions in which the 
CQUIN is operating in terms of the demands on the service, and as I will go 
on to demonstrate, demands on healthcare resources. As the following 
accounts and observations across the memory service illustrate, reifying the 
patient pathway through the CQUIN was difficult given the practical 
challenges currently facing the NHS.  
Mobilising resources along the pathway 
 
According to the implementers of the CQUIN including information 
managers, the CQUIN since it encourages assessment and therefore referral 
rates, institutes a particular future care pathway. The CQUIN is useful for 
describing the journey of the patient and also to prescribe in terms of 
referring patients from hospital to primary care (c.f. Pinder et al., 2005). 
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Drawing on Pinder et al., (2005) the CQUIN is a ‘mobilising metaphor’, 
which drives ‘structure to doing something about it [dementia] once they’re 
[the patient] left hospital, which we didn’t really have before’ (Conversation 
Consultant Geriatrician 1). At the same time that Consultant Geriatrician 1 
argued that the CQUIN formalises current working practices, there were 
points at which this structure was difficult to maintain. As Consultant 
Geriatrician 1 explained, 
 
‘My hesitancy is we can identify, and we can recommend some 
follow-up, but does that turn into someone carrying out the follow-
up and the patient actually going; and ‘cause a lot of the challenges 
in the NHS are communications across transitions of care.’ 
 
What Consultant Geriatrician 1 described as ‘communications across 
transitions of care’ produced particular uncertainties around referral and 
follow-up practices. Reflecting on my own observations of consultations 
and team meetings, the CQUIN was marked relatively by its absence in 
terms of communicating the source of  referrals to the memory service. 
Arguably, practising the CQUIN was made further complex as Information 
Manager 1 explained, ‘patients move around the organisation’ leading to 
‘messy’ rather than ‘streamlined’ practice (Interview Information Manager 
1). Unlike the practices observed in Chapter Six, the portability of patients 
across healthcare sites instituted by the CQUIN, produced complexity as 
opposed to resolving complexity. As the following extract will confirm, the 
follow-up practices driven by the CQUIN, raised further uncertainties in 
terms of care options and resource allocation, which effected the decisions 
made by clinicians in terms of referrals. As Registrar Geriatrician 1 
illustrated, 
 
‘You have to look at the bigger picture. So you’re picking them up 
and referring them back to the GP; I know that in (location) there’s a 
four month wait to be seen in memory services, so actually you can 
highlight this to the GP, and relatives and carers, that there may be 
an issue and be followed up, but actually then they’re waiting a long 
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time for that follow-up. So actually if the memory services are 
struggling to see the volume of patients that we’re referring, you 
then ask the question you know the bigger picture: what kind of care 
are we offering these patients in terms of diagnosis and treatment? 
And that then leads you on I suppose to say, well actually what 
treatment is there? Yes there are four drugs out there, but they’re 
drugs and they’re not completely effective. What other then - you 
think about more holistically, what other social care do we give to 
these patients? And I think that that’s been in decline recently as 
well. So it’s a very, it’s a small bit isn't it in doing an AMTS, and 
just cos you identify, what on earth does that lead to? And that - 
what that leads to is like the bigger picture, and actually perhaps 
that’s what we need to be improving, is that bigger picture of 
improving assessment, diagnosis, treatment and like care and 
support in the community; that needs to be there and I think that’s a 
really big issue.’ 
 
Developing the theme, upon which this chapter is grounded, the future 
patient pathway instituted by the CQUIN, is developed in the present in 
order to ‘marshal resources [and] coordinate activities’ (Brown, Rappert and 
Webster, 2000: 4). However, translating this in practice was difficult 
because of the practical challenges facing the organisation of healthcare; the 
conditions of its implementation. As the CQUIN increases identification and 
referral rates more broadly, Registrar Geriatrician 1 expressed their concern 
that ‘the bigger picture’ in terms of treatment and care were not advancing 
at the pace of initiatives, which promote diagnosis more generally. This 
therefore created particular uncertainties around patient futures in the 
hospital setting, which paradoxically, the CQUIN was expected to handle 
and sort.  
 
Furthermore, the CQUIN may well increase the speed of referrals but at the 
same time, this produced particular challenges within the memory service 
facing demands on resources and time. The increased number of referrals 
was a frequent note of observation across the memory service. They had the 
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potential to slow down the time it took for referral to specialist memory 
clinic already a point of concern for clinicians as I noted during a 
conversation preceding an observation with Trainee Psychiatrist 3, ‘The 
clinician explained to me that the patient had previously had a CT scan 
following reports of memory loss in 2013. The clinician noted here that ‘as 
you can see, the time it’s taken for referral had been quite a lengthy 
process.’  Increasing referrals also had the potential to disrupt the reified 
patient pathway or what Registrar Geriatrician 1 described as ‘care and 
support in the community’. Overall, Registrar Geriatrician 1 confirmed the 
uncertain relationship between diagnosis and prognosis which was at the 
centre of concerns around efforts to diagnose AD overall, as this thesis has 
argued. The process of referral for preparing the patient pathway was also a 
point of contention as the CQUIN moved into the memory service. Here, I 
witnessed how clinicians across the memory service interacted with the 
CQUIN, and observed these particular uncertainties negotiated in practice. I 
observed a team meeting with Ridge NHS Centre where (rather 
unexpectedly), the CQUIN appeared in a discussion regarding referral 
practices,  
 
‘A memory nurse presented a new referral from the GP. The 
clinician began by stating that the patient’s physical health is a 
‘major concern’ going on to detail the patient’s medical history. The 
memory nurse explained that during a home visit they tried to 
administer the ACE 111 but the patient had fallen asleep (scored 
32/84). The memory nurse suggested that although she wanted to 
carry out a scan she did not think it would be beneficial for the 
patient as he is ‘near end of life’. The nurse exclaimed that the 
patient’s memory decline is ‘almost the least of the patient’s worries’ 
going on to questions, ‘it’s a wonder why people get referrals’. A 
memory nurse interjected at this point, ‘it’s because of the CQUIN’”.  
 
During the team meeting, the ambivalence towards formal initiatives such as 
the CQUIN became clear. As suggested above, the memory nurse became 
concerned for the health of the patient more broadly, and the 
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inappropriateness or irresponsibility of carrying out the tests with the patient 
who was ‘near end of life’. What I reflected on during this observation was 
that despite information managers and geriatricians arguing that the CQUIN 
is useful for structuring the patient pathway, increasing referral rates had the 
ability to produce particular anxieties for clinicians and patients. This 
anxiety was initially manifest as patients referred to memory service from 
the CQUIN, were then subject to extensive technological testing through the 
use of ACE 111 when in fact dementia was the ‘least of their worries’. The 
CQUIN then shifted the point at which the patient in this instance was 
referred from the GP. Here, the CQUIN appeared fleetingly yet significantly 
drawing attention to the lack of care associated with diagnostic referral: 
without due regard for the conditions in which the framework was being 
implemented in terms of the organisation of practice, and the individual 
particularities of patients as mapped in Chapters Five and Six. Tracing 
further observation notes, I also found that, tensions arose between the 
availability of resource allocation and treatment options. The conditions in 
which the CQUIN was being implemented reflected the lack of resources 
available, particularly for treatment options. The conditions in which it was 
being implemented could have led to its absence in observations of the 
memory service; its inability to produce action beyond initial referral was a 
point of contention across the memory service in particular.  
 
Marshalling or mobilising resources through the CQUIN and therefore 
constituting a future with AD through “‘real time’ activities”, (Brown, 
Rappert and Webster, 2000: 4) was difficult when the availability and 
accessibility of treatment options in particular was a cause for concern. As I 
have clarified throughout this thesis, clinicians continually worked to 
negotiate classification in an arena of medical uncertainty; treatment options 
in the service were limited and there is no cure for the disease to which end 
clinicians shifted back and forth between techniques, technologies and 
professionals. During an observation of a team meeting at Nunmill Hospital, 
I witnessed the tensions within the NHS overall, with regards to the 
resources available for AD, and therefore the conditions in which 
frameworks such as the CQUIN were being implemented overall, 
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“The specialty doctor presented the case of a patient who having 
been given a diagnosis of AD, was finding it difficult to swallow the 
tablet capsules of Galantamine. The speciality doctor explained to 
the consultant that instead of prescribing the capsule form of the 
treatment, she has ordered the medication in liquid form. At this 
point, the consultant gasped and exclaimed, ‘do you know how much 
a bottle of that costs - over £2000 per bottle!’ The specialty doctor 
looked taken aback and the consultant went on to say, ‘no, I’m sorry 
you’re going to have to withdraw that order – we’ve been told 
specifically not to order that in.’ The consultant reasoned that they 
knew about this only because they were invited to attend a medicines 
management meeting. A discussion ensued between the clinicians 
about the trusts reluctance to prescribe liquid forms of the treatment 
because of demand on services, and yet a number of older patients 
were finding it incredibly difficult to take the capsule form. As the 
consultant exclaimed, ‘we’re torn really.’” 
 
This observation is suggestive of the practical challenges currently facing 
the NHS in terms of resources. Clinicians were faced with having to 
navigate the uncertainty around a lack of resources and the financial burden 
of the NHS trust, which affected patients and their treatment options. It also 
affected the ways in which clinicians were able to account for individual 
patient needs; a concern, which resonated with all clinicians across the 
memory service. The following extract from an interview with Consultant 
Psychiatrist 3, highlighted further the uncertainties associated with 
classifying AD particularly at earlier stages, given the demands on the 
memory service overall. As they explained,  
 
‘I think referral numbers from what I understand are going up, and 
are likely to continue going up. As well, the resources with the 
economy, the resources are going down as well, particularly with 
social care as well. So it’s going to mean a lot more demand on the 
one, the service. And as you mentioned earlier on it’s the fact that 
publicity as well from the government, publicity about dementia 
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pushing early diagnosis as well and pressure on the hospitals as well; 
the CQUIN screening for dementia to refer people to clinic. So I 
think it’s going to be a lot more input or demand on services, a lot 
more emphasis on diagnosis, but then less support afterwards with 
social care budgets being reduced. Other agencies having to make 
cut backs, so we’re going to end up with a lot of people being 
diagnosed with dementia, with MCI and then not much to do with 
them afterwards. So it’s a concern.’  
 
For Consultant Psychiatrist 3, diagnosis in the classification process is 
privileged, ‘a lot more emphasis on diagnosis’, overall, in the context of the 
implementation of the CQUIN. Early diagnosis is privileged both within the 
clinic, and more broadly in terms of social resources. As demonstrated in 
my study, patients and clinicians were necessarily affected by this privilege 
in the memory service. The patient pathway beyond diagnosis was a 
particular concern for Consultant Psychiatrist 3, because of the practical 
challenges facing the service in terms of resource allocation. As the CQUIN 
and commitment to early diagnosis drives referral rates more generally, this 
disrupted the reified patient pathway across the memory service because of 
the limited resources available in terms of treatment and care. This was a 
frequent topic of discussion across the memory service since it was this 
group of actors directly involved with referrals and therefore practising 
diagnosis.  
 
So far, I have sketched the difficulties and uncertainties that emerged in 
everyday practice when attempting to prepare for the future of the patient 
pathway. As demonstrated, the CQUIN shifted the ways in which clinicians 
approached cognitive assessment, and also reflected the tension around the 
practical challenges facing the NHS, in terms of availability of treatment 
and resources. The conditions, in which the CQUIN is being implemented 
more generally, produced tensions around the availability of resources in 
terms of both care and treatment. Entangled in the uncertainty of the 
conditions of healthcare practice, I reflect on the extent to which this 
implicated my own observations of the CQUIN; elusive because of the 
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complexities that already exist in healthcare which clinicians were 
continually navigating. The following section, based on interview accounts 
and supplemented by observations from within the memory service, 
captures how a broader commitment to early diagnosis translated into 
clinical practice. Whilst the first section has demonstrated the future reified 
in the patient pathway, in the final section of the chapter I critically analyse 
how the CQUIN constitutes a further dimension of the future as it shifts a 
classification of AD towards earlier stages.  
Shifting classification in time and early diagnosis 
 
Developing the notion of the future as a discourse with effects in the present 
(Selin, 2008) and the temporality of classification, I analyse how 
commitments to early diagnosis through initiatives such as the CQUIN, 
were approached, interpreted and negotiated in everyday clinical practice. 
According to scholars Flaherty and Fine (2001), we have a ‘profound 
interest in knowing the future, but try as we might, it always seems to 
surprise us’ (pp. 155). As I demonstrate, the CQUIN and its commitment to 
early diagnosis, as it reified the patient pathway, produced complexities and 
uncertainties for both patients and clinicians.  
 
According to Golumb et al., (2004), ‘explosion of interest [in AD] reflects a 
shift in dementia research away from established disease and toward early 
diagnosis’ (pp. 353). As illustrated in Chapter Six, efforts to expand the 
disease to incorporate the label Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), is a 
direct example of attempts to diagnose AD in its earliest stages. Early 
diagnosis of AD reflects a commitment in policy and practice, to calculating 
and formally measuring, the number of individuals set to develop the 
disease and therefore categorised as ‘at risk’. The expansion of the disease 
to incorporate asymptomatic cases, the at risk status, and early diagnosis, 
reflects the aim in medicine to manage the threat of disease through 
population screening programmes using highly sophisticated and innovative 
technologies to detect potential pathology. With the case of AD however, as 
I demonstrated in Chapter Two, the matter of screening is a point of 
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contention within clinical practice; a screening programme for Alzheimer’s 
disease to formalise risk calculation, has not been recommended (UK 
National Screening Committee, 2015). As Wilson and Junger (1968) 
explicate, adequate knowledge of the disease is required in order for 
screening practices to be implemented, perhaps why there are no formative 
population based measures to identify those who may be at risk of 
developing Alzheimer’s disease. Instead initiatives such as the GP QOF and 
the National Dementia CQUIN are implemented to identify and case find a 
number of individuals perceived to be at risk of AD. In terms of the CQUIN, 
this includes a group of individuals over the age of 75 admitted to AMU.  
 
Aside from the theme of risk, which has been adequately addressed in this 
thesis, the objective of the following section is to critically analyse how 
clinicians approached early diagnosis. In doing so, I illustrate that despite its 
hopeful discourse, early diagnosis through the CQUIN and more generally, 
shifted the temporality of classification, which produced particular 
uncertainties for both clinicians and patients. Part of this analysis included 
analysing whether the constituent futures of AD as performed in Chapters 
Five and Six could, ‘carry on’ through this promotion of early diagnosis 
(Law and Singleton, 2000: 775). Clinicians, patients and family members 
were affected by the principles of early diagnosis: anticipation, ‘the present 
is governed, at almost every scale, as if the future is what matters most’, 
emerged as an affective condition (Adams et al., 2009: 248). In Chapters 
Five and Six, cognitive screening tools in the memory service, were co-
constituted around two interrelated representations of temporality and 
futures in the present for managing uncertainty. First, during the clinician-
patient interaction, clinicians mediated and manipulated the tools to protect 
patient identity, built around the ways in which patients conceived the 
nature of testing and diagnosis overall. Second, I demonstrated the ways in 
which clinicians kept patients on into the future driven by the possibility 
that they may go on to develop AD and which I linked to the mediation and 
manipulation practices witnessed in Chapter Five. In part, this process of 
keeping patients on was also driven by patients’ expectations around a 
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future with AD. I investigate how this navigation work shifted with efforts 
to increase early diagnosis rates.  
 
To this end, I extend my analysis of the CQUIN, by drawing on Michael’s 
(2000) claims about positive and negative futures. The kinds of futures 
rhetorically enacted by the CQUIN, and commitment to early diagnosis 
more broadly downplay the role that the CQUIN has, in constructing 
particular expectations about a future with AD. As I will elucidate further, 
early diagnosis overall, produced uncertainty for patients and uncertainty 
around resource allocation given the practical challenges facing the NHS in 
terms of treatment options and care. I concur with Michael (2000) that, ‘the 
sorts of futures attached to a given project are…often contested’ (pp. 30). In 
this sense, stressing of the good associated with the CQUIN and early 
diagnosis more broadly, was implicit in ‘downplaying’ the more ‘tangential’ 
consequences of promoting early diagnosis for AD, which is uncertain and 
complex (pp. 30). Although Michael (2000) discusses technoscientific 
developments and the future, the themes raised can be similarly applied to 
the more mundane practices of the CQUIN, since as I show, it was implicit 
in constructing both patients’ and clinicians’ expectations about a future 
with AD. Overall, by problematising or pathologising later onset AD, and 
promoting early diagnosis, policy makers and therefore clinicians implicitly 
engage in the construction and constitution of patient expectations around 
what a future with AD might bring. The construction around patient 
expectations in this chapter is related to the reified patient pathway that the 
CQUIN and with it early diagnosis institute as demonstrated in the first 
section of this chapter. Early diagnosis as it shifted the temporal orderings 
of everyday classification practices, produced particular uncertainties in 
terms of resource allocation, care and treatment.  
 
Efforts to increase diagnosis rates and diagnose AD in its earliest stages 
have been criticised publicly by clinical professionals. In response to the 
lack of a screening initiative for AD, healthcare professionals have 
questioned whether the current rhetoric around early diagnosis and case 
finding, is in fact a screening method that lacks robust evidence (see 
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McCartney and Brunet, 2014). As a practising GP, Brunet (2014) also 
questions the effects that the increased governance of healthcare 
professionals may have on the GP-patient interaction. This process is further 
complicated again by the introduction of the National Dementia CQUIN. 
Tracing interview accounts and observation notes, clinicians and patients, 
practised ‘wilful resistance’ to early diagnosis and the kinds of temporal 
orderings this constituted (Michael, 2000: 32). At one level, there was the 
notion that ‘in the face of the fear of such a devastating condition [AD], and 
with such a possibility [early diagnosis], who could resist this hope; (Rose, 
2009: 78) and yet at the same time, the hopeful discourse around AD was 
contested. Prior to analysing the perspectives of clinicians, I am not 
suggesting that all healthcare professionals responsible for promoting early 
diagnosis necessarily endorsed its principles. As the following extract from 
Clinical Psychologist 1 highlighted, 
 
“The prevailing sort of narrative is still: if we can’t give them 
medicine then what’s the point. If we can’t cure it what’s the point. 
There is still a lot - still around - certainly I’ve sat in commissioning 
meetings with GP commissioners saying, ‘remind me again what’s 
the point of early diagnosis’?  So you know these are people who are 
in positions of responsibility, with a lot of experience of training, 
who are still very unsure about it all.”  
 
As Clinical Psychologist 1 explained, during commissioning meetings, early 
diagnosis was a point of contention. The uncertainty around early diagnosis 
lies with the fact that for commissioners, as there are no definitive treatment 
or cure options for the disease, this made the discussion of early diagnosis 
futile. This points more broadly to the uncertain relationship between 
diagnosis and prognosis suggested in this thesis. The interesting point to 
draw from this extract, is that even those who have the responsibility to 
make decisions regarding whether or not to privilege early diagnosis and to 
consider how best to anticipate future diagnostic decisions, were ‘unsure’ of 
what was best for who, and why. Drawing on Aronowitz (2009: 423) here, 
as the CQUIN overall, aims to detect AD in its earliest stages, this does not 
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necessarily mean that it ‘change[s] patients’ ultimate prognosis’ (pp. 423). 
This was an argument iterated by a number of clinicians across the memory 
service. However, early diagnosis was also approached ambivalently in 
terms of making decisions about who early diagnosis was best for and why. 
The following extract from an interview with Clinical Psychologist 3, 
illustrated moments of uncertainty and complexity addressed throughout 
this thesis, which directly impacted how clinicians approached early 
diagnosis. Despite the fact that there is no known cause or cure for AD, 
what Clinical Psychologist 3 suggested, is that promoting early diagnosis, 
managed clinicians’ anxieties about the lack of diagnostic certainty whilst a 
person is living. As Clinical Psychologist 3 illustrated, 
 
‘The current kind of situation where we haven’t, there isn’t an end 
point so, and so, I wanted to say - I mean sometimes people talk 
about kind of anti-task behaviour in order to contain the anxiety in 
clinicians and whether how much of this activity [early diagnosis] is 
more to do with kind of clinicians’ kind of helplessness that actually 
really and truly we only can find out certainly post-mortem. Also 
there is not a cure actually yes we can support people through their 
illness and through their journey but we can’t offer an awful lot in 
terms of certainty to people so in what way are we trying to contain 
our own kind of levels of anxiety within this by feeling that we’re 
doing something useful?’ 
 
Clinical Psychologist 3 raised a particularly important point here. As she 
highlighted, promoting early diagnosis through initiatives such as the 
CQUIN, enabled clinicians to manage their own anxieties about diagnosis 
overall. Beyond analysing the mechanisms of early diagnosis through the 
lens of risk, it was this uncertainty around a definitive diagnosis for AD that 
drove the promotion of early diagnosis because there is no cure. In this 
sense then a paradox emerged. A lack of certainty about the future of AD in 
terms of cure and definitive diagnosis drove clinicians to manage their own 
professional anxieties by promoting early diagnosis. However, in doing so, 
this had important implications for patients as early diagnosis was implicitly 
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involved in constructing patients’ expectations about a future with AD. 
Tracing interview and observation notes, the CQUIN produced particular 
uncertainties around patient futures as it shifted the point in time at which 
classification was practised. This therefore raised the debate about early or 
timely diagnosis as Consultant Psychiatrist 3 explained, 
 
‘So early diagnosis would be picking it up at the earliest possible 
stage; so somebody may not realise they’ve got a problem, the 
relative may not realise they’ve got much of a problem, but they 
might not be scoring as well as the rest of the population on testing. 
If you looked in more detail you may pick up that they’ve got an 
MCI, or a very early dementia, so that would be an early diagnosis 
would be picking up before the person has noticed a problem, or 
before any family member, or before it’s causing any problems. 
Timely would be if there’s been a problem identified by a family 
member, or by someone else, and they’re concerned enough. Timely 
would be that they had access to services, that they can get it quickly, 
so that when they go to the GP is not just their age or having to wait 
6 months for an assessment. Timely would be once they’ve 
identified a problem, they can get into services, get an assessment, 
get a diagnosis as smoothly and as quickly as possible. So timely 
would be when it’s caused a problem and they want to know a 
diagnosis but not trying to screen. Essentially screening is designed 
for asymptomatic people, and if they’re asymptomatic why are you 
screening for something that you can’t prevent, you can’t really treat? 
There’s screening for things that you can’t do anything about seems 
not just pointless, but harmful.’ 
 
According to Consultant Psychiatrist 3, the distinction between early and 
timely diagnosis had distinctive consequences when applying each approach 
in practice. The debate between early and timely diagnosis
26
 was a frequent 
topic of discussion during interviews particularly when discussing the 
                                                          
26 Notions of both early and timely diagnosis have been the focus of attention in recent clinical academic 
literatures investigating how clinicians (predominantly GPs) respond and practise timely diagnosis and early 
intervention initiatives (see Dhedi, Swinglehurst and Russell, 2014; Robinson, 2015). 
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CQUIN with clinicians. For Consultant Psychiatrist 3, early identification in 
the memory service was difficult to practise because of the complexity 
associated with the disease overall, which cannot be treated or prevented. 
Unlike Clinical Psychologist 3, Consultant Psychiatrist 3 resisted early 
diagnosis, referencing ‘timely diagnosis’ as an effective alternative. Timely 
diagnosis represents a more careful and considered approach to 
measurement of cognitive decline. It follows the process from diagnosis, 
treatment, to prognosis. The expectations that Consultant Psychiatrist 3 
shared here about early and timely diagnosis were built around the 
availability of treatment and cure, and the ways in which clinicians 
conceived the nature of diagnosis overall.  
Closing off futures? 
 
I focus attention from herein on the ‘harmful’ effects and affective 
consequences of early diagnosis for patients that I frame within a broader 
discussion around patient futures. Developing the debate between early and 
timely diagnosis, Trainee Psychiatrist 1 during interview, highlighted a 
number of important points for analysis,  
 
‘I also think there’s a real danger with early diagnosis of - there’s a 
difference between early diagnosis and timely diagnosis, a huge 
difference. So not everybody wants a diagnosis: I had a case recently, 
a still on-going case that I’m seeing next week, of a gentleman in his 
early 70’s used to be very, very high functioning, ran his own law 
firm and he came in; he had really good cognitive decline. I’ve given 
them a diagnosis of dementia and him and his wife are just 
devastated. You know absolutely devastated. He’s fit and healthy in 
every other way and yes that’s good for them to know about the you 
know and they did want a diagnosis, but after you given them that 
diagnosis in the clinic they then go home and then they sit and they 
think. They’re you know they’re literally devastated by it and you 
wonder you know in this case actually maybe with a kind of a couple 
of years of not knowing that he definitely had dementia, it might 
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have been good for them ‘cause he’s very frustrated now. He’s 
lashing out verbally at his wife ‘cause he’s so frustrated and worried 
about the future, and maybe that’s not always the best thing. But 
they want you know, this couple did want it and sometimes I think 
people think they want a diagnosis because we want to know what’s 
causing the memory loss and they want treatment ‘cause early 
treatment is really important you know 1/3 to 2/3’s of people do 
respond to the medicines that we have and to slow down the 
progression of forgetfulness, but not everybody wants that diagnosis.’  
 
For a number of clinicians, early diagnosis is useful for allowing patients to 
plan for their future and make decisions regarding future care, ‘early 
diagnosis is so important so that you can allow people to make decisions 
about their future themselves’ (Consultant Psychiatrist 2). In a number of 
instances this was echoed during observations of team meetings where 
clinicians would stress the importance of making decisions about their 
future whilst ‘they still had capacity’ (Observation MDT Nunmill Hospital). 
I reflected here on the extent to which clinicians actively wanted patients to 
be able to prepare for their future, whilst at the same time recognised that 
diagnosis may not necessarily be sought after by patients and family 
members. I develop this point further towards the final sections of the 
chapter. To what extent might early diagnosis therefore have the potential to 
close off futures in terms of anxiety and anticipation as to what the future 
with AD might bring? This extract from Trainee Psychiatrist 1 served to 
highlight these tensions. As she explained, classification and diagnosis 
should be handled with care given that the anticipation associated with 
diagnosis had important and at times adverse implications for patients and 
family members. In this case, for the patient ‘the future is what matters most’ 
(Adams et al., 2009: 248), ‘he’s so frustrated and worried about the future’. 
According to Trainee Psychiatrist 1, the patient was ‘very high functioning’ 
and was therefore subsequently affected by the interests of diagnosis, which 
served to compound a theme raised in Chapters Five and Six, regarding the 
construction of a successful ageing process.  
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Trainee Psychiatrist 1 also expressed feelings of ambivalence about early 
diagnosis; she recognised that there may be times where patients are unsure 
about ‘want[ing] a diagnosis’ (c.f. Mol, 2008). Furthermore, alongside the 
increased focus on diagnosis overall however, the autonomy of those 
reticent towards diagnosis had the potential to be constrained. Whilst 
Trainee Psychiatrist 1 intimated that the consequences of diagnostic 
classification might engender fear about the future, to what extent might this 
fear be driven by constructions of self, identity and the aged body 
specifically related to what Trainee Psychiatrist 1 conceived as a ‘very high 
functioning patient’? Trainee psychiatrist 1’s acknowledgment that ‘a few 
years not knowing’ might be useful, echoed an argument I made in Chapter 
Six. Clinicians were able to take their time with diagnosis, which was 
constrained by efforts to increase early diagnosis rates in an ageing 
population. This was a point that was similarly stressed during an interview 
with Consultant Psychiatrist 3 when describing the CQUIN overall, 
 
‘It’s [CQUIN] a case it seems of questionable value to me. Not just 
because of the demand for the service but because of the worry that 
it causes for patients and the lack of benefit.’ 
 
Consultant Psychiatrist 3 recognised that the patient is potentially affected 
by the interests of the CQUIN, ‘worry it causes for patients’: and 
anticipated the consequences of knowing. In doing so, clinicians were 
implicitly involved in constructing patients’ expectations around diagnosis, 
AD, and what the future might bring. This shifted how classification was 
approached in practice and the lives of patients in the present; eloquently 
described previously by Trainee Psychiatrist 1. Reifying the patient pathway 
through formal initiatives such as the CQUIN shifted the temporal orderings 
and constitutions of diagnosis in the present, which as I have suggested, had 
the potential to impact patient futures. The conditions, in which the future 
was constructed, produced uncertainties for both patients and clinicians in 
the organisation of healthcare facing current demands on both resources and 
time. This had important implications for resolving or dealing with the 
241 
 
complexities entangled in classifying in AD, and therefore making sense of 
AD overall.    
 
Translating early diagnosis through initiatives such as the CQUIN was 
subsequently approached ambivalently across the memory service. 
Clinicians encouraged early diagnosis since it enabled patients in the 
memory service to prepare for their future and raise awareness about AD, 
and yet they also recognised that shifting the temporality of classification 
produced particular uncertainties and anxieties for patients. This 
ambivalence was highlighted most fruitfully by Clinical Psychologist 1 
during interview,  
 
‘I mean for me in one way it’s [early diagnosis] great. I think - well 
there’s a couple of ways in which it’s great. One way which from a 
patient care point of view, is that if we know early what’s going on, 
people have a chance to make sense of their experiences to plan and 
change things accordingly. For the systems around that person to 
adapt, both family and societal statutory and voluntary and so on and 
so all of that’s good. And I think you know for me, it's the science of 
sort of cognitive assessment is fascinating. So I really enjoy it: 
reading and researching and seeing patients and working with them. 
So I, the downside of it all is that I think that’s something that people 
feel we can measure and value, and it’s something that doctors and 
psychologists can get involved with and label as an activity that 
they’re doing. They’re much the stuff about making the life of 
people with dementia worthwhile and improving their experience; it 
falls into the sort of much lower valued bracket of ‘care’, which as a 
society we undervalue. And so I think to a certain extent, there’s sort 
of a little bit of a conspiracy - not a sort of conscious one - but or a 
collision of motivations, that’s created this. So we can set a target for 
it; we can measure it; we can get doctors and nurses and 
psychologists to do it; we can say that it’s a difficult and complex 
thing that we can sell. So it’s, the Trust has an investment in them as 
a health economy within the health economy as a provider of 
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services to support that, and people’s jobs depend on it, and so on: 
it’s an industry... it’s much harder to describe, it’s much harder to 
price, it’s much harder to value…to do person-centered dementia 
care that actually improves people’s lives.’ 
 
More generally, early diagnosis, enables patients to prepare for a future with 
AD or ‘make sense’ of their diagnosis. However, the notion of early 
diagnosis also has a commitment to the overall healthcare economy. The 
culture of practising early diagnosis is therefore entangled in efforts to 
improve diagnosis rates through formal measurement targets, which 
contribute to this healthcare economy. As a result, the experiences of 
patients, and care practices or what Information Manager 2 described as the 
‘touchy feely’ aspect of initiatives promoting early diagnosis, are 
undervalued in these discussions, which could lead to a ‘collision of 
motivations’. This created a repertoire of uncertainty in clinical practice and 
arguably corresponds with Latimer’s (2000) claim, that the ‘purity’ of the 
clinic and clinical work does not necessarily value the role of ‘social work’ 
in medicine (pp. 122). The lack of value associated with such work is 
perpetuated by the increasing demands to rationalise, legitimise and 
measure clinical work through what she contends is a ‘narrow definition’ of 
‘evidence and efficacy’ (Latimer, 2000: 22). For clinicians they were 
concerned that early diagnosis enacts a promissory abstraction about the 
future, embedded in the wider institution of the healthcare economy as 
‘industry’.  
 
This excerpt further illustrates the claims I made at the beginning of the 
chapter, that with the expansion of AD to incorporate the earliest stages of 
the disease, this reflected the broader commitment in medicine to calculate 
risk. More generally, this has important implications for those areas of 
practice that are difficult to quantify and measure. Moreover, the extract 
corresponds with Aronowtz (2009) who iterates when discussing the 
converged experience of risk and disease, ‘it is, of course, difficult to 
measure consequences such as fear, disturbance to peace of mind, and the 
work of patienthood and to balance these effects against the health benefits 
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of new knowledge and practices…’ (Aronowitz, 2009: 439). Measuring fear 
and anxiety in the memory service was inherently difficult and yet as 
demonstrated, were the affects produced by the hopeful discourse around 
early diagnosis, as it constructed patients’ expectations around a future with 
AD. This fearful anticipation of AD was witnessed across the memory 
service.  
 
Observed across team meetings and interactions between patients and 
clinicians, clinicians recognised the fear associated with the label AD (see 
Beard and Neary, 2012) and the possibility of a future with AD. In 
observations of consultations, patients would thank the clinician for not 
laughing or apologising for how ‘stupid’ they thought they were. Patients 
often expressed anxiety with regards a diagnostic label in relation to how 
they conceived AD overall, as mapped in Chapters Five and Six. 
Subsequently, as policy initiatives such as the CQUIN actively promote 
diagnosis they become implicitly engaged in (re)constructing this fear and 
anxiety for patients as the following analysis will demonstrate. I observed a 
team meeting at Nunmill Hospital where I noted that clinicians recognised 
the fear associated with AD,  
 
‘A Memory Nurse presented the case of a patient who refused to 
attend an initial appointment for cognitive testing and also refused to 
attend a scan appointment. The consultant steering the meeting, 
explained that there ‘isn’t much that can be done as the patient has 
the capacity to make these decisions’. A memory nurse interrupted at 
this point and exclaimed that this was a regular occurrence 
suggesting there is still a lot of negativity around the meaning of 
memory loss and its associations with dementia, which as she 
explained, ‘a lot of patients are fearful of and reject the terms’. 
 
Managing this fear and anxiety and the rejection of a dementia label, was an 
important aspect of clinicians’ work as demonstrated in Chapter Five. 
However, as early diagnosis reifies the patient pathway and emphasises the 
importance of diagnosis, this produced further anxieties which clinicians 
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found difficult to navigate. Tensions arose around promoting early diagnosis 
and maintaining the individual at the centre of medical decision-making. 
Whilst the CQUIN and early diagnosis more generally, creates populations 
of individuals at increased risk of developing AD, the implications for 
clinical practice in terms of the diagnosis process are important to consider. 
This was confirmed during interview with Clinical Psychologist 2 
 
‘I wonder about the balance. What happens to all those people who 
have a diagnosis, and if there is such a value placed on them having 
a diagnosis, do we then lose the - do we then lose sight of the 
individual at the centre of it; what it means for them to have that 
diagnosis, how they want that to be?’ 
 
This quote from Clinical Psychologist 2 effectively illustrated the approach 
taken by all clinicians across the sites under investigation, that by 
privileging diagnosis, this had important implications for patient futures. 
What is interesting about this excerpt is that is relates to the points I made in 
Chapter Five. As shown, in order to manage uncertainty and the ways in 
which patients conceived the nature of the testing process overall, clinicians 
would approach and perform the tools with provisionality which meant that 
at times, clinicians would keep patients on for review as demonstrated in 
Chapter Six. However, what Clinical Psychologist 2 described here, is a 
shift from this provisionality for the protection of patient self and identity, 
towards a method of diagnosis, which may not take into consideration 
patients’ expectations around diagnosis. As Flaherty and Fine (2001) 
contend ‘looking forwards to goals or purposes of one kind or another, the 
self, constructs a line of action in the present by anticipating and thereby 
bringing into being, just those events which seem to call for an intended 
response’ (pp. 157). In this sense, the patient self ‘how they want to be’ is 
likely to have an impact on a future with AD in the present. Furthermore, 
for Clinical Psychologist 2 we must take care of diagnosis, it should be 
about ‘balance’ between navigating resources and privileging diagnosis. As 
she explained, the value associated with diagnosis and assessment may not 
map onto the ways in which patients conceive the nature of diagnosis. As a 
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result, for Clinical Psychologist 2, privileging diagnosis, at times fails 
overall, to locate the individual at the centre of its concerns. The sentiments 
of Clinical Psychologist 2 were illustrated across the memory service and 
confirmed by Clinical Psychologist 3 who argued that early diagnosis 
produced particular anxieties for patients about future care practices.  
 
‘It’s a really difficult balance to strike here isn’t it because early 
diagnosis absolutely is very important, and good media coverage; 
and the general population becoming much more aware of the 
symptoms of dementia; and of dementia as such in terms of kind of 
dementia friendly societies and communities it’s hugely important. I 
would definitely subscribe to that, but the other side, the flip side of 
that coin is that you can potentially create huge anxiety in the 
worried well or in what is not necessarily a process that needs to be 
pathologised. So I don’t know whether I’m clear of what I’m trying 
to say, because there’s a great danger with pathologising it because 
with pathology comes great anxiety. With pathology also comes a 
whole biomedical kind of culture and system of something that 
perhaps isn’t best addressed in a biomedical environment but more 
in a community kind of environment’ 
 
The hopeful discourse around diagnosing AD is that ‘earlier is almost 
always better’ (Lebowitz, 2004: 350) which is promoted through popular 
culture and media discourse. Paradoxically, as Beard (2012) argues 
however, ‘contemporary public perceptions and media portrayals of 
Alzheimer’s are almost exclusively pejorative’ (pp. 12). This has the 
potential to produce particular uncertainties around patient futures in the 
present or the ‘worried well’. In part, this is entangled with the fact that 
despite the uncertainties associated with diagnosing AD which are 
recognised in practice and policy, managing the disease remains within a 
biomedical framework. In terms of what Clinical Psychologist 3 described 
as ‘anxiety’ for patients, the overarching biomedical model for managing 
AD is therefore implicit in constructing patients’ expectations around a 
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future with AD as the following extract from an interview with Consultant 
Psychiatrist 1 clarified, 
 
‘It’s very difficult isn’t it because we don’t have a cure because 
there’s a limited number of things we can actually offer to people: 
are we just giving them more years of anxiety? And you know sort 
of this sort of ‘Sword of Damocles’ isn’t it hanging over you sort of. 
I think it is going back to the cancer analogy in some ways, it not the 
same as cancer because cancer’s got potentially curative treatments 
etc. I suppose the converse argument is though that we know that the 
state of treatments is poor within Alzheimer’s dementia or dementia 
generally; Alzheimer’s and Lewy body being the only ones that 
actually got any treatments. And it’s only I think by increasing our 
population, and our awareness, and a profile of it both locally and 
sort of nationally and globally, that potentially we’re going to have 
more interest from pharma and other companies and doing the 
research that will therefore hopefully leads to sort of population 
benefits in the long run. So yes it’s a double edged sword.’  
 
For Consultant Psychiatrist 1, classification is ‘difficult’ and this excerpt 
made it clear that to diagnose without a ‘cure’ requires handling with care 
because it has the ability to increase ‘anxiety’ in those diagnosed; rendering 
‘hope and fear’ (Adams et al., 2009: 248) key components in the driving of 
classification. As Consultant Psychiatrist 1 explained, diagnosis therefore 
represents the ‘Sword of Damocles’ embodiment of foreboding regards 
diagnosis; an affective state. The future of AD is uncertain in terms of cure 
and treatment, which created the space of ambivalence confirmed by 
Clinical Psychologists 1 and 3. It also had the potential to prolong the 
anxieties felt by patients as it shifted the point in time at which cognitive 
function was assessed. Whilst keeping patients on into the future was 
predominantly valued across the memory service as demonstrated in 
Chapter Six, clinicians also recognised that not all patients actively sought a 
diagnosis. I also witnessed the ‘double edged sword’ described by 
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Consultant Psychiatrist 1, during an observation of a team meeting at Ridge 
NHS Centre, 
 
“A memory nurse presented the case of a patient who they described 
as ‘cognitively deteriorating’ in terms of loss of memory and loss of 
physical functioning. The memory nurse explained that the patient 
and the patient’s family were keen to know whether they could 
discuss treatment options. The registrar steering the meeting 
interrupted at the points and suggested this would be like ‘clutching 
at straws’ and the memory nurse agreed since the cognitive 
screening test was ‘very low.’” 
 
Throughout this thesis, it has become clear that the complexities associated 
with diagnosing AD overall, were constituted both in the act of diagnosis 
and the lack of treatment and curative options post-diagnosis. Negotiating 
the complexity in the MDT, clinicians were therefore faced with the 
knowledge that for some cases, providing treatment would be like ‘clutching 
at straws’. Reflecting on my observation here, I am not suggesting that 
clinicians were making such decisions with ease, rather it was clear from 
observations and conversations with clinicians, that as described during a 
team meeting at Nunmill Hospital they felt ‘torn’: on the one hand seeking 
to diagnose patients, and at the same recognising the lack of options in 
terms of treatment and care. When patients were referred at earlier stages, 
this presented further challenges for both clinicians and patients particularly 
around the availability of treatment at earlier stages. However, whilst I have 
suggested thus far that clinicians and patients were affected by the 
temporalities of early diagnosis, there was also a collective agreement in the 
memory service, that clinicians did not want patients to reach a point where 
they could not exercise autonomy or agency. I observed a team meeting at 
Nunmill Hospital where these tensions were apparent,  
 
“The consultant psychiatrist presented the final case of the meeting. 
She explained that the patient has a lack of insight in relation to their 
dementia diagnosis and looking to colleagues for support here, she 
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contended this was problematic because it meant that ‘patients are 
waiting until a ‘crisis point’, ‘wanting to cross the bridge when they 
come to it instead of dealing with the situation straight away.’” 
 
This observation reflected what was broadly the case across the memory 
service, that despite the anxieties that the promotion of early diagnosis 
produced for individuals, clinicians were concerned that patients were 
unwilling to mobilise for the future and instead were waiting for a ‘crisis 
point’. Conflicting representations of temporality therefore emerged: 
according to the consultant in the team meeting, by waiting for a crisis 
point, the timeframe in which both patients and clinicians had to make 
clinical decisions was narrowed. At the same time, and as demonstrated 
throughout this chapter, clinicians recognised that promoting early diagnosis 
through efforts to calculate risk, had important implications for patients in 
the present. The CQUIN and promotion of early diagnosis more broadly, 
institute particular representations of temporality and of the future, which 
had important implications for clinical practice and around patients’ 
expectations regarding what a future with AD might bring; shifting the 
process of classification in the present. Subsequently, the temporal orderings 
of early diagnosis and its affective consequences correspond with Mead’s 
conceptualisation of the future, ‘there you have the future, the conclusion of 
the act, implied in what is now going on but which is not yet achieved, 
coming in to set up the conditions in terms of which stimuli shall arise’ 
(Mead, 1936: 156). 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have captured how efforts to increase diagnosis 
rates at earlier stages through initiatives such as the Dementia CQUIN, 
translated in everyday clinical practice. Despite not having the opportunity 
to follow the CQUIN through hospital practice, its effects have been 
observed in the intricacies of memory service practice, since it is explicitly 
involved in reifying the patient pathway across practices of care. I began the 
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chapter by exploring the extent to which the CQUIN, as a method of clinical 
governance for calculating risk, was approached by information managers 
and the lead clinician for the CQUIN. I recognised the opportunity I had to 
analyse the CQUIN in terms of the ways in which it might shift professional 
identities and autonomies in healthcare practice, as it created a focus on 
paperwork rather than practice. However, what is interesting about my own 
analysis from tracing interview accounts with information managers and the 
lead clinician, is that they were overtly aware that the CQUIN might simply 
be viewed and therefore practised as a simple paper based exercise. In doing 
so, they actively engaged with, and responded to this, by projecting the 
CQUIN beyond its role a performance measure, to its role in preparing and 
anticipating the future patient pathway for patients. Drawing on the 
analytical standpoint of the sociology of expectations, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that through the “‘real time’ activities” (Brown, Rappert and 
Webster, 2000: 4) of information managers and the lead clinician for the 
CQUIN, the CQUIN reifies the patient pathway in an attempt to manage the 
uncertainties associated with identifying AD in the hospital setting. Whilst 
information managers and the lead clinician for the CQUIN contended that 
the CQUIN sorts the complexities associated with the patient pathway, this 
was however, a point of contention across the hospital setting and memory 
service.  
 
Analysing the CQUIN in terms of the future and therefore as a particular 
temporal abstraction, troubled dominant constructions around risk and 
calculating futures, since the CQUIN had direct implications for 
representations of time in the present for patients and clinicians alike. 
Translating the CQUIN in practice, produced rather than managed 
uncertainties for both the organisation of healthcare and patients in the 
clinic. As the initiative was implicitly involved in shifting the 
representations of temporality in the present, this had important implications 
for the content of work in hospital, and the point at which cognitive decline 
was assessed and approached. It implicated the ways in which registrars and 
junior doctors approached and assessed cognitive function in the hospital 
setting, and directly impacted memory service practice in terms of 
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increasing referral rates. This point has been demonstrated in my study 
despite the fact that the CQUIN as a specific initiative for increasing 
referrals was relatively elusive in discussions in the memory service. 
Therefore attempting to reify the patient pathway, the CQUIN produced 
further uncertainties. What is interesting is that more generally, the initiative 
is pitched as a mobiliser of resources. However, within the current 
organisation of the healthcare service facing huge demands on both finances 
and time, this was difficult to practise. As the CQUIN prepares to mobilise 
resources by privileging diagnosis, this affected and reproduced the 
uncertainties it is expected to sort for both clinicians in terms of professional 
responsibilities, and patients in terms of a future with AD, since care as a 
viable alternative for managing AD overall, is missing. This had important 
implications for how diagnosis was approached, assessed and dealt with in 
the clinic, further impacted by the urgency to detect the disease at earlier 
stages.   
 
In the second section of the chapter, I explored how the CQUIN institutes a 
further dynamic and dimension of time in relation to early diagnosis. For a 
number of clinicians in the service, the CQUIN and commitment to early 
diagnosis overall, was implicitly involved in constructing the expectations 
around patient futures, which had important implications for how patients 
and clinicians responded to diagnosis. As I demonstrated in Chapters Five 
and Six, clinicians performed cognitive screening tools with provisonality. 
They practised mediation and manipulation work to navigate and manage 
the uncertainties associated with measures of cognitive decline. In Chapter 
Five, I demonstrated that this was much to do with navigating how patients 
conceived the nature of testing linked to discursive constructs around mental 
health and AD overall. In Chapter Six, I demonstrated how clinicians kept 
patients on into the future, driven in part by the expectations patients held 
about a future with AD. This provisionality had the potential to be 
constrained by the CQUIN and promotion of early diagnosis more broadly. 
Clinicians therefore, were continually navigating what they recognised as 
the uncertainties produced by this shifting temporality of classification, both 
on a local level in the clinic, and in relation to managing the ageing 
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population. Tensions arose however, as clinicians were also acutely aware 
of the importance of enabling patients to prepare for their future through 
early diagnosis: ambivalence was collectively observed across healthcare 
practice. There was also a collective concern amongst clinicians, that the 
material resources post-diagnosis, were failing to meet the needs of patients 
since AD overall, cannot be treated or cured. The shifting temporalities 
instituted by the CQUIN and early diagnosis more broadly, shifted current 
practice, which had important implications for patient futures, and the future 
of the reified patient pathway.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to capture the intricacies of power 
relations as performed within the everyday practices of the memory service, 
to make sense of the complexities associated with diagnosing AD. This 
included drawing attention to professional hierarchies and responsibilities, 
and the role of the MDT for negotiating the medical decision making 
process. Thus far, the networks of practice and clinicians in their different 
approaches, views, and perspectives across particular settings and points in 
time, interrelated and intersected for the purpose of making the tools and 
diagnosis work (c.f. Mol, 1998, 2002a). Yet, as I identified in the second 
section of this chapter, the wider political networks of power, which drive 
initiatives such as the CQUIN, produced particular uncertainties in everyday 
practice, for both patients and clinicians. One dimension of this, was 
confirming the uncertain relationship between diagnosis and prognosis, and 
the second dimension involved the ways in which clinicians struggled 
against feelings of ambivalence about early diagnosis. Developing the 
claims of Michael (2000), and the idea that with futures are entangled both 
positive and negative futures, the concerns raised by clinicians in terms of 
patient anxieties, were often invisible or tangential within the overall, 
promotion of early diagnosis. Yet, as I demonstrated, everyday practice was 
constrained by the introduction of the CQUIN and early diagnosis more 
broadly. This reflected the broader distributions of political power through 
which cognitive screening tools and AD were being managed and governed 
overall, which had important implications for the futures of AD realised in 
the present. Combined with constraint to clinical autonomy, clinicians in the 
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memory service and hospital setting were facing the very challenges that 
they set out to negotiate in everyday clinical practice. The points of analysis 
I made in this chapter however, have been made for the purpose of further 
discussion, rather than conclusive arguments, since I had limited 
observation data to follow the CQUIN through healthcare practice.  
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion 
 
In the preceding chapters, I explored the constitutive role of instruments for 
screening cognitive function, as they were used to navigate and manage the 
uncertainties associated with Alzheimer’s disease (AD), a disease, which is 
difficult to categorise and therefore diagnose. As Chapter Two illustrated, 
categorising AD is a complex process reflected in the attempts within 
medical and scientific arenas, to determine the boundaries, cause of, and 
cure for the disease. Concurrently, Science and Technology Studies (STS), 
medical sociology, philosophy and anthropology literatures, have shown 
how these processes are informed by, and express AD’s socially, culturally, 
and historically constructed categorisation from its inception in 1906. In 
Chapter Two, I highlighted how AD could be framed within, and intersected 
across, key debates around diagnosis as a social process (see Blaxter, 1978; 
Rosenberg, 2002, 2003; Jutel, 2009); disease categorisation and 
classification (see Gubrium, 1986; Bowker and Star, 2000; Gaines and 
Whitehouse, 2006; Rosenberg, 2006); the construction of normalcy and 
pathology (see Gubrium, 1986; Aronowitz, 2001; Whitehouse, 2004; 
Whitehouse and Moody, 2006; Mendelzweig, 2009; Moreira, May and 
Bond, 2009); and wider debates around medicalisation and 
biomedicalisation (see Estes and Binney, 1989; Conrad, 1992; Armstrong, 
1995; Clarke et al., 2003; Kaufman et al., 2004; Conrad, 2005). Despite AD 
being central to a number of these wider sociological and STS debates, the 
ways in which an AD classification is accomplished in the clinic through the 
use of available technologies, is an under researched area in previous 
literatures. Cognitive screening tools are low-technological and yet 
pervasive devices in healthcare, since their introduction in the 1960’s. Their 
sociological significance until now however, has been relatively overlooked, 
particularly when compared to the innovative technologies, which dominate 
interest in STS. As I have demonstrated in this thesis, the operation of, and 
interaction with these tools in practice, as a whole is important for 
understanding how uncertainty is negotiated, and therefore knowledge about 
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AD produced, in a complex division of labour in healthcare. Complexity 
arises both in terms of the difficulties associated with classifying AD, and of 
the challenges posed by the ageing population. These tools, which inform 
initial consultations, therefore perform central roles in mediating and 
helping to define and manage cognitive decline. As a result, I analysed the 
role of the tools in the clinic, and their adoption in the National Dementia 
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation Framework (CQUIN). A policy 
framework, which aims to control and thereby increase referral and 
diagnosis rates for AD, in order to manage the proliferation of individuals 
anticipated to develop the disease.  
 
Observing initial consultations and therefore drawing on ‘thick descriptions’ 
(Geertz, 1973) of clinician-patient interactions, I began my analysis in 
Chapter Five by investigating the ways in which clinicians navigated and 
managed three core areas of uncertainty. First, in relation to the difficulty 
associated with diagnosing AD overall, second, in relation to the 
ambiguities associated with the tools and third, in relation to the ways in 
which patients conceived the nature of diagnosis overall. I described how 
clinicians handled these uncertainties within the situated and socio-material 
culture of the clinic, through mediation and manipulation practices. The role 
of the tools and their constituent values were negotiated and enacted across 
the memory service, as all professionals across the clinical hierarchy were 
engaged with approaching and thereby performing the tools as provisional 
devices. I referred to this as the ‘making of provisionality’, stressing that 
this does not denote a normative downgrading of the tools in the clinician-
patient interaction. Rather, their provisionality, was made across the service, 
and was important for rendering the tools manoeuvrable and mobile across 
particular settings. Broadly speaking, as they shifted across different settings 
from patients’ homes to the MDT, they served to sustain the power relations 
within the memory service, whilst at the same time crafting a unique space 
for the role of memory nurses. Given the increased delegation of tasks to 
memory nurses including initial consultations, memory nurses attached 
social and cultural significance to the classification process in practice. 
However, as their work was transported into the multi-disciplinary team 
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(MDT) meetings, their work was transformed and reclaimed by 
professionals occupying positions higher up the professional hierarchy, 
confirming that the tools produced and reproduced professional hierarchies. 
I therefore concurred with Berg (1996) that the tools mediated professional 
hierarchies for the organisation of healthcare. Developing Berg’s (1996) 
work however, I suggested that rather than the clinician-patient interaction 
and the MDT encouraging different representations of the tools, in fact the 
tools were (re)constituted in these spaces.  
 
In addition, I also captured the ways in which clinicians balanced the 
informal or ad hoc practices engineered into the tools, and the quantified 
outcome on the tests. In doing so, particular dynamics of provisionality were 
witnessed across the hierarchy of the memory service. Extending Berg’s 
(1992) claims that routines are important for managing the potential ‘chaos’ 
of ad hoc practice, I showed how these routines were continually shifting 
and open for negotiation. As a result, the quantified outcome was both 
reconstructed to fit the clinical work to account for individual particularities 
and situational exigencies in and beyond the confines of the clinic, and yet 
at the same time, valued as a ‘black boxed’ device (see Latour, 1987). 
Herein, the portability of the tools rather than routines of practice became 
crucial for proceeding with classification. It was the portability of the 
numerical outcome across a complex distribution of medicine that was 
significant in the memory service. Within the performative architecture of 
the clinician-patient interaction, the tools were, in Berg’s (1996: 501) terms, 
brought to ‘life’. Yet simultaneously, the formal quantifiable outcome was 
necessary for bridging the complexities of the distribution of medicine, and 
for enacting the tools as central mediators for proceeding with classification. 
A moment of co-production therefore occurred, whereby the formal 
quantified outcome and the informal practices of the clinic, aligned for 
proceeding with classification since the formal does not ‘stand ‘powerless’ 
in the face of the contingent and interactionally achieved nature of the social’ 
(Berg, 1996: 515). For AD in particular, it was the portability of this formal 
work performed in the hierarchy of the memory service, which enabled the 
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classification process to proceed and for clinicians to make sense of 
complexity. 
 
In Chapter Six, I illustrated how cognitive screening tools were used to 
constitute the boundaries of classification across the memory service as 
clinicians mobilised and valued – rather than closed down - the uncertainties 
associated with diagnosing AD. Clinicians exploited the borderline score on 
a cognitive screening tool, as a way of keeping patients on for review, as the 
enactment of risk played out in the clinic. Creating a space for deferral and 
utilising uncertainty (to develop the work of Latimer (2013)) was fuelled by 
the possibility that patients may go on to develop AD. The clinic was an 
important space for producing knowledge about uncertainty. Rather than 
disposing of uncertainty, it was actively valued by clinicians, which in part 
led to this space for deferral. In the face of hopelessness about diagnosis and 
treatment options, and fuelled by the production of a borderline score, this 
space enabled clinicians to keep patients on for review. I continued analysis 
of the portability of this borderline score as a means through which the 
boundaries of professional groups could be bridged, as neuropsychology 
was called on to sort the uncertainty embedded in a borderline score. This 
space for deferral was therefore articulated as a privileged space for 
neuropsychology, and moving beyond the numerical borderlines, became 
both a technological and organisational endeavour. The expectation held by 
psychiatrists was that psychologists have a well developed and sophisticated, 
technological ‘tool box’ to draw on, and expertise and experience, to 
adjudicate on the significance of a borderline score. This expectation was 
projected on to this group of actors by psychiatrists but also emerged in 
MDT meetings. Psychologists were able to legitimately call all actors into 
account (Latimer, 2004) for the negotiation of the borderline.  
 
In addition, a borderline score was also mobilised when making decisions 
about employing the label Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI).  However, 
this extended beyond attempts to formalise or calculate risk. Here, key 
themes within the literatures on medicalisation and biomedicalisation 
(Armstrong, 1995, Conrad, 2005) were helpful to support my argument that 
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the problematisation of ageing itself, was implicitly involved in the 
construction of discursive accounts of ageing and AD. This affected the 
extent to which both clinicians and patients approached the term MCI and 
the constitution of the boundaries of the disease across the organisation of 
healthcare. Across this chapter, I suggested that whilst the space of deferral 
was constituted primarily on the risks associated with developing AD on 
presentation of a borderline score, it was also built on the expectations that 
clinicians held about the field of psychiatry. In essence, a further moment of 
co-production occurred for negotiating complexity in the clinic: entangled 
with risk were the expectations around the field of psychology, which 
aligned for proceeding with classification and moving beyond the 
borderlines. The moment of diagnosis witnessed in this chapter however, 
also highlighted the agency of the patient, the art of discretion in the clinic, 
and the ways in which clinicians approached diagnosis with care in light of 
individual particularities, and with respect to keeping patients on in the 
service.  
 
 
I extended the theme of risk and expectation in Chapter Seven by focussing 
on the ways in which clinical governance initiatives such as the National 
Dementia CQUIN, translate into everyday clinical practice. Employing the 
term translation, I captured the interactions, negotiations, interpretations and 
points of contention, at which the principles of the CQUIN were negotiated 
and handled in practice. In the UK, the increasing ageing population drives 
initiatives such as the CQUIN, for monitoring and increasing referral and 
early diagnosis rates for AD, and dementia more broadly. I showed how this 
initiative could be used to highlight shifting professional boundaries, 
identities, hierarchies and autonomies; a theme developed in much of the 
medical sociology and organisation studies literatures. I developed my 
analysis however, by demonstrating that the CQUIN enacts a particular 
representation of a future with AD as it reifies the patient pathway, which 
produced as opposed to resolved the uncertainties it is expected to manage. 
The CQUIN thus affected and shifted the temporalities of the content of 
work in the hospital setting, and the classification process to earlier stages, 
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and therefore the point in time at which cognitive decline was assessed, 
approached and therefore managed. This had important implications for 
both the organisation of healthcare and for patients’ expectations around a 
future with AD. The CQUIN implicitly constructed patients’ expectations 
around a future with AD as it reified the patient ‘pathway’. 
 
More broadly, my thesis contributes to the analysis of the practice of 
medical technologies, and the multiple constitutions of AD across socio-
technical arenas (Berg, 1996; Mol, 1998; 2002a) where key aspects of 
medicine including uncertainty, risk, medicalisation and biomedicalisation 
are to be found. It also extends this literature in three ways. Firstly, it draws 
attention to the role of mundane technologies used to detect the initial stages 
of cognitive decline through which diagnostic decisions are negotiated. The 
role of low-technological, mundane technologies in this process is an under 
researched area of previous literatures, particularly those exploring the 
social framing of the disease category, and the consequences of 
medicalisation and biomedicalisation. Yet, these mundane tools play a 
central role in detecting cognitive decline in the ageing population. The role 
of the mundane in terms of analysing medical technologies in healthcare is 
also a dynamic under researched in STS literatures, which tend to focus 
attention on innovative, disruptive diagnostic technologies for example, 
MRI scanning (see Joyce, 2008) within socio-technical environments for 
producing knowledge about disease. The power of the mundane is revealed 
across this thesis.  
 
Secondly, this thesis demonstrated both the everyday and routine role of the 
tools in the intricacies and networks of the clinic, and yet it also 
demonstrated how their adoption on a macro scale implicated the locality of 
the clinic: the power of the political within the arena of classifying AD was 
addressed. Thirdly, it confirmed that the relationship between medical 
technologies, diagnosis and prognosis is a process of continual and 
embedded routine and repetition across healthcare. However, in the locality 
of the clinic, as complexities emerged which were unanticipated and 
disruptive, and because of the complex distribution of medical practice, 
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these routines were continually shifting. Furthermore, on a macro level in an 
ageing population, where organisations are faced with handling an 
increasing number of individuals with AD, reifying the patient pathway 
through the CQUIN more generally, does not necessarily lead to closure for 
a disease that is difficult to cure and treat. 
 
The overall aim of this thesis was to investigate how uncertainty and 
complexity were managed for making sense of classification and producing 
knowledge about AD. The conceptual framework underpinning this thesis 
has been developed as a way of understanding how to manage and resolve 
uncertainty. Therefore, embedded within these three broad developments is 
a key concept established from my findings, which extends what is known 
about age, diagnosis and medical practice generally, and with reference to 
AD more specifically. Across my thesis, I developed the conceptual 
framework of portability through which I mapped and demonstrated the 
spatiality and temporalities of classifying AD across professional 
hierarchies: portability became necessary for making sense of complexity. I 
use the term ‘portability’ in this chapter, to illustrate how the multiplicity of 
AD hangs together, and for demonstrating how complexity was resolved. 
However, I also highlight that the multiple enactments of AD built around 
this portability concept, did not always cleave at neat points, which was 
impacted in part by the wider structures of political power, shifting current 
practice. These included initiatives such as the National Dementia CQUIN, 
which aims to increase referral and diagnosis rates in order to manage the 
ageing population.  
 
Through the conceptual framework of portability, I captured how cognitive 
decline was constituted across socio-technical and political arenas, and 
socio-material practices. As I clarified, the concept of portability was not 
unbounded and atemporal, but was, temporal, spatial, hierarchical and at 
times chaotic. The ontologies of AD were therefore constituted in spaces, 
which were temporal and bounded, which had important implications for 
managing diagnosis in terms of the ageing population. The emergence of 
portability, I initially attributed to the ways in which the technologies were 
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articulated in the interactive processes, and space of the clinic. The concept 
of portability was born out of the myriad of ways in which clinicians were 
able to approach and perform the tools as provisional devices in the 
interpretive repertoire of the clinic. The values of the technologies were 
constituted which reflects the arguments made by Dussauge, Helgesson, Lee 
and Woolgar (2015) that technologies do not hold intrinsic value but are 
made in practice: seen in this thesis in the clinic through the lens of 
provisionality.  
 
The mediation and manipulation practices witnessed in the clinic could also 
broadly represent what Mol, Moser and Pols (2010) describe as ‘care work’, 
performed in order to navigate and manage uncertainty (pp. 15). Clinicians 
across the memory service adapted their narration of the tests and the 
technologies in situ (for example, changing the questions on the tests), in 
order to cope with the uncertainties produced by measures of cognitive 
decline. This was shown to include the discursive constructs around ageing, 
AD and mental health more broadly, the difficulty for clinicians to 
determine a definitive diagnosis, and the ambiguities associated with the 
technologies overall. With reference to the discursive constructs around age, 
AD and mental health, the technologies were also implicitly involved in 
protecting patient identity through the actions of clinicians. Patient identity 
was constructed within the initial consultation, where the presentation and 
performance of self, shifted how the clinicians used and approached the 
tools. As a result, this thesis has contributed to understandings regarding 
patient selves and identities constructed and potentially disrupted by the 
testing process and diagnosis process overall. As I captured in the clinic, 
patient identities were constituted around negative discursive constructs 
around AD, ageing and mental health, that remain in existence in the 
general population. The work of Goffman (1969) was useful for framing 
this aspect of my analysis and the mediation and manipulation practices 
witnessed, in recognition of these discursive constructs for re(constructing) 
patient identity. 
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Portability was also an important concept for considering how matters were 
resolved when the informal or ad hoc practices through which the tools 
operated were valued in practice. Despite agreeing with Berg (1992: 169) 
that locally situated routines are important for ordering ‘chaos’, I developed 
his argument by suggesting that the routines for classifying AD were 
perpetually shifting and actively reflected on by clinicians, within and 
beyond the confines of the clinic because of the continually emerging 
moments of complexity. Therefore at the same time that routines were 
important (i.e. reconstructing the data to fit the clinical work) for negotiating 
complexity in situ, it was the portability of the quantified outcome of the 
tools rather than routine, that brought social order to these informal 
practices in the memory service. In turn, the complexities constitutive of the 
clinic were transformed into manageable problems for both patient and 
clinician through the articulation of the technologies in the clinic (Berg, 
1996). This therefore accomplished the provisionality of the tools in the 
clinician-patient interaction. The tools were given meaning through the 
actions of clinicians; (re)constituted and entangled in the social and clinical 
work of the clinic. Overall, the interpretive repertoire of the clinic enabled 
clinicians to approach and thereby perform these tools as provisional 
devices in response to the uncertainty in which AD is entangled more 
broadly.  
 
The enactment of provisionality however, was multiple and textured; 
layered through points in time and across different settings and actors. At 
the same time that it was ‘made’ through the navigation of uncertainty 
produced in the clinic, it was also seen through the lens of the dominance of 
the clinic (not necessarily a point unique to the study of AD) (c.f. Latimer, 
2013). Across medicine, clinical judgement remained an important method 
for navigating uncertainty as it was practised in response to a level of 
uncertainty that the technologies had failed to achieve (Atkinson, 1984). 
Practising clinical judgement across the memory service was therefore 
integral to the performance of the technologies. I argued that clinical 
judgement added a further dimension to the making of the tools as 
provisional devices, afforded the responsibility of those actors occupying 
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positions higher up the professional hierarchy including consultants (c.f. 
Latimer, 2013). Therefore, I demonstrated the dynamics of provisionality 
and the dominance of the clinic: memory nurses practised provisonality 
through mediation and manipulation practices, and consultants approached 
provisionality by privileging clinical judgement given their expertise and 
experience. Developing this point further however, it was the performative 
architecture of the clinic that encouraged a further dynamic for the making 
of provisionality, and where the first practical moment of portability was 
witnessed. The interesting point here is that the making of the tools as 
provisional devices shifted across the professional hierarchy: consultants 
exercised clinical judgement in the clinic (Bosk, 1979), and memory nurses 
often attached significance to what was culturally and socially significant 
(Latimer, 2000; Latimer, 2004). The collective line of agreement however, 
across the memory service was that these technologies required this level of 
mediation, to navigate and resolve the complexities unique to AD. 
Clinicians recognised the situated occasions and individual particularities 
for classifying AD, and the dynamics of this mediation work were 
observable across the professional hierarchy. 
 
There is much to be said for the space of the clinic and within it clinical 
judgement for constructing the medical-decision making process (Berg, 
1996; Latimer, 2013). Yet, in the process of diagnosing AD, the space of the 
clinic was at times a barrier to both the performance of the technologies, and 
therefore the management of uncertainty. The discourse of the clinic made 
the practising of the tools difficult, and the mediation and manipulation 
practices complex. The space, context and conditions of the clinic, impacted 
the articulation of the technologies for dealing with uncertainty. The clinic 
was imbued with negativity around what it means to be diagnosed, 
described by a number of professionals as ‘white coat syndrome’. The role 
performance of the clinic in this sense, affected how cognitive decline was 
assessed further affecting patient identity. Agreeing with Latimer (2004) 
that clinicians (particularly memory nurses) attached significance to what 
was socially and culturally significant, I introduced patients’ homes as a 
unique space for navigating uncertainty. As the tools were transported into 
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this space, clinicians (the majority of whom were memory nurses) were able 
to exercise further provisionality. Within this space, knowledge was 
distributed across both the tools and the materials in patients’ homes. 
Moreover, as only the memory nurse and the patient occupied this space, the 
work of memory nurses could not be immediately called into account or 
transformed by those higher up the professional hierarchy (c.f. Latimer, 
2004). This is not to suggest however, that the tools did not simultaneously 
produce and reproduce professional hierarchies. Within MDT occasions, the 
significance of the work of memory nurses was then transformed by 
consultants in order to proceed with classification. The tacit knowledge 
systems and the practising of clinical judgement worked alongside what was 
culturally and socially significant in the classification process and the 
mediated performance of cognitive screening tools. At this point, I reiterate 
that despite the making of the tools as provisional devices, I am not 
suggesting that this equated to the downgrading of the technologies. This is 
a normative assumption and suggests that these tools hold intrinsic value, 
which users fail to recognise. Rather, we need to see the value of these tools 
not in terms of their putative design and purpose, but how their role as 
articulated and made in the clinic renders them important tools in the 
classification process. This is further suggestive of the co-production 
between formal and informal practices observed in the clinic. 
 
Throughout my thesis, I have demonstrated the ways in which clinicians 
were continually finding value in uncertainty, which was highlighted most 
significantly when there was discrepancy over the boundaries of disease. In 
order to deal with complexity, the technologies played an important role in 
the interpretive repertoire of the clinic. Diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease 
however, particularly in terms of determining ‘tidy boundaries’ (Cox and 
Webster 2012: 400) for the disease is complex, which rests partly on the 
performance of cognitive screening tools. Subsequently, it is fruitful 
therefore to elucidate the ways in which clinicians approached the risks 
enacted by a borderline score on a cognitive screening tool. Risk was dealt 
with in two significant ways in the memory service. First, risk was 
mobilised by clinicians for keeping patients on for deferral, and second, 
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through the expansion of the disease to incorporate the label MCI. MCI was 
however, a point of contention across the memory service. Overall, I 
developed Latimer’s (2013) arguments, that uncertainty was utilised and 
mobilised within this space of deferral. However, entangled with risk for 
constituting the boundaries of classification were the expectations around 
the field of psychology in terms of the technologies used, and specialist 
expertise and experience. At the same time that a borderline score mobilised 
uncertainty it also became portable across professions. As a result, both the 
expectations around the expertise and experience of psychologists along 
with the technologies in this field played an enhanced role in constituting 
the boundaries of disease. Constituting the boundaries of AD reflected the 
complex distribution of labour across the service, and the ambiguities 
associated with cognitive screening tools. My analysis also demonstrated 
the co-production of the boundaries of AD built around risk, expectation, 
and the division of labour in the memory service. Here I concurred with 
Lock (2013) and argued that uncertainty dominates understandings of, and 
approaches towards, MCI in particular. Yet I also demonstrated that 
clinicians were continually crafting meaning out of uncertainty; keeping 
patients on in the service in order to make sense of diagnosis in everyday 
practice. I showed how this uncertainty and lack of clarity had important 
implications for professional practice; uncertainty mobilised work in the 
service and had value in itself. 
 
Mobilising and subsequently valuing uncertainty for the space of deferral 
required psychiatrists in particular, to demonstrate willingness to adapt to 
new and emergent hierarchical structures. It became the role of 
psychologists to reclaim the work of psychiatrists, and make decisions about 
moving beyond the borderlines. In my study of the memory service, 
psychiatrists projected their expectations about the expertise and 
technological skill set of psychologists onto this field, and psychologists 
performed this privileged position in the MDT legitimately calling all actors 
into account (Latimer, 2004) in order to make decisions about constituting 
the boundaries of classification. Overall, this demonstrated that on these 
occasions medical technologies had the ability to produce and reproduce the 
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intricacies of hierarchical work in healthcare. A key aim of this thesis 
overall, was to elucidate the initial processes of classification and the role of 
technologies for navigating the complexities entangled in this process. 
There were only a couple of occasions where clinicians performed 
diagnostic decisions during initial consultations. The diagnostic 
appointment that I did observe, the patient played an important role when 
clinicians were faced with making decisions about keeping patients on for 
review or making a diagnosis. What I emphasise here is that the borderlines 
of classification were not solely enacted by the technologies; clinicians 
accounted for individual particularities in situ which again reflected the co-
production of the tools in practice.  
 
Despite the portability of the tools across professional boundaries, this space 
of deferral however, was not unequivocally constituted across the memory 
service particularly when making decisions about the label MCI – the space 
remained ambiguous. I argued that the label MCI enacts the ‘language of 
risk’ (Webster, 2002: 447) and yet at the same time, was a point of 
contention across the memory service. It is tempting to make conclusive 
arguments that the label MCI and the expansion of AD overall, is a 
consequence of medicalisation and biomedicalisation processes infiltrating 
the practices of the clinic. At one level, I concurred that the label MCI 
constituted the effects of biomedicalisation, and argued that it demonstrated 
increased efforts to detect or problematise cognitive function. I also 
highlighted that the problematisation of ageing led to discrepancy across the 
memory service about the development of MCI to AD. I extended this 
framing however, by exploring the consequences of the ‘problematisation of 
normality’ (Armstrong, 1995: 482) contending that clinicians were not 
simply passive respondents to medicalisation. They actively recognised the 
consequences of efforts to problematise normality since as I have shown 
across this thesis, negative discursive constructs particularly around the 
successes or merits of ageing, impacted how patients conceived the 
classification process. As I demonstrated in Chapter Seven, this 
problematisation produced uncertainties and anxieties around a future with 
AD.  
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At times, the label MCI was employed to enable clinicians to label 
pathology without having to employ the label AD. The extent to which this 
affected the meaning of AD and the ways, in which patients conceived the 
label AD, was a point for further discussion. Perhaps the expansion of AD 
to incorporate MCI or those high functioning patients with MCI, had the 
potential to construct what Aronwitz (2009: 436) describes as ‘impossible 
expectations’ around AD since some individuals will simply be unable to 
perform these expectations as high functioning individuals and therefore 
‘live well’ with AD. AD is therefore entangled in negative discursive 
constructs around the expectations of what it means to age, and a future with 
an AD diagnosis. This drove a number of clinicians to label patients with 
MCI, which as a result problematised ageing. Subsequently, there were 
moments across the memory service where clinicians were implicitly 
involved in constructing patients’ expectations around what it meant to age 
as either a success or failure (Gilleard and Higgs, 2013). The expansion of 
AD thus shifted not only the meaning of AD but also the meaning of ageing. 
Resolving the boundaries of classification and moving beyond the 
borderlines was therefore a social, technical and cultural process, which 
reflected the extent to which age and ageing overall, are dynamic, discursive 
processes. Constituting the boundaries of AD also highlighted the 
contradictions present around age and ageing, for employing the label MCI. 
The status and therefore meaning of MCI was a matter of contention across 
the service, and a number of factors were attributed to its resolve. I 
concurred with Peters and Katz (2015) that the anxieties around the ageing 
process are entangled with the ways in which ageing is constructed as a 
success or failure of which memory loss is a significant factor. This was 
particularly the case when discussing early diagnosis with clinicians and the 
emergence and popularity of MCI. Yet, I also showed that MCI was 
performed ambivalently by clinicians. At the same time that clinicians 
expressed their concern that the label would produce further uncertainties 
and anxieties for patients, it also enabled clinicians to keep patients on in the 
service; mobilising uncertainty within a complex distribution of medical 
practice. 
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What my analysis pointed to more broadly was a further moment of co-
production of cognitive decline; constituted through efforts to manage and 
make sense of risk, and also account for patients’ expectations around age, 
ageing and AD as marked successes or failures (Gilleard and Higgs, 2010, 
2013; Higgs and Gilleard, 2014).  
 
Within my analysis overall, and the moments of provisionality and 
portability witnessed thus far, were particular dimensions of time important 
for accomplishing cognitive decline, and making sense of classification. The 
distribution of knowledge across space was therefore temporal and the 
different temporal orderings for classifying AD was an important point to 
highlight, which I will discuss in the remainder of the chapter. It is well 
established particularly in the field of STS that classification is a temporal 
process (Bowker and Star, 2000). Although Mol (2002a) speaks of reality as 
moving too fast to be explained by the orders of institutions and societies, 
this effaces the realities of classification which are made and unmade in 
particular conditions and through actions in practice - at what point and who 
decides whether things speed up, slow down and shift in time? The multiple 
moments of temporality, which interrelated and intertwined across the 
classification process, in this thesis did not always meet or cleave at neat 
points, producing further uncertainties around the classification process. 
This had important implications for patients and for the practicalities of 
healthcare more broadly. I therefore addressed the concept of time at 
different points throughout this thesis for negotiating how classification was 
resolved.  
 
Throughout my thesis, the different kinds of temporal orderings through 
which complexity was resolved and navigated have been an important 
theme. I have drawn on literatures including Mead (1936) and Adams et al., 
(2009), to demonstrate the shifting dimensions of time and its effects on 
clinical practice in the present: from clinicians exercising their agency in 
taking their time with patients particularly in the home environment, to the 
time at which clinicians deferred patients to neuropsychology, to clinicians 
keeping patients on into the future. Concurrently, MCI also represented a 
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further dynamic of temporality: the expansion of the disease pushed the 
boundaries of AD to detect the condition at earlier stages. Time was 
therefore a key driver of how the classification process was accomplished. 
Yet, this localised temporality was bound by a different delocalised 
temporality, as I argued in my analysis of the National Dementia CQUIN. 
As initiatives for increasing diagnosis rates were implemented in practice, 
they necessarily worked to speed up the time it took for diagnostic 
assessment, and the point in time at which cognitive decline was assessed 
and therefore problematised. 
 
To address the issue of time, I drew extensively on the sociology of 
expectations literature particularly in Chapter Seven (see Brown, Rappert 
and Webster, 2000; Michael, 2000; Brown and Michael, 2003; Borup et al., 
2006; Selin, 2006). I explored how initiatives which govern the use of 
cognitive screening tools for managing increasing diagnosis rates, created 
particular temporal orderings and anticipations around the future, which in 
turn had important implications for everyday clinical practice. The 
sociology of expectations literature was of use here inasmuch as this 
particular analytical perspective could help us explore the role of everyday, 
mundane technologies overlooked in this body of literature. Therefore, I 
troubled the dominant construction of this literature, which illustrated the 
innovation of technoscience by analysing the ‘real time activities’ (Brown, 
Rappert and Webster, 2000: 4) of the mundane performed in the present, for 
the realisation of particular futures. In doing so, I therefore tracked moments 
of tension produced by the CQUIN. I investigated the CQUIN as a device, 
which shifted the temporalities and spatialities of classification inherent to 
resolving or dealing with complexity.  
 
It would be tempting to have grounded my discussion of the CQUIN, within 
debates around risk, calculation of risk, and clinical governance, and the 
effects of this on professional roles, responsibilities and autonomies (see 
Rose, 1998; Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005). However, more importantly 
for negotiating complexity and constituting AD, the CQUIN and its 
commitment to early diagnosis, shifted the content of work in everyday 
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practice, and the current temporal orderings of classification. This was 
demonstrated in a number of ways including the time at which clinicians 
approached patients, the ways in which the immediacy of problems were 
addressed in Acute Medical Units (AMU), and the ways in which clinicians 
in the memory service, approached cognitive decline as the CQUIN moved 
across transitions of care. The CQUIN as a tool for reifying the linearity of 
the patient pathway was implicitly involved in shifting the temporalities of 
classification in the present, and in constructing patients’ and clinicians’ 
expectations around a future with AD. This was a particularly important 
point given that in order to protect patient identity through mediation and 
manipulation practices, clinicians were also involved in preserving how 
patients conceived their future selves built around particular discursive 
representations of what a future with AD might bring. As a result, efforts to 
detect AD in its earliest stages shifted and produced further anxieties for 
patients in particular. 
 
At this point, I reiterate that the version of cognitive decline or AD that was 
enacted in the hospital setting did not easily translate with the cognitive 
decline that was articulated in the everyday practices of the memory service. 
Addressing what I considered was the issue of power at play here, the 
structure of healthcare, and with it wider networks of political power, were 
manifest as they produced two distinctive yet interrelated sets of concerns. 
First, it produced particular discursive constructs around age, ageing and 
AD, which manifested in the clinic; the CQUIN had the ability to construct 
patients’ expectations around what a future with a diagnosis might bring. 
This produced uncertainties and anxieties in terms of living with a diagnosis 
of AD, and on a practical level in terms of the lack of resource allocation 
with regards to treatment and care. Second, the CQUIN also constructed 
clinicians’ expectations around a future with AD since it privileged 
diagnosis as a dynamic for managing AD, and reaffirmed the uncertain 
relationship between diagnosis and prognosis. Although this is not 
necessarily a point unique to AD, clinicians attested that because of the 
difficulty in determining a treatment or cure for AD, care as an alternative 
and viable option for managing the disease, is often overlooked within the 
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prevailing (bio)medical model. Echoing Lock (2013), despite the prevailing 
(bio)medical model through which AD is positioned, care was often at the 
core of both clinicians’ and patients’ concerns as demonstrated throughout 
my thesis. As highlighted, the interactive processes in the clinic, which 
shape classification, were replaced by a linear and temporal sequence 
(observation, to identification, to referral, to diagnosis). The CQUIN 
interrupted the temporalities of everyday clinical practice and the nuances 
of this linear process.  
 
On a practical note, the portability of the tools enabled an increasing number 
of individuals to flow through healthcare practice. However, this produced 
further complexities that the tools were expected to resolve: from navigating 
uncertainties produced by the clinic and the problematisation of ageing 
(Gilleard and Higgs, 2010, 2013), to the lack of closure the process 
produced in terms of treatment and care. The on-going negotiations of 
expectations around a diagnosis with AD flow between actors across 
professions, and across materials and space, within the temporalities of 
navigating AD. Yet, these on-going negotiations were constrained as the 
CQUIN was deployed in clinical settings. Overall, I argued that the CQUIN 
therefore constrained the making of provisionality in the clinic and the 
‘tinkering practices’ described by Mol, Moser and Pols (2010) for 
negotiating complexity and creating value out of uncertainty. The mundane 
and low-technological nature of these technologies rendered them easily 
adoptable and portable within frameworks such as the CQUIN, and yet as 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, the tools depend on mediation, 
manipulation and what Mol, Moser and Pols (2010) contend is ‘care work’ 
(pp.15). Furthermore, the political rhetoric of the ageing population through 
which initiatives such as the CQUIN emerged, raise urgent and disquieting 
questions for professionals and patients about whether earlier is necessarily 
better (Lebowitz, 2004). Resolving this tension between the tools as adopted 
in the wider policy terrain, and their translation into everyday clinical 
practice, required an exploration of the conditions in which these tools are 
used. Cognitive screening tools connect relations between actors, and across 
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materials, technologies, space and time, which as I have addressed was 
important for handling and making sense of uncertainty around diagnosis.  
 
By exploring the micro practices of the clinic and the role of cognitive 
screening tools as adopted in the wider policy arena, I have also been able to 
extend Mol’s (1998, 2002a) theoretical sensibilities in three significant ways. 
First, I captured how clinicians were accountable for diagnostic decisions 
when constituting the boundaries of the disease, and when implementing 
governance frameworks such as the CQUIN in practice. Second, I showed 
the points at which multiplicity does not cleave at neat points. Third, I 
demonstrated how complexity was resolved through hierarchical relations. 
Throughout my thesis as I drew on Mol to speak with and through my data, 
I concurred that the lack of closure around AD or what Mol (2002a) 
describes as the ‘permanent possibility’ of ‘doubt’, was ‘tamed’ within 
moments of co-existence and co-production (pp. 164). Yet, I extended 
Mol’s claims by capturing moments of chaotic practice and uncertainty, 
which could not be easily tamed, fuelled by the lack of closure around AD. 
What Mol describes as this ‘permanent possibility of doubt’ does at times, 
lead to chaotic practice, which was most fruitfully observed within my 
analysis of the CQUIN. As a wider structure of power, the CQUIN was 
implicitly involved in the construction of expectations around patient futures, 
built around powerful discursive constructs around ageing and AD. The 
CQUIN also produced tension around the process of diagnosis within the 
organisation of the hospital and memory service, and on a practical level, 
ignited debates around the challenges of resource allocation for managing 
AD. This had important implications for both patients and clinical practice 
more broadly. I have also extended Mol’s work by demonstrating that 
unlike atherosclerosis, where Mol effectively demonstrates what 
atherosclerosis is, Alzheimer’s disease remains elusive. Whilst AD appears 
to be ‘everywhere’ it is also ‘nowhere’ (c.f. Lock, 2013): there is no 
agreement amongst healthcare practitioners, policymakers, patients or 
family members about what AD is. 
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What I have alluded to across this thesis and emphasised when analysing the 
National Dementia CQUIN, is that for a disease such as AD, managing 
treatment and care options is a restricted process. This thesis therefore 
confirmed the relationship between diagnosis, prognosis and medical 
technologies, and yet at the same time, raised particular questions around 
the reified patient pathway. As a descriptive and prescriptive endeavour 
(Pinder et al., 2005) the patient pathway was also temporal, hierarchical, 
discursive and fluid. Cognitive screening tools as provisional and portable 
tools encouraged a renewed focus on the reification and linearity of the 
patient pathway. The reified patient pathway embedded the linearity of the 
process of referral, to diagnosis, to prognosis, to disposal. However, for a 
disease such as Alzheimer’s disease which is difficult to categorise; for 
which there is no known cause or treatment, and for which the 
problematisation of cognitive function produces powerful affects, closure by 
reifying the patient pathway was a complex process. A governance initiative, 
which constrains, or has the ability, to constrain the nuances of practice for 
AD, produces rather than sorts the complexities it sets out to challenge. 
Furthermore, in the arena of the ‘ageing population’, the technologies are 
used to allocate resources in terms of diagnosis and referrals; there is the 
expectation that closure is possible which was difficult to fulfil. Clinical 
professionals challenged this ‘closure’; they recognised that for a disease 
such as AD, the patient pathway is built around complex networks of social, 
technical and political arenas in which AD exists.  
 
Across this thesis, and woven throughout my analysis, I have also 
highlighted that articulating a classification of cogntive decline and AD is 
affectively charged. In the interpretive repertoire of the clinic, I 
demonstrated the ways in which clinicians managed the emotions of the 
clinician-patient interaction, where clinicians approached and performed the 
tools with care to negotiate the vulnerabilities of the diagnostic encounter. 
In doing so, clinicians were able to protect patient identity, and the anxiety 
felt by both patients and family members about the possibility of a 
diagnosis. I extended this argument in Chapter Six, by illustrating that 
whilst clinicians were able to keep patients on into the future, driven by risk, 
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this was also performed in order to account for, and thereby legitimate, the 
symptoms that patients were presenting, rather than disposing them as 
processes of ageing. These practices of care I linked to the negative 
discursive constructs which remain in existence across the general 
population with regards to what it means to age, and the expectations 
entangled in a diagnosis of AD. As a result, across this thesis I have drawn 
attention to processes of care over time through the actions of clinicians. To 
which end, a particularly significant aspect of my analysis could include 
encouraging auditors and healthcare policy actors, of the uncertainties and 
anxieties and therefore dangers, of proxy measures for calculating risk and 
diagnosis, through initiatives such as the Dementa CQUIN. It is crucial that 
these initiatives do not overshadow or constrain the locality of practice 
performed in the clinic, and embedded in a more person-centered approach 
to diagnosis, for making patients and family members feel cared for, and for 
making sense of what is essentially an uncertain and anxiety provoking 
diagnostic journey.    
Conclusion 
 
The intention of my thesis was not to propose specific policies for 
improving clinical practice, or proposing best practice in terms of the ways 
in which cognitive screening tools are adopted and governed more generally. 
Rather, I hope my arguments will elucidate what it is that cognitive 
screening tools accomplished for producing knowledge about AD. Given 
that AD is complex to diagnose in clinical practice, both in terms of its 
contested categorisation, and the negative discursive constructs around 
ageing and AD, much of the role of these tools was dedicated to making 
sense of complexity for both professionals and patients. Clinical practice is 
however, beginning to witness the challenges posed by the ageing 
population. As a result, analysing the conditions in which these tools operate, 
and highlighting what is currently valued in practice, is integral for 
understanding what then might shift, be lost or improved, and the effects of 
this for clinical practice. Many of the dilemmas produced by the uncertain 
relationship between diagnosis and prognosis can be mapped across other 
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disease categories and yet for AD, managing the expectations embedded in 
this process produces particular uncertainties for a disease that has no 
known cause or cure. The nuances of the patient pathway, and the 
uncertainties produced by attempts to reify what is essentially a temporal, 
fluid, provisional and situated diagnostic process for cognitive decline, have 
been made manifest within this study.  
 
This study, at the intersections of medical sociology and STS, also has 
broader appeal for considering the intersections between technologies, 
expectations and ageing, and the hierarchical and political structures 
through which diagnosis is accomplished. AD and cognitive decline are 
categories ‘made’ through the use of mundane cognitive screening tools for 
navigating complexity. Yet at the same time, as the politics of an ageing 
population govern the use of these tools, the provisionality and portability 
witnessed in the clinic has the potential to be constrained. The relationship 
between the micro everyday practices of the clinic within a shifting 
organisation of healthcare deserves attention when the challenges posed by 
the ageing population have direct implications for how diagnosis is 
performed, and therefore AD made sense of, for patients, family members 
and clinicians.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
275 
 
Bibliography 
 
ALZHEIMER’S RESEARCH UK. 2012. Diagnosing dementia using MRI 
scans 
[Online] Available: http://www.alzheimersresearchuk.org/projectdetail/ 
10027/Diagnosing-dementia-using-MRI-scans/ [Accessed 1st November 
2012] 
ALZHEIMER’S RESEARCH UK. 2015a. Developing a blood test to detect 
Alzheimer’s in its early stages. [Online] Available: 
http://www.alzheimersresearchuk.org/research-projects/developing-blood-
test-detect-alzheimers-early-stages/ [Accessed 1
st
 October, 2015] 
 
ALZHEIMER’S RESEARCH UK. 2015b. The power to defeat dementia 
manifesto 2015-2020. [Online] http://www.alzheimersresearchuk.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Alzheimers-Manifesto_2015_lores.pdf [Accessed 
April 2015] 
ALZHEIMER’S SOCIETY. 2011. Alzheimer’s Society Contribution to the 
Health and Social Care Bill Listening Exercise. [Online] 
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web
&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDMQFjAAahUKEwix6Z-yh-
PIAhWFVxoKHQ-
iBGM&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.alzheimers.org.uk%2Fsite%2Fscripts%
2Fdownload.php%3FfileID%3D1122&usg=AFQjCNGNeKzJlZuefTgPOnJ
58KQxdIZB0Q [Accessed 3
rd
 September 2015] 
ALZHEIMER’S SOCIETY. 2015a. Financial cost of dementia. [Online] 
Available: 
http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/documents_info.php?documentID
=418 [Accessed 1
st
 September 2015] 
 
ALZHEIMER’S SOCIETY. 2015b. Helping you to assess cognition: A 
practical toolkit for clinicians pp. 16-17. Available 
https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/download_info.php?downloadID
=1045 [Accessed 1
st
 September 2015] 
 
ALZHEIMER’S SOCIETY. 2015c. Statistics. [Online] 
https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/statistics [Accessed March 2015] 
 
ALZHEIMER’S SOCIETY. 2015d. What is Alzheimer’s disease? [Online] 
Available:  
http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/documents_info.php?documentID
=100 [Accessed March 2015] 
ALZHEIMER’S SOCIETY. 2015e. What is frontotemporal dementia? 
[Online] Available: 
http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/documents_info.php?documentID
=167 [Accessed 1
st
 September 2015] 
276 
 
ABBOTT, A. 1988. The system of professions: An essay on the division of 
expert labor, University of Chicago Press. 
ADAMS, T. & GARDINER, P. 2005. Communication and interaction 
within dementia care triads Developing a theory for relationship-centred 
care. Dementia, 4, 185-205. 
ADAMS, V., MURPHY, M. & CLARKE, A. E. 2009. Anticipation: 
Technoscience, life, affect, temporality. Subjectivity, 28, 246-265. 
ALMELING, R. & GADARIAN, S. K. 2014. Reacting to Genetic Risk An 
Experimental Survey of Life between Health and Disease. Journal of health 
and social behavior, 55, 482-503. 
ALTHEIDE, D. L. 1987. Reflections: Ethnographic content analysis. 
Qualitative sociology, 10, 65-77. 
AMIT, V. 2000. Introduction: Partial Truths. In: CLIFFORD, J. & 
MARCUS, G. (eds.) Writing culture: The poetics and politics of 
ethnography. Berkley: University of California Press  
ANGROSINO, M. & ROSENBERG, J. 2011. Observations on observation. 
The Sage handbook of qualitative research, 467. 
APPLE, R. D. 1995. Constructing mothers: Scientific motherhood in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Social history of medicine, 8, 161-178. 
ARMSTRONG, D. 1977. Clinical sense and clinical science. Social Science 
& Medicine (1967), 11, 599-601. 
ARMSTRONG, D. 1995. The rise of surveillance medicine. Sociology of 
Health & Illness, 17, 393-404. 
ARONOWITZ, R. A. 2001. When do symptoms become a disease? Annals 
of Internal Medicine, 134, 803-808. 
ARONOWITZ, R. A. 2009. The converged experience of risk and disease. 
Milbank Quarterly, 87, 417-442. 
ASHCROFT, R. E., NEWSON, A. J. & BENN, P. M. 2005. Reforming 
research ethics committees: latest proposals are a missed opportunity for a 
radical review. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 331, 587. 
ATKINSON, P. 1981. The Clinical Experience, Farnborough, Gower. 
ATKINSON, P. 1984. Training for certainty. Social science & medicine, 19, 
949-956. 
ATKINSON, P. & ATKINSON, P. A. 1995. Medical talk and medical work, 
Sage. 
ATKINSON, P. and DELAMONT, S. 2006. Rescuing narrative from 
qualitative research. Narrative Inquiry 16(1), pp. 164–172. 
277 
 
ATWOOD, G. D. & WHITEHOUSE, J. P. 2006. Building a Mystery: 
Alzheimer's Disease, Mild Cognitive Impairment and Beyond. Philosophy, 
Psychiatry & Psychology, 13, 61-74. 
BALLENGER, J. F. 2000. Beyond the characteristic plaques and tangles: 
Mid-Twentieth-Century U.S. psychiatry and the fight against senility. In: 
WHITEHOUSE, P. J., MAURER, K. & BALLENGER, F., J (eds.) 
Concepts of Alzheimer disease: Biological, clinical and cultural. Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
BARTUS, R. T., DEAN, R. L., BEER, B. & LIPPA, A. S. 1982. The 
cholinergic hypothesis of geriatric memory dysfunction. Science, 217, 408-
414. 
BEARD, R. L. & NEARY, T. M. 2013. Making sense of nonsense: 
experiences of mild cognitive impairment. Sociology of health & illness, 35, 
130-146. 
BERG, M. 1992. The construction of medical disposals Medical sociology 
and medical problem solving in clinical practice. Sociology of Health & 
Illness, 14, 151-180. 
BERG, M. 1996. Practices of reading and writing: the constitutive role of 
the patient record in medical work. Sociology of health & illness, 18, 499-
524. 
BERG, M. 1997a. Formal tools and medical practices: Getting computer-
based decision techniques to work. Social science, technical Systems, and 
cooperative work. Beyond the great divide. 
BERG, M. 1997b. Of forms, containers, and the electronic medical record: 
some tools for a sociology of the formal. Science, Technology & Human 
Values, 22, 403-433. 
BERG, M. 1997c. Rationalizing Medical Work - Decision Support 
Techniques and Medical Problems, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
BERG, M. & BOWKER, G. 1997. The multiple bodies of the medical 
record. The Sociological Quarterly, 38, 513-537. 
BERG, M., HORSTMAN, K., PLASS, S. & VAN HEUSDEN, M. 2000. 
Guidelines, professionals and the production of objectivity: standardisation 
and the professionalism of insurance medicine. Sociology of Health & 
Illness, 22, 765-791. 
BLAXTER, M. 1978. Diagnosis as category and process: The case of 
alcoholism. Social Science & Medicine. Part A: Medical Psychology & 
Medical Sociology, 12, 9-17. 
278 
 
BLESSED, G., TOMLINSON, B. E. & ROTH, M. 1968. The association 
between quantitative measures of dementia and of senile change in the 
cerebral grey matter of elderly subjects. The British Journal of Psychiatry. 
BLOUDEK, L. M., SPACKMAN, D. E., BLANKENBURG, M. & 
SULLIVAN, S. D. 2011. Review and meta-analysis of biomarkers and 
diagnostic imaging in Alzheimer's disease. Journal of Alzheimer's Disease, 
26, 627-645. 
BOND, J. & CORNER, L. 2001. Researching dementia: are there unique 
methodological challenges for health services research? Ageing and Society, 
21, 95-116. 
BORUP, M., BROWN, N., KONRAD, K. & VAN LENTE, H. 2006. The 
sociology of expectations in science and technology. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 18, 285-298. 
BOURDIEU, P. 1991 Language and Symbolic Power, Cambridge: Polity. 
BOSK, C. 2001. Irony, ethnography, and informed consent. 
BOSK, C. L. 2003. Forgive and remember: managing medical failure, 
University of Chicago Press. 
BOSK, C. L. & DE VRIES, R. G. 2004. Bureaucracies of mass deception: 
Institutional review boards and the ethics of ethnographic research. The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 595, 249-
263. 
BOWKER, G. C. & STAR, S. L. 2000. Sorting things out: Classification 
and its consequences, MIT press. 
BOYATZIS, R. E. 1998. Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic 
Analysis and Code Development, London, Sage Publications. 
BRITTAIN, K., CORNER, L., ROBINSON, L. & BOND, J. 2010. Ageing 
in place and technologies of place: the lived experience of people with 
dementia in changing social, physical and technological environments. 
Sociology of health & illness, 32, 272-287. 
BROOKS, A. T. 2010. Aesthetic anti‐ageing surgery and technology: 
women’s friend or foe? Sociology of health & illness, 32, 238-257. 
BROWN, N. & MICHAEL, M. 2003. A sociology of expectations: 
retrospecting prospects and prospecting retrospects. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 15, 3-18. 
BROWN, N., RAPPERT, B. & WEBSTER, A. 2000. Contested futures: A 
sociology of prospective techno-science, Ashgate Aldershot. 
BROWN, N. & WEBSTER, A. 2004. New medical technologies and 
society. 
279 
 
BROWN, P. 1995. Naming and framing: the social construction of 
diagnosis and illness. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 34-52. 
BROWN, P. & CALNAN, M. 2010. The risks of managing uncertainty: The 
limitations of governance and choice, and the potential for trust. Social 
Policy and Society, 9, 13-24. 
BRUNET, M. 2014. Targets for dementia diagnoses will lead to 
overdiagnosis. BMJ, 348. 
BUDSON, A. E. & SOLOMON, P. R. 2012. New Criteria for Alzheimer 
Disease and Mild Cognitive Impairment: Implications for the Practicing 
Clinician. The neurologist, 18, 356-363. 
CAINE, K. J., DAVISON, C. M. & STEWART, E. J. 2009. Preliminary 
field-work: Methodological reflections from northern Canadian research. 
Qualitative research, 9, 489-513. 
CALLON, M. & LATOUR, B. 1981. Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how 
actors macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them to do so. 
Advances in social theory and methodology: Toward an integration of 
micro-and macro-sociologies, 277-303. 
CANGUILHEM, G. 1978. On the Normal and the Pathological, Springer 
Science & Business Media. 
CANGUILHEM, G. 2008. Knowledge of life, Fordham Univ Press. 
CHAUFAN, C., HOLLISTER, B., NAZARENO, J. & FOX, P. 2012. 
Medical ideology as a double-edged sword: The politics of cure and care in 
the making of Alzheimer’s disease. Social Science & Medicine, 74, 788-795. 
CHECKLAND, K., MARSHALL, M. & HARRISON, S. 2004. Re-thinking 
accountability: trust versus confidence in medical practice. Quality and 
Safety in Health Care, 13, 130-135. 
CLAES, T., SLAMA, H., FERY, P., VOKAER, M. & PANDOLFO, M. 
2004. Is the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination effective to detect 
frontotemporal dementia? J Neurol, 251, 428-431. 
CLARKE, A. E. 2003. Situational analyses: Grounded theory mapping after 
the postmodern turn. Symbolic Interaction, 26, 553-576. 
CLARKE, A. E., SHIM, J. K., MAMO, L., FOSKET, J. R. & FISHMAN, J. 
R. 2003. Biomedicalization: Technoscientific transformations of health, 
illness, and US biomedicine. American sociological review, 161-194. 
CLARKE, L. C. H. 2002. Beauty in later life: Older women's perceptions of 
physical attractiveness. Canadian Journal on Aging/La Revue canadienne 
du vieillissement, 21, 429-442. 
280 
 
COHEN, L. 1998. No aging in India: Alzheimer's, the bad family, and other 
modern things, Univ of California Press. 
CONRAD, P. 1992. Medicalization and social control. Annual review of 
Sociology, 209-232. 
CONRAD, P. 2005. The Shifting Engines of Medicalization. Journal of 
Health and Social Behaviour, 46, 3-14. 
COPELTON, D. A. 2010. Output that counts: pedometers, sociability and 
the contested terrain of older adult fitness walking. Sociology of health & 
illness, 32, 304-318. 
COX, H. & WEBSTER, A. 2013. Translating biomedical science into 
clinical practice: Molecular diagnostics and the determination of 
malignancy. Health:, 17, 391-406. 
COYNE, I. 2010. Accessing children as research participants: Examining 
the role of gatekeepers. Child: care, health and development, 36, 452-454. 
CRAWFORD, R. 2004. Risk ritual and the management of control and 
anxiety in medical culture. Health:, 8, 505-528. 
CRUM, R. M., ANTHONY, J. C., BASSETT, S. S. & FOLSTEIN, M. F. 
1993. Population-based norms for the Mini-Mental State Examination by 
age and educational level. JOURNAL-AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION, 269, 2386-2386. 
CUIJPERS, Y. & VAN LENTE, H. 2015. Early diagnostics and Alzheimer's 
disease: beyond ‘cure’and ‘care’. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 93, 54-67. 
CUIJPERS, Y. M., VAN LENTE, H., BOENINK, M. & MOORS, E. H. 
2014. Quandaries of Responsible Innovation: The Case of Alzheimer’s 
Disease. Responsible Innovation 1. Springer. 
CUNNINGHAM‐BURLEY, S. & KERR, A. 1999. Defining the ‘social’: 
towards an understanding of scientific and medical discourses on the social 
aspects of the new human genetics. Sociology of health & illness, 21, 647-
668. 
DAVIES, C. 1995. Gender and the professional predicament in nursing, 
McGraw-Hill International. 
DAVIS, D. H. J. 2004. Dementia: sociological and philosophical 
constructions. Social Science & Medicine, 58, 369-378. 
DAVEY, R. & JAMIESON, S. 2004. The validity of using the mini mental 
state examination in NICE dementia guidelines. Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 75, 343-344. 
281 
 
DENZIN, N. K. Interpretive Ethnography: Ethnographic Practices for the 
21st Century. Interpretive Ethnography: Ethnographic Practices for the 
21st Century. SAGE Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE 
Publications, Inc. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
1. 2012a. The Prime Minister’s Challenge on 
Dementia 
[Online] Available: http://media.dh.gov.uk/network/353/files/2012/11/The- 
Prime-Ministers-Challenge-on-Dementia-Delivering-major-improvements-
indementia-care-and-research-by-2015-A-report-of-progress.pdf [Accessed 
4th 
February 2013] 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. 2012b. Using the Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework. Guidance for new 
national goals 2012-13. [Online] Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/215049/dh_133859.pdf [Accessed 2
nd 
September 2012] 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. 2013. G8 Dementia Summit 
Declaration. [Online] 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/265869/2901668_G8_DementiaSummitDeclaration_acc.pdf 
[Accessed December 2013] 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. 2015a. Overview of the Health and Social 
Care Act fact sheet. [Online] Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/138257/A1.-Factsheet-Overview-240412.pdf [Accessed 1st March 2014] 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. 2015b. Prime Ministers Challenge on 
Dementia 2020 [Online] 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/414344/pm-dementia2020.pdf [Accessed April 2015] 
 
DESMOND, M. 2008. On the fireline: Living and dying with wildland 
firefighters, University of Chicago Press. 
DHEDHI, S. A., SWINGLEHURST, D. & RUSSELL, J. 2014. 
‘Timely’diagnosis of dementia: what does it mean? A narrative analysis of 
GPs’ accounts. BMJ open, 4, e004439. 
DINGWALL, R. 2006. Confronting the Ant-Democrats: the unethical 
nature of ethical regulation in social science. Medical Sociology Online (1) 
pp51-58. 
282 
 
DODIER, N. 1998. Clinical practice and procedures in occupational 
medicine: a study of the framing of individuals. Differences in medicine: 
Unravelling practices, techniques, and bodies, 53-85. 
DOWRICK, C. 2006. When diagnosis fails: A commentary on McPherson 
& Armstrong. Social Science & Medicine, 69, 1144-1146. 
DUBOIS, B., FELDMAN, H., HOWARD, JACOVA, C., DEKOSKY, T., 
STEVEN, BARBERGER-GATEAU, P., CUMMINGS, J., DELACOURTE, 
A., GALASKO, D., GAUTHIER, S., JICHA, G., MEGURO, K., O'BRIEN, 
J., PASQUIER, F., ROBERT, P., ROSSOR, M., STEVEN, S., STERN, Y., 
VISSER, J., PIETER & SCHELTENS, P. 2007. Research criteria for the 
diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease: revising the NINCDS-ADRDA criteria. 
Lancet Neurology, 6, 734-46. 
DUNEIER, M. 1999. Sidewalk, Farrar. Straus and Giroux, New York. 
DUSSAUGE, I., HELGESSON, C.-F. & LEE, F. 2015. Value Practices in 
the Life Sciences and Medicine, Oxford University Press. 
EDWARDS, A., GRAY, J., CLARKE, A., DUNDON, J., ELWYN, G., 
GAFF, C., HOOD, K., IREDALE, R., SIVELL, S. & SHAW, C. 2008. 
Interventions to improve risk communication in clinical genetics: systematic 
review. Patient education and counseling, 71, 4-25. 
ESTES, C. L. & BINNEY, E. A. 1989. The biomedicalization of aging: 
Dangers and dilemmas. The gerontologist, 29, 587-596. 
EVERTS MYKYTYN, C. 2010. A history of the future: the emergence of 
contemporary anti‐ageing medicine. Sociology of health & illness, 32, 181-
196. 
FAIRHURST, E. 1998. “Growing old gracefully” as opposed to “mutton 
dressed as lamb”. The body in everyday life, 258-275. 
FISHMAN, J. R., SETTERSTEN JR, R. A. & FLATT, M. A. 2010. In the 
vanguard of biomedicine? The curious and contradictory case of anti‐ageing 
medicine. Sociology of health & illness, 32, 197-210. 
FLAHERTY, M. & FINE, G. A. 2001. Present, past, and future: 
Conjugating George Herbert Mead's perspective on time. Time & Society, 
10, 147-161. 
FOLSTEIN, M., SE, F. & PR, M. 1975. Mini-mental state. A practical 
method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician. Journal 
of Psychiatry Research, 12, 189-98. 
FOSTER, N. L. 2007. A new framework for the diagnosis of Alzheimer's 
disease. The Lancet Neurology, 6, 667-669. 
283 
 
FOUCAULT, M. 1977. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, 
Vintage. 
FOX, P. 1989. From Senility to Alzheimer's Disease: The Rise of the 
Alzheimer's Disease Movement. The Milbank Quarterly, 67, 58-102. 
FOX, R. C. 1957. Training for uncertainty. The student-physician, 207-241. 
FOX, R. (1959) Experiment Perilous: Physicians and Patients Facing the 
Unknown. New York: The Free Press. 
FOX, R. C. 1980. The evolution of medical uncertainty. The Milbank 
Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, 1-49. 
FOX, R. C. 2000. Medical uncertainty revisited. The handbook of social 
studies in health and medicine, 259-276. 
FRANCIS, P. T., PALMER, A. M., SNAPE, M. & WILCOCK, G. K. 1999. 
The cholinergic hypothesis of Alzheimer’s disease: a review of progress. 
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 66, 137-147. 
FUJIMURA, J. H. 1996. Crafting Science: a Sociohistory of the Quest for 
the Genetics of Cancer, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. 
GARFINKEL, H. 1953. A comparison of decisions made on four ‘‘pre-
theoretical’’problems by Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schuetz. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
GARFINKEL, H. 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.  
GARFINKEL, H. (1972 [1960]) A comparison of decisions made on four 
‘pre-theoretical’ problems by Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schuetz. 
Unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of California, Los 
Angeles, CA (first circulated in 1960, retyped and redistributed in 1972). 
GARFORTH, L. & KERR, A. 2010. Let's Get Organised: Practicing and 
Valuing Scientific Work Inside and Outside the Laboratory. Sociological 
Research Online, 15, 11. 
GEERTZ, C. 1973. Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of 
Culture. In: GEERTZ, C. (ed.) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: 
Basic Books. 
GIACCONE, G., ARZBERGER, T., ALAFUZOFF, I., AL-SARRAJ, S., 
BUDKA, H., DUYCKAERTS, C., FALKAI, P., FERRER, I., IRONSIDE, 
W. J., KOVÁCS, G. G., MEYRONET, D., PARCHI, P., PATSOURIS, E., 
REVESZ, T., RIEDERER, P., ROZEMULLER, A., SCHMITT, A., 
WINBLAD, B. & KRETZSCHMAR, H. 2011. New lexicon and criteria for 
the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease. The Lancet Neurology, 10, 298-299. 
284 
 
GILLEARD, C. & HIGGS, P. 2010. Aging without agency: Theorizing the 
fourth age. Aging & mental health, 14, 121-128. 
GILLEARD, C. & HIGGS, P. 2011. Ageing abjection and embodiment in 
the fourth age. Journal of Aging Studies, 25, 135-142. 
GILLEARD, C. & HIGGS, P. 2013. The fourth age and the concept of a 
‘social imaginary’: A theoretical excursus. Journal of Aging Studies, 27, 
368-376. 
GOFFMAN, E. 1959. The presentation of self in everyday life. London: 
Penguin 
GOFFMAN, E. 1961. Encounters: Two studies in the sociology of 
interaction. London: Penguin 
GOFFMAN, E. 1963. Stigma. London: Penguin 
GOFFMAN, E. 1983. The interaction order. American Sociological Review 
48(1), pp. 1–17. 
GOLOMB, J., KLUGER, A. & FERRIS, S. H. 2004. Mild cognitive 
impairment: historical development and summary of research. Dialogues in 
clinical neuroscience, 6, 351. 
GOODSON, L. & VASSAR, M. 2011. An overview of ethnography in 
healthcare and medical research. Journal of Educational Evaluation for 
Health Professions, 8, 1-5. 
GROSS, S. 2012. Biomedicine inside out: an ethnography of brain surgery. 
Sociology of Health & Illness, 34, 1170-1183. 
GUBRIUM, F. 1986. Oldtimer’s and Alzheimer’s: the descriptive 
organisation of senility, Greenwich, JAI Press. 
GUILLEMIN, M. & GILLAM, L. 2004. Ethics, reflexivity, and “ethically 
important moments” in research. Qualitative inquiry, 10, 261-280. 
GULLETTE, M. M. 1998. Midlife discourses in the twentieth-century 
United States: an essay on the sexuality, ideology, and politics of ‘middle-
ageism’. Welcome to middle age, 3-44. 
HACKING, I. 1996. The looping effects of human kinds, New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
HACKING, I. 1999. The social construction of what?, Harvard university 
press. 
HAMMERSLEY, M. & ATKINSON, P. 2007. Ethnography Principles in 
Practice, New York, Routledge. 
HARBERS, H. 2005. Science in Context: The Paradoxes of Universalism 
and Liberalism. JSTOR. 
285 
 
HARDY, J. 2006. A Hundred Years of Alzheimer's Disease Research. 
Neuron, 52, 3-13. 
HARDY, J. A. & HIGGINS, G. A. 1992. Alzheimer's disease: the amyloid 
cascade hypothesis. Science, 256, 184. 
HARRIS, J. 2005. The ordering of things: Organization in Bruno Latour. 
The Sociological Review, 53, 163-177. 
HARAWAY, D. (1987). A manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, technology, and 
socialist feminism in the 1980s. Australian Feminist Studies, 2, 1-42  
HARVEY, W. S. 2010. Methodological approaches for interviewing elites. 
Geography Compass, 4, 193-205. 
HEDGECOE, A. 2008. Research ethics review and the sociological research 
relationship. Sociology, 42, 873-886. 
HEDGECOE, A. M. 2003. Expansion and uncertainty: cystic fibrosis, 
classification and genetics. Sociology of Health & Illness, 25, 50-70. 
HESS, D. 2001. Ethnography and the development of science and 
technology studies. Handbook of ethnography, 234-245. 
HIGGS, P. & GILLEARD, C. 2014. Frailty, abjection and the ‘othering’of 
the fourth age. Health Sociology Review, 23, 10-19. 
HILLMAN, A., TADD, W., CALNAN, S., CALNAN, M., BAYER, A. & 
READ, S. 2013. Risk, governance and the experience of care. Sociology of 
health & illness, 35, 939-955. 
HOLLOWAY, I. & WHEELER, S. 2013. Qualitative research in nursing 
and healthcare, John Wiley & Sons. 
HOLSTEIN, J. A. & GUBRIUM, F. J. 2011. The Constructionist Analytics 
of Interpretive Practice. In: DENZIN, N. & LINCOLN, Y. (eds.) The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. 4th ed. London: Sage Publications. 
HORLICK-JONES, T. 2005. On ‘risk work’: professional discourse, 
accountability, and everyday action. Health, risk & society, 7, 293-307. 
HOUSLEY, W. 2000. Story, narrative and team work. The Sociological 
Review, 48, 425-443. 
HSCIC. 2015. Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) Recorded Dementia 
Diagnoses: March 2015. [Online] Available: 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB17326/qual-outc-fram-rec-dem-
diag-apr-2014-mar-2015-rep.pdf [Accessed 16
th
 April 2015] 
HYDÉN, L.-C. & SACHS, L. 1998. Suffering, hope and diagnosis: on the 
negotiation of chronic fatigue syndrome. Health:, 2, 175-193. 
286 
 
IHL, R., FRÖLICH, L., DIERKS, T., MARTIN, E.-M. & MAURER, K. 
1992. Differential validity of psychometric tests in dementia of the 
Alzheimer type. Psychiatry research, 44, 93-106. 
ISAACS, B., LIVINGSTONE, M. & NEVILLE, Y. 1972. Survival of the 
unfittest: a study of geriatric patients in Glasgow, Routledge and K. Paul. 
ISMAIL, Z., RAJJI, T. K. & SHULMAN, K. I. 2010. Brief cognitive 
screening instruments: an update. International Journal of Geriatric 
Psychiatry, 25, 111-120. 
JENSEN, T. E. & WINTHEREIK, B. R. 2005. Book Review: The Body 
Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. Acta Sociologica, 48, 266-268. 
JITAPUNKUL, S., PILLAY, I. & EBRAHIM, S. 1991. The abbreviated 
mental test: its use and validity. Age and ageing, 20, 332-336. 
JOHNSON, J. C. 1990. Selecting ethnographic informants, Sage Newbury 
Park, CA. 
JOYCE, K. 2008. Magnetic Appeal: MRI and the Myth of Transparency. US, 
Cornell University Press  
JOYCE, K. & LOE, M. 2010. A sociological approach to ageing, 
technology and health. Sociology of Health & Illness, 32, 171-180. 
JUTEL, A. 2009. Sociology of diagnosis: a preliminary review. Sociology of 
Health & Illness, 31, 278-299. 
JUTEL, A. 2011. Classification, Disease, and Diagnosis. Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine, 54, 189-205. 
KAUFMAN, S. R. 2010. Time, clinic technologies, and the making of 
reflexive longevity: the cultural work of time left in an ageing society. 
Sociology of health & illness, 32, 225-237. 
KAUFMAN, S. R., SHIM, J. K. & RUSS, A. J. 2004. Revisiting the 
biomedicalization of aging: Clinical trends and ethical challenges. The 
gerontologist, 44, 731-738. 
KENNER, A. M. 2002. Securing the Elderly Body: Dementia, Surveillance, 
and the Politics of" Aging in Place". Surveillance & Society, 5. 
KERR, A. 2008. Assisted conception and the audit culture. Human Fertility, 
11, 9-16. 
KERR, A. & CUNNINGHAM-BURLEY, S. 2000. On ambivalence and 
risk: reflexive modernity and the new human genetics. Sociology, 34, 283-
304. 
KHACHATURIAN, Z. S. 1985. Diagnosis of Alzheimer's Disease. JAMA 
Neurology, 42, 1097-1105. 
287 
 
KIMCHI, E., DESAI, A. K. & GROSSBERG, G. T. 2012. New 
Alzheimer’s disease guidelines: Implications for clinicians. Current 
Psychiatry, 11, 15. 
KINGS COLLEGE LONDON & LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS. 
2007. Dementia UK The full report [Online]. Available: 
www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/download.php?fileID=2 [Accessed 
February 2013] 
KING’S FUND. 2015. Health and Social Care Act. [Online] Available: 
http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/projects/health-and-social-care-act [Accessed 
1
st
 March 2015] 
KINNUNEN, T. 2010. ‘A second youth’: pursuing happiness and 
respectability through cosmetic surgery in Finland. Sociology of health & 
illness, 32, 258-271. 
KITWOOD, T. 1993. Towards a theory of dementia care: the interpersonal 
process. Ageing and Society, 13, 51-67. 
KITWOOD, T. 1997. Dementia Reconsidered: The person comes first, 
Buckingham, Open University Press 
KRISTENSEN, S. R., MCDONALD, R. & SUTTON, M. 2013. Should 
pay-for-performance schemes be locally designed? Evidence from the 
commissioning for quality and innovation (CQUIN) framework. Journal of 
health services research & policy, 18, 38-49. 
LAKOFF, A. 2007. The right patients for the drug: managing the placebo 
effect in antidepressant trials. BioSocieties, 2, 57-71. 
LARSON, M. S. 1990. In the matter of experts and professionals, or how 
impossible it is to leave nothing unsaid. The formation of professions: 
Knowledge, state and strategy, 24-50. 
LASLETT, P. 1991. A fresh map of life: The emergence of the third age, 
Harvard University Press. 
LATIMER, J. 2000. The conduct of care: Understanding nursing practice, 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
LATIMER, J. 2004. Commanding materials:(re) legitimating authority in 
the context of multi-disciplinary work. Sociology, 38, 757-775. 
LATIMER, J. 2013. The Gene, the Clinic, and the Family: Diagnosing 
Dysmorphology, Reviving Medical Dominance, Routledge. 
LATIMER, J., FEATHERSTONE, K., ATKINSON, P., CLARKE, A., 
PILZ, D. T. & SHAW, A. 2006. Rebirthing the Clinic The Interaction of 
Clinical Judgment and Genetic Technology in the Production of Medical 
Science. Science, Technology & Human Values, 31, 599-630. 
288 
 
LATOUR, B. 1986. Visualization and cognition. Knowledge and society, 6, 
1-40. 
LATOUR, B. 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and 
Engineers Through Society, Harvard, Harvard University Press. 
LATOUR, B. 2012. We have never been modern, Harvard University Press. 
 LAW, J. 1990. Introduction: monsters, machines and sociotechnical 
relations1. The Sociological Review, 38, 1-23. 
LAW, J. & MOL, A. 2002. Complexities: Social studies of knowledge 
practices, Duke University Press. 
LAW, J. 2004. After method: Mess in social science research, Psychology 
Press. 
LAW, J. & LIEN, M. 2012. Slippery: Field notes on empirical ontology. 
Social Studies of Science, 0306312712456947. 
LAW, J. & SINGLETON, V. 2000. Performing technology's stories: On 
social constructivism, performance, and performativity. Technology and 
Culture, 41, 765-775. 
LAW, J. & URRY, J. 2004. Enacting the social. Economy and society, 33, 
390-410. 
LEBOWITZ, B, D. 2004. Mild Cognitive Impairment, Vol. 6:4 
LESSA, I. 2006. Discursive struggles within social welfare: Restaging teen 
motherhood. British Journal of Social Work, 36, 283-298. 
LOCK, M. 2005. Alzheimer’s Disease: A Tangled Concept. Complexities: 
Beyond Nature and Nurture, 104-138. 
LOCK, M. 2013. The Alzheimer conundrum: Entanglements of dementia 
and aging, Princeton University Press. 
LOE, M. 2010. Doing it my way: old women, technology and wellbeing. 
Sociology of health & illness, 32, 319-334. 
LONG, D., HUNTER, L., CYNTHIA & GEEST, V. D., SJAAK 2008. 
Introduction: When the field is a ward or clinic: Hospital ethnography. 
Anthropology and Medicine, 15, 71-78. 
LOVESTONE, S. & REYNOLDS, C. 1997. The phosphorylation of tau: a 
critical stage in neurodevelopment and neurodegenerative processes. 
Neuroscience, 78, 309-324. 
MALINOWSKI, B. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Pacific, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
289 
 
MANNING, N. 2000. Psychiatric diagnosis under conditions of uncertainty: 
personality disorder, science and professional legitimacy. Sociology of 
health & illness, 22, 621-639. 
MARIONI, R. E., CHATFIELD, M., BRAYNE, C. & MATTHEWS, F. E. 
2011. The reliability of assigning individuals to cognitive states using the 
Mini Mental-State Examination: a population-based prospective cohort 
study. BMC medical research methodology, 11, 127. 
MARSHALL, B. L. 2010. Science, medicine and virility surveillance:‘sexy 
seniors’ in the pharmaceutical imagination. Sociology of health & illness, 32, 
211-224. 
MATHURANATH, P., NESTOR, P., BERRIOS, G., RAKOWICZ, W. & 
HODGES, J. 2000. A brief cognitive test battery to differentiate Alzheimer's 
disease and frontotemporal dementia. NEUROLOGY-MINNEAPOLIS-, 55, 
1613-1620. 
MAXWELL, J. A. 2012. Qualitative research design: An interactive 
approach: An interactive approach, Sage. 
MAY, C., ROSE, M. & JOHNSTONE, F. 2000. Dealing with doubt: how 
patients account for non-specific chronic low back pain. Journal of 
psychosomatic research, 49, 223-225. 
MAYNARD, A. & BLOOR, K. 2010. Will financial incentives and 
penalties improve hospital care? BMj, 340. 
MCBRIDE, C. M., KOEHLY, L. M., SANDERSON, S. C. & KAPHINGST, 
K. A. 2010. The behavioral response to personalized genetic information: 
will genetic risk profiles motivate individuals and families to choose more 
healthful behaviors? Annual review of public health, 31, 89-103. 
MCCARTNEY, M. 2014. “Case finding” in dementia is simply screening 
with no evidence of benefit. BMJ, 349, g4791. 
MEAD, G.H. (1936) Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
MEAD, G.H. (1982) The Individual and the Social Self. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
MEAD, G. H. 2009. Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social 
behaviorist, University of Chicago press. 
THE MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL’S NEUROSCIENCES AND 
MENTAL HEALH BOARD (MRC NMHB). 2013. Neurodegeneration 
[Online] 
Available:http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Ourresearch/Boardpanelsgroups/NMHB/Pr
ogramme/Neurodegeneration/index.htm [Accessed 22nd March 2013] 
290 
 
MENDELZWEIG, M. D. 2009. Constructing the Alzheimer Patient. Science 
Studies, 22, 55-79. 
MICHAEL, M. 2000. Futures of the present: from performativity to 
prehension. Contested futures: a sociology of prospective techno-science, 
21-39. 
MIK‐MEYER, N. & OBLING, A. R. 2012. The negotiation of the sick role: 
general practitioners’ classification of patients with medically unexplained 
symptoms. Sociology of health & illness, 34, 1025-1038. 
MIOSHI, E., DAWSON, K., MITCHELL, J., ARNOLD, R. & HODGES, J. 
R. 2006. The Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination Revised (ACE‐R): a 
brief cognitive test battery for dementia screening. International Journal of 
Geriatric Psychiatry, 21, 1078-1085. 
MITCHELL, A. J. 2008. A meta-analysis of the accuracy of the mini-mental 
state examination in the detection of dementia and mild cognitive 
impairment. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 43, 411-431. 
MOL, A. 1998. Missing links, making links: the performance of some 
atheroscleroses. Differences in medicine: Unravelling practices, techniques 
and bodies, 144-165. 
 MOL, A. 1999. Ontological politics. A word and some questions. The 
Sociological Review, 47, 74-89. 
MOL, A. 2002a. The body multiple: Ontology in medical practice, Duke 
University Press. 
MOL, A. 2002b. Cutting surgeons, walking patients: Some complexities 
involved in comparing. J. Law & A. Mol (Eds.), Complexities: Social 
studies of knowledge practices, 218-257. 
MOL, A. 2008. The logic of care: Health and the problem of patient choice, 
Routledge. 
MOL, A. 2012. Mind your plate! The ontonorms of Dutch dieting. Social 
Studies of Science, 0306312712456948. 
MOL, A. & BERG, M. 1998. Differences in medicine: Unravelling 
practices, techniques, and bodies, US, Duke University Press. 
MOL, A. & Law, J. 2002. Complexities: An Introduction. In: Law, J. & Mol, 
A (eds) Complexities Social Studies of Knowledge Practices. Durham, 
London: Duke University Press 
MOL, A. & LAW, J. 2004. Embodied action, enacted bodies: The example 
of hypoglycaemia. Body & society, 10, 43-62. 
MOL, A., MOSER, I. & POLS, J. 2010. Putting practice into theory. Care 
in Practice: on Tinkering in Clinics, Homes and Farms, 7-26. 
291 
 
MOREIRA, T. 2010. Now or later? individual disease and care collectives 
in the memory clinic. 
MOREIRA, T., MAY, C. & BOND, J. 2009. Regulatory Objectivity in 
Action Mild Cognitive Impairment and the Collective Production of 
Uncertainty. Social Studies of Science, 39, 665-690. 
MUNRO, R. 1999. Power and discretion: membership work in the time of 
technology. Organization, 6, 429-450. 
MURPHY, E. & DINGWALL, R. 2007. Informed consent, anticipatory 
regulation and ethnographic practice. Social Science & Medicine, 65, 2223-
2234. 
NANCARROW, S. A. & BORTHWICK, A. M. 2005. Dynamic 
professional boundaries in the healthcare workforce. Sociology of health & 
illness, 27, 897-919. 
NASREDDINE, Z. S., PHILLIPS, N. A., BÉDIRIAN, V., 
CHARBONNEAU, S., WHITEHEAD, V., COLLIN, I., CUMMINGS, J. L. 
& CHERTKOW, H. 2005. The Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA: a 
brief screening tool for mild cognitive impairment. Journal of the American 
Geriatrics Society, 53, 695-699. 
NELIS, A. 2000. Genetics and uncertainty. Contested Futures, 209-28. 
NETTLETON, S. 2006. ‘I just want permission to be ill’: Towards a 
sociology of medically unexplained symptoms. Social Science & Medicine, 
62, 1167-1178. 
NETTLETON, S., O'MALLEY, L., WATT, I. & DUFFEY, P. 2004. 
Enigmatic illness: narratives of patients who live with medically 
unexplained symptoms. Social Theory & Health, 2, 47-66. 
NETTLETON, S., WATT, I., O’MALLEY, L. & DUFFEY, P. 2005. 
Understanding the narratives of people who live with medically unexplained 
illness. Patient education and counseling, 56, 205-210. 
NEVEN, L. 2010. ‘But obviously not for me’: robots, laboratories and the 
defiant identity of elder test users. Sociology of health & illness, 32, 335-
347. 
NEWMAN, J. C. & FELDMAN, R. 2011. Copyright and open access at the 
bedside. New England Journal of Medicine, 365, 2447-2449. 
NHS ENGLAND. 2014. Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
(CQUIN): 2014/2015 Guidance [Online]. Available: 
http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/sc-cquin-guid.pdf 
[Accessed 3
rd
 October 2014]  
NHS ENGLAND. 2015a. Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
(CQUIN) Guidance for 2015/16. [Online] Available: 
292 
 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/9-cquin-guid-
2015-16.pdf [Accessed 1
st
 September 2015] 
NHS ENGLAND. 2015b. Enhanced Service Specification Facilitating 
timely diagnosis and support for people with dementia 2015/16 [Online] 
http://www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/wp-
content/uploads/sites/12/2015/03/facilitate-tmly-diag-dementia.pdf 
[Accessed June 2015] 
NHS IMPROVING QUALITY. 2015. Commissioning for Quality and 
Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework. [Online] Available: 
http://www.institute.nhs.uk/commissioning/pct_portal/cquin.html [Accessed 
1st September 2015] 
NIEUWENHUIS-MARK, R. E. 2010. The Death Knoll for the MMSE: Has 
It Outlived Its Purpose? Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 23, 151-157. 
NOVAS, C. & ROSE, N. 2000. Genetic risk and the birth of the somatic 
individual. Economy and society, 29, 485-513. 
NUNOMURA, A., CASTELLANI, R. J., ZHU, X., MOREIRA, P. I., 
PERRY, G. & SMITH, M. A. 2006. Involvement of oxidative stress in 
Alzheimer disease. Journal of Neuropathology & Experimental Neurology, 
65, 631-641. 
ORLIKOWSKI, W. J. 2007. Sociomaterial practices: Exploring technology 
at work. Organization studies, 28, 1435-1448. 
OVRETVEIT, J. 1993. Co-ordinating community care: multidisciplinary 
teams and care management, McGraw-Hill Education (UK). 
OXFORD MEDICAL DICTIONARY. 2009. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
PARKER, C. & PHILP, I. 2004. Screening for cognitive impairment among 
older people in black and minority ethnic groups. Age and ageing, 33, 447-
452. 
PETERS, K. R. & KATZ, S. 2015. Voices from the field: Expert reflections 
on mild cognitive impairment. Dementia, 14, 285-297. 
PINCH, T. 2010. The invisible technologies of Goffman's sociology from 
the merry-go-round to the internet. Technology and culture, 51, 409-424. 
PINDER, R., PETCHEY, R., SHAW, S. & CARTER, Y. 2005. What's in a 
care pathway? Towards a cultural cartography of the new NHS. Sociology 
of health & illness, 27, 759-779. 
PINNER, G. 2000. Truth-telling and the diagnosis of dementia. The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 176, 514-515. 
293 
 
PORTER, T. M. 1996. Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objectivity in 
science and public life, Princeton University Press. 
POST, S. G. 1995. The Moral Challenge of Alzheimer’s Disease, Baltimore, 
John Hopkins University Press. 
POWER, M. 2004. The risk management of everything: Rethinking the 
politics of uncertainty, Demos. 
RAFFERTY, A. M. 1996. The politics of nursing knowledge, Psychology 
Press. 
RAJAH, M., BASTIANETTO, S., BROMLEY-BRITS, K., COOLS, R., 
D’ESPOSITO, M., GRADY, C., POIRIER, J., QUIRION, R., RAZ, N. & 
ROGAEVA, E. 2009. Biological changes associated with healthy versus 
pathological aging: A symposium review. Ageing research reviews, 8, 140-
146. 
RANDOLPH, C. 1998. Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of 
Neuropsychological Status (RBANS), Psychological Corporation San 
Antonio. 
REED, K. 2007. Bureaucracy and beyond: The impact of ethics and 
governance procedures on health research in the social sciences. 
Sociological Research Online, 12, 18. 
RICHARDSON, S. & MCMULLAN, M. 2007. Research Ethics in the UK: 
What can sociology learn from health? Sociology, 41, 1115-1132. 
RITCHIE, K. & LOVESTONE, S. 2002. The dementias. The Lancet, 360, 
1759-1766. 
ROBINSON, L., TANG, E. & TAYLOR, J.-P. 2015. Dementia: timely 
diagnosis and early intervention. 
ROSE, N. 1998. Governing risky individuals: The role of psychiatry in new 
regimes of control. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 5, 177-195. 
ROSE, N. 2001. The politics of life itself. Theory, culture & society, 18, 1-
30. 
ROSE, N. 2007a. Beyond medicalisation. The Lancet, 369, 700-702. 
ROSE, N. 2007b. The politics of life itself: Biomedicine, power, and 
subjectivity in the twenty-first century, Princeton University Press. 
ROSE, N. 2009. Normality and pathology in a biomedical age. The 
sociological review, 57, 66-83. 
ROSENBERG, C. 2009. Managed fear. The Lancet, 373, 802-803. 
ROSENBERG, C. E. 2002. The tyranny of diagnosis: specific entities and 
individual experience. Milbank Quarterly, 80, 237-260. 
294 
 
ROSENBERG, C. E. 2003. What Is Disease?: In Memory of Owsei Temkin. 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 77, 491-505. 
ROSENBERG, C. E. 2006. Contested boundaries: psychiatry, disease, and 
diagnosis. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 49, 407-424. 
ROSES, A. D. 2006. On the discovery of the genetic association of 
Apolipoprotein E genotypes and common late-onset Alzheimer disease. 
Journal of Alzheimer's Disease, 9, 361-366. 
ROWE, J. W. & KAHN, R. L. 1997. Successful aging. The gerontologist, 
37, 433-440. 
ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS. 2015. What is the Memory 
Services National Accreditation Programme? [Online] Available: 
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/quality/qualityandaccreditation/memoryservices/
memoryservicesaccreditation.aspx Accessed [October 2015] 
SAFERSTEIN, B. 1992. Collective cognition and collaborative work: the 
effects of cognitive and communicative processes on the organization of 
television production. Discourse & Society, 3, 61-86. 
SANDERS, T. & HARRISON, S. 2008. Professional legitimacy claims in 
the multidisciplinary workplace: the case of heart failure care. Sociology of 
Health & Illness, 30, 289-308. 
SCHWAIGER, L. 2006. To be forever young?: Towards reframing 
corporeal subjectivity in maturity. International Journal of Ageing and 
Later Life, 1, 11-41. 
SCOTT, S. 2009. Making sense of everyday life, Polity. 
SEIDEL, J. 1991. Method and madness in the application of computer 
technology to qualitative data analysis. Using computers in qualitative 
research, 107-116. 
SELIN, C. 2008. The sociology of the future: tracing stories of technology 
and time. Sociology Compass, 2, 1878-1895. 
SHAW, S., BOYNTON, P. M. & GREENHALGH, T. 2005. Research 
governance: where did it come from, what does it mean? Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine, 98, 496-502. 
SHERRATT, C., SOTERIOU, T. & EVANS, S. 2007. Ethical issues in 
social research involving people with dementia. Dementia, 6, 463-479. 
SPRADLEY, J. P. 1980. Participant Observation, Orlando, FL, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich. 
STREET, A. & COLEMAN, S. 2012. Introduction Real and Imagined 
Spaces. Space and Culture, 15, 4-17. 
295 
 
STRONG, P. M. 1979. The ceremonial order of the clinic: parents, doctors, 
and medical bureaucracies, Taylor & Francis. 
THORNE, S. 2000. Data analysis in qualitative research. Evidence Based 
Nursing, 3, 68-70. 
TIMMERMANS, S. & BERG, M. 1997. Standardization in Action: 
Achieving Local Universality through Medical Protocols. Social Studies of 
Science, 27, 273-305. 
TIMMERMANS, S. & BERG, M. 2003. The practice of medical technology. 
Sociology of health & illness, 25, 97-114. 
TIMMERMANS, S. & BUCHBINDER, M. 2012. Expanded newborn 
screening: articulating the ontology of diseases with bridging work in the 
clinic. Sociology of Health & Illness, 34, 208-220. 
TIMMERMANS, S. & MAUCK, A. 2005. The promises and pitfalls of 
evidence-based medicine. Health Affairs, 24, 18-28. 
TOMBAUGH, T. N. & MCINTYRE, N. J. 1992. The mini-mental state 
examination: a comprehensive review. Journal of the American Geriatrics 
Society. 
TORRES, S. & HAMMERSTRÖM, G. (2006) ‘To age well is not to age at 
all: elderly peoples’ notions of successful aging.’ Paper presented at the 
59th Annual Scientific meeting of the gerontological society of America, 
Nov 16-20 in Dallas, Texas, USA. 
TWIGG, J. 2006. The body in health and social care, Palgrave Macmillan. 
TWIGG, J. 2010. Clothing and dementia: A neglected dimension? Journal 
of Aging Studies, 24, 223-230. 
TWIGG, J. & BUSE, C. E. 2013. Dress, dementia and the embodiment of 
identity. Dementia, 12, 326-336. 
UCHIHARA, T. 2007. Silver diagnosis in neuropathology: principles, 
practice and revised interpretation. Acta Neuropathologica, 113, 483-499. 
UK NATIONAL SCREENING COMMITTEE. 2013. What is screening? 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.screening.nhs.uk/cms.php?folder=2436#fileid7942 [Accessed 
13
th
 June 2013] 
 
UK NATIONAL SCREENING COMMITTEE. 2015. The UK NSC 
recommendation on Screening for Dementia. [Online] 
http://legacy.screening.nhs.uk/dementia [Accessed April 2015] 
ULRICH, B. 1992. Risk society: towards a new modernity. On the Logic of 
Wealth Distribution and Risk Distribution, 19-50. 
296 
 
VAN HEUR, B., LEYDESDORFF, L. & WYATT, S. 2012. Turning to 
ontology in STS? Turning to STS through ‘ontology’. Social Studies of 
Science, 0306312712458144. 
WALFORD, G. 2009. The practice of writing ethnographic fieldnotes. 
Ethnography and Education 4(2), pp. 117–130. 
WATABE-RUDOLPH, M., SONG, Z., LAUSSER, L., SCHNACK, C., 
BEGUS-NAHRMANN, Y., SCHEITHAUER, M.-O., RETTINGER, G., 
OTTO, M., TUMANI, H. & THAL, D. 2012. Chitinase enzyme activity in 
CSF is a powerful biomarker of Alzheimer disease. Neurology, 78, 569-577. 
WEBSTER, A. 2002. Innovative health technologies and the social: 
Redefining health, medicine and the body. Current sociology, 50, 443-457. 
WHITEHOUSE, P. 2002. Letter to Lancet ‘Classifications of the dementias’, 
commentary on ‘The Dementias’ article by Richies and Lovestone. Lancet, 
360, 1759-66. 
WHITEHOUSE, P., FRISONI, B. G. & POST, S. 2004. Breaking the 
diagnosis of dementia. The Lancet Neurology, 3, 124-128. 
WHITEHOUSE, P. J. & MOODY, H. R. 2006. Mild cognitive impairment 
A ‘hardening of the categories’? Dementia, 5, 11-25. 
WIGG, J. M. 2010. Liberating the wanderers: using technology to unlock 
doors for those living with dementia. Sociology of health & illness, 32, 288-
303. 
WILKINSON, H. 2002. The Perspectives of People with Dementia: 
Research Methods and Motivations, London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers 
Ltd. 
WILLIAMS, S. J., MARTIN, P. & GABE, J. 2011. The 
pharmaceuticalisation of society? A framework for analysis. Sociology of 
Health & Illness, 33, 710-725. 
WILSON, J. & JUNGNER, G. 1968. Principles and practice of screening. 
WHO: Geneva. 
WIND, G. 2008. Negotiated interactive observation: Doing fieldwork in 
hospital settings. Anthropology and Medicine, 15, 79-89. 
WOLCOTT, H. F. 1990. Making a study “more ethnographic”. Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography, 19, 44-72. 
WOOLGAR, S. & LEZAUN, J. 2013. The wrong bin bag: A turn to 
ontology in science and technology studies? Social Studies of Science, 43, 
321-340. 
WOOLGAR, S. & NEYLAND, D. 2013. Mundane Governance: ontology 
and accountability, Oxford University Press. 
297 
 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION. 2015. Dementia Fact Sheet. [Online] 
Available: WHO http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs362/en/ 
[Accessed April 2015] 
ZEILIG, H. 2013. Dementia as a cultural metaphor. The Gerontologist, 
gns203. 
ZETTERBERG, H. 2011. New diagnostic criteria for Alzheimer's disease. 
Biomarkers in Medicine, 5, 407-409. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
298 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
299 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Summary of Assessment Tools Available 
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Source: Helping you to assess cognition: A practical toolkit for clinicians pp. 16-
17 (see Alzheimer’s Society, 2015b).  
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Appendix B: Information Sheet for NHS Staff (Observation and 
Interview) 
 
Participant Information Sheet (NHS Staff Observation and Interview)  
 
Study Title: Screening for Cognitive Function in Clinical Practice 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before deciding 
whether you would like to participate, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being carried out and what it involves. This sheet 
outlines the purpose and implications of the study and provides more 
detailed information about its conduct. I am willing to answer anything 
which is unclear or needs clarification. Please take time to decide whether 
you want to participate. You will be able to keep this sheet and a signed 
consent form. If you would like to participate, please contact me by 
telephone, by email, by letter, or in person. Thank you for reading this. 
 
This is not a clinical study. The purpose of this study is to explore the use 
of instruments for screening cognitive function across healthcare practice. 
Specifically, the objectives are to explore the use in practice of instruments 
for screening cognitive function by clinicians in aiding a diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s disease; better understanding the disease and loss of cognitive 
function; considering the implications of the tests and their results for 
patient care, healthcare service delivery and overall clinical practice.  
 
I would like your consent to be present as a researcher in the clinic or 
hospital ward as part of your medical team. If you agree, I would like your 
consent to observe staff team meetings and/or the use in practice of these 
instruments in out-patient clinics, acute medical services in hospital or joint 
elderly assessment services in hospital. Observing staff team meetings 
involves the researcher being present whilst the results of screening tests 
will be discussed. This will be only one aspect of the meeting and anything 
discussed which is not relevant to the research will not be noted. Observing 
clinical practices of cognitive screening processes involves the researcher 
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being present during consultations where instruments for screening 
cognitive function will be used with patients who have not had a formal 
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. I will not be providing nor interfering 
with prevention, diagnosis, or treatment. These events will not be audio-
recorded, but notes will be taken. You will have to provide informed 
consent for each stage; the presence of the researcher in the clinic as part of 
your medical team; observation of team meetings; observation of 
consultation and interview. You can withdraw from the study at any time 
without explanation, and information which might identify you will be 
removed as far as possible.  
 
After this, you may be approached for an interview which will last between 
30 minutes and 1 hour.  If you agree, your interview will be audio-recorded 
for transcription purposes. You will have to provide informed consent, 
information which might identify you will be removed as far as possible, 
and you can withdraw from the interview at any  
time without explanation. When the research study stops, you will receive a 
summary of the study’s findings on request so you can check that where you 
are quoted, it is both accurate and anonymous. The data collected will be 
published in a PhD thesis approved by the University of Leeds and 
potentially through academic publications such as books, book chapters, and 
peer-reviewed journal articles.  
 
All information collected during the study will be kept strictly 
confidential. The research location and identities of everyone taking 
part in the study will be subjected to anonymisation. Any information 
which may identify you will be removed. Electronic or manual data 
collected (audio recordings, transcripts, typed-up field notes) will be 
either stored in a locked filing cabinet on the University of Leeds 
security-controlled premises or on an encrypted, password-protected 
USB device, both of which will only be accessible by the researcher. 
Audio recordings and manual copies of field notes will be destroyed 
after use in accordance with the University of Leeds regulations. A 
manual copy of your contact details will be kept in case you need to be 
303 
 
contacted for a second interview and so you can receive a copy of the 
study’s findings, but these will be shredded after the PhD thesis is 
completed. Please note that you have the right to check the accuracy of 
data held.  
 
The project has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the 
Yorkshire & The Humber - Leeds West Research Ethics Committee and is 
being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).  
 
If you would like to request more information about the study or register an 
interest in participating, please contact me using the details provided below: 
 
Julia Swallow 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
0113 343 0112 
J.E.Swallow@leeds.ac.uk 
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Appendix C: Information Sheet for NHS Staff (Interview) 
 
Participant Information Sheet (NHS Staff) – Interview 
 
Study Title: Screening for Cognitive Function in Clinical Practice 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before deciding 
whether you would like to participate, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being carried out and what it involves. This sheet 
outlines the purpose and implications of the study and provides more 
detailed information about its conduct. I am willing to answer anything 
which is unclear or needs clarification. Please take time to decide whether 
you want to participate. You will be able to keep this sheet and a signed 
consent form. If you would like to participate, please contact me by 
telephone, by email, by letter, or in person. Thank you for reading this. 
 
This is not a clinical study. The purpose of this study is to explore the use 
of instruments for screening cognitive function across healthcare practice. 
Specifically, the objectives are to explore the use in practice of instruments 
for screening cognitive function by clinicians in aiding a diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s disease; better understanding the disease and loss of cognitive; 
considering the implications of the tests and their results for patient care, 
healthcare service delivery and overall clinical practice. One aspect of this 
will be to explore the implementation of the Dementia Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation Framework (Dementia CQUIN), using the 
Abbreviated Mental Test (AMT) dictates healthcare service delivery and 
patient care for NHS trusts.  
 
Your Role in the Project 
 
You have been approached as a participant in this project owing to your 
work as an information manager. As an information manger analysing, 
interpreting and presenting health data and information relating to the 
implementation of the Dementia CQUIN, you have the expertise to provide 
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insight into how this data is used to dictate resource management and 
healthcare service delivery.  
 
The Content of the Interview 
 
What you are being asked to consent to is an informal interview where you 
will be asked about your work as an information manager. Broadly, the 
interview will cover your reflections on how the Dementia CQUIN is 
implemented to allow retrieval of data; your professional relationship with 
clinicians who implement the CQUIN in practice using the AMT; your 
reflections on the role of the Dementia CQUIN in managing resources and 
healthcare service delivery in the Trust, and your reflections on the efficacy 
of the framework overall. Please feel free to elaborate on any answer or area 
which you think is particularly relevant or important. The interview will 
take approximately thirty-sixty minutes and will be recorded on an 
audiotape and later transcribed for analysis.   
 
If you agree, your interview will be audio-recorded for transcription 
purposes. You will have to provide informed consent, information which 
might identify you will be removed as far as possible, and you can withdraw 
from the interview at any time without explanation. When the research 
study stops, you will receive a summary of the study’s findings on request 
so you can check that where you are quoted, it is both accurate and 
anonymous. The data collected will be published in a PhD thesis approved 
by the University of Leeds and potentially through academic publications 
such as books, book chapters, and peer-reviewed journal articles.  
 
All information collected during the study will be kept strictly 
confidential. The research location and identities of everyone taking 
part in the study will be subjected to anonymisation. Any information, 
which may identify you will be removed. Electronic or manual data 
collected (audio recordings, transcripts, typed-up field notes) will be 
either stored in a locked filing cabinet on the University of Leeds 
security-controlled premises or on an encrypted, password-protected 
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USB device, both of which will only be accessible by the researcher. 
Audio recordings and manual copies of field notes will be destroyed 
after use in accordance with the University of Leeds regulations. A 
manual copy of your contact details will be kept in case you need to be 
contacted for a second interview and so you can receive a copy of the 
study’s findings, but these will be shredded after the PhD thesis is 
completed. Please note that you have the right to check the accuracy of 
data held.  
 
The project has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the 
Yorkshire & The Humber - Leeds West Research Ethics Committee and is 
being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).  
 
If you would like to request more information about the study or register an 
interest in participating, please contact me using the details provided below: 
 
Julia Swallow 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
07896 815 788 J.E.Swallow@leeds.ac.uk 
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Appendix D: Information Sheet for Relative and/or Carer 
 
Information for Patients’ Relatives and/or Carer 
 
What is the aim of the project? 
 
This research is for a PhD at the University of Leeds, which is looking at 
how memory is assessed in clinical practice. The observer wants to look at 
how this is accomplished in patient appointments. 
 
Why have you been asked? 
 
You have been asked and invited by the researcher because you are a 
relative and/or carer of a patient who has been identified by their healthcare 
practitioner as someone appropriate to the project and you may be 
accompanying them. You will be given time to read and think about 
whether you would like the researcher present during the appointment.  
 
The observations 
 
The observer will take notes and will not participate in the session. She will 
not have access to your relative’s clinical records and they will not be 
identified; the term ‘patient’ will be used in notes 
 
Observations will last for the duration of the patient appointment. The 
observer will not in any sense be judging the practices she is observing, but 
in the unlikely event that unsafe practice is brought to her attention she will 
follow appropriate Codes of Practice.  
 
What will you and your relative/ individual you are caring for have to 
do? 
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He or she, and if you are accompanying, will attend the appointment or be 
present at the time of consultation as normal. You will be asked to sign a 
form indicating your consent to the observation.  
 
Can they decline or withdraw from the observation? 
 
You or your relative/individual you are caring for can refuse to have the 
observer at the appointment and they or you can ask her to leave at any 
point during it with no disadvantage to yourself or to the patient.  
 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of 
it? 
 
The data is being collected for the PhD and only the observer and her 
supervisor will have access to the information. 
 
The results of the project, including direct quotations may be used in the 
PhD thesis and may be published in journals but individuals will not be 
identifiable. 
 
What if I have any questions? 
 
If you have any questions about the project, either now or in the future, 
please feel free to contact: 
 
Observer: Julia Swallow School of Sociology and Social Policy University 
of Leeds J.E.Swallow@leeds.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Anne Kerr School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Leeds e.a.kerr@leeds.ac.uk 
 
The project has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the 
Yorkshire & The Humber - Leeds West Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this sheet  
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Appendix E: Information Sheet for Patients 
 
Information for Patients  
 
What is the aim of the project? 
 
This research is for a PhD at the University of Leeds, which is looking at 
how healthcare professionals assess memory. The observer wants to look at 
how this is accomplished in patient appointments.  
 
Why have you been asked? 
 
You are being invited to participate because your healthcare practitioner has 
identified you as someone appropriate to the project. You will be given time 
to read and think about whether you would like to take part.  
 
The observations 
 
The observer will take notes and will not participate in the session. She will 
not have access to your clinical records and you will not be identified; the 
term ‘patient’ will be used in notes. 
 
Observations will last for the duration of the patient appointment. The 
observer will not in any sense be judging the practices she is observing, but 
in the unlikely event that unsafe practice is brought to her attention she will 
follow appropriate Codes of Practice.  
 
What will you have to do? 
 
Participate in the appointment as you would normally. You will be asked to 
sign a form indicating your consent to the observation. 
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Can I decline or withdraw from the observation? 
 
You can refuse to have the observer present during your appointment and 
you can ask her to leave at any point during it with no disadvantage to 
yourself. 
 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of 
it? 
 
The data is being collected for the PhD and only the observer and her 
supervisor will have access to the information. 
 
The results of the project, including direct quotations may be used in the 
PhD thesis and may be published in journals but individuals will not be 
identifiable.  
 
What if I have any questions? 
 
If you have any questions about the project, either now or in the future, 
please feel free to contact: 
 
Observer: Julia Swallow School of Sociology and Social Policy University 
of Leeds J.E.Swallow@leeds.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Professor Anne Kerr School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Leeds e.a.kerr@leeds.ac.uk 
 
The project has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the 
Yorkshire & The Humber - Leeds West Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this sheet 
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Appendix F: Consent Form for NHS Staff (Observation of 
Consultation) 
 
Consent Form – Observation of Consultation (NHS Staff) 
 
Study Title: Screening for Cognitive Function in Clinical Practice 
Name of Researcher: Julia Swallow       
Please initial box 
 
  
1. I have read and understood the information sheet Version 2.0 for the 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions, and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to  
withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  
 
3. I agree to participate in a later interview, if this is necessary, which 
will be audio-recorded and will be anonymised.  
 
4. I acknowledge that my data may be used in the PhD thesis and 
academic/other publications but any data used will be made 
anonymous.  
 
5. I consent to the researcher being present and taking notes during 
consultations where instruments for screening cognitive function 
will be used to assess patients’ memory NB: this will also require 
consent from the patient(s).  
 
6. I acknowledge that I can request a summary of the study and its 
findings.  
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I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
 
Name of Person Taking  Date   Signature 
Consent 
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Appendix G: Consent Form for NHS Staff (Observation MDT) 
 
Consent Form – Observation of Team Meetings (NHS Staff) 
 
Study Title: Screening for Cognitive Function in Clinical Practice 
Name of Researcher: Julia Swallow 
       Please initial box 
  
1. I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated……………… (Version 2.0) for the above study. I have had 
the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions, and have 
had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to  
withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  
 
3. I acknowledge that my data may be used in the PhD thesis and  
academic/other publications but any data used will be made 
anonymous. 
 
4. I consent to the researcher being present and taking notes during 
staff team meetings where clinical professionals will discuss the 
results of screening tests NB: Patients’ personal or clinical 
information will not be noted by the researcher.  
 
5. I acknowledge that I can request a summary of the study and its 
findings.  
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
 
 
Name of Person Taking  Date   Signature 
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Appendix H: Consent Form for NHS Staff (Interview) 
 
Consent Form for Participants (NHS Staff) – Interviews  
 
Study Title: Screening for Cognitive Function in Clinical Practice 
Name of Researcher: Julia Swallow 
       Please initial box 
 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet Version 2.0 for the 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions, and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
2. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary.  
 
3. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time  
without any disadvantage. 
 
4. There are no foreseeable risks or harm associated with  
participation in this project. 
 
5. The results of the project may be published but every attempt  
will be made to preserve my anonymity. 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
 
Name of Person Taking consent Date   Signature 
 
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher (original). 
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Appendix I: Consent Form for Relative and/or Carer 
 
Consent Form for Family Member and/or Carer 
 
Study Title: Exploring how Memory is tested in Clinical Practice  
Name of Researcher: Julia Swallow 
       Please initial box 
    
1. I have read and understood the information sheet Version 2.0 for the 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions, and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
2. I consent to the researcher sitting in and taking notes during the medical 
appointment. Consent will also be taken from the patient and healthcare 
professional. 
 
3. I understand that my consent is voluntary.  
 
4. I can withdraw this consent at any point during the consultation and it 
will not affect the medical care of the patient. 
 
5. I understand that the researcher will be taking notes during the 
observation on the actions of the patient and professional but there will 
be no data collected on my actions as the carer/family member. 
 
I agree to take part in the above study 
 
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
 
Name of Person Taking consent Date   Signature 
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Appendix J: Consent Form for Patients 
 
Consent for Participants (Patients) 
 
Study Title: Exploring how Memory is tested in Clinical Practice  
Name of Researcher: Julia Swallow 
        Please initial box  
 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet Version 2.0 for the 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions, and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my medical 
care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that I am free to ask the researcher to leave the 
appointment at any time without giving any reason, without my 
medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
4. I understand that the relevant sections of my medical notes and data 
collected during the study may be looked at by individuals from 
regulatory authorities or from the NHS trust, where it is relevant to 
my taking part in this research. I give permission for these 
individuals to have access to my records. 
 
5. I acknowledge that my data may be used in the PhD thesis and 
academic/other publications but any data used will be made 
anonymous. 
 
6. I consent to the researcher sitting in and taking notes during the 
medical appointment. Consent will also be taken from the healthcare 
professional. 
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7. I acknowledge that I can ask for a summary of the study and its 
findings.  
 
I agree to take part in the above study 
 
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
 
Name of Person Taking   Date   Signature 
Consent 
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Appendix K: Interview Schedule for Clinical Professionals 
(memory service) 
 
Interview Schedule Memory Clinics 
 
General Information 
 
Practice Background 
 How long have you been working as [insert profession]? 
 How long have you been part of the department here? 
 
Daily Role: 
 Could you talk me through your main responsibilities and tasks? 
 
Professional Practice – Individual Consultations 
 
These questions are focused on your individual use of instruments for 
screening cognitive function in practice. 
 
Referrals  
 Could you talk me through how patients are referred to you for 
assessment? 
 Where are the majority of patients referred from? 
 
Consultation  
 Could you talk me through the types of instruments you routinely 
use to assess cognitive function? 
 Do they each have a specific purpose?  
- If so, what is the purpose of each tool? 
- How do you decide to use which tool with patients and why?  
 How much attention do you pay to loss of memory? 
 
319 
 
 Could you talk me through what other kinds of assessments you 
perform with the patient in the consultation? 
- Is this standardized for each patient?  
 At what point during the consultation do you administer these 
instruments for screening cognitive function with patients?  
 
 Could you talk me through what happens during the remainder of the 
consultation when the patient has completed the cognitive 
assessment test? 
 At what point do you consider further diagnostic testing is required? 
 Is this based purely on the patient’s performance on the test? 
 Could you talk me through what kinds of further diagnostic testing 
may be used and why?  
 
 Could you talk me through a scenario where a patient has scored 
positively on the cognitive assessment test?  
- What happens next? 
 Could you talk me through a scenario where a patient has scored 
negatively on a cognitive assessment test?  
- What happens next? 
 
 Could you reflect on how important your clinical judgment is when 
using these tests with patients? 
 Could you talk me through the possibility that false positive, false-
negative results may occur in the consultation?  
- How could you overcome this? 
 
The Instruments in Practice and AD 
 
I would now like to discuss your approach towards these instruments and 
the outcome of these instruments for practice, patients and understanding 
AD. 
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 Could you briefly talk me through the history of the use of these 
instruments in clinical practice generally? 
 How much do you value these screening tools as indicators of 
pathological cognitive decline? 
 How important do you think they are in detecting cognitive decline 
in your area of healthcare?  
 Do you think these instruments impact on a broader understanding 
of cognitive impairment associated with diseases such as 
Alzheimer’s disease? 
- If so, could you talk me through this? 
- If not, could you talk me through what you think the overall 
purpose of these instruments is in clinical practice? 
 
 Could you reflect on whether your use of these instruments has 
altered since you have been practicing? 
- If so, could you please talk me through what is different 
about your previous use of these tests and how you practice 
them now? 
- Why do you think this is? 
- If not, could you please talk me through how your use of 
these tests has remained the same? 
-  
 Could you reflect on whether you think these instruments are used 
similarly across healthcare practice? 
- If so, what do you think leads to this similarity in practice?  
- If not, what do you think influences clinicians to use these 
tests in certain ways?  
- Do you think that the different ways in which clinicians 
administer these tests impacts further diagnostic testing? 
 
 Has the uptake of these tests by clinicians in your area of practice 
altered in the time you have been practicing?  
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- If so, could you talk me through the extent to which 
clinicians used these tests when you first started practicing 
compared to now? 
- If not, could you reflect on why you think their use by 
clinicians has not changed since you started practicing? 
 
 Do you think that the way you use these tests in consultations will 
differ between settings and clinicians? 
- If so, could you talk me through how you think their use may 
differ from hospitals to memory clinics to out-patient clinics? 
- If not, do you think their standardized use is valuable to 
clinical practice in terms of diagnosis, patient care and 
treatment? 
 
 Could you talk me through what happens to the results of these 
tests? 
 Could you talk me through how the results from the tests determine 
further diagnostic testing, patient care, treatment and wider 
healthcare service delivery? 
 Could you please outline what you consider to be ‘normal’ ageing 
processes?  
 Do the results from these tests influence your understanding of 
Alzheimer’s disease? 
- If so, could you outline exactly how your understanding of 
the disease changes in accordance with the use of these tests? 
- If not, could you outline to what extent you think the purpose 
of these tests is to navigate the difficulties in conceptualizing 
Alzheimer’s disease? 
 
 How important do you think these tests are in determining healthcare 
service delivery, patient care and treatment? 
 Could you please talk me through how these tests are used to 
determine pharmacological treatment for AD? 
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Focus on early screening and diagnosis in relation to an ‘ageing 
population’ 
 
I would now like to move onto discuss the recent attention in both policy 
and practice on the early identification of AD in accordance with what is 
being projected as an ‘ageing population’. 
 
 What does the concept of an ‘ageing population’ mean to you as a 
practicing [insert profession]? 
 What do you think the consequences of an ageing population are for 
patients and your profession? 
 Do you think the ways in which you practice and use these 
instruments has altered in accordance with this focus on an ‘ageing 
population’?  
- If so, could you talk me through how your practicing of these 
tests has changed? 
- If not, do you think this idea of an ‘ageing population’ has 
yet to feed into what happens in consultations? 
 
 Do you think your perception of cognitive impairment has altered 
with the increased focus on the ageing population and early 
detection of Alzheimer’s disease? 
 Can you reflect on the incorporation of Mild Cognitive Impairment 
as a diagnostic criterion in relation to your administration of these 
tests?  
 Has this label affected your understanding of cognitive impairment? 
 Do you think it is a useful label in determining normal from 
pathological cognitive impairment?  
- If so, could you talk me through how and why? 
- If not, could you talk me through why this label may not be 
helpful? 
 Could you please reflect on whether Mild Cognitive Impairment has 
impacted your administration of these tests? 
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Implementation of the National Dementia CQUIN- Memory Clinic/Out-
Patient Staff 
 
 Are there any patients who attend your clinics who have been 
referred to you from the implementation of the National Dementia 
CQUIN in hospital?  
 If so, approximately what percentage? 
 Could you reflect on what you think about a standardized screening 
programme using instruments for screening cognitive function? 
 Do you think these instruments should be used to screen for initial 
cognitive decline? 
 Could you reflect on whether you think the National Dementia 
CQUIN may impact your use of these instruments? 
- If so, could you talk me through what you think this impact 
may be? 
 
Implementation of the National Dementia CQUIN- Hospital Staff 
 
 Could you reflect on whether your use of these instruments has 
altered in accordance with the implementation of the Dementia 
CQUIN? 
 What do you think the impact of the CQUIN has had on diagnosis 
rates? 
 Do you consider the Abbreviated Mental Test to be valuable in the 
process of screening for initial cognitive decline? 
 Could you reflect on what you think about a standardized screening 
programme using instruments for screening cognitive function? 
 Do you think neuropsychological instruments should be used to 
screen for initial cognitive decline? 
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Inter-Professional Communication/Collaboration 
 
 How much communication is there between different professionals 
using these instruments? 
 Has this altered at all since you have been practicing? 
 Are the results of these tests discussed routinely with fellow 
practitioners?  
 What do you think the impact of this may be for a patient’s 
diagnosis, care and treatment?  
 How important do you consider inter-professional 
communication/collaboration is in relation to the use of these 
instruments?  
- Who is it important for and why? 
 
Changing landscape of screening, diagnosis and intervention 
 
 Do you think that current focus in policy on early assessment has 
altered the way you use these instruments? 
 Could you reflect on what you think of the increased focus in policy 
on identifying AD in its earliest stages? 
 Do you think instruments for screening cognitive function have an 
important role to play here? 
 Could you talk me through what you understand as biomarker 
technologies in detecting early signs of Alzheimer’s disease? 
 What do you think the future of instruments for screening cognitive 
function is in relation to other medical technologies such as 
biomarkers? 
 Could you reflect on how you think these instruments may be valued 
by clinicians if biomarkers technologies become routine practice? 
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Closing 
 
 Is there anyone in particular you think would be useful for me to 
interview? 
 Are there any other comments you would like to make regards your 
use of these instruments which we have not already covered? 
 Are there any comments or questions you would like to ask about 
the research? 
 
End 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
326 
 
 
 
 
 
